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ABSTRACT
This thesis sets out to examine contemporary organisational restructuring. In 
particular it documents and examines the role of engineers and systems analysts in 
designing and delivering new technologies and work systems.
On the basis of fieldwork observations and detailed cross sectoral interviewing of 
over three hundred personnel in over sixty organisations, the thesis documents the 
kind of restructuring that is taking place and who is involved in the process. Whilst 
examining the role of trade unions, management and engineers within this process of 
restructuring the key focus is systems analysts - who hitherto, have remained a 
largely uncharted and under-researched group of workers. Through fieldwork, 
interviews and literature reviews the thesis highlights who systems analysts are and 
what is involved in the process of systems analysis and design.
The thesis, First, documents and offers a critical assessment of the process of 
business restructuring and some of the key attempts to theorise this process. 
Second, it documents and examines a series of methods, values and techniques 
which constitute a design culture, or referral point, from which engineers and 
analysts interpret what is in the organisations interest, make sense of their own 
work, pass judgement on their designs and assess their relationships to others 
involved in the design process. Third, through an analysis of the tools and 
techniques used for systems analysis and design the thesis demonstrates that there is 
a profound contradiction between, on the one hand, attempts to develop tools and
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techniques to more accurately embody the social in the technical and, on the other 
hand, the influence which prevailing property relations and configurations of power 
have on the tools and techniques used in systems design. This influence is manifest 
in the continued existence of a software bottleneck and in system failure and user 
dissatisfaction. Fourth, the thesis highlights the nature of union involvement in the 
design process and demonstrates some of the key issues and concerns unions face in 
the 1990s. Finally, the thesis assesses a number of key attempts to analyse the class 
position of' intermediate strata' and demonstrates, on the basis of fieldwork studies 
and interviews the class position of engineers and systems analysts and how this 
influences the types of technologies and systems these groups design.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the broad process of organisational restructuring and 
documents the role of systems analysts within this process. The rationale behind the 
research is that systems analysts constitute a largely uncharted group of workers and 
yet are central to the design and implementation of new information technology 
based work systems which organisations are introducing.
From the outset it was apparent that to build up an accurate picture of change and 
the role of analysts within it that not only would I need to deploy a methodology 
that enabled me to interview and observe analysts at work but one which also 
enabled cross sectoral analysis. This would allow me to capture the diversity of 
organisations systems analysts worked in from heavy engineering and manufacturing 
through to the financial services sector and public organisations. Further, the data 
gathering needed to be reflexive so that I could check and cross check my findings 
with informants in light of new data gathered and thus progress in both theoretical 
and empirical terms. Consequently, I examine a number of key groups and parties 
involved in the process of design and restructuring, namely trade unions, 
management, management and information technology consultants, systems 
analysts, systems managers and engineers. The rationale behind my focus on each of 
these groups is explained fully in the methods appendix. My concern was to build up 
a broad picture of the process of change and at the same time to cross refer
accounts of this change. Focus on these groups facilitated this and gave me a 
detailed and rich picture of change and the role of various parties involved.
This thesis is based on extensive fieldwork and is reflexive in character. I did not 
enter the research with a particular idea or problematic. Rather, there were several 
ideas and problematics which were tested in the field and evaluated. Several theses 
emerged, the most important of which became my central thesis: that the culture, 
practices, values and methods of engineers and systems analysts demonstrates the 
ways in which engineers and systems analysts rationalise their designs and design 
activity and interpret what is ' best' for organisations. The thesis demonstrates that 
not only do engineers and systems analysts exercise degrees of autonomy over the 
systems that get built but that they actively interpret, via a distinctive design culture, 
just what constitutes 'capital's interest' and good or bad systems design.
The thesis is divided into six chapters in which I incorporate the findings of my 
fieldwork as they affect and implicate each of the groups I am concerned with. I 
have tried to maintain a balance in the chapters between my own empirical fieldwork 
data and the broader theoretical debates which are presented and discussed. My 
findings are used to assess the merits and weaknesses of these broader debates.
In Chapter One I demonstrate that much of the theoretical debate on information 
technology and the restructuring of work, with its emphasis on sweeping paradigm 
changes in manufacturing, business and broader society, is deterministic, ideological 
and out of touch with the changes I encountered in my research. My research
indicates a far more incremental and contingent process and suggests that far from 
there being a sweeping transformation in the mode and methods of producing goods 
and services, rather, different organisational strategies reflect specific local 
contingencies, for example, type of product, nature of market, market position, or 
local industrial relations and labour market conditions etc. I demonstrate through my 
fieldwork data and through an evaluation of several key theories of manufacturing 
and organisational change that the rationale behind the introduction of new working 
practices and organisational cultures can be theorised differently. Rather than being 
the harbinger of a new age of organisation these practices are historically 
contingent, a reflection of key features of the contemporary historical conjuncture 
and balance of class forces.
In Chapter Two I focus on the work of engineers, for several reasons. First, many 
analysts either called themselves systems or software engineers or did some form of 
'engineering' as part of their broader job remit. Second, and more importantly, it 
became apparent that much of the 'toolkit' systems analysts use has its roots in and 
is borrowed from engineering. Third, I was interested in documenting broadly the 
different work cultures which analysts and engineers experience - to show how 
possible variations in employment sectors (retracting manufacturing industry, 
expansionary service industry etc.) might have an impact upon engineers and 
systems analysts perceptions and practice. Whilst my interest in engineers was 
fuelled by these concerns, it increased once I started teaching engineers whilst still 
undertaking this research. My teaching included assessing syllabus content and how 
it met market demands and this prompted me to look in detail at engineers' values
and methods. Consequently, Chapter Two using fieldwork data as well as literature 
reviews, documents a specific set of values and methods which engineers hold and 
which they utilise to rationalise their role in the design process and to assess the 
merits and weaknesses of the designs proposed and the types of systems which they 
build.
In Chapter Three I focus specifically upon the work of systems analysts and their 
role within the design process. Having established what systems analysis is, who 
does it, and the requirements in terms of education, training and skills, I document 
and assess the values and methods held by systems analysts which (as with 
engineers) serve to legitimate the analysts" role within the design process and which 
act as referral point from which analysts pass judgement on the validity of the 
systems they design. I establish that analysts exercise degrees of autonomy within 
the design process both in terms of the exercise of their own labour and in terms of 
their capacity to build systems which reflect their particular interests or world views. 
In this and chapters four and six I also draw out some of the similarities and 
differences between engineers and systems analysts in terms of practices, values and 
methods and highlight the different ways in which engineers and analysts perceive 
their work and their relationship to others involved in processes of design.
In Chapter Four I argue that there is a ' software bottleneck' in systems design. This 
reflects, in part, one of the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production - its socialisation of the productive forces, on the one hand, yet its 
constraint of these very productive forces, on the other, by the dominant set of
property relations and configurations of power that flow from a system based on 
private ownership of the means of production. I examine some of the key solutions 
advanced to counter this bottleneck and highlight the autonomy analysts exercise 
within the design process. I show that the project team approach to analysis and 
design (favoured by most systems analysts and systems managers) signifies the 
power analysts and 'systems departments' can wield. The project team indicates that 
design needs to be conceived as a process of compromise. This is contrary to the 
content of analysts education, training and much of the literature of systems design 
which presents design as a science, uncompromising and value free. I argue that the 
project team approach is anti-democratic and needs to be so. if' system interests' are 
to be secured within the design remit. I also discuss the possibilities of analysts 
transcending dominant design paradigms rooted in class based systems, arguing that 
many systems perspectives reinforce an elitist view of the designer and serve to 
subjugate the user to the higher good of 'the system'. Where this view is not 
seriously challenged, by either workers or managers, it is likely that systems analysts 
will remain wedded to existing structures of power and authority within 
organisations.
In Chapter Five I extend debates on democracy within the design process by 
focusing on trade union involvement in this area. On the basis of interviews with 
national, regional and local union officers and shop stewards it is clear that union 
involvement in the design process is nominal. I argue that unions tend to hold a 
technologically deterministic position vis a vis technology and its design; this 
position, coupled to their commitment to collective bargaining and reformism,
weakens their capacity to secure their members' interests within the design process. 
Consequently, many organisations have been able to take advantage of high 
unemployment, anti-trade union legislation and a favourable political climate to 
introduce new technology and new working practices largely unchecked. An 
alarming development is that not only are unions today further removed from 
involvement in the design process than at any time since the 1960s; but that they are 
becoming increasingly complicit in securing workers' acceptance of new designs and 
new working practices. This is because many unions, in a context characterised by 
plummeting memberships and fierce inter union competition for representation rights 
with employers, are prepared to sign away basic employee rights (for example, the 
right to strike) and, equally importantly, are expected to police all new agreements 
and to secure worker compliance to new systems as a matter of contract.
Chapter Six is concerned with the class position of engineers and systems analysts. I 
argue that none of the key debates offer an adequate account of engineers' and 
analysts class position. The majority of engineers and analysts I studied are part of 
the collective labourer, albeit generally non-subordinate and not class conscious 
labourers. There are, however, notable exceptions, which are discussed. Likewise I 
argue, on the basis of themes developed in earlier chapters, that engineers on the 
whole (partly because they experience the effects of recession more directly than 
systems analysts) tend to be more critical of existing bases of power and authority 
and of government policy, than systems analysts. I also demonstrate how 
perceptions of class, power and authority have an impact upon engineers' and
systems analysts' perceptions of their own labour and upon the types of systems 
which they design.
In the Conclusion I summarise my main research findings and indicate the ways in 
which the research contributes to and extends debates on design and technical 
change. I also discuss the implications of my findings for current research and 
practice and suggest ways in which the research could fruitfully be extended.
Finally, in the Methods appendix I discuss the philosophical approach underlying the 
research. I discuss why I chose to combine fieldwork observation and extensive 
cross sectoral interviewing techniques and I emphasise the qualitative and reflexive 
nature of the work. Details regarding the number and type of interviewee, fieldwork 
location, field practice, chronology of work, and analysis and interpretation of 




There has been widespread debate amongst politicians, managers and academics 
regarding the relatively poor performance of the British economy and the productivity of 
British industry (Coats & Hillard 1986). This has stimulated debates on manufacturing 
strategy and models of restructuring. Initially, many of these debates took an eulogistic 
'follow Japan' approach (Ouchi 1981, Hayes 1981, Peters 1982). More recently, these 
changes have been variously theorised as signifying an historical rupture with supposedly 
old and dated methods of production and the opening up of new production paradigms. 
These encompass either relatively simple shifts towards new systems of production 
(Piore & Sabel 1984, Atkinson 1985, Tolliday & Zeitlin 1986, Hirst & Zeitlin 1990) to 
more complex general statements about changes in the social relations of production and 
the broader social and cultural fabric of society (Murray 1985, Jessop 1988, Baudrillard 
1988, Mine 1992, Handy 1995, Maflfesoli 1995). The general impression is that we are 
entering a new historical stage, the apocalyptic dimensions of which are similar to those 
adumbrated by Marx 1 .
In this chapter I focus upon four key theoretical debates concerning change and 




4) Post-Fordism and Regulation Theory.
These debates are chosen because they encompass a variety of discourses on the nature, 
cause and likely outcomes of the contemporary restructuring of manufacturing. These 
debates are evaluated in light of my fieldwork data. The intention is to provide a 
theoretical framework from which to assess organisational change and the broader 
processes of restructuring. This will then serve as a framework to locate my research in 
subsequent chapters on the work of 'designers' and of the social relations surrounding 
the design, development and introduction of new technologies.
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Follow Japan: Japanisation and Flexibility in Britain?
As many companies struggled to survive the increasingly competitive and recessionary 
environment of the early 1980s, attention came to be focused on Japan and the Japanese 
'economic miracle' (Cross 1985). It is the relative success of certain Japanese companies 
and their seeming ability to ride out the worst of the recession that has prompted interest 
in Japanese working practices, organisational culture and society2.
Monden (1981) argues that the innovative practices Japanese firms are introducing, in 
particular the 'just-in-time/Total Quality Control' (JIT/TQC) system of production, 
represents a revolution in work organisation as great as that of Henry Ford. According 
to Sayer
Many features of Japanese manufacturing have been cited to explain its 
competitive success, for example, relations between industry and the state, 
between industry and banks, low wages, tame unions, workaholism and the 
catch all category of Japanese culture (1986, 43-44).
Whilst recognising the importance of these factors in accounting for overall Japanese 
economic success Sayer nonetheless wishes to stress the 'Just-in-Time/ Total Quality 
Control' system as the decisive variable securing Japanese corporate success and in 
particular to emphasise that many of these practices are 'exportable'
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given the effect of the law of value in enforcing the adoption of the most 
productive techniques among competitors, they are already diffusing outside 
Japan (1986: 43).
Sayer stresses that these Japanese innovations
represent a radical departure from conventional western managerial wisdom, yet 
in common with previous managerial and process innovations they involve the 
search for time economies in the circulation of capital and for new ways of 
extracting surplus value (1986: 44).
Whilst recognising that the particular organisational forms of capital bear the imprint of 
the particular social formations in which they develop Sayer (1986) nonetheless 
anticipates that these practices will become widespread as the 'operation of the law of 
value' penalises those firms that do not adapt and innovate and likewise reward those 
that do.
Sayer contrasts the Japanese 'JTT/TQC' system with what he describes as the western 
'just-in-case' (JIC) system
The 'just-in-case' system is a shorthand for a common bundle of characteristics 
of western industrial capital. These include particular approaches towards 
volume and specialisation of production, flexibility and demarcation, skills, 
quality control, bureaucratisation of procedures and relationships between 
groups, management techniques, innovation and the labour market....in many 
respects JIC resembles 'Fordism'0986: 46).
The JIC system is characterised as one of high volume production of standardised 
commodities, in which competitive success is tied into low unit costs and economies of
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scale in which production is essentially mass production using standardised dedicated 
technologies and labour processes and in which the ultimate imperative is the 'getting of 
metal out the door' (Abemathy et al 1983).
This system is perceived by a variety of theorists (Kem & Schuman 1989, Piore & Sabel 
1984, Atkinson 1986, Adler 1985, Tolliday & Zeitlin 1986) as having a number of key 
drawbacks:
1) The system is geared towards uniformity and standardisation of products and 
is therefore perceived as unresponsive to changes in the market.
2) Focus upon output and the speeding up of machines and individuals creates 
serious imbalances between the various aspects of the line.
3) Large inventories and buffer stocks are expensive in terms of interest charges, 
storage and monitoring costs and wastage when model specifications change 
(Estall 1985).
4) Rejects and defective parts or processes tend to be concealed in buffer stocks 
which enable one to get another part from store rather than get the 'build right 
first time'.
5)* Testing quality in' is far more expensive than 'building it in first time'.
6)The JIC system generates a deep vertical hierarchy of control which is both 
costly and unwieldy, acting to curb employee commitment and slow down 
innovation and communication (Clegg 1992, Handy 1995, Piore & Sabel 1984, 
Atkinson 1985, Thompson 1991).
By contrast Sayer argues that the 'jnVTQC system prevalent in Japan is a way of
Organising the immediate manufacturing labour process and buyer-supplier 
relationships between firms, but it is [also] normally surrounded and supported 
by a wider set of practices regarding skills, management-labour relations and 
labour market conditions (1986: 51).
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The key features of this system are:
1) The reduction of set up times of machines assisted by close collaboration 
between management, process engineers and shop floor workers 
(Schonenberger 1982).
2) The elimination or reduction of buffer stocks which are seen as an indication 
of waste and 'inefficiency' stemming from poor line balance, production 
problems, idle time, surplus workers, excessive equipment capacity and 
insufficient preventive maintenance (Sugimori et al 1977).
3) Total quality control and a get it right, defects free manufacture, first time 
round (Ohno 1982).
4) Workers with high behavioural skills, cooperativeness and self-discipline 
(Sayer 1985, Littler 1982, Suzaki 1985).
The most startling feature of the JIT system is that instead of producing at maximum 
volume in anticipation of market demand production now takes place only as and when 
needed. Workers at the end of the line are given output instructions and they instruct the 
workers immediately upstream to produce the parts they will need just-in-time, likewise 
these latter workers in turn instruct workers upstream from them to produce just-in-time 
and so on (Sayer 1986).
Instructions between workers can be communicated by means of tags or boards called 
'kanban'. The whole system is a 'pull' rather than 'push' system whereby the kanban 
system orchestrates diverse activities into a flow line, markedly reducing planning, 
information handling and supervision costs and increasing the utilisation of capital (Ohno 
1982).
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Whilst the kinds of machinery used need not be very different from those used in the JIC 
system, the layout of the factory has to be changed radically:
For example, under the JIC system lathes are clustered in the factory and 
operated by workers specialising in such skills. This contrasts with a layout 
oriented to production flow, where equipment is in line with material flow - the 
common approach in Japan (Suzaki 1985: 14).
For manufacturers to get most benefit from the JIT system a system of supplier networks 
needs to be generated. This makes for reductions in expensive materials handling 
equipment, factory space, storage/transportation and labour costs. Close management 
surveillance, co-operation and overlapping ownership between core companies and their 
suppliers is a key feature of JIT in Japan (Altshuler et al 1984). Crucially JIT depends on 
a set of labour market conditions and practices which include multiskilling, flexible 
working and job rotation along with simple payment systems to facilitate this. Low 
turnover of managers and key core workers and engineers on the shop floor is also seen 
as critical as is the need to zero defect manufacture achieved through quality circle, 
employee commitment to quality and self inspection and tight supplier control (Sayer 
1986).
Those aspects of the Japanese system that the firms I studied were trying to adopt were 
Just-in-Time and Total-Quality-Control. This necessitated experiments with labour 
market segmentation and the introduction of new working practices and contracts. 
These tended to take the form of labour 'flexibility' strategies, in particular attempts to
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overcome 'restrictive practices' and 'unwieldy job demarcations' and to initiate both 
single union agreements or some broader general union agreement to quality and 
flexibility. Likewise some firms were seeking to tighten up their supplier base and seek 
joint contracts, the explicit aim of which is to achieve 'defect free manufacture', stock 
reduction and quality. Thus one Production Manager argued:
Our company is initiating major changes in working practices ... in particular to 
overcome demarcation but also to instil responsibility with the workforce for 
quality. Our supplier base has also been extensively rationalised and contracts are 
awarded on a basis of preferential supplier status - those firms who meet our 
quality standards consistently and who reorganise their own production along 
similar lines to ensure defect free components will be given the contracts [the] 
key to all this has been a change in attitude on the part of the workforce and the 
unions ... and I think obviously Government policy has facilitated this 
(Production Manager, Multinational Car Manufacturer, England).
However, whilst a number of firms I studied were introducing JIT/TQC practices the 
majority were more or less carrying on as usual. Indeed, diffusion of JIT outside Japan 
has been slow, possibly because competitive advantage in Japan also derives from unique 
cultural features, close and favourable relationships with the state and financial 
institutions and tight supplier bases (Briggs 1987, Sayer 1986, Halliday 1976) which act 
to impede the 'law of value' in generalising the Japanese model abroad.
Most managerial literature on Japan tends to ignore these factors. A number of 
consultants and managers I interviewed shared this uncritical stance towards Japanese 
manufacturing practice:
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You've got to hand it to the Japs they know how to work together ... 
co-operation and flexibility are the key to their success ... (Consultant, Major UK 
Consultancy, Scotland).
What we need is more co-operation and less infighting and interdepartmentalism 
... the Japanese have got it sussed with their emphasis on harmonised working 
practices and team working (Personnel Manager, Japanese Electronics 
Company, Wales).
However, what is often eulogised as Japanese experience (Ouchi 1981, Schonberger 
1983, Hayes 1981) is, in fact, a received model. As Ackroyd et al (1987) argue, it is not 
as easy to reproduce this or that particular Japanese trait or practice, as many practising 
UK managers and consultants apparently believe. Japan has its own unique historically 
determined class structure, labour market, industrial relations, culture, values and 
particular structuration of capital (Halliday 1975, Littler 1982, Briggs 1987) which, 
whilst conditioning the high levels of profitability of key Japanese corporations, 
nonetheless have their own specific drawbacks and contradictions (Lane 1987).
However, not all managers I interviewed were impressed by the ' Japanisation' discourse; 
indeed, a few were quite critical of Japanese work methods:
I am totally unimpressed with the Japanese companies I have visited. They are 
ham strung by red tape and the rule book ... they are too rule bound and too 
inflexible. I don't think they are either better run or have better work relations 
than we have (Managing Director, Major UK Lighting Company, Wales).
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Another drew out the possible weaknesses of the JIT system of production so 
predominant in Japan:
Britain is not Japan, we do not have the same industrial relations ... we do not 
have the same culture, control or, indeed, ownership of our supplier companies 
as do Japanese corporations ... there isn't the same State support for industry ... 
JIT in Britain is risky (Production Manager, Major White Goods Manufacturer, 
Wales).
Thurley (1987) argues that there is a considerable gap between the ideological level at 
which so much of the debate is carried out and the realities of institutional practice and 
human behaviour where decisions are taken largely for pragmatic reasons. My own 
research confirms that this gap is particularly evident when one examines the practice of 
Japanese management in subsidiaries operating in this and other countries3 . The range of 
employment practices utilised are, in many cases, little different from those of UK, 
American, or European firms. Several Japanese companies I studied were, for example, 
taking advantage of cheap female YTS labour, with management recognising, albeit 
when pressed, that this was one reason for investment, another being access to European 
markets. Franko and Dunning (1986) indicate that successful Japanese firms operating 
abroad, are very often exploiting acts of omission in the host countries industrial policy, 
investment strategies and domestic competitiveness rather than gaining advantage from 
superior management practices.
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A number of union officials I interviewed, pointed out that most Japanese firms 
operating in Britain were either 'low tech', or 'no tech'; operating here to get round EC 
restrictions and to take advantage of cheap labour and favourable tax grants:
Far from this company being innovative in its working arrangements I have to 
admit it is less progressive than many of the American or Swedish companies we 
have agreements with ... if you ask me all the company was wanting here was 
cheap mass assembly ... take a look its all female and YTS labour ... core 
components are shipped in from the parent company ... We are just assembly the 
companies just getting round EEC legislation on imports at the lowest cost in 
terms of investment in plant and personnel (Shop Steward, Japanese White 
Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
Dunning (1986) argues that where Japanese companies have invested on a large scale, 
for example Nissan in Sunderland, this investment has had a stimulating effect on 
competitors. Ford's 'After Japan" program, is cited as the most obvious example of a 
traditional Taylorist company, reassessing its work practices in response to supposedly 
superior Japanese practice (Giles & Starkey 1987).
However, the impetus to change at Fords and in many of the companies I studied does 
not so much come through an overnight conversion of management to the new gospel of 
Japanisation but is rather the result of reassessments of long standing internal problems:
In particular - poor productivity, inconsistent quality, poor labour relations, high 
overheads and an inability to consistently meet production schedules (Systems 
Manager, Multinational Car Manufacturer, England).
19
A number of managers I interviewed argued that the increased interest in flexibility owes 
more to the general intensification of competition, favourable legislation and the need to 
secure short term cost savings, than to a more thorough going conversion of UK 
management to a new business creed:
We have gone down the road to JIT and total quality management after careful 
consideration over a number of years of the rigidities inherent in mass 
production...In the sixties at this very site we pioneered work in job rotation and 
job enlargement, an objective here was to improve quality through enriching 
operator life and getting commitment to personal quality ... but recession hit and 
internal power struggles within the corporation over investment strategy and ... 
use of robotic and mechanised driven solutions to quality overrode these 
experiments. Obviously we also had to deal with increasingly militant labour 
organisations ... it was getting out of hand ... I could see the current strategy 
unfolding even then in the early seventies as senior executives looked for a 
solution to not only quality and cost savings but to the labour problem ... so we 
were quite aware of this and developing our own response well before the public 
debates on JIT, TQM and Japanese management (Production Manager, 
Multinational Car Manufacturer, England).
I found that typically management is experimenting with a variety of strategies of work 
organisation. In particular, a number of companies in my studies, are trying to internalise 
the market: that is, make workers directly accountable and responsible for their own 
work, via both utilisation of surveillance technology and a subverting of traditional union 
structures and negotiating machinery. 'Quality circles', 'Quality teams', 'Tiger teams' 
and a new emphasis on 'harmonisation' and 'corporate teamworking' may serve to 
weaken class solidarity amongst workers and tighten managerial control over 
production. One Personnel Manager candidly states:
20
Let's be frank ... no one around here is naive enough to think we could have 
achieved any of this [harmonised work cultures and greater flexibility] had it not 
been for Thatcher and the changed attitudes she has conveyed ... I'm not a 
'faddist' I don't believe any of the nonsense about harmonisation ... It might not 
even last much longer ... it's days will be numbered with a changed political 
climate (Personnel Manager, Software Manufacturer, Wales).
Friedman (1977) argues that management's are adopting new strategies of 'responsible 
autonomy' and 'flexibility' in an attempt to harness the adaptability of labour-power by 
giving workers leeway and encouraging them to adapt to changing situations in a 
manner beneficial to the firm. Japanisation, broadly defined, is seen as part of this overall 
strategy, as management supposedly seek to move away from the tight, costly, 
bureaucratic and delimiting control strategies of Taylorism and Fordism. However, my 
research would caution against such bipolar presentations of shifts in working practice. 
A number of companies I studied were actually doing the reverse by abandoning 
responsible autonomy type strategies and reintroducing strict Taylorism, indeed, 
primitive Taylorism:
Ten years ago, we were experimenting with all kinds of practices, including job 
enrichment, job enlargement, improved facilities, devolving more decision 
making to operatives, in an attempt to liven up their work ... We had to, as did 
many companies round here, because frankly, labour turnover was abysmal [and] 
our training policy was in tatters ... People just were not prepared to do the job 
... Nowadays people are more grateful... [and] they are grateful to have any job, 
let alone interesting, rewarding jobs ... Yes we've ditched most of our earlier 
experiments ... It's probably more like the 1950s in here now than the 1990s 
(Production Manager, White Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
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Friedman's identification of western management strategy with Taylorist control repeats 
Braverman's (1974) error, of treating direct control as the theory and practice of 
capitalist control over the labour process. Companies, in short, are pursuing a variety of 
strategies to raise profitability, including moves towards greater flexibility, tighter control 
and routinisation. I found that even in the same firm ostensibly contradictory policies can 
be pursued, for example, tighter control and Taylorisation of administrative, managerial 
and design grades and possible moves toward greater autonomy, or flexibility of 
production workers, utilising reprogrammable 'flexible' technologies. Alternatively, the 
reverse may happen and firms may be re-Taylorising shop floor work whilst, at the same 
time, introducing the latest reprogrammable technologies and Japanese style 
management practices. This is exactly what one large automotive components 
manufacturer was doing:
We used to be very craft based [with] lots of craftsmen ... utilising very 
personalised machinery [and] building in small runs for a whole range of 
customers ... We used to manufacture a whole variety of components here ... so 
many I lost count ... Now we have rationalised our customer and product base 
[and] will be introducing new technology and will have our latest dedicated lines 
up and running by May 1992 ... If you ask me we've gone back to Henry Ford's 
principle, not away from it ... and I mean at every level of the organisation 
(Production Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Ackroyd (1987) and Pollert (1989), argue that British firms are not attempting to 
introduce Japanisation/>erse but attempting to adapt to changed economic and political 
conditions, without relinquishing established bases of profit, power and influence. The
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essence of manpower flexibility, underlying many of these changes, is the pliability of 
working arrangements, or the ability of management to adjust quantity, composition, 
function and intensity of labour inputs to changing demands and requirements. Where 
firms are attempting to introduce flexibility, they are doing so, invariably, to reduce 
labour costs, increase productivity and improve quality.
Flexible Specialisation
The model of flexible specialisation advanced by Piore and Sabel (1984), Atkinson 
(1985), Tolliday and Zeitlin (1987) and Hirst and Zeitlin (1991) has achieved wide 
currency. Pollert (1987) argues 'that its appeal lies partly in its graphic dualist boldness 
and partly because it appears to integrate a number of processes' (1987: 32). The model 
essentially postulates two kinds of organisational flexibility: first, functional flexibility 
which refers to the crossing of occupational boundaries and more recently multiskilling 
of core workers; and, second, numerical flexibility which refers to a firm's capacity to 
adjust labour force levels rapidly via part-time, temporary and subcontracted labour, 
commonly referred to as 'peripheral' labour.
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Figure 1. Flexible Firm
Coinciding with this core-periphery distinction in the labour market Atkinson (1985) and 
Piore and Sabel (1984) distinguish between core and peripheral organisations. They 
argue that flexible work situations will come to characterise the core whilst Fordist mass 
production intensifies in the periphery (Goldthorpe 1985, Christopherson & Storper
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1989, Harrison and Bluestone 1988) possibly leading to a second industrial divide (Piore 
and Sabel 1984).
Central to the arguments of Piore and Sabel (1984) and Kem and Schuman (1989) is the 
notion that management's are redefining their labour problem, as they realise the futility 
of Taylorist management methods in the face of intensified Japanese competition and 
changing work attitudes. The key theme of the flexible specialisation thesis, as Wood 
(1989) points out, is the insistence that management are, or should, break with past 
orientations of control and intensification of work and seek to reverse tendencies 
towards ever more detailed divisions of labour.
The central building block of flexible specialisation is its distinction between mass 
production and craft production. Mass production is usually defined by Flexible 
Specialisation theorists, as the manufacture of standardised products in high volumes, 
using special purpose machinery and, predominantly, dedicated routine unskilled labour. 
Conversely, flexible specialisation is presented as a system of manufacture of a wide and 
changing array of customised products using flexible, general purpose machinery and 
skilled adaptable workers (Hirst & Zeitlin 1991).
According to Hirst and Zeitlin (1991), neither mass production nor flexible specialisation 
are inherently superior to the other, rather, each model is theoretically capable of 
generating a virtuous circle of productivity improvement and economic growth. Flexible
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Specialisation theorists are quick to stress however, that the practical realisation of either 
model is contingent on institutional regulation at a micro and macro level. Thus Atkinson 
(1986) and Atkinson and Meager (1986), argue that in Britain, the drive to full flexibility 
is impaired by short sighted government policies, insufficient spending on education and 
training, incorrect monetary policies and a management culture still steeped in 'tough 
boss' Taylorist attitudes. By contrast Kem and Schuman (1989) argue that Germany has 
an almost fully flexible manufacture.
The flexibility thesis suggests a broadly favourable view of industrial relations which 
challenges ideas of work degradation and presents an alternative counterpoint to 
Braverman's thesis that deskilling is a central part of the capitalist labour process. Piore 
and Sabel see flexible specialisation as a way out of the supposed crisis of Fordism and 
the alienating conditions of the assembly line. They assert that flexible specialisation 
stresses the potential of new technology to upgrade skills and 'open up long term 
prospects for improvement in the conditions of working life' (1984: 278).
One of the main weaknesses of 'flexible specialisation' is its oversimplification of work 
organisation into two discreet historical paradigms: Fordist based mass production and 
flexible specialisation (Metcalf 1986, Pollert 1987). One must question the whole notion 
of sweeping flexibility and a shift away from supposedly Taylorist or Fordist mass 
production. The Warwick IRRU Company Level and Industrial Relations survey,
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covering multi-establishment companies with over 1000 employees in six sectors, found 
that the majority of firms reported no significant changes in policy towards the use of 
temporary labour contracts (Marginson 1988). Even more importantly, the NEDO 
survey, which set off with the intention of proving the flexible firm model by examining 
changing managerial practices, concluded that it was not possible to make definitive 
statements about which direction firms were moving. Reporting the result of the NEDO 
Report, Atkinson and Meager (1986) ask 'Is flexible specialisation just a flash in the 
pan?'. Their own research evidence forced them, as Pollert notes, 'to dilute their claims 
of an overarching strategic shift, or of flexibility as the central management aim' (1987: 
32).
Rather than positing two dichotomous models of development, Flexible Specialisation 
theorists should recognise that capital has always had a variety of strategies of labour 
market segmentation, i.e. gender, race, age, skill, etc., and a repertoire of managerial 
strategies (Friedman 1977, Thompson 1989, 1995, Burawoy 1986, Edwards 1979) the 
use of which can be contingent upon a variety of factors, for example labour militancy, 
training programmes, labour market skills, specific level of capital accumulation, etc.
Sayer (1980), Clark (1988) and Bonfeld (1987) see flexible specialisation as being far 
more circumscribed than Flexible Specialisation theorists in that they do not see evidence 
of sweeping changes away from mass production and towards niche production. They 
also theorise those changes that are taking place differently, for example, perceiving
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flexible specialisation as an attempt by managers, not only to reassert control over the 
labour process but also to win productivity and quality improvements within essentially 
Taylorist and Fordist systems of manufacture.
This point was brought home by several respondents in the companies I studied. They 
stressed that they were utilising new 'flexible' technologies and work practices (e.g. 
multiskilled, or more accurately, firm specific skilled labour in quality teams and within 
JIT manufacturing systems) not in an attempt to abandon Taylorist or Fordist methods, 
but to address some of the problems encountered with them, i.e. consistently poor 
quality, high labour turnover, absenteeism, costly supervisory hierarchies and 
bureaucracies4 .
I asked the Systems Manager of an automotive components firm in Wales whether he 
thought the firm's recent commitment to JIT and flexibility involved a shift in managerial 
philosophy away from traditional Taylorist methods. I also enquired whether or not the 
company was going down the 'niche' market route extending its customer base and 
offering greater product diversity.
We decided to go for a low stocks JIT system ... and to reorganise our lines to 
suit... In the past few years we've brought in CAD, Robotics, reprogrammable 
CMC machine tools and experimented with quality teams. We will be striving for 
a full CIM system ... Ironically we are focusing our lines and becoming more 
dedicated, as our computer systems and business operations link in ever more 
closely to those of our major customers, who often insist that we adopt their 
methods ... To be frank, we used to knock out the odd components here and 
there for a wide range of car manufacturers big, small and down right quirky but
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we've become far more dedicated now, our product range has narrowed, our 
lines are more dedicated ... and I suppose diversity of work on the lines too ... 
[and]... maybe ... also the skills component of workers on the line ... I know a 
lot of the older ones complain more now about tedium (Systems Manager, 
Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
I asked the Production Manager of an electrical components company in Scotland 
whether or not he thought the firm's commitment to JIT and high levels of automation 
had meant a radical change in the way labour was utilised in the organisation:
What we are witnessing is more a changed culture than an actual change in 
labour utilisation ... All I can say is production here, is essentially mass 
production of standardised components ... The greatest change has been JIT and 
reduction of inventories and this was preceded by a massive campaign in the 
company, emphasising quality and the need for everyone to pull together ... it's 
the culture again ... More than anything, all of us are aware of the fragility of our 
jobs. (Personnel Manager, Electrical Components Manufacturer, Scotland).
As Block (1985) argues, the notion of flexibility is unclear. A variety of forms of labour 
utilisation coexist under capitalism and they always have done. By contrast, Flexible 
Specialisation theory tends towards a nostalgic reification of craft labour, not only as the 
medium through which individual workers will free themselves from the tedium of the 
line but also the medium through which unprofitable firms will secure profitability. Such 
analysis oversimplifies both the causes of worker alienation and the conditions necessary 
for profitable production. It also reduces the repertoire of managerial concerns to only 
one: labour flexibility. In short, flexibility may be no more the key to profitability than
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any other managerial strategy, such as economies of scale, good advertising, good 
product design, product development, niche marketing and attractive pricing, etc..
Piore and Sabel assert that Flexible Specialisation offers labour new hope: the hope of 
being reskilled and respected within a high trust work relation often goes against actual 
practice. Cohen (1987) and Shaiken (1984) argue that management may, through 
strategies of labour market segmentation and ending of internal job demarcations, be 
reasserting much of the control over labour which it lost in the seventies. This can be a 
very high risk strategy. My own research indicates the concern many managers feel over 
the fragility of recent organisational and technological changes:
Headlong rushes into ad hoc computerisation flexible work systems and JIT may 
prove unwise ... These systems are very fragile [from] a pulled plug, a blown 
fuse, a change of attitude ... and we are put in a delicate position (Personnel 
Manager, Major White Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
JIT and Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) are often seen as high trust 
manufacturing environments requiring close collaboration and excellent working 
relations between both workforce and suppliers. A significant number of managers 
pointed out that JITs success depends on having the 'right' political climate because any 
stoppage of work, be it in the supplier, or manufacturing base, will have disastrous 
consequences on work in progress. Equally, concern was voiced over the issue of 
flexibility and new harmonised work cultures:
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The whole point about flexibility is that it is tied into productivity and quality 
performance indicators ... In turn for accepting new agreements on working 
practices ... and in particular reskilling and weakening of job demarcations ... our 
workforce expect to earn better pay and have at least the same if not better 
conditions ... management hang everything on being able to deliver consistent 
pay improvements ... through productivity and quality gains ... What happens if 
they can't do this ... because the market cannot absorb any more capacity or 
your competitor is using cheaper labour or securing greater productivity? ... [It 
can be] a recipe for disaster... Look at Nissan. They promised the earth and now 
they are facing a three day week ... Imagine how the workforce must feel given 
management's insistence that their flexibility strategy was right (Personnel 
Manager, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
Piore and Sabel's flexible specialisation thesis offers a model in which workers and 
managers unite for the common good of the organisation. It is a model which downplays 
antagonism of interest between workers and managers. Dankebar (1988) draws out the 
reformist implications of this position, whilst, at the same time, highlighting the fragile 
social consensus that this form of work system may rest upon. For employers, flexible 
specialisation openly politicises the manufacturing process, in the sense that the whole 
system rests on high trust quasi-democratic work relations and upon an internalisation of 
market values. This generates competition between workers in quality and production 
teams, bolstering the maintenance of divisions in terms of pay, status, and responsibilities 
between core and peripheral workers. It also persuades workers to accept the need for 
continual productivity and quality increases via competitive quality teams, cultural 
symbolism, and a suitable array of surveillance and shop floor data capture technology5
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Post-Modernism: From Weber's Iron Cage to Gergen's Clouds?
Debates on 'post-Fordism' and 'flexible specialisation' assert rupture with old modes of 
production and the emergence of sweeping new production paradigms; likewise in 'post- 
modem' organisational theory we find a new discourse proclaiming organisational 
revolution and radical restructuring. Gergen (1989) captures the mood of this discourse 
when he asks: why must we conceive of organisational cultures as structures rather than 
clouds or tents? He argues that modernist discourses have straight-jacketed our 
emotional and conceptual frameworks in Weberian notions of rationality and efficiency.
Clegg (1990: 2) argues that 'organisational theory is a creature of modernity', based on 
notions of bureaucratic control over a detailed division of labour that is no longer 
dominant. Gergen (1989) stresses that organisational theory has committed the 
'modernist' sin of belief in the  narrative of progress': scientific management and 
systems approaches, in particular, with their emphasis on the 'rational' design of 
organisations, pursuit of organisational 'efficiency' and the minimisation of uncertainty 
are seen as key sinners (Thompson 1991).
In contrast to the narrative of 'modernism', with its emphasis on the rational 
understanding and essential knowability of 'nature', post-modernism stresses the
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'fundamental uncontrollability of meaning' (Parker 1990). Certainty becomes uncertainty 
and reality does not exist outside of multiple discourses (Foucualt 1977, Keane 1988, 
Baudrillard 1988). Thus, Clegg (1990) stresses the breakdown of dominant Taylorist 
divisions of labour and an abandonment of Weberian rationality within organisations. 
Parker (1990) sets discussion of 'post-modern' organisations within a framework of 
societal breakdown with the emphasis on cultural fragmentation and organisational 
pluralism. Mulgan (1989) talks of a shift from 'strong' to 'weak' organisational power, 
as information technology facilitates a more decentralised, plural and democratic exercise 
of power; whilst Bauman emphasises a new cultural climate of heterogeneity, 
indeterminacy and disorganisation leading to a general impression of'disorientation and 
chaos' (1989: 793).
Post-modern discourse also draws on the work of 'post-industrial society' theorists 
(Touraine 1974 and Bell 1984) and futurologists (Naisbitt 1982, Toffler 1980) with their 
advocacy of a paradigm shift away from production to consumption and leisure 
(Callinicos 1989). Finally, there is a strong technological determinist undercurrent within 
much of the post-modern discourse: Mulgan (1989), Clegg (1990), Naisbet (1983) and 
Handy (1990) all present technology, and specifically, information technology, as the 
initiator of organisational changes.
The modernist organisation according to Clegg 'may be thought of in terms of Weber's 
typification of bureaucratised, mechanistic structures of control, as these were
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subsequently erected upon a fully rationalised base of divided and deskilled labour' 
(Clegg 1990: 177). By contrast, Hydebrand (1991) argues that the 'post-modem' 
organisation is small, or located in small subunits of larger organisations. It is service 
orientated, its technology is computerised, its division of labour informal and its 
management structure decentralised, eclectic and participative.
Modern Organisation
Market
stable markets, mass consumption 
producer dictates supply 





dedicated special purpose, assembly line
Work organisation
Taylorist, detailed division of labour
Management tasks
Supervision, planning and control





mechanistic structures of control
Post-Modern Organisation
Market
Dynamic markets, niche markets 
consumers dictate supply 









Facilitive, eclectic and participative
Company size and structure
small companies or franchises 
cultural networks 
information technology networks 
de-centralised 
informal division of labour
Table 1. Regulative Context and Characteristic Features of a 'Modern' and 'Post- 
Modern' Organisation.
The 'post-modern' organisation is held to be post-bureaucratic. Strong cultural and 
information technology networks are the cement which holds them together (Berg 1989, 
Heckscher 1994). The notion of post-bureaucratic organisation fits in with broader
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societal changes argued to be taking place by post-modernists. Thus Baudrillard (1983) 
highlights the breakdown of conventional wisdom's and practice as we enter a new age 
of 'hyper reality' in which fact and fiction, right and wrong, become increasingly 
unknowable, increasingly distorted through what Marxists would conceptualise as an 
attenuated state of commodification, reification and alienation. Lash (1988) refers to the 
erosion of social boundaries and an all purpose reversal of the division of labour. Added 
to this, we get a far broader argument that 'post-modernity' represents a liberalisation of 
society and a democratisation of organisational power (Clegg 1990, Handy 1995).
The message is that companies can no longer afford the burden of monolithic 
bureaucratic and costly structures and procedures. Post modern organisations are argued 
to be in a process of 'reverse thrust', seeking consciously to decentralise and downsize 
as they are now 'prepared to live with structural chaos and ambiguity' (Berg 1989: 207). 
Underpinning much of the 'post-modern' discourse on organisational change is the 
notion of mass pluralisation within society. Post modernists argue that collective class 
consciousness is drowning in a sea of commodity fetishism (Baudrillard 1989) and a 
rediscovery of 'individualism' or 'tribalism' (Murray 1988, Maflesoli 1995). This, in 
turn, is perceived to support shifts within organisational practice towards 
'democratisation' and 'high trust' work relations (Clegg 1990). The new emphasis 
within 'post-modern' organisational discourse is on the role of managers as 'facilitators' 
and on the importance of symbols and culture as both organisational levellers and 
'efficiency' enablers (Cooper 1989).
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Drawing on post-industrialism's end of ideology thesis, Lyotard (1984) dismisses the 
grand scientific discourses of Western society arguing that with the computerisation of 
society the medium exists for the creation of a new discourse of plurality and openness 
within organisations. Likewise, Burrell (1988) anticipates a star role for computer 
architecture as an 'organisational democratiser' rather than Benthamite Panoptican.
Thompson (1991) stresses that whilst Bell was wary that the hedonistic excesses of 
consumerism would destabilise post-industrial society, Bauman (1988) sees it as 
sweeping away the systems problems. The market brings with it the pressures and 
pleasures of seduction by the symbolism of spending power. Thompson (1991) argues 
that, for many post modernists, so effective is this seduction that capital is able to 
dispense with repression and much of its apparatus of control and the need for political 
legitimisation and ideological domination.
The notion of impermanence and change Marx used to highlight social relations under 
capitalism is rearticulated and given a new twist by many former radicals now turned 
post-modernists. Callincos (1989), for example, argues that, above all else, 
post-modernism, in its origins, reflects the disillusionment of the 'generation of 68 and 
the 'left' aspirations that were shattered with the defeat of the general strike in France. 
Over twenty years later, with Western capitalism seemingly stabilised under the
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leadership of the New Right, the retreat of the generation of 68 from the revolutionary 
beliefs of their youth has gone even further. As Harman remarks, 'If the fashion in 1968 
was to drop out and to drop acid now, apparently, it is to drop in and drop socialist 
politics (1989: 8).
A principle feature of post-modern discourse is its aestheticism inherited from Nietzche 
and reinforced in Derrida's and Foucault's attempts to articulate the philosophical 
implications of modernism. Sontang (1980) has argued that aestheticism involves an 
attitude which is neutral with respect to content. This drift towards aestheticism 
accorded with the cultural mood of the 1980s a decade obsessed with style. Theorists of 
post-Fordism captured the differentiation of markets and rise of designer brands and 
consumption based lifestyles. In various aspects of life, as Callinicos argues:
One could detect a similar association of certain kinds of consumption with 
forming oneself into a particular kind of person. Among the most important was 
a narcissistic obsession with the body, both male and female, less as an object of 
desire than - when disciplined by diet and exercise into a certain shape - as an 
index of youth, health, energy and mobility. This stylisation of existence to 
borrow Foucault's phrase is surely best understood against the background, not 
of New Times, but of good times for the new middle class, a class which found 
itself in the 1980s with more money in its pocket and easier access to credit, 
without the pressure to save which the old petty bourgeoisie was subject (1984: 
169).
To this one can add that not only was the middle class experiencing this cultural 
transformation but also significant sections of the working class and particularly younger 
workers, in foil time employment. They also had the necessary purchasing power to
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enter the new post-modern world of 'hyper-reality', with its confusion and distortion of 
historical epochs and meanings, manifest in the growth of retro-culture and consumptive 
existence (Harvey 1989, Boyne & Rattansi 1990). Imminent within post-modern 
discourse is a strong undertone of nihilism, disaster and despair, what Kermode (1988) 
calls 'routinised apocalypse'. This is not only borne out by the films of this time bearing 
similar titles and imagery but in the downturn in people's hopes and experiences. Here, 
social Danvinianism is generalised into the new moral philosophy via successive right 
wing governments setting new political agendas of monetarism with its rhetoric of 
leaning out the economy, kicking the crutches from under the indolent and workshy and 
revamping the welfare state (CIS 1981, 1984).
For Lyotard
eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one listens to 
reggae, watches a western, eats McDonalds food for lunch and local cuisine for 
dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and "retro" clothes in Hong Kong; 
knowledge is a matter for TV games (1984: 76).
However, as Callinicos argues 'it all depends on who "one" is. The vast majority of the 
population, of even the advanced economies, are excluded from the delights of French 
scent and Far Eastern travel'(1989: 163).
Supporting 'post-modern' organisational theory is the notion of post-industrial society. 
Key to post-modern argument is information technology as organisational reorganiser
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(Cooper 1989). Often these debates share the broader technologically deterministic and 
apocalyptic discourse of futurology (e.g. Channel 4: Visions of Heaven and Hell 1995). 
The growth of the 'information super highway', the increasing use of the 'Internet' for 
the gaining of competitive advantage (Noble 1995), and a sweeping shift towards 
teleworking, homeworking and the spatial mobility this offers to those connected to the 
'net' is heralded by many post-modernists and futurologists alike as the beginning of a 
new age and new human being, indeed, as the end of the organisation and of 
organisational man (Handy 1995, Heydebrand 1989, Clegg 1992, Naisbet 1995).
Handy (1995), Clegg (1992), Peters (1994), Heydebrand (1989) and Naisbet (1995) 
offer a vision of the future in which work for many will be completely transformed. The 
argument is that information technology enables organisations to 'downsize' and indeed 
go into 'reverse thrust'. Technology is perceived as the key which will unlock the door 
to a new generation of high tech home workers who, through their screens, a modem 
and connection to the 'net', will be able to carry out all their previous work tasks and 
more in their own home or even whilst in transit. The emancipatory overtones of this 
'information society' perspective with its class of mental workers liberated from the 
doldrums of organisational routine and the Taylorist rule book is compulsive whilst at 
the same time sinister.
The compulsion flows from the imagery of individual emancipation and self control over 
the pace, duration, intensity and even geographical location of ones own work activity.
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Organisations like Chiat Day with their heavy reliance on teleworking and minimalist 
office space, absence of overt hierarchy and oppressive organs of control and 
accountability offer a glimpse of the possible liberation of humanity from the drudgery of 
paced work. The emphasis on 'social ownership of space' and equipment and lack of 
'private property' in the means of production, including the lack of physical property 
markers like personal desks, equipment and artefacts render the impression of a quasi 
'socialised' liberated work atmosphere.
On the other hand the social isolation and alienation that can occur from this shift is 
apparent. For example, one teleworker reported how the only buzz in his office (he 
worked from home) was the buzz of the hard drive on his computer6 . Several 
interviewees who worked this way expressed, to me, their concern over the lack of 
social interaction with colleagues and how this not only adversely affected their 'sense of 
well being and belonging' but also how it could 'adversely impact on the creative 
process' as face to face 'brain storming sessions' and 'informal chats over coffee' are 
replaced by the splendid isolation of the isolated employee and his/her personal 
computer. Not only is person to person contact reduced but the new forms of contact 
that are established are of a more obtuse kind. Because one can tap into a variety of 
discourses and a truly emancipatory vocabulary, the 'net' allows creativity and free 
expression (Shields 1995, Jones 1994); but the morality and value judgement that peer 
pressure and organisational codes of conduct impose on practice and lifestyle recede.
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The teleworker can, in fact, lose sense of his or her own organisational identity in 
proportion to the decline in the social life and body politic of the organisation itself.
More dramatic still is the professed impact of information technology and organisational 
'downsizing' on individual lifestyles and broader processes of socialisation. With the 
disappearance of the organisation - to be replaced by a string of electrons and 
'cyberspace' - lie the possibility for the disappearance of those factors serving to stabilise 
the daily life of organisational man like a job for life, with associated organisational perks 
- pension rights, employer contributions, and social and welfare facilities, etc. These are 
replaced by the insecurity of short term contracts, homeworking and self-employment.
Post-modernists see core information workers as essentially young, mobile, free and 
flexible (Clegg 1992, Naisbet 1995, Baudrillard 1988). The concept of a family wage 
recedes into history and increasingly the nuclear family with its implicit attachment to 
geographical space and its need and desire for stability proves unable to adapt to this 
new institutional setting. In this post-modern condition (Smart 1992, Tester 1993) serial 
monogamy, psychosis, despair and a lack of 'belonging' are argued to become the 
'norm' (Robins 1993, Handy 1995). One of my interviewees, in his early thirties, voiced 
strong feelings on this matter:
I have been working in computing now for several years ... if you want the 
glamour and prestige and money you have to be prepared to be mobile.[It's] one 
reason I haven't put down roots. In the past five years alone I've worked for 
twenty different organisations on a contracting basis, the last one paid £800 per 
week for three months ... Much of the work is done alone, you don't get to mix
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with other organisational members - they can resent your presence ... You feel 
lonely sometimes in a new company, a new town, a new country ... I've not been 
able to keep a steady girlfriend ... I've just drifted from one semi-permanent 
relationship to another ... Unless I am prepared to work full time for one of the 
larger institutions on lower pay and doing less innovative work this is the 
sacrifice I and thousands like me [have to be] prepared to make ... But I don't 
like it...Sometimes working from my hotel room or rented accommodation I feel 
totally isolated....totally alone (Consultant, Programmer/ Software Engineer).
In contrast to what is claimed to be an emancipatory life style for this key group of 
information workers. Handy (1995) argues one also sees the emergence of an underclass 
which, for whatever reason, has neither the means nor inclination to ride the information 
technology tidal wave. Increasingly these people are perceived by post - modernists and 
futurologists alike as being marginalised. They are pushed into the low wage primitive 
assembly end of the economy or increasingly pushed out of employment altogether 
through successive rounds of rationalisation and automation (Naisbet 1995, Noble 
1995).
This economic marginalisation of the 'under-class' (Handy 1995) is supposedly 
compounded by the ending of 'collective consciousness' and the rise of 'individualism' 
articulated in post-modem discourses which emphasise the 'ending of ideology' and 
politics (Foucault 1977, Keane 1988). In particular, they emphasise the ending of 
dominant 'meta-theoretical ideological' narratives like socialism or communism (Larrain 
1994). As the masses become embroiled in a situation of 'simulacrum' (Baudrillard 
1988), truth and falsity become a matter of language games. Here, 'everything becomes 
undecidable' (Baudrillard 1988:126) and 'libidinally charged' (Foucault 1979) in which
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no one discourse has any more validity or purchase on the 'truth' than any other 
(Foucault 1981).
In their euphoric focus on the liberating potentialities of new technology many post- 
modernists fail to examine the social relations surrounding the design, development and 
use of such technologies. Consequently, they fail to recognise that much of this 
technology has been concerned with tracking and tightening up accounting procedures7. 
In particular, it has been concerned with 'the efficiency in wages paid and prices 
extracted with, in other words, the very material world of production that 
informationalism supposedly replaces' (Ryan 1989: 567). I found that new technology 
was not only being introduced by the majority of companies in my study to improve 
product development, quality and costs but also, and tied into this, to increase control 
and surveillance of labour processes and to raise labour productivity8 . Post-modem 
writers downplay the relationship between technology, capital and social change. 
Consequently, post-modernists are only the latest of a long line of academics infatuated 
with technology. Thus, when Cooper states that 'more than anything else it's technology 
which gives the modem organisation its special character' (1989: 2), it is as if the whole 
debate on the social construction of technology never happened (MacKenzie & 
Wajcman 1985, Pinch & Bjerker 1989, Mackay & Gillespie 1992).
Bauman's claim that 'capitalism has won the struggle for control over production' 
(1988: 808) or Baudrillard's (1988) claim that mass 'simulacra' has replaced class
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consciousness with rabid egoism is again hardly consistent with the wealth of labour 
process literature on worker resistance (Thompson 1995). Likewise, post-modernist 
borrowings from post-Fordist and flexible specialisation theory has come under heavy 
criticism (Mously 1987, Pollert 1988, Hyman 1988, Thompson 1991). Fordism was 
never the sole, or even dominant, form of work organisation in countries like Britain. 
Fordism and Taylorism were, as Hirst and Zeitlin (1989) acknowledge, adapted and 
modified as a consequence of changing local, national, regional, cultural, political and 
economic conditions, producing a variety of amalgams. More importantly, deskilling is 
not the only concern of capital. Many post-modernists share Braverman's reified view of 
capitals need to deskill and control (Thompson 1991). Consequently, they assume that 
Taylorism is the production logic of capitalism. It is, thus, difficult to perceive within this 
model further non-Taylorist transformations of the labour process. Not only is there a 
neglect of worker resistance in Braverman's model but so too in that of post-modernists, 
who downplay resistance and emphasise cultural homogeneity and harmony within 
organisations (Clegg 1990). Like Braverman, post-modernists also have an inadequate 
grasp of capitalism and, significantly, the operation of the law of value and its effect on 
the accumulation process. As profit rates begin to equalise in any given branch of 
production, capital will tend to seek either new methods of surplus extraction or to move 
into entirely new branches of production. This ebb and flow of capital into and out of 
different branches of production, in search of above average rates of profit, leads to a 
tendency towards the consolidation of old skills and techniques in those branches of 
production becoming fully capitalised and an opening up of new skills and techniques in
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the newer sectors of production. This should caution against the making of universal 
statements about deskilling or specific control strategies and, in particular, of 
characterising, entire historical epochs as either Fordist/Taylorist, post-Fordist or post- 
modernist.
The post-modem assertion that organisations are becoming more decentralised, leaner 
and by implication democratic represents an uncritical acceptance of much of the 
managerial literature emphasising 'open door' policies, anti-hierarchical managerial 
structures and 'harmonised' work relations. As Thompson notes:
Essentially what we are seeing is a duality in which the decentralisation of the 
labour process and production decisions (through mechanisms as diverse as 
profit centres, subcontracting and quality circles) is combined with increased 
centralisation of power and control over the spatially dispersed, but 
interdependent units' (Thompson 1991: 8).
Baran (1988) cites numerous cases where computerised data is used to monitor 
workers' productivity and status and to measure labour costs against that of other plants.
My research indicates that in the current economic and political climate, extensive 
opportunities exist on the shop and office floor to electronically monitor and reintegrate 
decentralised tasks and locations:
Our computer based Manufacturing and Resource Planning system along with 
our incorporation of a 'just-in-time' and total quality management programme 
have meant that at the same time as downsizing our organisation - for example,
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subcontracting work out. reducing middle manager and many supervisory 
grades, shedding labour in stores, etc. - we have at the same time, been able to 
tighten up control of the overall production process and the different grades of 
worker ... (Personnel Manager, Magnetic Tape Manufacturer, Wales).
The post-modem concern with the removal of hierarchy within organisations, such as 
the middle layers of an organisation is not the same as altering the basic power structure. 
Companies like MacDonalds or Collorol claim 'no boss' structures, yet there are 
elaborate hierarchies based on incentives, badges and grades (Thompson 1991). More 
importantly, new forms of work organisation, like quality circles and quality teams make 
it possible to have an ostensibly flatter organisational structure but even greater 
concentration and centralisation of power in managerial hands. This is particularly true 
when used in conjunction with new work cultures, emphasising harmony and 
co-operation interwoven with appropriate monitoring technology. My research 
reinforces the view that whilst some firms are 'leaning out' the hierarchy; they are, at the 
same time, increasing control over workers:
This company likes to think it is very open and fair ... In many ways it is ... but... 
it's like the film Stepford wives in here: if you are a woman ... all's happy so long 
as you accept what you are told and don't think too much about things ... For 
example, I work in a group of 15 ... There's 15 girls in this quality team [and] we 
make suggestions for quality improvements. We report weekly on productivity 
and problems experienced with particular components or processes ... we are 
encouraged by the bosses who are all men to be open and to stop production 
when we see a fault, etc. ... The pressure is really on you, in these groups and it's 
on you because your pay and bonus, as a group, is related to your productivity 
and performance in terms of suggestions, attitudes, stoppages, quality of 
batches, etc. ... and at times it's unbearable ... I can't keep up the pace all the 
time and other girls feel the same. We don't want to let each other down because
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we know at the end of the week the bosses will display the names of those girls 
whose work was below par ... They can get victimised ... I haven't been but 
friends of mine have ... and the victimisation is worse and hurts more because it's 
from girls in your own team ... so the pressure to succeed and try hard is always 
on you ... You don't want to let them down ... It's built into the system (Shop 
Steward, Japanese Domestic White Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
The Systems Manager of the same firm responded,
Let's be frank ... nobody is claiming we've got total democracy here or 
anywhere else ... It's probably unworkable ... But what we do have is contented 
workers and a viable business ... I'm under no illusion that senior managers are 
running the show and are doing a damn sight tighter job of it than before ... It's 
really hands on here and I'm proud of it (Systems Manager, Japanese Domestic 
Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
Thompson (1991) argues that post-modern emphasis on decentralisation and 
desegregation of large companies likewise does not stand up to scrutiny. There has been 
an unprecedented number of mergers and acquisitions in the past few years. One of the 
main premises of the Cecchini Report is that central economies of scale necessary for 
restructuring for the single market would precisely be driven by the merger and 
acquisition process.
Post-bureaucratic arguments (Clegg 1990, Parker 1990, Heckscher 1994) not only 
wrongly interpret changes in the structure of modern organisations, they vastly 
overestimate the extent of the challenge to the domination of the large firm itself, arising 
from small firms, subcontracting, and franchises. Thompson (1991) argues that today the
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power of large firms is at its strongest over the smaller units, desegregated or otherwise 
(1991: 10). For example, it has been well documented how Japanese companies exercise 
hegemonic power over the satellite firms that supply them (Kumazawa & Yamanda 
1988). Likewise, the increasing number of franchises belies the control that the central 
company imposes. Felstead (1991), for instance, documents how franchisees have to 
accept precise procedures, criteria and performance targets governing operations. 
Agreements such as those imposed by MacDonalds frequently contain clauses that 
stipulate contracts can unilaterally be modified by the franchiser. Ironically, as Thompson 
(1991) argues, given the post-modern emphasis on language, the original French 
meaning of franchisee - 'freedom from servitude or restraint' bears little relationship to 
practice.
Post-modernists stress that modern organisations are rule-bound with tight job 
specifications and detailed divisions of labour (Clegg 1990, Gergen 1989). Drawing on 
debates ushered in by Piore and Sabel (1983, 1984) and Atkinson (1985) on flexible 
working and the flexible firm, post-modernists assert we are witnessing a deconstruction 
of conventional job boundaries and definitions and a shift towards more flexible 
polyvalent forms of labour. The problem with this argument is that there is little 
empirical evidence to substantiate claims of sweeping, flexible specialisation (Pollert 
1987). The notion of a paradigm shift in work organisation, implied in the flexibility 
thesis, ignores the fact that capital has always adopted a variety of strategies of labour 
control and utilisation. Notions of flexibility are, likewise, poorly theorised: flexible for
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who, and by what criteria? Does this flexibility imply greater exploitation? 
Post-modernists ignore these issues and, make generalisations about consumers who, 
through the exercise of their purchasing power, compel organisations to reassess their 
labour and machine utilisation policies. The market and consumer are thus reified and 
business becomes an epiphenomenon obligingly following our spiritual and cultural 
needs as consumers, striving to deliver to us exactly what we want: perfect consumer 
democracy.
Post-modernists do not understand, Thompson argues:
that flexibility and interchangeability of functions is entirely compatible with 
extremely tight job and task specifications, as experience at companies as diverse 
as Nissan and McDonald indicates' (1991: 11).
At McDonalds, total flexibility among crew members is combined with standardised 
products and precise planning of subdivided tasks, underwritten by the book - a 385 
page operations manual, crammed with detail, such as 'cooks must turn, never flip, 
hamburgers one, never two at a time ... cashiers must make eye contact and smile at 
every customer' (Silver 1987). Sayer makes the point that flexibility relies heavily on:
The performance of workers who are technically unskilled or semi-skilled but 
behaviourally highly skilled (1986: 67).
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Many employers are utilising changes in employment legislation and labour markets - 
particularly high unemployment - to create the desired culture of flexibility and 
co-operation. My research indicates that firms are spending a great deal of time and 
effort on recruitment and selection, with even franchisers using lengthening waiting lists 
to screen out 'undesirables' and to ensure 'correct' socialisation of employees. Deal and 
Kennedy argue:
Strong culture companies go into the trouble of spelling out, often in copious 
detail, the routine behavioural rituals they expect their employees to carry out 
(1988: 15).
I found that management are taking advantage of high unemployment, favourable 
legislation and changed political circumstances to drive through new working practices 
and work cultures:
Let's make no bones about it, the last ten years have seen sweeping changes in 
peoples' attitudes to work ... It doesn't take a genius to see that in these current 
conditions, the workforce will be more amenable to changes in working 
practices ... I have altered many job definitions and overcome many arbitrary job 
boundaries ... set by the unions years ago ... I expect to see willingness and 
flexibility in my workforce ... not rigid job demarcation ... particularly the 
process workers and routine workers ... We readily shift them from task to task 
... (Managing Director, Chemical Company, Scotland).
Post-modernists put a lot of emphasis on culture as the glue which holds decentralised 
parts of the new organisation together but miss the point about the bureaucratic 
consequences.
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Whenever you have what appears to be a successful decentralisation, if you look 
more closely, you will discover that it was always preceded by a period of 
intense centralisation where a set of core values were hammered out and 
socialised into people before the people were turned loose to go their own 
"independent" ways. (Wiek cited Alveson, 1990: 42).
The idea of post-bureaucratic organisation that infuses post-modem organisational 
discourse owes more to an uncritical, unchallenging acceptance of the global prophecies 
of pop management than to a critical exploration of organisational changes:
The "break with bureaucracy" fits nicely into an era when entrepreneurial 




A variety of theorists have utilised the term 'post-Fordism', in their attempts to analyse 
changes taking place in manufacture and society. Key contributors to the British debate 
have been the neo-Gramcian Marxists, grouped around the political magazine Marxism 
Today, which argues that we are living in 'New Times' which represent a decisive break 
with the economic and social trends of much of this century (Jaques & Hall 1989). Lash
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and Urry (1987) claim that organised capitalism has been replaced by a new phase and 
by new forms of institutionalisation: 'disorganised capitalism'.
'Post-Fordism' draws heavily on a vision owing much to Gramsci's essay 'Americanism 
and Fordism' (Gramsci 1971) and Braverman's 'Labour and Monopoly Capital' (1974) 
in which Taylorism is presented as a form of production and labour organisation 
characteristic of the Fordist era. Fordism is referred to as a system of mass production 
utilising assembly line technology, special purpose machinery, detailed division of labour, 
based on increasing task fragmentation, the production of standardised goods, 
'technological efficiencies' of planned production, economies of scale and the 
development of a mass market coupled to appropriate macro-economic policies, i.e. 
Keynesianism. The Fordist system, according to Post-Fordists, implies a definite type of 
society: industrial society based on a predominantly male, full time, working class 
concentrated in large plants in large industrial cities. According to theorists of this model 
the assembly line economy promoted industrial unionism and workers parties in politics 
with its concentration of labour in large plants, performing essentially routine work, in a 
full employment economy. In short, social democracy was underwritten by Fordism and 
the Welfare State.
Post-Fordists homogenise the post-war world so as to be able to stress the social and 
political differences after 1973. This roughly corresponds to the time of the oil crisis 
which is the point recognised by post-Fordists as marking the beginning of the end of
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Fordism. Not only are regional complexities obliterated but there is no real explanatory 
core to the post-Fordist case other than the decomposition of Fordist structures (Hirst & 
Zeiltlin 1991). The post-Fordist case involves, by and large, borrowing and radically 
simplifying the flexible specialisation approach to manufacturing. Hall (1989), Robins 
(1989) and Leadbeater (1989) assume that new 'flexible' production techniques, work 
methods and organisational cultures have swept across the manufacturing spectrum. 
From this, they read off equally dramatic changes in society, utilising a diluted 
post-modern discourse. Hence, Marxism Today's assertion of 'New Times' as a fluid, 
transient society dominated by shifts from collectivism to individualism, from production 
towards consumption and from substance towards style (Marxism Today, December 
1989).
Post-Fordism in the hands of Marxism Today is essentially pop-sociology, an 
undertheorised but, nonetheless, entertaining imagery. In the hands of Jessop and some 
of the leading Regulationists (Aglietta 1979, Lipietz 1988, Mjoset 1985) who draw upon 
some of the concepts of post-Fordism it becomes a serious theoretical tool. It is both to 
do justice to this more elaborate articulation of post-Fordism and to evaluate critically 
the work of the Regulationists that I have chosen to combine discussion of the two 
schools in the following section.
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Regulation Theory and Post-Fordism
Regulation Theory sets itself a large task: to theorise a particular accumulation regime 
and its regulative ensemble. In attempting to do so it offers a rich and, at times, 
persuasive interpretation of change.
Regulation Theory (RT) in Britain has been primarily associated with the debates 
surrounding Fordism and post-Fordism. However, Fordism and post-Fordism are simply 
Modes of Regulation (MOR), concepts which RT can either draw on or ignore. 
However, the degeneration of RT into post-Fordism has arisen through too close an 
identification with the 'new realism' which came to prominence amongst sections of the 
'left' in the 1980s (Sayer 1990, Clarke 1988). RT, however, is not some monolithic bloc, 
but encompasses many schools of which the Marxism Today version is only one9. RT is 
in part a reply to orthodox 'equilibrium' economics, although it can be identified more 
generally as 'political economy'. Regulationists attempt to take up where Marx left off in 
analysing the laws of motion of capitalism and capitalism's internal development. In 
particular, they are looking for ways in which capitalism attempts to overcome its 
contradictions as manifest in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. As Bonefeld 
argues, RT is:
Concerned with understanding how the reproduction of the capital-labour 
relation is historically realised and regulated and how capitalism is prevented 
from collapsing (1987: 96-127).
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Jessop attempts to extend RT beyond political economy into an analysis of the 
'superstructure' in order to understand how capitalism achieves its regulative capacity:
Answers [are to be found] ... in specific institutional forms social norms and 
patterns of strategic conduct that both expressed and regulated these conflicts 
(1988; 14).
Thus, rather than predicting the 'final stage of capitalism' or awaiting its 'imminent 
collapse', Regulationists seek out its regenerative capacity to transform itself. What is 
new about the Regulation approach, however, is the 'teleologism' built into their 
analysis. Thus, for British Regulationists, the present crisis has within it the seeds of a 
new system, namely, post-Fordism 10 .
In Britain, at least, RT seeks to explain new emerging social and political relations based 
on post-Fordist productive relations:
Post-Fordism is the nearest thing we have to a paradigm that can link 
widespread changes in forms of production to changes in class relations, state 
forms and individual identities (Rustin, 1988: 36).
Taking account of Marxist debates over relative autonomy that have occurred over the 
last twenty years, RT seems to be coming home to its material roots, encompassing 
notions of class struggle, changes in production, consumption and the state. Probably the
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chief achievement of RT is this shedding of dogmatism and for bringing back the debate 
from degenerating into liberalism or idealism. For Discourse Theory everything, 
including the economy, is discursively constructed (Keane 1988, Baudrillard 1988, 
Lyotard 1987, Foucault 1977) whereas Regulationists argue that they accord the 
economy a rightful place.
The economy plays a determining role, but the political has the dominant role 
(Jessop 1989: 12).
Jessop argues that Regulationists do not privilege any one point over any other but 
acknowledge different levels. The 'correspondence' between these levels is not 
automatic but the product of struggles 11 . The figure below represents one possible 
regime of accumulation and its corresponding regulative ensemble.
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Figure 2. Accumulation Regime and Regulative Ensemble.
Jessop is keen to emphasise the dynamism of RT. No Mode of Regulation can last 
forever, new regimes arise, but this is not determined in advance but contingent upon 
struggle. With RT, transitions are not seen as inevitable, nor are they deemed to be
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automatically successful. 'Flawed' regimes can come into existence (hence Jessop's 
theory of "flawed Fordism" in Britain).
The Transition to Fordism
Aglietta (1979, 1982) sees two main Modes of Accumulation (MOA), Extensive and 
Intensive. More popularly referred to as pre-Fordist and Fordist/post-Fordist modes of 
growth. This opens up ambiguities in the Regulation approach as some Regulationists 
talk of post-Fordist regimes as new modes of accumulation whereas Aglietta, saw both 
Fordist and post-Fordist accumulation regimes as pan of the Intensive Mode of 
Accumulation.
For Aglietta, the extensive period of growth was marked by the spread of industry rather 
than maximisation of resources and labour. Under the system of extensive accumulation, 
Regulationists argue that non-commodity relations predominate over commodity 
relations. Within the intensive regime commodity relations come to predominate and 
capital perfects its technique of labour control along Fordist lines.
Regulationists argue that the 1929 crisis reflected the disjuncture between productive 
capacity and consumptive capacity a disjuncture which they maintained existed until the
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1950s when production and consumption capacities were harmonised on the basis of a 
Fordist ensemble (Aglietta 1979, Lipietzl986).
This ensemble is then analysed at several levels the productive level, the labour process, 
consumption patterns and the superstructure supporting the Fordist Regime of 
Accumulation (Jessop 1988).
The Productive Level - Fordism is based on mass production and mass consumption. 
Products are standardised and a new balance is said to be struck between Department 1 
&212 .
The Labour Process - Mass production is achieved by a mechanised assembly line based 
on Taylorist (time and motion) methods. The task is deskilled to the level at which it can 
be performed by a 'trained gorilla'.
The argument is that these two processes revolutionised production to the extent that 
other firms were compelled to adopt the same techniques on pain of extinction and thus 
Fordism becomes the dominant, or generalised 'mode of production' for Regulationists.
Consumption Patterns - Consumption is massified and demand maintained by a variety 
of means, in which hire purchase and credit play important roles. Trade Unions also 
grow and create bargaining structures so as to match wages to profits and/or output and
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so maintain demand. The Keynesian welfare state ensures the absence of possible slumps 
and welfare benefits ensure the consumption capacity of the poorer sections of society.
The Fordist Superstructure - Some elements of this have already been noted, i.e. 
Keynesianism, the Welfare State and collective bargaining. Many Regulationists see a 
close fit between the Regime of Accumulation (ROA) and the socio-political system 
(Hirsch 1983). A sophisticated abstract economism thus breaks through. The Mode of 
Integration (MOI) of the working class is said to switch from the repressive to the 
ideological. Poulantza's (1978) notion of the increasing penetration of the state into 
more and more spheres of society is particularly relevant here. Political parties become 
transformed as notions of class are said to wither, replaced, instead, by status groups, 
consensus politics, and a one nation strategy. The State is argued to increase its support 
for the economy through tariffs, active restructuring and socialising losses.
The Fordist Economy
Regulationists stress that the new mode of growth modifies the laws of capitalism in a 
number of spheres including the boom-slump cycle, wage relations, credit and inflation. 
Post-war Fordist capitalism is perceived as an entirely different regime to that of the 
pre-war extensive regime. Regulationists see the extensive regime as being characterised
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by competition and price reduction sales drives whereas under the intensive regime, 
competition is replaced by monopoly, stagnant wages with real rising wages, and sales 
increased not so much by lowering prices but by raising wages (Aglietta 1979). Inflation 
and enhanced credit facilities take on new force within the Fordist economy. 
Monopolistic capital enables firms to anticipate market saturation and depreciation 
which comes to be accommodated through:
1) Building it into the price
2) Building in planned obsolescence
3) Offsetting depreciation costs through:
(a)Rising prices
(b)Rising wages
For RT new crises emerge because powerful unions are capable of forcing up wages 
faster than profits. The Fordist mode of growth, however, does not collapse but rather it 
drifts to overaccumulation and rising 'social overheads' act as a drain on the system. 
Hence, Regulationists see Thatcherism as an attempt to commodity previously social 
costs through the privatisation of public services. As long as relative surplus-value 
continued to increase through productivity increasing faster than wages and increases in 
'social overheads' Fordism could endure, but by the mid-seventies, Regulationists argue 
that this was no longer the case. The only way out was the transition to a new regime of 
accumulation .
61
For Regulationists, Capitalism is thus metamorphosing into a new post-Fordist mode of 
growth which contains the possibilities of sustained accumulation.
Post-Fordism as an Ideal Type
Regulationists define post-Fordism in terms of an 'ideal type' (Jessop, 1988) which has a 
number of key elements:
Product: Regulationists argue that post-Fordist manufacture is geared towards 
customisation and market niching. Economies of scope are said to replace economies of 
scale. The emphasis in consumption shifts from keeping up with the Jones's to asserting 
ones own individual style.
Dictatorship of Individualism: Regulationists assert the predominance of consumer 
choice/changed consumer lifestyles which, presumably, are fed back to manufacturers 
who dutifully produce the requisite commodities. Fordist methods fail to address the 
needs of the new discerning customer. Consequently, purpose built machines designed to 
build one or two items are said to be giving way to more sophisticated general purpose 
machines that can perform a multiplicity of tasks and produce a variety of different 
products.
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Labour: Regulationists see changes in productive technique making themselves felt on 
working practices. The emphasis is said to be away from mindless repetitive deskilled 
work towards flexibility of labour, presumably to match the flexibility of the machines, 
rather than the exploitative requirements of capital, i.e. its social relations of surplus 
extraction. The post-Fordist worker is said to be given more tasks, particularly in quality 
control, which in turn has ramifications on the management structure. Whereas Fordist 
workers were carefully policed by layers of foremen and managers, now the need is for 
self-regulation along supposedly Japanese lines which typically have six or seven layers 
of management, in contrast to Ford's and General Motors twenty seven layers. Core 
trusted workers are able to secure good wages in return for 'flexibility' and co-operation 
with management (as in the 'New Unionism' of the EETPU, etc.) and at the expense of 
the peripheral work force, on low pay, no benefits and short term contracts. These 
workers, along with the long term unemployed, are argued to constitute a new 
'underclass' excluded from the affluence of the majority, within the post-Fordist 
economy, and left to survive on the fringes of that economy subject to policing, 
intimidation and further marginalisation by a minimalist State professing a hands off 
free-market philosophy (Leadbeater 1987).
The Superstructure: Regulationists associated with the Communist Party of Great 
Britain and 'Marxism Today' see the Trade Unions giving in to a 'new realism' or 'new 
unionism' as the sting is taken out of unions via incorporation into the new post-Fordist
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consensus, with core workers and their unions offering co-operation with employers in 
return for benefits. The result is the growth of'company unionism' and the break-down 
of traditional bargaining and negotiation procedures. Under post-Fordism, political 
parties are also said to become more like 'Public Relations' agencies, regulating between 
the elements of a segmented, divided society. Presidential populist styles come to 
predominate as personalities replace real issues. Consensual democracy of the Fordist 
era is argued to give way to 'plebiscitary populism' and a 'security state' to discipline the 
underclass which rapidly learns it has nothing to loose but its chains.
The concepts, 'regime of accumulation' and 'mode of regulation', are attempts to revise 
and broaden the scope of hitheno economistic Marxism's, to take account of the role of 
the broader social system in the maintenance and reproduction of capitalism. As Rustin 
argues:
The originality of the regulation approach is its recognition of the systemic 
consequences of changing technologies, forms of organisation and class 
relations, both in the economic sphere itself (production, circulation and 
consumption), and for neighbouring spheres of political and social life. The 
disagregation of essentially dualistic forms of class relations, institutionalised in 
forms of industrial relations and government in the period from the New Deal to 
the inflationary crisis of the 1970s, into a more dispersed, differentiated, and 
individualised series of relations between capitals and its various social partners 
and antagonists, does seem like a major shift in the axes of social organisation. It 
also seems that the development of information technologies and the immensely 
powerful and cheap communication which these give rise is the essential motor 
of these changes, without which they would not have been able to occur (1990: 
42).
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Regulationists and post-Fordists offer a tempting theorisation of change within the 
capitalist mode of production. Certain features which they identify such as moves 
towards flexible production processes or the individualisation of consumption, have 
become part and parcel of the advertising, media and academic debate the accepted 
'common-sense' discourse of the 1990s.
Regulation theory is emerging out of a more orthodox Marxist school but in the process 
much is being lost and revised. In particular, value analysis, the very linchpin of Marx's 
own assessment of the developmental tendencies of capitalism, is downplayed and 
misunderstood. As Gough argues:
Current debate on 'post-Fordism' is centred on technical-organisational 
questions. The forms of the labour process, organisation of the firm, inter-firm 
relations and the relation between production and consumption are approached 
from this view point, the viewpoint of industrial sociology, managerial and 
organisational theory. What is neglected in the debate, is how the 
technical-organisational questions fit with the social relations represented in 
value. This is not a small omission. Value is the key social representation of 
labour in capitalist society. The question of value is the question of how different 
labours are commensurated; of the means by which surplus labour is extracted 
from workers by capital (surplus-value); of the dynamic of capital accumulation 
(self-expanding value, the circuits of capital through money to productive forms 
to money): the question of money, credit and capitalisation; and of the 
contradictions within these forms. The current discussion of 'post-Fordism' 
abstracts from these questions of value analysis and ignores the contradictions of 
the capitalist mode of production which value analysis has demonstrated (1990: 
1-2).
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Gough's argument is that 'post-Fordist' capital labour relations can be theorised more 
coherently through value analysis and that this analysis suggests that present 
organisational-technical forms, i.e. 'post-Fordism' are episodic, a function of the period 
of crisis, rather than the features of a new long term regime of accumulation.
Given that Aglietta's text 'A theory of Capitalist Regulation' was concerned precisely to 
relate the labour process and forms of organisation to value production, current 
Regulationist writing downplays value analysis. Geddes draws out the determinism of 
such an approach:
Post-Fordist theory proposes that at the heart of the new era of post-Fordism, 
are new forms of capital labour relations. These forms are typically assumed to 
be able to overcome the problems for capital contained within the Fordist labour 
process, and thus constitute the basis for a qualitatively new era of accumulation. 
Implicit in this assumption is the notion that such forms are relatively stable and 
productive - otherwise they would not be able to constitute the basis for a 
'sustained long wave of accumulation (1988: 93).
The post-Fordist model assumes stabilisation of class relations: bought out 'core' 
workers complying with management, i.e. utilising their initiative within a variable labour 
process, and 'peripheral' workers controlled within the labour process and within 
negotiations over wages and conditions out of fear of the sack. They are also easily 
replaced by the reserve army of unemployed.
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However. Elam and Bjorsen (1989) and Gertler (1989) have pointed to the weaknesses 
of'flexible integration' as a strategy of accumulation, i.e. the high degree of dependency 
of firms on skilled, multiflexible labour and lack of 'tautness' characteristic of 'just-in- 
time' production systems. Of course, Regulationists may agree that these new systems 
are unstable and argue that this does not undermine the approach of the Regulationists in 
any way. But, surely, the very indeterminacy of such relations bring into question the 
viability of constructing models emphasising emerging 'regimes of accumulation' which 
have, as their underlying assumption, the generation of historically superior or stable 
'flexible integration' accumulation forms. As Gough (1990) argues, the class relations of 
the 'core' have specific contradictions, largely by-passed by the Regulationists. To the 
extent that, in the interests of collaboration, security of employment is guaranteed by 
capital and labour can use this security to resist intensification. The high organic 
composition characteristic of the core gives labour the power to immobilise expensive 
plant. High wage differentials between core and peripheral workers may help in 
establishing control but to the extent that they do not correspond to productivity 
differences, they disrupt the role of value in establishing proportionality's across the 
division of labour. Within each firm, the high integration of tasks and stages of 
production makes it difficult to apportion rewards according to output or effort. This 
produces a tendency to hourly or uniform payment rather than output related payment. 
Yet this conflicts with the individualisation of terms of employment and incentives to 
individual initiative which are said to characterise post-Fordist relations within the 'core'. 
This is possibly one reason why Japanese firms have sophisticated measures of
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punishment underlying their more paternalistic face (Briggs 1986, Williams et al 1990). 
The problems do not stop here, however, because in the periphery insecurity of 
employment produces low commitment from workers and low investment in training 
from employers. These tend to limit the volume of production per worker and especially 
the quality of production. Thus, in both core and periphery, capital faces problems of 
simultaneously obtaining co-operation from workers and imposing control (Friedman 
1986).
Regulationists theorise the transition to post-Fordism as a 'technical organisational' 
question. The crisis in the old regime of accumulation is articulated as the crisis of 
Fordist production or organisational techniques, not as an accumulation crisis. This has 
dramatic repercussions on the theorisation of capital-labour relations. A period of crisis 
tends to lead to increasing differentials in wages and conditions via the differentiated 
ability of firms to pay and the expression of competitive pressures in incentives. The ebb 
and flow of capital in and out of sectors (in an attempt to generate above average rates 
of profit) and the equalisation of profit rates within sectors (and also the resultant fall off 
and renewed search for new sources of profitability) lead to combined and uneven 
development of sectors, productive forces and relations of production. This results in 
capital - labour differentials which are further exacerbated by the increased level of 
unemployment. These mechanisms, arising from the value relations of capitalism, are 
sufficient in themselves to explain not so much a core-periphery but a long spectrum of
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wages and conditions and emphasise the instability of particular groups of workers on 
this continuum.
Stagnant and uneven accumulation tends to have a disciplining effect on all workers. But 
for skilled workers there is a contrary tendency. In periods of low average profitability or 
uncertainty about future profitability, investment in the reproduction of skilled labour 
power tends to tail off leading to an increase in the bargaining power of this group. This 
divergence of bargaining power between different groups of workers can appear as core- 
periphery differences. Further, a period of crisis is a contradictory time in which to 
introduce highly integrated and/or high organic composition labour processes. Whilst the 
disciplining effect of the crisis can facilitate the introduction of such processes, the 
co-operation of the workforce necessary for the successful utilisation of such processes 
is constantly undermined by high unemployment, calls for wage restraint, wage cuts and 
widening or accentuated differentials.
In a period of crisis, the contradiction between the spatial mobility and immobility of 
capital becomes sharpened but not resolved. As Harvey (1982) argues, the social nature 
of capitalist production tends to produce spatial concentration of production due to 
socialisation of labour and skills in particular industries and regions, the mutual 
dependency of different branches of production, the requirement for supporting 
infrastructures, local skills and knowledge and the long turnover times necessitated by 
many types of fixed capital. In times of crisis this 'immobilisation' of capital has its
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contradictions, which, manifest in value terms, are none other than inflation in ground 
rents (land values), in the price of infrastructure and in the price of labour power (Harvey 
1982). The immobility of capital tending to prevent an adequate commensuration of 
labour in different localities, regions and countries and consequently from adequately 
rendering labour as abstract labour and labourers as abstract labourers. Thus, there is 
also a tendency towards spatial mobility as capital seeks to remove the particular 
concrete ties that labour has to it. This leads to the reproduction of core-periphery in 
geographical form, although this is a highly unstable division, as capital is able to 
decentralise from the core or recentralise from the periphery. In contrast, post-Fordists 
tend to see the 'peripheralisation' of capital as evidence of a dramatic historical rupture 
in regimes of accumulation rather than as a derivative of the contradictory nature of the 
capitalist accumulation process.
Regulation theorists tend to see the rapid technological innovation of post-Fordism, i.e. 
'flexible integration' as overcoming the root of crisis whereas this technological 
dynamism (in value terms a reflection of the rise in the social organic composition of 
capital) is the very precursor of crisis. Moreover, the particular dispersion of wage 
increases and differentials has further narrowed the range of potential consumers 
throughout the 1980s. Regulationists might argue that the relation of wages, 
productivity and prices obtaining over the last ten to fifteen years is episodic and a 
function of crisis, and that a new regime of accumulation which accomplished a 
generalised revival of the international capitalist economy would involve a different
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wage-productivity-price relation. According to Gough (1990), such an argument 
concedes a lot since it implies that the supposed new regime of accumulation cannot be 
read off from current trends, and that the wage relation in the 1970s and 1980s has been 
constructed by a crisis of accumulation, rather than by 'post-Fordist' changes in the 
labour process.
A further feature identified within the post-Fordist literature is the supposed match 
between product variety demanded by consumers and the product variety possible with 
the dominant labour-process. Standardised Fordist production runs are supposed to give 
way to shorter more varied 'niche', even customised products. Several points need 
emphasising here: first, there is no reason to suppose that new labour processes are 
being used to create greater product variety than classical Fordist or Sloanist labour 
processes (Gough 1990). Second, such an argument ignores the fact that production 
under capitalism is first and foremost production of exchange-value (although every 
exchange value must have a use value). Individual capitalists do not care what they 
produce so long as they produce an adequate rate of profit. The supposed tendency 
towards variety in products may thus be a function of the value relations of a particular 
conjuncture, the impact of the crisis of accumulation on the structure of consumer 
demand, increasing differentials and cheapening of the elements of Department 2 rather 
than the subordination of capitalist production to consumer interest. Finally, value 
analysis indicates that variety is episodic, a function of this period of crisis rather than an
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indicator of a new more permanent regime of accumulation (Hyman 1988, Thompson 
1991, Williams and Cutler etal 1987).
One can challenge the notion of a Fordist regime of accumulation both theoretically and 
empirically. My research confirms that within capitalism there are a variety of labour 
processes. One need not be prioritised over the other, as the key element is production 
of surplus-value. Historically this has tended to take the form of the subsumption of 
labour to capital in the machine process, i.e. the extraction of relative, as opposed to 
absolute surplus-value, but the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive but contingent, 
amongst other things, on class struggle14 .
Regulationists argue that it was a Fordist accumulation regime which was responsible for 
the long-wave post second World War boom, but as Clarke (1988) and Mandel (1975 ) 
have argued, the post-war reconstruction was not marked by Fordism per se but by 
austerity, sharp industrial and political class struggles and by increasing state intervention 
and credit expansion. The driving force of accumulation in this period was not mass 
consumption and Keynesianism but profits. The dynamism of the boom derived from the 
high profits of the immediate post war era, pent up demand, and the massive increase in 
the product of manufacturing industry absorbed by the non-productive sectors - notably 
the State-military, infrastructure, etc.. The post-war boom was certainly different from 
previous booms. But the qualitative difference lay, not in the structure of the regime of 
accumulation, based on Fordist labour processes, but in the fact that national and
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international authorities were willing to sustain accumulation via an unprecedented 
expansion of the credit system. This prompts Clarke to conclude:
The regulation approach not only over-estimates the stability and duration of 
'Fordist' modes of regulation, it also overestimates the contribution of Fordism 
to the post war boom (1988: 16).
Aglietta was aware that the Fordist accumulation regime was marked with contradiction 
this took the form of inflation through monopoly price fixing, used to counter rising 
wages, social overheads and depreciation, which were manifest in a tendency for the rate 
of profit to fall. For Aglietta, new crisis could only be overcome and accumulation 
sustained if capital could find ways of increasing the production of relative surplus-value.
The problem is that new 'flexible' modes of increasing relative surplus value are 
abstracted not only from class struggle but the market and the international division of 
capital and labour. The fact is that some companies may introduce flexible production 
processes only to find they do not have the skilled labour or industrial relations to 
operate them successfully. Additionally, they may find that the market for such products 
changes and that it is necessary to switch to dedicated high volume production. There is 
also the possibility that competition will force investment in dedicated products or that 
monopoly position dictates a squeezing out of 'flexible' competitors through utilising 
high flows and price rigging, etc.
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The weaknesses of the Regulation approach flow from their theory of overaccumulation. 
Aglietta (1979) ascribes overaccumulation to the surplus profits derived from 
Department 1 which are argued to arise as the result of invention of new machines or as 
a result of increased demand resulting from the growth in the social organic composition 
of capital. These surplus profits are argued to fuel the 'animal spirits' of capitalists in 
Department 1, their resultant 'euphoria' sustaining their over-investment even when 
over-production occurs. Thus, for Aglietta, the source of overaccumulation is the 
prospect of surplus profits provided by the exploitation of temporary market 
opportunities, and the explanation is Keynesian, overaccumulation deriving from the 
subjective irrationality of entrepreneurial expectations.
However, Aglietta misses the point: Marx sought to locate the contradictions of 
capitalism, not in the subjective irrationality of capitalists but in the objective features of 
the capitalist mode of production. Aglietta's critique of neo-classical conceptions of the 
market does not go far enough: he explores the relations between the major 
Departments of production without questioning the efficacy of the market in regulating 
relations within branches of production, thus abstracting from the uneven development 
of the forces of production within specific branches of production which is the driving 
force of accumulation, the source of overaccumulation and crisis. As Clarke argues:
It is not surplus profits offered by a growing market but competitive pressure, 
based on the uneven development of the forces of production, which forces 
individual capitalists to seek to constantly revolutionise the forces of production 
(1988: 19).
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The tendency towards overaccumulation in all branches of production, however, new, 
old, big or small, is not determined by the anarchy of the market, but by the 
contradictory form of capitalist accumulation. As competition compels capital to 
constantly revolutionise and expand the forces of production, without regard to the 
limits of the market, the consequence is that new methods of production become 
generalised through devaluation, liquidation, intensification of labour and redundancy: 
the developmental norm of capitalism.
Keynesians and Regulationists see overaccumulation and underconsumption as two sides 
of the same coin. Both have a distorted understanding of the relationship between credit 
and overaccumulation. In the boom, credit expansion enables capital to temporarily 
suspend the barriers to accumulation by enabling production to take place in those 
sectors operating with below average rates of labour productivity, in short those 
producing with more than the socially necessary labour needed to produce. This is fine 
whilst credit fuels expansion of market and finances new ventures and consumption but 
it does not solve the fundamental problem, namely, the need to restructure or rationalise 
the various branches of production. By 'socialising' the costs of the devaluation of 
capital, credit merely stimulates the inflationary overaccumulation of capital with the 
attendant risk of even more devastating crises in the future as the reality gap between 
prices and actual values widens.
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Regulationists argue that the historical tendency towards overaccumulation is mediated 
by institutional forms. However, these institutional forms are not the 'modes of 
regulation' and 'regimes of accumulation' which Regulationists document. Rather, they 
are the institutional forms of class struggle. The overaccumulation of capital takes on the 
form of an intensification of the competitive struggle between capitals and of the 
industrial struggle between capitalists and workers.
These struggles are conditioned upon a historically developed institutional form of 
labour relations, industrial structure, geography, credit, system, etc. The struggle is not 
confined within these forms but is a struggle to maintain or transform them as capitalists 
and workers confront these forms as barriers to their own reproduction. 
Overaccumulation crises do not automatically lead to the dislocation of the structural 
integration of the regime of accumulation. They lead to an intensification of the 
competitive and class struggle which impose themselves on the State which cannot 
simply be reduced to a superstructural expression of structural forms of the monetary 
and wage relation as Regulationists imply. This is because the State plays a fundamental 
role in attempting to confine social reproduction within the alienated forms of the wage 
and monetary relation by enforcing the laws of capitalist property and contract and by 
regulating the reproduction of the working class, through systems of social 
administration. One reason why the institutional forms of capitalist social relations, are 
not 'modes of regulation' which institutionalise some kind of social democratic class
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compromise, according to the structural imperatives of a regime of accumulation, but 
rather institutional forms of class domination which express a particular configuration of 
class struggle.
For Regulationists, the relative stability of a particular accumulation regime has to be 
assured by corresponding modes of societal and hegemonic forms of 
integration/repression: the 'mode of regulation'. The concepts of integration/repression 
impinge, mainly at the level of the state. Poulantzas' notion of state politicisation of more 
and more spheres of social and economic life is very important here. Hirch (1983) and 
Lipietz (1987) attempt to theorise state forms and functions in relation to changes in 
production, thus seeking to unite complex economic, political and ideological 
phenomena into a unified structure, the development of which is said to be conditioned 
by the laws of capitalist development and class struggle (Hirsh 1983). A particular 
articulation or ensemble of regulative forms is argued to correspond to a particular 
regime of accumulation. However, the mechanisms and processes whereby these forms 
come to constitute the 'regulative ensemble' are unclear. Following Gramsci, there is a 
strong tendency within the Regulation approach to disarticulation of the constituent 
elements of the regulative ensemble. We are offered concepts of 'contending historical 
blocs' and 'projects' but no sense of determinacy between them. No answer is offered as 
to which agency co-ordinates the strategy of accumulation and which one assembles the 
hegemonic project in order to achieve 'the state'. Consequently, the state comes out of 
all this more as an arena of struggle than as a class state executing the general interests of
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capital. In effect, and unintentionally, Regulationists thus offer a theoretical model which 
can underpin the very reformist conceptions of the state which many wished to challenge 
(Aglietta 1979, Jessop 1988).
According to Bonefeld (1987) the Regulationists dual perspective of structural 
determination and class position fails to recognise 'objective laws' as derivatives of the 
class relation. For Regulationists, it is the development of capital accumulation which 
determines the environment of struggle. Class struggle thus loses Marxist significance as 
the motor force of history and we are left with what Bonefeld calls 'process without 
subject'.
Jessop (1988) denies this, arguing that Regulationists do not reduce class to a secondary 
factor. For example, their concept 'flawed Fordism' is taken as indicative that definitive 
prognosis of the transition towards post-Fordism is not possible precisely because of the 
unpredictability of class struggle. The 'contingent' outcome of a dialectic of structure 
and strategy'. However, this argument is weak. The fact that 'post-Fordism' is already 
theorised as an accumulation regime, in advance of class struggle, indicates the 
teleologism within the Regulation approach. Likewise, the Regulationist/ Poulantzian 
assumption of the 'a priori' statification of society is implicitly functional and 
reductionist. The state is seen to constitute, regulate, integrate and secure capitalist 
reproduction. Within this paradigm there is an over-emphasis on the state as the primary 
force of'recomposition' of society. Regulationists exaggerate the power of the state by
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assuming the functionality of compatible state action toward the pre-supposed needs of 
capital reproduction. As Bonefeld argues:
The stratification of society results in the Gorzian "farewell to the working class" 
and the welcome to its successor: social movements (see Hirsch 1980; 
Hirsch/Roth, 1986) ... Instead of being seen in terms of a pluralist struggle for 
shares in power, in order to secure the viability of a certain fractional 
accumulation strategy, the State should be analysed as a mediation of the 
historical transformation of the direct production process (Negri 1977) ... The 
State has once more, to be seen as at the centre of the dialectic of the 
organisational repressive aspect of the presence of labour within capital (1987: 
123).
The consensual-concessional mode of integration which Regulationist argue constitute 
the Fordist period is now replaced by a hegemonic project, based on social division and 
marginalisation. The shift to the 'right' in the leading imperialist countries is postulated 
as a period of 'radicalisation' which is necessary for the restructuring of production 
relations on a post-Fordist basis. However, the conception of a post-Fordist historical 
block abstracts social phenomena from the complex diversity and heterogeneity of a 
transition period. As expressions of struggle, Fordism and post-Fordism are 
conceptualised as pure blocks, as 'accumulation regimes'. In reality, they are full of 
cracks, fissures and contradictions and never just a synchronisation of functionally 
required regulative forms. As Bonefeld argues:
The Fordist/post-Fordist debate interprets historical tendency in terms of its 
more or less close approximation to a model, whose pure form is allegedly 
progressively disclosed. But this is to depart from the conception of historically 
specific determination on which Marx's own method turns (1987: 126).
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Although an increasing number of commentators suggest that capitalist industry and 
society is undergoing qualitative change as evidenced in the plethora of terminology used 
to denote it, i.e. 'neo-Fordism', 'post-Fordism', 'post-Modernism', 'Nextism', 
'Benettonism', Troudhonism', 'Japanisation', 'Flexible specialisation' etc.. There is little 
certainty as to its future character. Faced with such complex and contradictory social 
phenomenon it is tempting to go for 'binary histories': industrial versus post-industrial, 
Fordist versus post-Fordist, modem versus post-modern, etc.. Such a process, as Sayer 
argues, is fraught with risk and misconceptions:
Inevitably we end up with overburdened dualism's and overelastic concepts. 
Worse, we invite a consequent diminution in the richness and therefore the 
power of our conceptual equipment. The trouble with concepts like Fordism, 
post-Fordism and flexible specialisation is that they are overly flexible and 
insufficiently specialised (1990: 17).
Aglietta's pioneering work was based exclusively on an assessment of the United States 
and neither the Parisian, German or British schools have took an internationalist 
perspective of production and consumption under capitalism. The international market, 
international division of labour, combined and uneven development of capital, and 
imperialist articulation of the world economy have tended to be pushed into the 
background, as each school has sought to examine those particular regulative tendencies 
of interest to it. These tendencies are invariably national, and invariably geared towards 
leading edge sectors to highlight those processes facilitating a new accumulation regime
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and mode of regulation. The abstraction of regimes of accumulation from the 
international division of labour and multinationals ability to exploit the vagaries offered 
by differently constituted social formations casts doubt on the theoretical and empirical 
validity of the model.
The lifelessness of the Regulation approach becomes all the more stark when one 
contrasts the intemationalisation and interpenetration of capital in different countries. 
The search for profits may dictate, within a given social formation (comprising given 
labour skills, geography, political climate, resources, etc.) that mass production on 
'Fordist' lines are introduced, for example, car body panels made in Korea and Spain 
whilst more sophisticated manufacturing processes, say, engine build, is undertaken in 
Belgium or Britain supplying not only more skilled labour, but a developed infrastructure 
which can accommodate a different number of build processes ranging from mass flow 
line to dedicated batch, etc. There is little theorisation within the Regulation approach of 
the international division of labour or capitals ability to move in and out of markets and 
sectors in search of average, or above average, rates of profit and the concomitant effect 
this has upon the composition and recomposition of labour and forms and variety of 
labour which may exist side by side within the same manufacturing process, or within 
different processes. One need not historically supersede or exclude the other because the 
limits to surplus-value are not merely contingent on technical or organisational divisions 
of labour. More importantly than this, within the Regulation approach, there is no 
conception of Imperialism, of Imperialist exploitation, and of the decisive skew
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imperialism adds to the formation and consolidation of labour processes within particular 
social formations.
Generalisations about 'Fordism' are spurious enough, never mind 'post-Fordism'. Thus, 
Littler (1985) argues that in Britain less than 700,000, out of a total workforce of 20 
million, work directly on Fordist lines. Even then, few of the problems which are alleged 
to dog Fordism (i.e. line balancing, labour resistance) apply in these sections alone 
(Meegan 1988). Regulationists make too simple a deduction, arguing,
1) post-war capitalism can be characterised as Fordist
2) capitalism is currently in crisis
3) therefore, Fordism is in crisis.
It does not necessarily follow that Fordism is the cause of capitalism's crisis. Many mass 
production sectors are highly profitable. My own research indicates that some firms are 
actually switching away from 'flexible production' of 'niche' products to standardised 
dedicated high volume mass production. Likewise, there is no reason why new mass 
production sectors which do not compete with old ones should not flourish, using 
Fordist, or even pre-Fordist, methods so long as they are able to attain average or above 
average rates of profit.
Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence to show a relative decline in rates of output 
or productivity increases in the mass production industries (Meegan 1988, Williams 
1987)15 . As Pollert (1987) argues, many users of the term 'flexibility' have either
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deliberately or unintentionally overlooked the double edged, value-laden character of the 
word. Flexibility in the abstract sounds agreeable but not always when considered in the 
concrete, e.g. the debilitating effects of working alternate blocks of day and night shifts.
Flexibility is no more the secret of capital accumulation than is deskilling. 
Capitalist industry has always combined flexibility's and inflexibility's, and what 
are possibly emerging now are new permutations of each, rather than a simple 
trend towards greater flexibility, period (Sayer, 1990: 26).
For Clarke:
The past decade has not so much seen a restructuring of the regime of 
accumulation, based on the development of post-Fordist forms of production, as 
a sustained offensive against the working class, aimed primarily at the 
destruction of the institutional forms of the Keynesian Welfare State which 
underlay the ability of the organised working class to realise a consumption 
norm, based on a generalised expectation of rising living standards ... While 
Keynesianism was the ideological expression of the attempt of capital and the 
state to respond to the generalised aspirations of the working class, in the post 
war boom, neo liberalism is the ideological expression of the subordination of 
working class aspirations to the valorisation of capital (1988:37).
The recovery of the late 1980s is not based on the development of new forms of 
production but sustained on the basis of the mass devaluation of capital and destruction 
of unprofitable productive capacity along with associated offensives against the 
organised working class. As one senior corporate manager I interviewed made clear this 
recovery has been sustained primarily by the intensification of labour:
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Lets make no bones about it one of the prime factors stimulating our own and 
other companies inward investments in the UK has been the dramatic turn 
around in work attitudes primarily fostered by the government but aided by a 
new economic realism and insecure job markets ... This has enabled companies 
to raise productivity and invest more confidently (Production Manager, Major 
Car Manufacturer, England).
Regulation theory in proclaiming the latent viability of new regimes of accumulation 
rather than theorising the moribund nature of capitalism and its essentially pernicious 
mode of accumulation, unwittingly provide the theoretical rationale for the regeneration 
of national economies rather than emphasising how national regeneration can only take 
place by confronting the barrier of working class aspirations.
Summary
In this chapter I have sought to highlight the transformative nature of capitalism and to 
discuss the ways in which both work organisations and broader social relations are 
continually changing. I have discussed the intensification of competition between firms 
and highlighted the key role of information technology in enabling management to 
restructure and rationalise work processes. At the same time I have discussed the 
possible impacts and ramifications of this technology and processes of restructuring on 
the broader social relations of production and wider society.
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Many firms are taking advantage of favourable legislation, high unemployment and a 
new political realism to rationalise operations and tighten control over employees. 
Information technology enables senior management to rationalise organisations as more 
and more operations - from marketing through to design and manufacture - become 
automated or computerised. In some organisations this technology has been 
accompanied by even more significant cultural and political changes; where this is the 
case information technology is often used surreptitiously to increase the surveillance and 
monitoring of ostensibly 'free' or 'harmonised' workforces. Importantly, it is being used 
to raise the rate of productivity of a whole army of white collar employees who, 
previously, were relatively immune from employers' attempts to either control them or 
to routinise their work.
In the following chapters I examine in detail the role of engineers and systems analysts as 
key 'change agents' within this process of restructuring. I shall be arguing that although 
neither engineers nor analysts are the blind agents of capital and, in fact, possess a 
significant degree of autonomy within the design process, their designs nonetheless often 
reinforce the dominance of capital over living labour within the production process.
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Engineers Values, Methods 
and Role in The Design Process
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Introduction
Engineers and systems analysts are two key groups of workers central to the process of 
business restructuring discussed in chapter one. It is they who design the technologies, 
and implement, maintain and develop systems and infrastructure that enables business to 
restructure. At the same time their design experience and career opportunities are 
intimately bound up with this process of restructuring1 .
Neither engineers nor systems analysts roles within the design process can be fully 
understood without reference to this broader institutional context of change. Both 
engineers and analysts articulate and justify their own particular work activity by referring 
to this broader institutional context and work in the context of a complex web of values 
and methodologies which are tested, contested and reassessed in this changing world2.
In this chapter I address two issues Firstly, factors which may account for the tendency 
amongst engineers towards designs which devalue, downplay or deskill human labour 
(Braverman, 1974, CSS, 1981, Noble, 1984, Rosenbrock, 1986). Secondly, the impact of 
engineers' practice, values and methods upon the work of systems analysts3 . Engineers 
constitute an interesting social group in their own right, standing as they do at the 
forefront of systems design broadly defined. No analysis of the process by which 
technologies come to be constructed can be complete without an exploration of this key 
social group.
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Do those designing and delivering technology consciously seek to provide capital with the 
means for 'disciplining the industrious classes'? How does capital translate its 'interest' 
into physical artefacts and manufacturing processes? How does it secure the co-operation 
of engineers and designers in this process? Do these engineers and designers automatically 
recognise, accept or acquiesce to 'capital's interest', or do they challenge it?
I will be arguing that an analysis of technological artefacts of the last two hundred years 
discloses the operation of a dominant ideological paradigm: distrust of the industrious 
classes and a need to control them, coupled to an often inhuman disregard for the people 
operating such technologies. However, I do not wish to maintain that all engineers and 
technologists per se are responsible for this situation; rather some of them are both the 
medium and mediators of such an ideology, as well as its victims.
My research indicates that there is consistency in the design and development of 
technologies geared towards the control and manipulation of human labour so as to 
intensify its exploitation. However, it is too simplistic to ascribe to all those responsible for 
such designs anti-workerist, pro-capitalist interests. I found that quite often engineers 
could be deeply troubled by the types of system they design:
To be honest, it would drive me crazy having to operate these blow moulding 
machines ... It is mind numbing repetitive work ... It must drive the girls crazy 
operating them..../Jf7ry build them like this?} ... Well, er, it's designed this way - 
cost benefited this way. [Really?} ...WelL, er, I suppose the intention is to keep
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wage costs down ... and give management control ... Well, there's no suppose 
about it, is there? ... But it's not a reasonable work system [and] no human being 
should really have to live like this ... Its not ideal [and] I'm not proud of it... but 
this is life (Production Engineer, Plastics Manufacturer, Wales).
Historically, engineers have proven to be quite critical of capitalist society and of 
individual capitalists. Thus, as Stabile (1987) and Meiskins (1983) argue, at the turn of the 
century, Veblen and sections of the American Electrical Engineers castigated the 
bourgeoisie, who were seen as parasitic and irrelevant to the organisation of production. 
Engineers argued that they knew best how to organise and control production which they 
perceived as an essentially technical process thrown into disruption by the operation of the 
market.
If we are to impute to engineers per se an anti-workerist mentality derived from their 
acceptance, wholesale or otherwise, of a pro-capitalist mentality, then what might that 
mentality look like? Also, by what means is it assimilated or reproduced? Finally, how 
then do we account for the similarity of designs in non-capitalist social formations in 
Eastern Europe prior to recent reforms? Lenin (1965), for example, believed that there 
was much that was progressive in 'scientific management'. If Marxist leaders like Lenin 
can abstract 'science' and 'methods' from its social relations of production, then we 
should not be too hard in our condemnation of engineers for committing an equal error 
and seeing in the methods of engineering a notion of abstract 'progress' and 'science'. 
Furthermore, engineers are no more immune from the commodification of social life and 
work processes than anyone else. That capitalism appears on the surface to be an
89
exchange of free equivalents - labour for an equivalent wage - and accumulation merely a 
technical process, is an illusion which most share. Criticism of this forms the basis of 
Marx's analysis of this mode of production and examination of the production of surplus 
value. It is not unreasonable to assume that many engineers and technologists, just like 
most others, fail to understand the commodity forms through which capital generates 
surplus value and, thus, see the organisation of production as natural and non-exploitative.
I shall argue that there is in engineering a set of values and methods which, though not 
mechanically derived from some notion of capital expediency, can act to reinforce 
capitalist social relations. These values and methods are produced in specific historical 
conjunctures. Some predate the development of capitalism itself, arising out of the 
interplay of a variety of social forces and cultures. Others represent more conscious 
attempts, particularly of large corporations, state agencies and professional bodies, to 
disseminate a particular world view amongst engineers.
Drawing on interviews, case study observation and literature reviews I have been able to 
document several major methodological approaches and value systems which inform the 
types of technologies and work systems which engineers design4 and which, when utilised, 
either individually or together, act to constitute a design culture or engineering system 
which can serve to both legitimise engineers practices and act to reinforce worker 
subordination within the design process. These approaches are formal theory, analytic
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theory, Taylorism and methods time measurement, control and systems theory, 
productivism, design purity and technological determinism5
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Formal Theory
Design is premised upon quantifying, standardising and controlling matter. This matter, 
however, by its very nature, exists only through process of continual change and 
transformation. Ironically, the very subject matter that constitutes the 'science' within 
engineering - for example, thermodynamics, with its emphasis on the continually changing 
states of solids, liquids and gases - is routinely forgotten when it comes to creating 
engineered states, be they specific technologies or entire production processes which call 
for order, control and stability6 .
As a result of the application of formal logic, an approach to engineering and design has 
emerged based around notions of constancy, stable systems and control. The objective of 
the design remit is to achieve an 'engineered predictable steady state', be it the balance of 
human and machine feeds on a manufacturing line, or the specific working tolerances of a 
bearing on a crankshaft. This is clearly indicated in the following commentaries of three 
very different engineers I interviewed, the first complaining about the difficulties of line 
balancing:
We seek to impose order where disorder is the norm. (Production Engineer, 
Automotive Components' Manufacturer, Wales).
The second is conscious of the contradiction between theory and practice:
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We have subject matter, like thermodynamics and fluid mechanics, the entropy 
law, etc., which inform us of the changing states of solids and liquids and the 
volatile nature of matter ... In reality, however, we must seek to hold fast that 
which moves, constrain that which changes, predict the unpredictable ... because 
we are engineers (Director, Artificial Intelligence Centre, Scotland).
The third highlights the problems that can emerge when design is premised on a formal 
basis:
I work with quantities ... Everything is reducible to a symbol - length (1), mass 
(m), thermodynamic temperature (t), etc., [and] my lads have access to whole 
volumes of calculus and conversion tables ... [When] a project comes in, work is 
assigned to each member of the team, who then start working out the calculations, 
moving to ever finer levels of abstraction, until we are satisfied that each phase of 
development of any particular component is 100% tested ... But I suppose each 
mathematical refinement, each ever more sophisticated model is ... a kind of 
bucking of reality ... We froze it for a moment and tested a specific piece of it in 
abstraction from the whole and it all added up nicely ... we congratulate ourselves 
... but when the clock starts again [and] when we get feedback from the customer 
and user, we hear the part failed, it dulled too quickly ... and our solution? Go 
back to ever more sophisticated calculus and programme for every conceivable 
contingency, using our latest simulation and graphics packages ... Something's 
wrong somewhere (Design Engineer, Pharmaceutical manufacturer, Scotland).
What these engineers are touching upon is a profound contradiction and antagonism, 
embodied in engineering methods and practice. It is an antagonism expressed in the 
predominance of formal logic within our society and within the scientific and engineering 
culture in particular7 .
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Mannheim (1973) argues that this leads to a situation where one no longer asks what one 
would like to know and what would be of decisive significance, but attempts to deal only 
with those complexities which are measurable, according to already existing methods8 .
Western engineering philosophy rests unwittingly on formal logic, which, according to 
Novack (1978), is the Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism which starts from the 
proposition that "AC is equal to 'A', a postulate which is accepted as an axiom for a 
multitude of practical human actions and generalisations. In reality ' A' is never equal to 
'A'9.
The axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' on the one hand appears to be the point of departure for 
engineer's knowledge and understanding, yet on the other hand, appears to be a major 
source of frustration, misjudgement and, indeed, error in design. Every machinist knows 
that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of bearing 
brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones, which should not, 
however, exceed certain limits, i.e. tolerance. By observing the norms of tolerance, the 
cones are considered as being equal when the tolerance is exceeded, the quantity goes 
over the quality and the cones are useless (Novack, 1978). An engineer designing cones 
and bearings can successfully calculate tolerances but he or she cannot always ensure that 
they are met in manufacture. Whilst incorporating tolerance in the design of a bearing is 
relatively straight forward, trying to engineer speeds and feeds on a production line using 
the same philosophical approach is fraught with far more problems, e.g. knowing precisely
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which series of quantitative analysis are going to bring about which type of qualitative 
change.
The critical assumption of formal logic is constancy: the need to engineer stable states. 
Mathematical models are constructed on the basis of formal logic to express, in numerical 
form, specific fixed states to enable calculations to be made on them. Once each abstract 
fixed state has been calculated and checked, it then becomes a matter of merely releasing 
the 'time freeze'. However, matter exists in time, and time and matter are continually 
changing. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that when frozen fast models are 
released, in time, they are often out of touch with changed realities. This argument was 
captured neatly by one of my interviewees:
One of the problems with traditional systems design approaches, is that the actual 
method by which you compiled information on current user practices, was highly 
dogmatic ... Projects tended to be driven from the top [and] too many 
unwarranted assumptions about the form and content of users work went 
unchallenged ... We would often assume, for example, that any particular user 
actually did the work as specified in the formal job remit, in reality all kinds of 
problems emerge [because] users do not always work to the book. In fact, they 
never work to the book. They may sequence their work in illogical fashion, do a 
variety of overlapping tasks, etc. ... We spent far too much time compiling 
statistics and information on the basis that the user environment was constant and 
readily knowable [and] no sooner had we spent thousands [of pounds] building 
information systems on the basis of this data than the system was outdated or only 
partially accurate ... The emphasis today, is on user generated systems using 
support software, visual displays, modelling and prototyping, etc., which, I 
suppose, is an acknowledgement that our existing methods and practice were out 
of date ... The aim now, is to build systems real time, interactively with users ... 
This has been quite a revolution in systems analysis and design (Industrial 
Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
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Analytic Theory
Reinforcing the 'formal logic' approach are two other notable value systems which impact 
upon western engineering and science. The first is what Hales (1982) terms the 'Scientific 
Revolution' which is a commitment to seeing the universe in mathematical and 
increasingly quantifiable terms, part of a general movement of empiricism emerging in the 
16th and 17th centuries. The second has its specific location within capitalist relations of 
production and is geared around prediction and control (Marx 1981, Marglin 1974, 
Braverman 1974).
The analytic approach is premised on the supposition that if each part of the system is 
perfect, the aggregate of the parts or the whole should be perfect as well. The fundamental 
assumption of this approach is that if we understand each part very well, we will also 
understand the entirety very well. This approach to design is microscopic and anatomical, 
focusing on individual parts and understanding the whole by dissecting it into its 
constituent parts. Intrinsic to such an approach is a recognition of the impartiality of the 
scientific and a faith in pure reason: so long as we study something long enough and hard 
enough we will solve its mystery. It is an approach emphasising analytic detachment and 
order.
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Yoshida (1989) argues that western designers and manufacturers severely proscribe the 
system being built via detailed analysis and design methodologies, detailed division of 
labour, close supervision and tight control. This argument is supported explicitly by a 
number of systems analysts and engineers I interviewed:
I think there is a tendency to dive into documentation and procedure before we 
really understand the more fundamental issues, like do we really need this system? 
What is its purpose? How will it handle change? etc. ... In my opinion this stems 
from the culture in which business is run, management driven, top-down projects 
premised upon having reliable quantitative data on each functioning part of the 
system ... Structured methods, and detailed analysis and design procedures, testify 
to this perennial obsession with trying to stick a number and a value on each 
aspect of the design process ... Design, in my opinion, should be more intuitive ... 
Good designers recognise that reality is every changing and unpredictable ... 
(Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
We tend to get bogged down in actual methods and calculations without realising 
that these methods actually impose their own logic, on the way we conceptualise 
the project... The methods tend to assume order and functionality at each stage of 
the design process and if you stick to them too closely, you will loose sight of the 
wood for the trees ... (Software Engineer Automotive Components Manufacturer, 
Wales).
In effect, tight boundaries are proscribed, in advance, for any particular project, then each 
aspect of it is undertaken via a detailed division of labour. Chan et al (1990) argue that a 
typical example of Western engineers' analytic and Taylorist mentality, can be found in the 
development of computer based Manufacturing and Resource Planning systems (MRP). 
In response to intensified international competition, many Western manufacturers were 
looking for ways of economising and rationalising production. A solution advanced by 
engineers and designers was MRP, a system which offered managers the prospect of
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tighter control over working practices and materials supply. Chan's argument is that MRP 
represents both the triumph and the failure of the analytic tradition within Western 
engineering: the notion that you understand and perfect the system - in this case, 
manufacturing processes - through perfecting, controlling and monitoring each individual 
sub-part of the whole10 .
Yoshida (1989) argues that, in contrast to the analytic approach characteristic of western 
engineering and management, a holistic approach predominates in Japan. This approach 
takes the position that even if each part is perfect, the whole may still not be perfect. The 
fundamental assumption being that the entirety is more than the sum of its parts. 
Synergism, or Gestalt, might be used to describe this approach. Yoshida maintains that the 
holistic approach is rooted in a different cultural tradition: the distinctiveness of the 
Japanese social formation, with its homogenous race, language and supposedly shared 
value system. By contrast, Yoshida argues that Americans, with their heterogeneous 
culture and Taylorist value system, seek to proscribe the boundaries or perimeter of the 
system, once rigid boundaries are defined. People then fall into a habit, or philosophy, of 
doing only that which is prescribed for them, i.e. Taylor's ideal:
Under our system, a worker is told just what he has to do and how to do it. Any 
improvement he makes upon the orders given to him is fatal to his success (1906: 
4).
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This leads to a sapping of initiative and creativity within the design process, the under 
utilisation of skills and intensified problems of alienation and resentment (CSS 1981, 
Cooley 1981, Wood 1989).
Taylorism and Methods Time Measurement
Formal and analytic approaches to design are buttressed by many engineers' acceptance of 
Taylorist and Methods Time Measurement (MTM) inspired philosophies11 .
For Taylor, engineers would be the ones who would systematically plan others' labour 
and, at the same time, be the repositories of knowledge of production processes and 
techniques. Taylor's initial formulations of'scientific management' were extended by the 
engineers Maynard, Stegmerten and Schwab into MTM12. Taylorist notions of 
manufacturing, as a science, predicated upon the creation of constant stable states and the 
rationale application of knowledge is taken several stages further by MTM theorists. Each 
operation is broken down into the movements required and the time needed. This may 
entail close observation and timing of workers but also draws upon a massive body of 
standardised data, developed by industrial engineers, concerning the way in which 
operations can be simplified to achieve maximum economies of motion, thereby reducing 
the time required for tasks. Emery (1981) argues that if we look at traditional practices in 
designing a mass flow line, we find that critical assumption has slipped in and has been
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reinforced by the widespread reliance on MTM as a planning tool. This assumption is that 
it must be possible for each worker to be responsible to an external supervisor for his or 
her individual performance. On this assumption, MTM goes beyond being a planning tool 
to determine the probable labour requirements of sections of the line and becomes part of 
the detailed day-to-day supervisory control over production. Under this impetus, 
fragmentation of tasks heads down to the lowest common denominator of the labour on 
the line. Each component part of the line is broken down, analysed and calculated, then 
reassembled in real time. The assumption that a line must be built up from the individually 
supervised one man shift unit enters the design of algorithms to determine line balance13
However, the practical problems of line balancing cannot be solved simply by abstracting a 
particular aspect from the total systems of potential gains and inherent costs of flow 
production. Buzacotti (1986) argues that mathematical models for line balancing, built up 
over a number of years, find their rationale in the decomposition of tasks in which 
individual units of labour are taken as a given elementary basis to enact planning 
calculations upon. He adds that there is no rational engineering explanation of why this 
should be so other than Taylorist dogma14 .
The majority of engineers I interviewed cited some of Taylor's most base assumptions 
about work design and human motivation:
This plant is designed on the basis of mine and management's experience of MTM 
... Each component part of the plant has been analysed by myself and colleagues
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to determine, using MTM, the most efficient combinations of manning, equipment 
utilisation and materials throughput ... It is a painstaking job, requiring a large 
quantity of calculations and high level mathematics [and] neither I, nor my 
colleagues, can concern ourselves with human issues ... Operators are considered 
as working units [and] they are there to work, to do as they are told ... If I went 
out on to the floor and said, "Hey lads, how would you like this new system to 
work?", fifty percent wouldn't have a clue and the other half would want all kinds 
of luxuries ... I design on the basis of hard facts, not psychology (Production 
Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
The way I see it [is that] it does not make good business sense to devolve power 
to workers ... Why design in control and skill when all they will do is turn around 
and blackmail the company ... wanting more pay and recognition? ... My personal 
view is that, where possible, automate as much of the production process as 
possible ... That way you get rid of uncertainty and get in managers' good books 
(Graduate Electrical Engineer, Large Public Utility, Scotland).
It is possible, as Smith (1986) argues, that many graduate engineers loose an appreciation 
of the skills and culture of shop floor workers which, previously, were held by those 
engineers who came up through the traditional seven year craft apprentice route. 
However, this still does not locate the seeds of this anti-labour culture within specific 
forms of theory and practice. An example of this is control and systems theory, or case 
study and project working, where engineers are rewarded for economising on labour costs 
or better, eliminating labour altogether:
In my opinion, there is an unwritten code of practice, within certain branches of 
engineering which automatically perceives the workforce, or human element, 
within any particular system, as a weakness [and] a source of possible error and 
frustration for the engineer ... I had an old lecturer, who was adamant that good 
engineering seeks to control and tightly specify the operating unit - his term for 
the worker ... I suppose he was a classic Taylorist ... But even today, in newer 
engineering disciplines, this same distrust is felt... and probably exacerbated by the 
inclusion of managerial and accounts based subject matter and this perennial push 
for business awareness (Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering 
Company, Scotland and also University Course Validator).
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The Council for Science and Society (1981) has argued forcefully that Taylorist and 
MTM inspired approaches to design are counterproductive in that they lead to the 
creation of alienating forms of work, under-utilisation of operator skills and creativity. 
They add that these approaches break the learning curve between theory and practice, 
leading to the destruction of intelligence within the production and design process. Some 
of the strongest criticisms of Taylorist and MTM inspired engineering and management 
practice has come from industrialists:
We are going to win and the industrial West is going to loose out [and] there's not 
much you can do about it because the reasons for your failure lie within 
yourselves. Your firms are built on the Taylor model. Even worse, so are your 
heads ... with your bosses doing the thinking while workers wield the 
screwdrivers. You are convinced deep down that this is the right way to run a 
business. For you, the essence of management is getting ideas out of the heads of 
management and into the hands of labour ... We, however, are beyond the Taylor 
model. (Mr. Konasake, Executive Director, Matsushita Panasonic, cited by Tribus 
1989).
The argument is that Japanese manufacturing has competitive edge because it is capable of 
producing higher quality goods, at comparable prices, because it has supposedly 
abandoned Taylorist forms of work organisation and design. These are replaced with a 
variety of co-operative and harmonised work philosophies and work relations, whose 
central premise is the recognition of the value of the shop floor worker and the need to tap 
into human creativity. Whilst managers like Mr. Konasake, may be well aware of the 
failings of traditional Taylorist work organisation and design philosophies, the same
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cannot be said for the majority of engineers I interviewed, who were still steeped in a 
Taylorist culture and tradition of design predicated on tight control and preferably 
elimination of the 'operating unit'.
There were, however, a few notable exceptions:
If we want to remain competitive with the Japanese, we have to seriously 
reconsider the way we go about engineering and designing products ... I have 
visited a number of Japanese companies, including Nissan, and their approach to 
design is far more open and intuitive ... All along the line they get feedback [and] 
design is less compartmentalised ... Designs are discussed, employees and 
customers are brought into the discussions, their opinions are actually sought ... 
The layout of the lines necessitates far greater employee involvement in quality 
inspection and trouble shooting and they are rewarded accordingly (Production 
Engineer, Defence Contractor, Scotland).
Whilst Taylorist attitudes to design and work organisation were common amongst 
engineers I interviewed, these ideas were not always thought through nor were they 
always the dominant ideas; they were open to challenge and there was variation:
We will need to be far more innovative and open than we currently are....Somebody 
has got to bite the bit and bring about some dramatic change before we are all out of 
a job....The way I see it, Taylor has had his day....It was all right for a time but things 
have changed [and] industrial relations have changed. As engineers we need to 
change with the times and be more innovative in the ways in which we approach 
design (Chief Design Engineer, White Goods Manufacturer, Scotland).
Much would depend on which particular engineer one was referring to, for example, 
production or electrical, personal background, or types of projects he or she had worked
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on, etc.. Thus, one graduate electrical and electronic engineer, who was working in the 
aerospace industry, recalled the following experience of working on a robotics project 
with a number of different workers both within his own and other companies:
At university, we never paid much regard to the worker or issues like the quality 
of working life ... Ergonomics was-always seen as a soft option and rather girlish 
[and] it was always implicit that worker involvement in design was fraught with 
danger ... Two years ago, I began working as part of a larger team on telechiric 
devices to be used in hostile environments, like radioactive situations, bomb 
disposal, noisy or polluted work environments, etc. ... Much of the work involved 
talking to users, getting hands on experience of their work, discussing their fears 
and worries and helping them to be forthcoming about the technologies being 
suggested and how they could be improved ... The whole thing for me was a 
learning experience and immensely rewarding ... In one factory, I was working 
with a small group of girls on a line handling toxic chemicals. Getting to 
appreciate their job, its dangers, and their fears over loss of skill and their need to 
feel useful affected me ... It's a humbling exercise ... I will never feel the same 
again about design and all that Taylorist power shit (Electrical and Electronic 
Engineer, Aerospace Industry, England).
Engineers live in a changing world, their perceptions of that world and the values they 
hold are continually being tested. Whilst Taylorism may be a dominant engineering 
approach, it is not uncontested. Its rationale is questioned, by at least some engineers.
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Control and Systems Theory
Noble (1984) argues that engineers' ideology of control
... emerges most clearly as a motivating force, an ideology in which the distrust of 
human agency is paramount and in which human judgement is construed as 
human error. But this ideology is itself a reflection of something else: the reality of 
the capitalist mode of production. The distrust of human beings, by engineers, is a 
manifestation of capitals distrust of labour. The elimination of human error and 
uncertainty is the engineering expression of capital's attempt to minimise its 
dependence upon labour by increasing its control over production. The ideology 
of engineering, in short, mirrors the antagonistic social relations of capitalist 
production. In so far as the design of machinery, like machine tools, is informed by 
this ideology, it reflects the social relations of production (1984: 6).
Noble, however, fails to explain adequately how engineers come to hold this ideology and 
how it might change over time. He portrays an omniscient capital, with only one interest 
vis-a-vis labour which has somehow moulded engineering values. Absent is any sense of 
dynamic and engineers are presented as the passive recipients of a dominant ideology 
rather than active shapers of ideologies. The conditions giving rise to the formation of 
particular ideologies are constantly changing. Discussion of control and system theory 
must be sensitive to processes of change within capitalism and within engineers' practice 
and perceptions, otherwise engineers are simply reduced to direct, unwitting, agents of 
capital.
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The development of control and systems theory within engineering is intimately tied into 
the development of the capitalist labour process and, in particular, to the historical 
development by early innovators, manufacturers and business of a vocabulary of deskilling 
premised on distrust and contempt for the working class. Technology historically has been 
used as an instrument to wrest control of the labour process from the worker (Marx 1969, 
Braverman 1974, Levidow & Young 1981). Much of the literature accompanying the 
development of the automatic machine process was couched explicitly in terms of 
providing employers with the means to exercise greater control over labour and to prevent 
labour's independent initiative and control over production processes. This was the 
rationale, Ure argued, in the invention of the self-acting mule, 'A creation designed to 
restore order among the industrious classes' (cited by Levidow & Young 1981: 22). It is 
the assumption behind much of the advertisement and sales literature for early machinery 
and it is the explicit philosophy of scientific management and early developments in 
control and systems theory.
Boguslaw, for example, argues:
Our immediate concern, let us remember, is the exploitation of the operating unit 
approach to systems design, no matter what materials are used. We must take care 
to prevent this discussion from degenerating into a single-sided analysis of the 
complex characteristics of one type of systems material: namely, the human being. 
What is needed is an inventory of the ways in which human behaviour can be 
controlled and a description of some of the instruments which will help us to 
achieve control. If this provides us with sufficient 'handles' on human materials, so 
that we can think of them as one thinks of metal parts, electrical power or 
chemical reactions, then we have succeeded in placing human material on the 
same footing as any other material and can proceed with our problems of systems
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design ... There are, however, many disadvantages in the use of human operating 
units. They are somewhat fragile; they are subject to fatigue, obsolescence, disease 
and death; they are frequently stupid, unreliable and limited in memory capacity. 
But beyond all this, they sometimes seek to design their own circuitry. This, in a 
material, is unforgivable. Any system utilising them must devise appropriate 
safeguards' (1976: 88).
Control and systems theory as engineering science is little more than an articulation in 
mathematical form of the antagonism of interest between capital and labour that exists 
within the capitalist mode of production. That early proponents of such theory were so 
open about the need to control labour, to subordinate it and teach it docility, reflects the 
starkness of conditions in which the early machine process was being developed. 
Vocabularies of systems design premised on the open and direct subordination of labour 
and strategies of outright scientific management may have been appropriate to an earlier 
period of capital accumulation but are a political and economic liability within certain 
branches of production and certain social formations today. Employers and politicians 
alike have to be sensitive to a variety of interest groups and changed cultural perceptions 
about the form and nature of work (Thompson 1995, Marsh 1995, Berggren 1989, Clarke 
1990).
How has control and system theory adapted to the changed conditions in which engineers 
work? The vocabulary of employers' inalienable rights to exploit workers as they feel fit is 
gradually disappearing, at least in certain social formations; and a wider vocabulary, 
emphasising labour's special or unique contribution to the total system, is slowly emerging 
within engineering. The basic philosophy underpinning control and systems theory,
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however, has not really changed. Human beings are still seen as component parts of a 
system. Systems should be designed to emphasise the functional unity of parts; humans are 
still recognised as possibly 'difficult' or 'dysfunctional', to be handled by either elaboration 
of more sophisticated systems concepts, for example, contingency approaches to design 
(Willcocks & Mason 1987) or through the input of greater quantitative variables into the 
final system equation to be handled by the computer. In short, human beings now have to 
be considered more fully if complex manufacturing systems are to function, but they are 
still regarded with distrust, as problem areas, and, consequently, in need of control or 
preferably elimination by designers.
The majority of engineers I interviewed and observed did, indeed, display many of the 
attitudes to control that Noble indicates. However, a number were also critical of those 
structures of control and the implicit assumptions of deskilling and automation that went 
into engineering design:
There are systems I would have liked to design. For example giving greater 
control to certain operators over CNC machining, so as to be able to tap into their 
accomplished skills and years of experience [and] also to enhance their job 
satisfaction ... I thought flexible manufacturing here would follow this path but it 
hasn't ... Management merely want to replace the skilled machinists with YTS 
overseers and keep all design within engineering ... Personally I disagree 
(Mechanical Engineer, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
Another engineer complains that open systems design can get too complicated and 
political and that he prefers the comfort of a more proscribed design remit:
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All design, however small, is conceived in terms of a system ... It's a view of the 
world where we look at the relationship of a particular component, or change in 
one aspect of the system, on the totality of the system ... [A big system] requires 
one to think systematically, trying to consider the variety of physical and 
non-physical inputs required, their ratios, quantities, impact on other systems 
components, etc. ... it can all move into politics and industrial relations and 
become very messy ... I'd rather stay where I am and just focus my skills on 
solving particular technical problems (Electrical Engineer, Large Public Utility, 
Scotland).
Control and systems theory are two general theoretical approaches to design within 
engineering. Both approaches are most prevalent in production and industrial engineering, 
but are also prominent in the vocabulary of engineering generally. Certainly, graduate 
production or industrial engineers will have been exposed to these theories. Bums and 
Filter (1987) argue that, for many industrial engineers, explicit or implicit system definition 
is included as part of the design assignment. Boundaries of a system are established by 
specifying the components included within the system, the inputs to it and the outputs 
from it. Two key elements to system design are the selection of parts of which the system 
is composed and the arranging of these parts in some kind of pattern, in space and time. 
The degree of autonomy of the industrial engineer, at this stage, can be immense. For 
example, the engineer may have the choice of both physical and non-physical elements of 
the system, their relation to each other, speed and intensity of work and the degree of 
control, skill, feedback and input.
I designed everything around you, even the relationship of this office to the shop 
floor ... Two seconds is all it takes for any manager to get out there and keep an
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eye on work progress ... the materials, suppliers, precise quantities of labour and 
skills ... the ratio of men to materials, their specific utilisation and in what quantity 
... The technology and training required was all determined by myself with the 
assistance of colleagues ... It gives me satisfaction ... I didn't need some 
snotty-nosed consultant to do it for me, I followed basic engineering principles 
(Production Engineer and MD, Chemical Company, Scotland).
Burns and Fitter (1987) argue that systems consist of parts, or components, of which 
there are three types: structural, operating and flow. A structural component is one whose 
principle function is to maintain the necessary relationships of the parts as a functioning 
whole, for example, the casing of a watch. The structural component of a system serves to 
locate, constrain and shield. The operating component of a system has two distinct parts: 
men and machinery. The allocation of tasks between them is a frequent requirement of 
industrial engineering design. The physical components exist to serve the system in which 
they function, whilst human components have purposes of their own, apart from and 
outside of any particular system which
operates more effectively as fundamental individual interest of well being and even 
personal survival are subordinated more completely to the system interest (Burns 
and Fitter 1987: 94).
The flow component of a system is the ratio of time and rate of movement of the system 
components, its inputs and outputs. The problem of specifying flow and time standards for 
human performance, within a system, constitutes one of the industrial engineers most 
challenging tasks. He or she must make judgements on the suitability and variability of
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various personnel, including their mental and physical properties, and the minimum levels 
required for the performance of duties.
The purpose behind utilising systems theory is to achieve a steady controlled state. 
Control is perceived by engineers, as that which guides, directs, regulates and constrains15 
Out of twenty engineers I specifically asked about 'open' and 'closed' loop systems 
fourteen said that they would prefer to design closed loop systems on the basis that this 
would eliminate the uncertainty of including human agency and be a 'better engineered 
system'. Only one engineer openly espoused the benefits of an open loop system:
Manufacturing is moving real time [and] our business has seen rapid changes these 
past few years as we move towards zero inventory, zero defect, zero stock ... JIT 
manufacturing requires you get quality right first time. It requires you have 
adequate feedback on the state of play within any particular system. You can 
inbuild this electronically ... but this does not give you the flexibility that well 
trained people do ... They bring a variety of sense and experience to the process 
and, unlike most technology, readily learn to adapt and distinguish between what's 
important and what isn't (Senior Production Engineer, Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
It is ironic that the growth of systems and control theory within engineering was boosted 
by developments in what can only be described as crudely functionalist sociology. 
Engineers utilised Parsonian models of system and functionality to construct their own 
models of manufacturing relations and the role of engineers within the process of design. 
Systems and control theory in engineering has not yet escaped its functionalist origins.
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Cohen (1968) argues that functionalism tends to treat societies or social wholes as having 
characteristics similar to those of organic matter or organisms. In one sense, fimctionalism 
is anti-reductionist, emphasising the systemic nature of social wholes. As Brown (1992) 
stresses, these wholes are then perceived as involving differentiated units which are 
interdependent, and this raises two related questions. How is the independence of units 
effected? What contribution do the parts make to the whole? Explanation is sought 
through a detailed examination of the functions of the parts, for the maintenance of the 
whole, at the same time, emphasising how form is appropriate for such functions.
However, this system - of finely engineered equations determining flows and human 
agency inputs - is unpredictable. As Bums and Fitter note:
The problem of balance between human individuality and the benefits of a stable, 
reasonably efficient and reasonably predictable operating system ... has profound 
philosophical aspects and subtle practical difficulties (1987: 95).
The CSS (1981) argument for a systems theory approach to design is premised on being 
able to calculate, quantify and predict component parts of a particular system and then 
creating, on this basis, suitable mathematical models which, by process of ever greater 
abstraction, approximate to reality. The logic fuelling this approach to systems design is 
implicit in recent attempts to use computers, in engineering, to generate new technological 
systems. For example, De Neufville and Stafford (1974) document a series of 
mathematical techniques such as production functions and marginal analysis that can be
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used to generate good systems design, assuming that the input data is 'correct' and that 
the quantities collected when worked upon will provide an accurate qualitative picture. 
They assume that having access to powerful computer based modelling tools will produce 
superior designs. However, this is not always the case.
Modelling software has its uses but only so far ... In my opinion too much 
emphasis, within engineering is placed on assuming the validity of data received ... 
It is taken as a given ... Somewhere along the line someone went out and gathered 
raw data... But how do they know the data they gathered is accurate? ... How do 
you know it's accurate? ... The only way is to immerse yourself in the user 
environment, talk to people, even do their tasks yourself ... Today, too much 
design is dictated by the modelling methods and too much emphasis is placed on 
quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, design experience ... (Software Engineer, 
Public Service Institution, Scotland).
Algorithmic methods of problem solving require predictability, repeatability and 
quantifiability. Cooley (1983) argues that the quantitative information designers amass, 
before making qualitative judgement, is extremely complex and that the crude introduction 
of the computer into the design process by management results in a deterioration in design 
quality. Wheale argues:
Algorithmic methods reduce the decisions left to the operator of the system to 
routine choices between fixed alternatives. Similarly, computer systems used to 
systematise building design, by arranging predetermined elements on a visual 
display unit, in order to produce different build configurations, limit creativity in 
the job to choosing how the different elements will be disposed, rather than 
considering, in an open ended way, the types and different forms and materials 
that might be used (1983: 204).
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Cooley (1987) argues that this conditioning of technologists by traditional design methods 
leads them to downplay broader systems theories, and to underplay human skill and 
ingenuity - which tends to be seen as dysfunctional and in need of elimination from any 
particular system16 .
A number of engineers I interviewed viewed the drive towards ad hoc computerisation 
and increasing reliance on quantitative modelling techniques as leading to a situation of 
design sterility within engineering:
We have CAD/CAM and we also have some very sophisticated design software ... 
But the software is only as good as the guy using it... {Presumably also only as 
good as the person who designed it?] ... More... It takes longer, you get bogged 
down in key strokes, programming routes, the process of instruction [and] a logic 
is imposed by the software which does not necessarily facilitate creativity and fast 
route brainstorming ... I think it also prevents us communicating with each other 
... (Design Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Everyone here uses quantitative statistical techniques for building up models or 
scenarios of how a particular system will operate ... It's amazing, I've had lads in 
my department, who when questioned about a component they have designed on 
screen and which, in practice, has been found to be wanting, turn round and say 
that they are right and reality must be wrong. I remember one gentleman who got 
a real bollocking ... He took me through his entire design route, every little 
equation on every stage of the design, pointing out that he had followed the 
methods to the letter. "Yes,", I said, "but that isn't engineering. What you failed to 
consider in your equations is the fact that this equipment was going to new 
customers, who were very brutal and heavy handed with it ... Maybe, if you had 
torn yourself away from the screen, and actually visited them and watched the 
equipment being used, you would have built the casing and switches differently!" 
(Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
Wheale notes:
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It is ironic that cybernetic techniques are now used in some firms to help stimulate 
individual and work group creative thought when it is the very philosophy behind 
cybernetic control which has aided transfer of the discretion in work from the 
worker to management. Indeed, creativity techniques, such as brainstorming and 
synectics, may be seen as treatments for people in a society suffering from general 
repression of its imaginative and creative abilities (1983: 204).
The adoption by engineers of a system approach to design was part of an advancement of 
general systems theory which, according to Brown (1992), aimed to show how concepts 
and assumptions could be used to analyse phenomena in a wide range of fields of scientific 
enquiry and to develop a new scientific doctrine concerned with the principles which apply 
to systems in general. General systems theory was seen by many engineering educators as 
relevant to the design of technological systems. Engineers were particularly drawn to its 
utilisation of organic analogy and the notion that systems could ' stabilise' themselves. 
Within this perspective systems are conceived as 'open', with the connotation that they 
continue to exist because they exchange materials with their environment reorganising 
towards states of greater heterogeneity and complexity. In such a model, attention focuses 
primarily on the exchange across the boundaries of a system and the 
input-throughput-output process, whereby the system maintains and 'stabilises' itself 
within its environment. The model also focuses on the feedback mechanisms through 
which homeostasis can be secured.
Whilst early engineering systems theory tended to operate on a very closed system model, 
perceiving the system as one of relatively static equilibrium, this approach was soon found
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lacking. Engineers increasingly were asked to design ever more complex manufacturing 
processes and to deal with an increasing number of problems related to systems design. 
For example, they attempted to maintain quality and to combat monotony and worker 
alienation on the line. This, in turn, would meet the demand from labour for more 
enriching jobs and would provide management with more interactive feedback and control 
over ever more complex processes. Closed loop models proved increasingly dated when 
dealing with this changed social context.
Given this context, engineering systems theory began to make a slow and painful 
transition from a closed, to an open, systems approach. Roethlisberger and Dickson 
(1939), in their analysis of the early Hawthorne experiments at the Western Electric 
Company, identified - possibly for the first time - the 'informal' organisation of an 
industrial enterprise. This was a big step forward from the reductionist and closed systems 
culture of Taylorism which assumed that workers worked to the manual and that 
organisations could be planned and work executed with scientific precision17 .
Systems theory received new impetus from the work of the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations set up in 1947. Jaques (1951) highlights how the pattern of social activity in an 
organisation is the outcome of the interaction of the firm's 'social structure' seen as 
essentially recognisable and stable, its 'culture' (customary tradition and ways of thinking 
and doing things) and members 'personalities' and their total psychological makeup. 
According to Kelly (1978) a major preoccupation of the Tavistock group has been to
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clarify and to specify clearly the roles, relationships and allocation of authority and 
responsibility within these systems.
Jaques' earlier work was expanded on by Trist and Bamforth's (1951) research into the 
longwall method of coal mining. For the first time, the concept of a production system as 
a 'socio-technicaT system is introduced. Trist argued that open system theory (derived 
from the general systems theory of Von Bertalanfiy (1950)) and socio-technical theory 
were mutually supportive, the latter being a logical extension of the former. Brown (1992) 
stresses that the open systems concept focuses attention on the exchanges which take 
place between the organisation or system and its environment: on the 
import-conversion-export-process. This implies the property of 'equifinality', that is, 
being able to achieve a steady state from different initial conditions. The technological 
component is seen as playing a key mediating role in the process of defining the boundary 
conditions under which a steady state can be achieved. A key operational concept within 
the socio-technical approach is the notion of'primary task'. This is the identification of the 
primary task of an organisation as the starting point for investigation and judgement of the 
appropriateness of the organisational structure in the light of the technical, economic and 
socio-psychological resources within which it operates. Trist and Bamforth argued that 
one of the problems of work organisation in mining was that it,
borrowed with too little modification, from an engineering culture appropriate to 
the radically different situation of the factory (1951: 23).
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In contrast to conventional production engineering methods, with their emphasis on 
maximum job decomposition and fragmentation of tasks, the socio-technical school 
emphasises how work groups are capable of 'responsible autonomy' and how it is not 
possible to control labour down the pits on the basis of'one man-one task'. The detailed 
division of labour and hierarchical ' one man - one task' unit of organisation is derived 
from the scientific management school. Work, in practice, is team-based and highly 
polyvalent skills are deployed. Trist and Bamforth (1951) stress that responsibility can be 
laid with the group for the entire cycle of operations and that self-regulation of tasks not 
only creates greater worker involvement but has no detrimental effect on productivity.
According to Pasmore (1982), the Tavistock school's contributions to the design and 
organisation of work have been influential in forming an alternative loci of design to 
scientific management. Interestingly, as scientific management came under increasing 
criticism from the mid-1970s, a number of engineers, sensitive to the need for change, 
became more receptive to the socio-technical school. However, the process is by ho 
means even or uncontested. My own research and teaching experience with engineers 
confirms that a common reaction to the problems of manufacturing has been to assert the 
need for tighter control over manufacturing processes, not through harnessing human 
potential within production but eliminating it, wherever possible, through further and more 
extensive automation:
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Unions are the source of our trouble ... Why should we pander to their demands 
for skill and quality of working life? ... They have priced people out of a job ... As 
an engineer, I would seek to automate as much work as possible and where [this 
is] not possible build control into the technology ... (Electrical/Electronic 
Engineer, recently graduated, currently unemployed).
I think, what you will find, is that many unscrupulous employers are taking 
advantage of favourable industrial relations to push through further rounds of 
automation and tighten control over existing practices ... Information technology 
is allowing them to do this via the back door (Professor of Engineering and 
Director of Artificial Intelligence Centre, Scotland).
That the majority of engineering systems theory is so divorced from developments in 
broader systems theory (for example, the political contingencies and labour process 
approaches) and does not take on board many employers' calls for 'flexible', 'reactive' 
manufacturing processes, says a lot about the technicist outlook of engineering educators 
and the contempt often displayed in engineering curricula for the social sciences and the 
contribution of these to the design process18 .
The majority of engineers I interviewed adhered to a weakly functionalist interpretation of 
systems design. There was little evidence of any sweeping change in engineers' design 
philosophy. The majority had only just come to terms with discarding their Taylorist 
crutches and compared to the computer systems analysts interviewed displayed decidedly 




[The most] Basic criticism of systems approaches in the strong form of 
socio-technical systems theory, or functionalist sociology, is that they reify the 
organisation and do so in ways which are illegitimate and misleading. That is, they 
treat it as a 'thing', an entity which can have aims and needs distinct from those of 
the individuals and groups which compose it, and can act on its own, as it were, 
independently of the decisions and instructions of some of its members (1992: 82).
Rice similarly asserts:
Open systems live by the exchange of materials with their environment and have 
the capacity to reach a time independent steady state ... Once the steady state is 
disturbed for any reason, the system will exert forces to restore it ... Any healthy 
system will resist change (1963: 262).
This conceptualisation of the inherent characteristics and behaviour of systems, regardless 
of the nature of the individuals, groups and classes who compose them is too simplistic 
and functionalist, failing to appreciate the ways in which organisational goals, rules, roles 
and order are continually negotiated and re-negotiated in the active struggle between 
organisational members (Silverman 1970).
As Brown argues of the socio-technical approach:
If, as Jaques claims, levels of responsibility can be measured precisely; if levels of 
pay which are felt to be fair can be objectively determined, for each level of 
responsibility; if individuals have innate capabilities which determine the level of 
work (i.e. responsibility) with which they can cope effectively and without undue 
anxiety; and, if individuals can be allocated to jobs appropriate to these capacities; 
then there is a basis for resolving conflicts about wages and salaries ... The 
conceptualisation of an industrial organisation, or business enterprise, as a unified 
system with a clearly identifiable goal, or primary task, and with activities and
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relationships appropriately structured to accomplish the task, makes it difficult to 
provide a satisfactory account of conflict within the organisation (1992: 62).
Systems theory in its organismic, functionalist and more open socio-technical forms is 
essentially conservative, offering an ideology of crisis free manufacture. It is merely a 
question of the engineer creating the right conditions for the system to reach a state of 
homeostasis.
Burrel and Morgan caution.
In so far as systems theorists adopt organismic models which presume a functional 
unity of systems parts, with certain imperative functions which must be satisfied, if 
the organisation is to survive, their analysis is constrained by the requirements 
characteristic of a managerial point of view. It is this consonance between the 
nature of the organismic analogy and the requirements of managerialism which 
underwrites the dominance of organismic models within the field of organisation 
theory (1979: 219-20).
Productivism
A significant number of engineers I interviewed conceptualised their work in productivist 
terms. By productivist I mean that these engineers defined their own labour in terms of 
physically producing or making artefacts, and obtained a sense of worth and purpose from 
their direct involvement in making physical products. Like many of the systems analysts I
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interviewed, they often used the vocabulary of the 'coal face', thus making analogous 
comparison with manual workers, in contrast with those involved in supervision or 
managerial roles:
Unlike much of management, stuck in the office, I see myself as a practical person, 
designing and building useful products [and] getting down to where the action is 
on the shop floor, not just dreaming up ideas and strategies but actually 
implementing them [and] producing something useful (Design Engineer, 
Aerospace industry, England).
As engineers the focus of our activity is the design and development of products - 
whatever they may be. This is useful productive work. Without us nothing would 
get built and nothing would move ... Our labour is essential to society (Chief 
Design Engineer, Chemical Company, Scotland).
The productivist culture of many engineers serves as an heuristic, enabling engineers to 
define their relationship to others. In their struggle to wrest control of production 
processes from skilled craftsmen, early engineers sought to couch their claims to authority 
in terms of the possession of a superior productive knowledge 'scientific management' 
(Braverman 1974). In engineers' early critiques of capitalism, they used this same 
productivist culture to support their technocratic vision of production and society (Veblen 
1988). At other times this productivist culture has been used by engineers to highlight 
their affinity with shop floor skilled labour, for example in joint union actions over pay and 
conditions, or over the design of socially useful products (Smith 1986, Cooley 1980).
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However, managers, particularly in Britain, have seen this productivist culture as a prime 
reason why engineers should not be given strategic managerial positions seeking to 
consolidate divisions of labour geared around pigeon-holing engineers into 'technical' jobs 
(Armstrong 1987).
Management pat you on the back when you've done a good job ... They never 
refrain from telling you how technically brilliant you are and how without you 
nothing would get done ... but that's as far as it goes. They don't offer you more 
responsibility [and] they don't consider your managerial potential, or the fact that 
you've probably done more business studies than they have ... (Mechanical 
Engineer, heavy electrical engineering company, Scotland).
The image of engineers as 'practical' men of science engrossed in the detailed labour of 
design and manufacture is a strong one. At its most vulgarised, it takes the 
characterisation of the man in blue overalls wielding a spanner and screwdriver, the Kevin 
Websters of this world. 19 At a more sophisticated level, it takes the characterisation, as 
Albury and Schwarz argue, of the technologist, invariably white and male, dedicated, 
rational and pragmatic, almost beyond the range of normal personality (1982: 108).
Engineers foster this image through emphasising that engineering disciplines are 'science' 
and that engineering practice is 'applied science', and through the cultural medium of 
manufacturing artefacts as they work upon 'practical problems' applying their theoretical 
repertoire as rational 'experts' to produce artefacts. Engineering journals, with their 
pragmatic literary style and emphasis on rationality, cultivate this image, as do the
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professional engineering associations, through their heavy emphasis on engineering as an 
applied science rather than, for example, as an art.
Stabile (1987) argues that a particularly strong image of the engineer and one dating back 
to Veblen is the image of the engineer as productive technocrat - a view which sees 
engineers as the group in society best able and most fitted to managing the modern 
technologically complex manufacturing organisation. Many engineers today, like Veblen 
over eighty years ago, still have this strong technicist view of the manufacturing process 
and their own labour within it. At its most radical, this view can lead to the suggestion that 
whilst engineers and technologists are needed, private capitalists and many managers are 
not, because they are seen as essentially non-productive.
It seems to me that people who actually do the work, designing and building the 
technologies and planning and organising production, etc.......on a scientific basis
... should be the same people running the company, not some financier or fat 
shareholder who knows absolutely nothing about manufacture or the needs of this 
industry (Design Engineer, Aerospace Industry, England).
Confusion over the nature of the accumulation process and the emphasis on the technical 
and productive aspects of engineers' labour, produces a variety of political prognosis 
ranging from Veblen's assertion of the primacy and rightfulness of engineers' claims to 
corporate power (as the bearers of rational productive knowledge); to Edgell (1973) and 
Mallet's (1975) argument that engineers commitment to the higher rationality's of science
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and productivism will pose problems of securing managerial legitimacy, prompting 
engineers to go over to the side of labour, in opposition to an irrational social system.
Whilst engineers draw a sense of pride and personal worth from being involved in the 
design of tangible physical artefacts, they have been, and are increasingly, conscious of the 
fragility of such a position when it comes to advancing their own material aims. As early 
as 1919 professional engineers were arguing for the need for greater managerial and 
organisational awareness and duties. The president of the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers then argued:
If we are to maintain, or perhaps I should say, if we are to prevent further 
encroachments upon our established position in the engineering world, mechanical 
engineers must give more attention to the administration and organisation of 
workshops (cited by Meiskins 1989: 221).
The Finniston Report (1978) again highlighted the need for engineers to be made aware 
of, and taught, managerial and organisational skills, along with their development of 
greater understanding of business and the social context of design. The Report 
documented the low status of engineers and argued that the absence of engineering 
awareness and of any appreciation of engineering skills amongst management has led to a 
lack of competitiveness. However, according to Armstrong (1987), managers do not 
accept the premise of the Finniston Report, i.e. the importance of the 'engineering
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dimension'20 . Armstrong argues that productivist ideology is seen as evidence of 
engineers' unsuitability for power by a management steeped in a non-productivist culture.
Gerstl and Hutton (1966), and Berthoud and Smith (1980) have shown that the majority 
of professional engineers are keen to become managers. Many managers, however, are 
sceptical about allowing them to do so:
I think the strongest case is that of the technologist or engineer who is quite 
unsuited to a business career (Platt 1963:28).
Or again, Dr. Arnold's influential view of the education suitable for a gentleman:
Rather than have it the principle thing on my son's mind, I would gladly have him 
think that the sun went round the earth, and that the stars were so many spangles 
set in the bright blue firmament (Bamford 1960: 120).
Urwick (1963) argues that, in order to establish management as a profession in its own 
right, it was necessary to detach it from its historical entanglement within engineering. In 
Britain this is precisely what happened, as a process of differentiation of tasks slowly took 
place. Fayol (1949) asserts that a distinction should be drawn between technical expertise 
and managerial expertise and that within larger organisations management should 
consciously divorce itself from technical and operational matters, so as better to focus on 
strategic goal setting and administration. Drucker (1955) takes this argument to its logical 
conclusion by stating that management which spends its time not dealing with strictly
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management concerns, is not fulfilling its role as management. Management should 
manage and engineers should fix machinery and sort out technical problems. Obviously, 
such an argument leaves room for debate as to what precisely constitutes a management 
concern. Mintzberg (1973) went some way to clarifying this by characterising 
management jobs as those encompassing figurehead, leader, liaison, monitor, 
disseminator, spokesperson, entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator and 
negotiator21 .
For engineers, like Taylor, the idea that management should be rooted in non-productive 
knowledge would have been unthinkable. The core of managerial expertise and 
knowledge was, for Taylor, the knowledge of productive processes which enabled the 
industrial engineer to redesign them to reduce 'waste' effort. Indeed, for Taylor, it was 
management's' possession of such technical knowledge that gave it their legitimate base 
for control over the workforce. This is a view held by a number of engineers I 
interviewed.
Look ... I shouldn't be saying this, but a lot of managers in this company shouldn't 
be here ... They don't understand the manufacturing process, they are not involved 
in the day to day running of the plant, in buying equipment, solving technical 
difficulties, dealing with customers ... They don't even go down on to the shop 
floor ... so they can't understand the feelings of the workforce ... The more I think 
about it, I wonder just what these managers in fact do (Design Engineer, 
Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
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Armstrong (1987) argues that senior management, in Britain at least, have become 
divorced from the particularities of productive labour and form a key locale of the 
anti-technological, anti-productivist culture. Wiener (1981), Scott (1985) and Lash and 
Urry (1987) have also sought to isolate key anti-productivist sites and institutions within 
the British social formation, like the public school system or the predominance of financial 
and landed capital over manufacturing, and the dominance of aristocratic and landed 
gentry within Britain. These are said to weaken the position of engineers and undervalue 
the role of science and technology within British society.
Armstrong and Wiener touch upon important nerves. A picture is painted of an essentially 
regressive and parasitic management and a general culture of anti-productivism and under 
appreciation of investment in manufacturing: a ruling class out of touch with the realities 
of the changed competitive position of international economies and leading Britain down a 
nostalgic road to ruin. This image found strong support amongst a number of the 
engineers I interviewed:
I am sick and tired of this government's attitude to manufacturing .. There is a 
lack of insight and long term investment [which is], in my view a reflection of the 
old gentry mentality and the short term interests of accountants dominating the 
financial markets and City of London ... Long term investment in design and 
technology is totally inadequate [and] producing a culture within engineering of 
dismay, and feelings of lack of recognition of worth .. and ultimately less creative 
projects (Chief Design Engineer, Managing Director, Chemical Company, 
Scotland).
128
Hurst (1986) argues that the dominant management education movement (MEM), with 
its emphasis on traditional management education and training divorced from 
manufacturing and technical knowledge, cannot meet changes in world competition and is 
holding back new ideas (for example, on flexible working, TQM, etc.) which are 
perceived as vital to competitive success. A similar argument is put forward by Glover and 
Lawrence (1986) who suggest that the education and training of managers in Germany 
and Japan differs substantially from that of the advocates of MEM: less emphasis is placed 
on control, through accounting measures, and more emphasis is placed on decentralised 
decision making, greater autonomy and flexibility by management attuned to the need for 
technological change.
As Parnaby argues:
There has been a whole generation of MBA students who will not go near a 
manufacturing strategy ... They want to be in at the gin and tonic end with the 
financial strategy (Parnaby cited by The Engineer, 1985: 97).
Whitley (1981) argues that subjects like production engineering are not popular with 
management students even though they have been gutted of technological content to 
make them more palatable.
This anti-productivist culture has begun to permeate engineering itself, finding receptive 
sites among those graduates who seek to use their qualifications to get out of
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engineering22 . As Asher (1984) argues, many engineering students have gone on to do 
MB As and other management qualifications to get out of engineering and into Parnaby's 
'gin and tonic culture'.
Armstrong analyses management through Fox's (1974) theorisation of power and trust 
arguing that management is a high trust, high discretion activity, whereas productive 
activity is generally perceived as low trust, low discretion.
There are, however, a number of problems with Armstrong's analysis. Like Poulantzas 
(1975), Armstrong's definition of productive labour fails to grasp that what is productive 
under capitalism is that which secures profitability. Workers in banking, business 
administration, sales and management are vital to securing the realisation of surplus value, 
produced at the point of production23 . Much managerial work is productive, i.e. of ideas, 
technologies, manufacture and its design, layout and operation. Sometimes management, 
may even physically operate plant. Likewise, much of engineers' so-called productive or 
technical labour involves varying degrees of supervision and control, formally through 
direct control of others' labour, under supervision; and informally, through the kinds of 
control structures engineers build into technologies.
[The debate on management/engineer roles] ... makes me laugh ...I designed the 
layout of this plant virtually single-handedly. I had hundreds of men working 
under me on a daily basis ... Today, I am constantly making managerial decisions 
over the allocation of labour to use for particular batches and lines, organising 
meetings, contacting suppliers and customers, kicking ass ... and none of this is 
recognised by management here, as management, when it comes to being duly
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rewarded ... I have more personal responsibility here than most of the managers 
put together (Production Engineer, US Electronics Company, Scotland).
Management may like to think the that they are the only ones making managerial 
decisions but they are misguided ... When we are given a broad remit to increase 
flexibility and labour productivity, in this plant, all the actual choice of technology 
and strategy is down to us: CNC over conventional machinery, robotics over 
manual operations, who is to do what job, what skills will be required ... Bloody 
hell, it was me and not the production manager who was in on the union meeting 
over task allocation and job definition! ... The guy who should have been doing it 
was playing a round of golf with clients (Mechanical Engineer, Heavy Electrical 
Engineering Company, Scotland).
Further, Armstrong downplays the fact that engineers do attain senior managerial 
positions, particularly in Germany, Japan, France and the USA: productivism alone 
cannot, therefore, be seen as a general disqualification from management.
As Duncan (1981) and Palaez (1990) argue, once whole sections of the labour process 
and particular branches of production have become 'commodified', labour becomes part 
of the collective labour of society and increasingly experiences both subordination and 
routinisation. This applies not only to sections of manual labour but also to management 
and engineers:
I remember when I first started work here ... There was a great deal of give and 
take in the company [and you could use a lot of initiative, for example, over the 
choice of tables you used to arrive at a particular calculus, or the particular way 
you approached a design project, along with what types of tools you worked with 
... Today, we are told which tables to use. We are given fixed design 
methodologies to follow [and there are] no more informal information gathering 
over a coffee in the canteen, or a pint in the pub ... We even have sensors on our 
CAD and word processing systems to monitor our output and productivity ... but 
even worse than this, we don't have the freedom to bounce ideas around like we 
used to ... I can't just get up and take a stroll down to the shop floor. I now have
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to get permission and fill in a report saying why I am going down ... and there may 
be no specific reason ... I might just want to see how things are progressing, or 
how the lads are getting on (CAD Engineer, Aerospace Industry, England).
Braverman (1974) argues that engineers are the recipients of skills won over from 
production workers - that they embody the penetration of capital into the production 
process, consciously seeking to separate the conception of tasks from their execution so 
as to break the power of skilled workers and prevent forms of work pacing such as 
'soldiering'. Likewise, Noble (1984) sees engineers as, on the one hand, almost the blind 
agents of capital, embodying in their theories of control nothing more than capital's need 
to subordinate labour whilst, on the other, recognising the complexity of social relations 
surrounding engineers' work and the formation of particular philosophical paradigms.
The problem with this analysis is that it fails to appreciate the diversity, polyvalency and 
variety of engineering positions and tasks (Smith 1986). These range from those 
occupying essentially managerial roles, to those carrying out relatively mundane low level 
technical tasks, with a spectrum in between. This is the reality of engineering work. 
Engineers are not a homogenous bunch of workers experiencing exactly the same types of 
socialisation at work. Braverman establishes too arbitrary a distinction between 
conceptual work and physical or practical work. Many engineers carry out both aspects of 
work in the same task:
A lot of the work I do is down on the shop floor. I may spend hours sorting out a 
particular fault on a machine with the machinist [while] working together, sleeves
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up [and] covered in grime ... I don't see my work as just brain work ... True I 
apply knowledge taught and have to go back to the office to write up reports ... 
But many guys on the shop floor also apply theoretical skills and have to write up 
reports (Mechanical Engineer, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
Many workers, skilled or otherwise, perform varying degrees of conceptual work. 
Braverman overemphasises both the extent and the desire of capital to separate the 
conception and execution of tasks. He glibly assumes that all engineers have no other 
raison d' etre than to control manual labour through the exercise of their superior 
conceptual knowledge. One needs to be sensitive to engineers' own subordination and 
exploitation within the workplace both in terms of the intensification of their work, and 
reductions in pay, status and conditions:
The younger engineers from university [and] they come here with such a superior 
attitude because that's what they have been taught... But it's not long before they 
realise that they are the same as everybody else, we are all in the same boat ... 
There's been over a thousand job losses at this and our sister plant, engineers as 
well... The knife cuts everywhere and we've seen real falls in our pay and status 
... There's not the work and there's no more interesting projects in the pipeline ... 
In fact it's a gloomy picture all round (Electrical Engineer, White Goods 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
I have argued that many engineers hold a productivist philosophy. This is not the same as 
saying that they are productive labourers, as distinct to non-productive labourers - as both 
Poulantzas or Armstrong, in their different ways, argue. My purpose for looking at 
engineers' productivism is simply to document a discernible characteristic that I have 
identified and to explore how this may have an impact upon the systems design process.
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Many engineers' productivist philosophy, like their notions of design purity, can lead to 
conflicts of interest. For example, a productivist desire to expand, manufacturing, science 
and technology or management's requirements for short term profitability which may 
manifest itself in a lack of manufacturing investment and interesting engineering projects, 
and worsening position of many engineers. At a time of mounting recession, severe job 
losses, manufacturing closure and rationalisation, many engineers' productivist value 
systems may act as a seedbed of critique and radicalism against managerial and political 
strategies.
Purity of Design
Many engineers I interviewed believed the adage that 'form follows function' and had 
very strong ideas about what constitutes good engineering and a well engineered product. 
Typical phrases used in engineering design departments to indicate a well engineered 
product are 'purity of design', 'unity of form and function', 'singularity of purpose' and 
'logicality of design'. Typical phrases denoting engineers' dissatisfaction with an 
engineered product were: 'over-engineered', 'under-engineered' and 'lack of fitness for 
purpose'.
This terminology is interesting because it discloses a political position within the design 
process and reflects, in engineering terms, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, not only with a
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particular engineered product, but also with the social relations of design and production 
in which engineers are implicated. This is clearly expressed by one interviewee.
Engineers do have notions of purity of form and function but these notions often 
get compromised on the altar of cost benefit analysis ... It does affect one's sense 
of pride ... I know it does mine ... There's nothing worse than doing a tacky job ... 
[That's] sound enough in itself, don't get me wrong ... but cost cut or too 
pinickity, due to having to meet too many formal requirements ... You know it's 
an important part of the satisfaction of an engineer's job to see his designs in 
practice ... One doesn't like being associated with some Mickey mouse design ... 
there is a lot of pride in engineers, particularly here ... The Italians are renowned 
for their pure design philosophy, unity of form and function, singularity of purpose 
... it gives their products charisma, it sells ... But it is difficult to maintain designs 
which are at one with your instinct, whilst at the same time, having to meet a 
number of external constraints such as law, cost, levels of skill needed, etc.... Any 
system which involves people interaction requires knowledge of motivation, 
understanding politics ... because in business every system is by definition a 
compromise ... somewhere along the line (Chief Design Engineer, Heavy 
Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
There are a number of assumptions and arguments here. The engineer clearly has an idea 
of what constitutes 'purity of form and function' but offers only a glimpse of what that 
may be, i.e. something that is not 'tacky', 'too pinickity', or 'compromised'. He goes on 
to argue that the Italians, amongst others, are renowned for their 'pure design 
philosophy', which gives their products 'charisma'- but, again, he does not really specify 
what this philosophy looks like, other than that it is a type of design, that is 'at one with 
your instinct' and that this instinct gets compromised on 'the altar of cost benefit analysis'.
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This argument was reiterated by a variety of engineers, at different levels, from recently 
chartered engineers, through to chief design engineers and in a variety of manufacturing 
settings. It is worth exploring in some detail just what it is these engineers are trying to 
elucidate. Take, for example, the following comments from a Professor of Engineering 
and Director of an Artificial Intelligence Centre, a Senior Design Engineer in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry and a Design Engineer in the Aviation Industry:
There is a certain understanding, in my opinion, amongst engineers, as to what 
constitutes a good design - it's something you instantly recognise ... It's where the 
form of the design naturally follows its function ... It's where there is a sense of 
purpose and unity about the whole thing ... Take the C5 from Sinclair. That is 
what engineers would call a nightmare [and] it offends every engineering instinct 
... It doesn't meet its purpose and is tacky... It is too low, too under powered, too 
uncomfortable, too expensive and too dangerous ... (Professor, of Engineering 
and Director, Artificial Intelligence Centre, Scotland).
The simpler you can make it the better. The less parts the better. The less moving 
parts even better still. Hindsight has 20/20 vision ... If someone places a design in 
front of me, I can recognise more or less straight away if this is a good or bad 
design ... (Senior Design Engineer, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
What I understand by purity of design, is that the product is neither over- 
engineered, nor under-engineered but just right... Sometimes we under-engjneer 
products, that is we could have built them better, made them more suitable for the 
purpose ... But we've been working to budget... Other times I have to admit we 
have over-engineered products [and] they have been too complicated for users to 
operate, overly elaborate and sophisticated for the purpose to which they were 
used ... Money comes into it... There was a time when we had virtually unlimited 
finance and round here there were all kinds of whacky projects underway ... Real 
technological overkill... (Design Engineer, Aerospace Industry, England).
The notion that an engineer can almost instinctively spot a well engineered design comes 
over very forcefully. We are not, however, really offered an explanation of how or why. Is
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it that a well engineered product is really the one that is simple and has the least number of 
moving parts? What criterion do you use to denote notions of simplicity? Or how do you 
know when you have too many moving parts? The following interviewee offers a partial 
response to these questions:
We are taught ... and I think it's common sense that you don't waste energy ... 
You keep frictional losses down, mechanical tolerances close ... Take the internal 
combustion engine ... If you design in counterbalances to offset vibration caused 
by, let's say, a vertical twin engine, these counterbalancers soak up power creating 
frictional losses ... So why not just build a triple or four cylinder engine, or utilise 
two stroke rather than four stroke? ... With two power strokes rather than one 
power stroke in every four you can then use less cylinders and still maintain 
smoothness (Mechanical Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, 
Scotland).
SL: Yes, you will get smoothness but that is only one characteristic. What of economy, 
mechanical longevity and emission? Doesn't the four stroke currently fare better here?
Yes, smooth running is only part of the equation but that's my whole point... We 
have this body of theoretical knowledge which says: okay, from a purely 
dynamical point of view, this is the best way to cut down frictional losses ... 
Utilising calculus like the coefficient of friction, we can calculate a variety of 
frictional scenarios ... But then, yes, there is the reality that the internal 
combustion engine has its many uses and different users want different 
characteristics ... so it becomes a compromise (Mechanical Engineer, Heavy 
Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
If all design is thus a compromise, why do engineers appear to accept readily that there is 
such a thing as purity of design? This particular engineer seeks to locate answers to this
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question in terms of a body of theoretical knowledge, encompassing thermodynamics and 
frictional equations and to document how, from a 'dynamical' point of view, you can 
arrive at the notion of'design purity'. The argument, however, would be more convincing 
if such designs occurred in practice. However, virtually all of the engineers I interviewed 
stated that design was a compromise, so how can these same engineers still assert the 
validity of the concept? It is interesting to note some of the examples of design purity 
offered by my interviewees:
Take the Italian car and motorcycle manufacturers ... Here we see an unabashed 
single-mindedness of purpose ... You take a car like the Ferrari, or a motorcycle 
like the Ducati and take it to pieces [and] it just smacks of quality and purpose ... 
Virtually every part is functional in form ... whilst also being engineered to the 
highest standards ... There are no hidden gimmicks ... Contrast this with the 
Japanese, who over-engineer everything ... Look at the latest Toyota Supra ... 
They couldn't get the geometry right... because the car is a compromise ... It's 
not a real sports car ... so they had to add on a package full of electronic gadgetry 
to balance out the steering and handling ... That's what I call over-engineering 
(Design Engineer, Chemical Company, Scotland).
When I pointed out to this engineer that for many people the Ferrari had a number of 
drawbacks - for example, price, lack of economy, incapacity to carry more than two 
people, lack of comfort, width and dangerously low ride height - he recognised this and 
argued that: 'because of the design's uncompromising nature ... it is so pure [and] it 
demands respect'. If this engineer was alone in making the analogy between Ferraris and 
pure design, his argument could more readily be dismissed as personal prejudice; but he 
was not:
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A concept like the Ferrari and much of the best Italian and German engineering is 
uncompromising ... single minded and demands respect ... from both an 
engineering point of view and from the driver's point of view (Senior Production 
Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
The fact that many engineers recognise that the Ferrari is not everyone's ideal, or that it 
has real drawbacks, is irrelevant to them. Indeed, more than this, it seems to constitute 
almost a necessary qualification for the car having such 'purist' engineering status. It is 
almost as if the very singularity of its purpose and the fact that it is so uncompromising, 
compels the human being to either adapt to the singularity of its design or reject it. The 
same engineer argued that:
This design reflects to me a kind of sado-masochistic philosophy amongst Ferrari 
engineers ... Let's face it, they design this bloody outrageous car with so much 
power and which is so outrageously fast for today's road, that it's a potential 
weapon and then they turn round and say, "Well only a privileged few can drive 
one and when they do, they will have to suffer the consequences, in terms of its 
demanding driving characteristics and uncompromising nature." ... Only a 
sado-masochist would do that ... but you've got to respect them for it (Senior 
Production Engineer, Heavy electrical engineering company, Scotland).
It would be easy to dismiss the debate on design purity as just a reflection of a dominant, 
white, male, macho culture centred within specific engineering fields, say, motor 
manufacture and the military; Cockburn (1985) alludes to this. But such an argument is 
too sweeping because engineers, in a variety of fields, utilise this concept. Take the
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following example from a design engineer, in the Pharmaceutical Industry, talking about 
the design of a pair of surgical scissors:
I spent several weeks designing these scissors ... Just hold them ... You can feel 
the balance ... It's perfect ... These are not your high street junk ... This is pure 
engineering ... I've had doctors and nurses contacting me congratulating me on 
the design ... They like the feel, the balance but also the look ... Have you seen 
such a beautifully balanced pair of scissors? (Design Engineer, Pharmaceutical 
Industry, Scotland).
Or again a materials engineer talking of the design of drill bits:
People often fail to appreciate the work [and] the design that goes into the making 
of one of these ... This drill will cut continuously for longer than any comparable 
drill on the market... It's as tough as a diamond ... I made no compromise in it's 
design, it's pure engineering (Design Engineer, Machine Tool Industry, Scotland).
Both engineers were moved by the products they had designed, and felt a strong sense of 
pride and self-worth from designing 'pure', well engineered products. Neither, however, 
could accurately pin-point or describe what 'design purity' was, or how they came to be 
able to distinguish between 'pure', well engineered, products and poorly engineered 
products. I would argue tentatively that notions of design purity are learned, they are 
socially informed, rooted in specific socio-cultural conjunctures but not mechanistically 
derived from them24 . A number of interviewees alluded to how notions of design purity 
may be learned:
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In the past, through the craft route, you would be apprenticed, you would serve 
your time ... practical hands on time with engineers, fitters, draughtsmen ... More 
than this ... it's difficult to place ... You kind of picked up a feeling for the 
discipline [and] learned a kind of purity of design through practice ... 
[Youjwatched materials fail under different conditions [and] picked up a 
repertoire of materials and stresses, a logicality of design ... The learning curve 
went beyond the technology [and] you gauged a feeling of the formal and informal 
politics of design (Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Equipment 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
[It's] seeing designs unfold ... Some fail, some succeed ... [And then] knowing 
why [and] learning the theoretical knowledge of materials in college ... Slowly you 
build up a picture of what is good and bad engineering ... I remember as a rookie, 
designing a crankshaft for a fixed pump ... it was bomb proof - needle roller 
bearings supporting each section of the crank and an oil pump that pumped at 
tremendous pressure ... I remember the senior engineer turning round to me and 
saying, "No good, ... over-engineered ... It's a fixed pump you are designing for a 
quarry, not a bloody Rolls Royce ... Our customers won't pay for this and we 
don't want to sell them something that's going to last forever!" ... That was my 
first awakening (Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Equipment Manufacturer, 
Scotland).
What these examples illustrate is that notions of design purity and good engineering are 
socially rooted: both of these engineers refer to the social relations of production which 
condition their understanding of design purity. Thus the latter engineer developed what he 
considered to be a well engineered product but had to reassess notions of what constitutes 
'well engineered' in the light of'commercial' criterion. There is obviously an intimate link 
between notions of 'under-engineered' and 'over-engineered', and the size of one's 
budget and nature of the market - this linkage is most obvious in the case of the aviation 
engineer quoted earlier highlighting the 'whacky' projects being undertaken in his 
particular firm due to an almost unlimited research budget, leading to the production of 
'technological overkill'. Noble's (1985) study of CNC machine tools documents a similar
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process whereby relatively unlimited budgets in the military sector led to the development 
of overly elaborate, very sophisticated and costly forms of CNC machining.
Notions of what constitutes design purity are also linked to particular aesthetic and 
cultural practices. These in turn can be related, though not mechanically, to changes in the 
development of the forces of production. For example, much of the hand crafted products 
of the late 18th and early 19th century may be seen today as overly intricate and delicate, 
what one engineer described to me as 'too fussy'. 23 With the development of the 
manufacturing process and particularly mass production for mass markets, such detailed 
intricate labour is marginalised and is replaced with designs of less detail, less intricacy and 
smoother lines. This reflects changes in production methods, technology, quantities of 
labour time and the rise of cheaper synthetic materials. These, in turn, can be seen as an 
indication of the rise in the organic composition of capital, the capitalisation and 
standardisation of manufacture, and the need to increase labour productivity and reduce 
materials costs, so as to maintain profitability. In short, changes in aesthetics and culture 
are shaped in part by changes in the mode of manufacture and, once established, have an 
impact on that manufacturing process. Engineering notions of design purity are formed in 
this crucible of continual change but interestingly, have a degree of stability and 
consistency which appears almost impermeable to change. Whilst different examples of 
what constitutes 'design purity' can be found in different branches of production and at 
different historical conjunctures, the notion that there is a 'design purity' seems to 
transcend specific socio-cultural conjunctures and modes of production. For example,
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engineers I interviewed in Poland also maintained that there is such a thing as 'design 
purity' and alluded to it in similar fashion - functionality of purpose, unity of form and 
function, etc24 .
Notions of'design purity' serve to depoliticise and depersonalise design. They are used by 
engineers to refer to what constitutes a good, as opposed to bad, design. They are used as 
a term of reference to establish an engineer's estimation of self-worth and pride, and to 
differentiate engineering from other occupations, i.e. mechanics, technicians, but 
particularly, non-productive managers who, presumably, would not know a 'pure' design 
if they tripped over one. They also serve as ideological props, enhancing engineering 
mastery over nature but also over mere humanity which should stand in awe, if not fear, of 
some of its most 'pure' designs. Design purity is a concept that is esoteric and elusive; 
none of the engineers I interviewed could pin it down with any precision. At best, they 
could only allude to the social processes of its production - particularly craft practices, 
training, forged acquaintances, specific bodies of theoretical knowledge, etc. Ironically, it 
may act to reinforce relations between skilled workers and many engineers who may share 
similar productivist attributes and values regarding the relevance and importance of 
technology in society. It may also reinforce the way in which that technology, and with it, 
the social relations and emotions surrounding its design, get compromised on the altar of 
cost-benefit analysis and through the impersonal workings of the market.
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What is of interest, is how the concept may affect the design process and engineers' 
estimation of that process. Take, for example, the following comment from a software 
engineer in his late twenties:
I see a process taking place within all fields of manufacture towards 
standardisation and new logicality of design ... Look at clothing ... What 
characterises the top designer labels? ... The elegance of the cut ... the purity of 
the design. The same in cars [or] building construction ... It's the end of detailed 
work and unnecessary fiissiness ... Design, like production, should be simple, 
straight cut, logical and uncompromising [and] that's how I want to design my 
software (Software Engineer, University, Scotland).
Forgetting for the moment whether this particular designer has been incorporated into the 
post-modernist aesthetic, the implications of such a design philosophy on, for example, job 
enrichment and reskilling is alarming. Would the designer prefer, on the basis of not 
wanting fussiness or compromise, to develop software with minimal human override or 
which sought to impose its 'logical' uncompromising structure on the human condition?
In summary, notions of'design purity' may act to reinforce engineers' perceptions of their 
rightful role within the design process as the 'guardians' of technology and progress. 
More importantly the concept serves to establish engineers' own identity vis-a-vis shop 
floor but particularly management employees. There is also a sense in which the concept 
'pure' engineering represents an idolatry of engineers own labour as uncompromising, 
practical and purposeful activity. Notions of 'design purity' also serve as a basis from 
which engineers not only judge the value of the final product of their own labour but,
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importantly, make value judgements on others labour within the overall process of 
production. Notions of 'purity' serve engineers rather like the vestal virgins serve 
Christianity: they embody notions of chastity, devotion and denial and act to remind us of 
our fallibility and weakness - our compromised human condition.
Technological Determinism
Much of the literature and practice of engineering is couched in a technologically 
deterministic vocabulary that abstracts engineering practice and artefacts from the social 
relations of production. Histories of technologies become histories of great names and the 
unfolding of some abstract law of progress. Latour argues:
Despite the fact that it is hard to picture diesel engines, or bicycles, or atomic 
plants, reproducing themselves through mating, trajectories are drawn that look 
like lineage's and genealogies of purely technical descent. The ... conceptual 
history of science or epistemology; these are the names of the discipline that often 
should be X rated that explains the obscure reproduction habits of these pure 
breeds (1987: 133-34).
For the resolute technological determinist, technological forces are the decisive factors 
generating social change. From this perspective, the process of industrialisation is 
abstracted from the social relations through which design and production takes place. 
Technological artefacts, such as textile machinery, steam technology, navigational
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technology, or electrical and mechanical power, are seen as causing social change; and, in 
strong versions of technological determinism, as the main determinants of that change.
Noble argues:
Because of its very concreteness, people tend to confront technology as an 
irreducible brute fact, a given, a first cause, rather than as hardened history, frozen 
fragments of human and social endeavour (1984: 8).
This is reinforced by the fact that the social relations of exploitation under capitalism 
appear as natural technical relations of administration. Likewise, the rise in the social 
organic composition of capital and the resultant dominance of dead labour over living 
within many manufacturing processes reinforce technologically deterministic views among 
engineers. The rise in the organic composition of capital tends to obliterate labour power 
as the source of value, as profit is mediated via the socially necessary labour time that it 
takes to produce commodities. Advanced stages of mechanisation, automation and 
robotisation seem to confirm that it is technology which is the source of value and cause 
of change. Technological determinism thus places engineers, historically, centre stage and 
reinforces their perceptions of specific manufacturing processes and of particular 
technologies as natural, neutral and inevitable. This view masks the particular choices and 
the consequences of an engineer's work on, for example, the sexual division of labour, 
skills or quality of working life under a technicist discourse. Consequently, the processes
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whereby specific divisions of labour, skills and forms of work are engineered remain 
hidden, reducible merely to technical imperatives, read off from specific technologies:
In utilising these automatic packers ... machine sensors and bar code scanners 
there is less need for labour and supervisory staff ... If we had a different 
technological configuration, we would have different labour requirements ... Sad 
but true (Mechanical Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
To this engineer at least, the social division of labour is a function of the forms of 
technology. However, this analysis fails to consider the politics of the design remit which 
led to the installation of this, rather than other technologies. As the production manager 
within the same company put it:
We considered a variety of strategies for boosting our competitive position ... 
including buy-outs, advertising, sales drives and implementing new quality control 
and productivity related bonus schemes ... In the end, it was a political decision ... 
The technology merely carried through the political aim. I'm not stupid. I know 
the debates on computer versus human centred systems ... In this climate we 
opted for computer control... Really, I think some of the engineers here just think 
we are impressed by the technology. I doubt they realise their proposed solutions 
were part of our overall strategy and accepted for no other reason (Production 
Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Likewise, technological determinism can act to conceal sexist bias within the design 
process:
Work in this factory is very delicate: soldering of circuits, routing of wires, 
handling of small fragile components ... This type of work is best suited to the
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girls, that's why we employ so many of them in production (Electrical Engineer, 
Electronics Manufacturer, Wales).
What the above engineer fails to mention is that 60% of these girls were YTS placements, 
or part-timers, working, as one manager said, for less pay than a man would be prepared 
to take. Also:
This kind of work - light assembly - is regarded round here as traditional women's 
work ... If we put a man on the job he would soon start complaining and showing 
an attitude (Production Manager, Electronics Manufacturer, Wales).
The huge armies of technical staff thrown into being by the development and extension of 
capitalist relations of production, further reinforces technologically deterministic attitudes, 
within engineers, by isolating individual engineers from the total process of design and, in 
consequence, inhibiting their comprehension of the relationship of detailed work to the 
total work:
I spent several years working on the design of a machine for grading components 
on a flow line, essentially lifting them off the line according to grade and type and 
feeding them into other lines. This was part of a research programme that myself 
and colleagues had been involved in, along with teams from other interested 
companies and vendors of hardware and software, to achieve the automated 
factory ... Only last month did I finally get to see my work in operation ... It 
actually depressed me, all that money, all those years of research to produce this 
design and you could have took a YTS trainee off the dole put him on the job and 
got exactly the same result with a saving of millions of pounds to society ... What 
really bothers me is that I never even contemplated this alternative. Like all my 
colleagues, we were just geared up into the project trying to advance-the 
technology for technology's sake (Design Engineer, US Electronics Company, 
Scotland).
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Rosenbrock (1987) cites the example of a lamp factory in which the industrial engineer 
chose to use middle-aged women to do one particular task, placing a filament in a light 
bulb every 4.5 seconds, because it would have offended an engineer's sense of design to 
waste a robot on such a low level mundane task. Rosenbrock's argument is that the 
designer thought nothing of wasting the human being's potential.
Interestingly, the latter example was in Hungary, whereas the former example is a leading 
US electronics company in an advanced capitalist economy. What can we deduce from 
these two cases? Obviously both engineers felt a robot was wasted, in both cases because 
it was too engineered and too sophisticated for such a simple task. The only significant 
difference is that in the former case a robot was used (despite offending its designer's 
sense of purpose), whereas, in the latter case, a robot was not used because it was cheaper 
and more convenient to use a middle-aged woman. We can straight away conclude it 
would also have been cheaper to use a YTS trainee or middle-aged woman in the former 
case.
So why did a robot get used in the capitalist context? Does the answer have something to 
do with capital's attempt to control and subordinate labour within the production process? 
This hardly seems realistic. A YTS trainee, or a middle-aged woman, on a production line, 
surely can not pose that much of a control problem to management in the context of
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recession and labour movement retreat; capital has managed far more recalcitrant sections 
of the labour force quite successfully and at far more militant periods of history. Anyway 
there are a variety of control strategies and managerial repertoires that could have been 
considered. Maybe management was taking advantage of the historical conjuncture of 
labour retreat and high unemployment to drive through new manufacturing processes and 
to impose new divisions of labour. In this particular case, it hardly seems worth the 
company's effort to spend millions on designing a robot solution when managers within 
the company were making it quite clear that recessionary conditions meant that such 
investment would possibly not recoup itself. Was a robot used because the mutual 
interaction of competition in this particular branch of production necessitated high rates of 
productivity to survive? I will let the engineer speak for himself as he answers the point 
succinctly:
There is no economic benefit, at least as far as I can see it from utilising this robot, 
it can operate no faster than an average worker. In fact it is probably slightly 
slower. True it won't tire and make mistakes so easily ... but Christ, several 
million pounds of mistakes - that's what it cost to develop! ... I think the reason 
why it got developed has to do with the nature of the interest groups surrounding 
this project, both here, in the parent company, components and software suppliers 
and our customers' design departments ... What did management request? 
Broadly, flexible manufacturing capability. What did we deliver? Flexible 
manufacturing capability - but in what form? ... Software, machinery and robotics 
... Almost instinctively their and our designers along with suppliers dived into 
technological solutions ... We all communicated in the same language and we 
didn't have a different vocabulary ... We didn't even consider a different 
vocabulary (Design Engineer, US Electronics Company Scotland).
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What this engineer is describing is the social relations and actors involved in the design 
who had vested interests in certain solutions. The customers wanted flexibility and the 
suppliers and designers were both keyed into particular interpretations of flexibility. In 
effect similar cultures were talking to and working in collaboration with each other - 
engineers and technologists, all speaking the same vocabulary of automation. In other 
words, there was a technological matrix surrounding the design. Management merely 
specified the broad context of manufacturing flexibility; engineers and technologists 
engaged in the project then pushed through a particular interpretation of flexibility.
The former example indicates the grip which technological solutions to manufacturing 
problems has on the minds of technologists in capitalist societies. It does not, however, 
explain how that philosophy gets into mainstream technological vocabulary and 
technologists' ways of thinking. This is a complex question. On the one hand, one can 
argue that the early history of invention was intimately tied into the development of 
manufacturers' struggle to secure control and maintain order over the workforce. Many of 
the early inventors were directly recruited from the bourgeoisie, often businessmen in their 
own right, with no sentimental predisposition towards labourers. Maybe engineers' early 
development and their emergent and relatively privileged place in the division of labour, as 
designers of technologies and machinery which controlled labour, mitigated against their 
'humanisation' as a social group or foreclosed alternative design paradigms that would 
have antagonised employers. Maybe engineers' own struggles to attain recognition from 
employers and managers meant taking on board, developing and modifying dominant
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managerial views of organisation and control of labour processes. Perhaps the ending of 
craft routes into engineering ruptured the chord connecting engineering theory to practice, 
removing engineers from the shop floor, further isolating them from production workers 
and making them more susceptible to technologically determinist views.
Rosenbrock argues that:
Engineers in my experience are never taught a set of rules or attitudes which 
would lead to this kind of view [to disregard for full use of human abilities]. Nor 
do they base their actions on a set of explicit principles incorporating it. Instead, 
we have to imagine something like the 'paradigm' discussed by Thomas Khun. 
This is the name he gives, in the sciences, to the matrix of shared attitudes and 
assumptions and beliefs within a profession. The paradigm is transmitted from one 
generation to another, not by explicit teaching but by shared problem solving ... 
We still have to ask how this paradigm arose (1987: 282).
My own research indicates that engineers do get taught a set of rules and attitudes that 
makes them amenable to particular design interpretations.26 Rosenbrock too readily 
dismisses the impact of this education and downplays the prevalence of certain values and 
principles within engineering, e.g. control and system theory which may reinforce 
technologically determinist views within the design process. Rosenbrock's explanation of 
how this technologically determinist paradigm is formed is instructive. Essentially, he 
argues that we can distinguish between two types of machinery: that which enhances 
human ingenuity and skill and that which destroys it.
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For reasons which were valid enough in the early nineteenth century and which 
are well documented by Ure and Babbage, the second course proved more 
profitable for the inventor and the manufacturer than the first. When the 
engineering profession arose later in the century it, therefore, inherited only one 
attitude to the relation between machines and human skill, which is essentially the 
one described above (1987: 284).
Unfortunately, he does not advance on this. Why did the second course of action prove 
more profitable than the first? How did this attitude to design get generalised? Why did 
engineers accept it? Did all engineers accept it? Are engineers merely the passive 
recipients of a dominant culture moulded exclusively by the manufacturers and 
industrialists of the day as Rosenbrock seems to suggest? This argument leaves too much 
unexplored and unexplained and portrays engineers in a static, wooden, relationship to 
manufacturing and to the design process. If we want to understand more about why 
certain engineers hold technologically deterministic positions, we need to look further. A 
useful focus for this is to consider the issue of compromise within the design process:
At school and college we were taught history as a history of great names and 
inventions ... Progress seemed to be the inevitable outcome of these inventions 
and anyone who stood in the way of their development was a Luddite ... I think in 
this kind of presentation we have a view ... which undermines engineers' attempts 
to get to grips with the actual process of design ... The nearest we get to 
recognising the messiness of design is when we talk about engineering as a 
compromise ... But what do we mean? A compromise of what and between who? 
(Production Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales.)
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Any serious investigations of compromise would challenge dominant views of technology 
as rational, given and incontestable and would force engineers to consider their role in the 
design process more critically24 .
Summary
McLoughlin and Clark (1994) highlight the need for research into what they refer to as 
the 'architecture' of the engineers' 'black box'. In many ways this is precisely what I have 
done. I have opened up the 'black box' of technology to show how specific engineering 
values, methods and practice constitute, in the words of Clark et al (1988), an 
'engineering system'. The purpose behind disclosing some of the elements of this system 
is to demonstrate how it conditions the process of design and engineers relationships to 
others in the design process.
Rather than arguing that some notion of capital expediency infuses the psyche and work 
of engineers, turning them into direct agents of capital within the process of business 
restructuring, I have highlighted the diversity of values and methods engineers are 
exposed to and, indeed, which they consciously generate. These values and methods give 
identity and purpose to engineers' work and to the products of their labour. Whilst some 
of these values and methods act to reinforce the subjugation of labour within the process 
of production others act as sites of possible unity with that labour.
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The important point to stress is that engineers are not just the passive recipients of a 
dominant ideology. Transformations within the capitalist mode of production, leading to 
the historic growth in the organic composition of capital and the dominance of dead 
labour over living within the production process have placed engineers and designers, 
broadly defined, centre stage in the process of manufacture; but engineers' own 
experience of this process and its contradictory developments - for example, in terms of 
the combined and uneven development of the productive forces, crisis and rationalisations 
- is such that a variety of sites emerge for the growth of distinctive cultures and 
interpretations of change.
These values and methods also serve to legitimate a particular relationship between 
designers and the design process - for example, establishing engineers as professionals 
possessing distinct knowledge and principles which help to define engineers relationship to 
management and workers. Many of these values, principles and methods are utilised 
heavily by systems analysts and information technology professionals generally. One 
cannot, therefore, adequately understand the work of systems analysts without 
understanding this shared 'tool kit' of values and methods. In the following chapters on 
systems analysts and the software bottleneck I discuss these values and methods more 
fully and focus upon the ways in which systems analysts use and modify them in their 
own practice of design.
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Systems Analysts Work, Values, Methods 
and Role in The Design Process
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Introduction
In many ways engineers are a heterogeneous group, located within distinct disciplines of 
engineering for example, mechanical, electrical or production engineers and spread 
across a variety of industries and sectors. This generates complex cultures and diverse 
work activities and experience which mitigate against defining engineers as a specific 
group of workers with a specific relationship to the labour process. In contrast, systems 
analysts are a more homogeneous group of workers, generally implicated in designing 
technologies of rationalisation - where much of their work deals with the very substance 
of control, cost cutting, accounting and surveillance (Ryan 1989).
The onset of recession in the late 1970s stimulated investment in information technology 
which enabled firms to both rationalise and streamline non-profitable activities like 
administration, surveillance and accounting whilst at the same time securing tighter 
control over labour and raising its rate of exploitation (Thompson 1995, Ryan 1989, 
Sturdy 1992, Button 1992). Systems analysts are deeply implicated in the process of 
business restructuring and are perceived by many users, at a variety of levels, with some 
trepidation and awe. This is not simply because they are at the forefront of a new 
technology but because they are at the forefront of a process of restructuring which 
leads to job loss, rationalisation and disruption. Systems analysts are often perceived by 
users, engineers and even themselves as the archetypal 'yuppies'. Like any caricature, 
this is a generalisation, but it is nonetheless one which has an element of truth within it. I
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was immediately struck by the different cultures, lifestyles, dress and outlook of systems 
analysts compared to engineers. This contrast is brought home, for example, in debates 
within the systems profession over whether or not systems analysis is an engineering 
discipline or an art. On the one hand systems analysts utilise many of the concepts and 
vernacular of engineering; but, on the other, they also wish to distance themselves from 
that culture, stressing the interpersonal, artistic and 'business driven' nature of their 
work and their incorporation into the dominant business ethic.
In this chapter I discuss what systems analysis and design is, who systems analysts are 
and whether systems analysis and design is engineering or art. I also discuss recruitment 
paths into systems analysis, the skills required, issues of deskilling, and systems analysts' 
values and autonomy within the design process. Finally, I explore issues of 
professionalism and status and the way these influence systems analysts' work1 . The 
objective is not only to provide insight into this group of workers but also to highlight 
the ways in which systems analysts explain their designs and justify their work within the 
broader process of business restructuring discussed-above, in Chapter I 2 .
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Systems Analysis and Systems Analysts
The British Computer Society (1988) argues that the need for systems analysis stems 
from the rapid growth in information technology and its increasing centrality to industry, 
business, commerce and government.
In the forefront are the systems analysts and designers who are critical to the 
effective use of information technology. Their technical knowledge and business 
understanding enables them to play a key role in matching the application of 
information technology to the ever changing needs of business and 
administration (BCS 1988: 1).
Changed terms of competition and recessionary conditions have stimulated the 
development and utilisation of information technologies within business and 
organisations, predominantly as a rationalising technology (Braverman 1974, Noble 
1977, Kraft 1979), and have likewise generated large demand for computer systems 
analysts. However, computer-based systems analysis, as a distinct occupation, can trace 
its roots back to the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) project sponsored 
by the US Airforce during the Korean war (to centralise the North American radar 
system). It was at this time that the term 'systems analyst' emerged, to denote the 
separation of the conceptual task of writing a programme from the mechanical task of 
writing the code (Kraft 1979: 7).
At a more general level, systems analysis can trace its origins to two overlapping 
traditions: firstly, unsurprisingly, it is rooted in the systems movement, discussed in the
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previous chapter, with its concern with the structuring of problems and identification and 
ordering of the various components within a system. Secondly, it is rooted in control 
engineering which, according to Vickers (1986), became the new discipline and 
philosophy which permeated the work of engineers and technologists from the 1930s 
onwards. One of my interviewees candidly discussed the implications of these two roots 
of systems analysis:
Systems analysis at a very general level is concerned with producing change 
within any given system.....one analyses a given system with a view to changing
it....but the degree of change is proscribed by shall we say a mental set of what is
practicable and possible.......Control and systems theory offer models of
organisation that are comfortable....! would suggest for most analysts because
they are not radical models. They are not models which readily recognise 
contradiction or antagonism but models which imply solvability....as systems
analysis matured from its unstructured roots in programming systems and 
control theory got heavily utilised...possibly because disputes over parameters 
and boundary problems are comfortably left to others (Senior Lecturer and 
Consultant Software Engineer, University, Scotland).
A BCS document charts the nature of the occupational group:
In the past, it was mainly computer specialists who used systems analysis to help 
them understand business systems and to make improvements in them - such 
people may be called computer systems analysts. Today an increasing number of 
non-computer specialists are using systems analysis to enable them to participate 
effectively in the development and implementation of efficient business systems - 
such people may be called business systems analysts. Both types of systems 
analyst employ the same methodology; they can be trained together; they often 
work together, each bringing his or her own experience to bear on the 
co-operative task of developing a new system (1988: 2).
The BCS argues that systems analysis is:
a methodology used world-wide for creating efficient information systems, the 
methodology prescribes
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the work to be done
its sequence
the tools and techniques to be used
the management of systems development
investment appraisal
quality assurance
the documentation to be produced (1988:2)
The methodology is supposed to guide analysts through the various stages of the 
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Figure 3. Stages in Analysis and Design
The BCS defines systems analysis in terms of the application of a given methodology 
and denotes two types of people who use this methodology: computer systems analysts 
and business systems analysts.
There are a number of problems with this formulation Firstly, there are a multiplicity of 
competing analysis and design methodologies which indicates that there is no sure 
agreement as to which is best. Secondly, and more importantly, my research indicates
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that many systems analysts and systems managers simply do not use any formal 
methodology even though they are familiar with them:
I've designed some of my best systems on the back of a fag packet (Systems 
Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Good analysis and design comes through brainstorming sessions with users ... 
methodologies are okay for the nervous types or inexperienced ... then again 
they shouldn't be in systems in the first place (Systems Developer, Water 
Authority, Wales).
We can all play the rules game ... we can all recite rules or best practice in 
analysis and design ... structured methods are supposed to epitomise good 
practice ... in theory maybe they do ... but, in reality, this wonderful theory falls 
apart in the hands of the inexperienced analyst (Systems Analyst, Large Public 
Service Institution, Derbyshire).
Systems analysis is intuitive ... but not all people have got intuition ... I would 
suggest they rely heavily on methods to compensate ... (Systems Analyst, 
Electronics Defence Sector, Scotland).
Those systems analysts I interviewed and observed utilised a variety of techniques such 
as data flow diagrams, data dictionaries, entity models and cost benefit analysis, etc., but 
they did not theorise their use of these techniques in terms of BCS definitions of an 
agreed and accepted systems analysis methodology. Rather, they utilised these 
techniques as a mechanic might utilise a spanner, as a tool. The majority of analysts I 
interviewed argued that the actual knowledge needed to carry out analysis and design 
was far more esoteric:
... it's a personal experience ... it's about politics and persuasion ... it is in my 
opinion an art ... don't get me wrong, you can do analysis via a proprietary 
methodology but it would be like trying to cross the road reading a manual,
163
whilst your eyes are down on the print a car has run you over (Systems 
Manager, Heavy Electrical Equipment Manufacturer, Scotland).
Most analysts explained their work in a technical vocabulary which downplayed political 
decision taking and presented analysis and design in terms of a technically rational 
processes. However, the above interpretation finds support in the work of Feeny and 
Sladek (1977) who address the different roles performed by a systems analyst. They 
conclude that the success of the analyst's performance depends on their ability to play 
the correct role, with the right people, at the right time; a systems analyst may well have 
to assume 'the role of persuader, catalyst, confronter or impostor, in order to bring 
about change and this needs a high degree of political skill' (1977: 85-86).
The BCS definition of systems analysts is too restrictive in that it downplays both the 
diversity of people doing analysis and the factors contributing to this diversity. My own 
research indicates that definitions of systems analysts are far from clear cut:
We don't call ourselves systems analysts but systems engineers. You should be 
careful in your survey about what you mean by the term systems analyst. In a 
data processing environment, the function of a systems analyst is standard and 
simple, but another animal is evolving called a systems engineer. These people 
have got to be able to deal with all the vagaries of industrial life. Systems 
engineering, when it comes down to the nuts and bolts, is the application of 
formal and informal politics of industrial organisation (Managing Director, 
Software and Robotics company, Wales).
There are no systems analysts at CMWS. That is not to say we don't do systems 
analysis, rather systems analysis is only one part of the work we do ... we are not 
just looking at the analysis of the system, but also looking at the commercial 
considerations - market pressures, geography, etc. ... that's why we call 
ourselves consultants (Director, Micro Computing Centre, Wales).
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Systems analysis is a stage people go through as part of a career progression, but 
I'd suggest they wouldn't like to be called systems analysts, I expect they'd 
prefer the title 'systems engineer' (Consultant, Multi-national 
Hardware/Software Manufacturer, London).
In conditions characterised by chronic labour market shortages of IT staff, in general, 
(Vowler 1989) and systems analysts in particular (Butcher 1984) and in a rapidly 
changing technological and market context, neat bipolar categorisations, like those of the 
BCS, concerning who does and who does not perform systems analysis, are increasingly 
seen as dated by actual systems practitioners:
In this department, I have some 40 systems staff, we all, even the youngsters do 
systems analysis - sometimes as part of our job, but as the changed title suggests, 
we are systems developers and analysis is only one aspect of development - I 
regard my staff as supermen, a new breed of computer experts with all rounded 
skills, from programming through to analysis ... I pay them accordingly ... the 
work's hard but the market demands we become more flexible and drop rigid 
job divisions ... that are, anyway, becoming a thing of the past... part of the old 
DP ivory tower of systems development that characterised much of the sixties 
and seventies nightmare (IT Director, Major High Street Bank, London).
The argument that divisions of labour, within systems development, are changing and 
new job titles emerging to reflect this, would seem to be confirmed by the NCC (1985) 
Skills Survey Report which indicated that over half of its respondents had dropped 
traditional analyst/programmer distinctions and were adopting more 'fluid' labour 
policies vis-a-vis computer professionals, including the increase of multiskilled labour 
with enlarged job functions, experience and training. This prompts Friedman to argue 
that:
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Overall, the structure of job categories in information systems departments is 
coming to look like research, or professional units within organisations, rather 
than the mass production departments predicted by Kraft. The base of the 
internal job pyramid is getting narrower, the upper middle layers wider (1989: 
308).
Essentially, difficulties experienced in modelling increasingly complex and sophisticated 
user environments has resulted in the ad hoc development of a polyvalent division of 
labour, within systems departments. Strategies for dealing with user relations include 
user involvement in systems design, end user computing, information centres, 
decentralisation, prototyping, evolutionary systems development and changing the 
recruitment and skills sets of systems developers (Friedman 1989: 271).
Systems Analysis: Engineering or Art?
The BCS and EEE are attempting to establish systems development as an engineering 
discipline through advocating a tightening up of standards, tools, techniques and 
recruitment. 3 The emphasis within the BCS and IEE is on making software development 
an engineering exercise: systems engineering is emerging as a set of methods and tools 
applied, in a disciplined way, to the whole system design and development process, i.e. 






















Figure 4. The Systems Life-Cycle.
However, BCS and IEE attempts to establish good analysis and design in terms of an 
engineering discipline was greeted with caution, alarm and sometimes resistance by 
many practitioners I interviewed:
Software engineering and, indeed, the whole movement towards standards and 
utilisation of tools within the systems profession is on the one hand very laudable 
... Martin's approach and the tools he recommends have their use ... But there is 
a tendency, particularly on the part of sellers of this stuff, to see it as the answer 
to all systems designs problems ... We have one of the best tool kits of any 
systems department in the country [and] we have graduates with heads full of 
the latest engineering approaches but I would swap them all for a couple of 
experienced business orientated analyst/programmers who can get out there and 
hold a good conversation with users (Systems Manager, Large Communications 
Company, Wales).
This emphasis on software engineering worries me ... all stages of the systems 
development life cycle are not of equal importance. Ninety per cent of a good 
systems development is at the analysis phase: getting user requirements, 
understanding the issues, negotiating compromise. Most engineering tools are at
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the back end, even the use of structured methods like LSDM with detailed 
analysis requirement front ends, cannot alter the fact that systems development is 
primarily a political and not engineering process ... Not only are a repertoire of 
skills necessary, including common-sense and cunning... but more importantly, a 
recognition that what you are dealing with is people in organisations, people 
with possibly different goals, pulling in different directions, with different worries 
... no end of engineering tools can solve an essentially political problem (Systems 
Manager, Aerospace Industry, England).
It is not more sophisticated tools, like CASE or 4GLs, etc. that we need. It's 
people who can communicate and who have experience ... A tool is just a tool... 
Conversation, the ability to elicit information from users, the capacity to 
understand business requirements, organisational politics and culture ... and the 
broader political and economic forces operating on us all, is, above all, the most 
important criteria of being a good systems analyst... I don't want wet behind the 
ears 'techies' from college in my systems department... I'd prefer an arts student 
... a sociologist or economist any bloody one but not a 'techie' ... (Systems 
Manager, Large Public Utility, Scotland).
The point being made is that it is business understanding and a broad based arts (not 
engineering) culture which is perceived by many analysts and systems managers as the 
key indicator of success; it is these which most accurately capture the work of the 
systems analyst. Indeed, several analysts were offended by suggestions that systems 
analysis could be standardised with appropriate tools and techniques:
I've been in a senior analyst position for over ten years. Prior to that I worked 
up through the programmer/analyst route. Like most people in this department 
over the years I've developed a feel for the organisation and the nature of 
business. You spend more time listening and talking to users, becoming involved 
in broader systems issues, politics, etc.. Its a learning curve for which you are 
rewarded with project management and systems management posts ... Talk of 
systems analysis as engineering will reduce us in management's eyes to the status 
of engineers ... or techies ... In my opinion it's a retrogressive move on the part 
of the BCS and an understandable one on the part of the IEE ... but I and many 
colleagues do not like it ... The BCS are doing us no favours (Senior Analyst, 
Large Private Utility, Wales)
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Analysis is a political process requiring managerial skills ... It is not an 
engineering process ... The mentality which reduces it to such, is precisely the 
mentality that put engineers in their low status rut ... (Systems Analyst, 
Manufacturing Company, Scotland).
There is little doubt but that as one progresses up the systems career ladder, one is 
punished for being a 'techie' and rewarded for being business- orientated. As Murray 
(1989) argues, even those who entered the profession via the programming route 
become less wedded to notions of technical rationality and take on board more business 
and managerial philosophy as they climb the career ladder and increasing portions of 
their time are spent alongside users and managers. Too close an identification with 
engineering; and in particular the presentation of analysts work in terms of a body of 
technical expertise; was seen by the majority of analysts, particularly senior analysts as a 
liability which would alienate them from users and particularly from management.
Recruitment and Skills
Issues of recruitment need to be seen in the context of moves on the part of key bodies 
like the BCS, IEE and NCC and specific employers to strengthen 'professionalisation'. 
The IT industry generally has suffered from a poor image largely as a consequence of the 
number of'cowboys' that entered the industry at a time of rapid expansion and basic 
skills shortage, but also because of the high levels of user dissatisfaction and systems 
failures that have occurred (Willcocks & Mason 1987, BCS 1988). An important 
consequence of this, and one which Smith (1986) has documented in relation to
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engineers, is that there has been a rapid increase in direct graduate recruitment into 
systems analysis at the expense of both technical college, in-house, and general labour 
market recruitment (NCC 1985, NCC 1994). In effect, this has resulted in a broad rise in 
qualifications within systems analysis commensurate to similar increases within other 
professions (NCC 1994, USR 1994). However, graduate recruitment per se and certain 
types of graduate recruitment, in particular, were reported to me by a number of systems 
managers and analysts as not being without their problems:
I recruit graduates straight into analysis and design on the basis of three criteria: 
do they have the analysis skills? Do they have the technical skills and are they 
likely to bugger off after one year? ... Seriously, graduate labour turnover is a 
problem. (Systems Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
We run graduate training programs where we take on youngsters and sponsor 
them through college ... We also recruit graduates from the general labour 
market... The difficulties begin straight away. Firstly, graduates tend to be high 
flyers. They are in big demand and they know it, and can demand high salaries 
and benefits. Secondly, they usually anticipate rapid promotion irrespective of 
merit... (Systems Manager, Large Financial Services Company, Scotland).
I have been recruiting staff into systems for more years than I care to remember 
... We have graduate recruitment paths like most organisations ... and we have 
good and bad graduates from them ... In the past some of the graduates coming 
from computer science degrees were bloody awful ... Heads full of technical 
jargon, glasses and white coat types, not the most ideal people for senior posts, 
like analyst and project manager, which require human skills, common-sense, 
communication ability and political nous ... Of course, things are getting better 
and colleges are teaching more rounded skills ... But you can't substitute for 
experience and the learning curve of being in work, having your butt kicked, 
making mistakes, learning who and who not to antagonise, who pulls the strings, 
what the organisation is all about ... I've found that some of our best people, 
particularly on the analysis side, are redeployed users, people from within the 
organisation who know how it works, who understand power, and who, above 
all, else are loyal. They've probably been with us years, are settled in the area, 
married with kids, and not about to get up and leave. Personally, I prefer 
recruiting these types or, alternatively, a young lad or lassie from school, who 
shows some initiative and outgoing personality and who can pass our assessment 
and psychometric tests ... You can train these up in your culture and methods
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and they tend to be far less snotty and more loyal than graduates (Systems 
Manager, Aerospace Industry, England).
A general concern of systems managers was not only high graduate turnover (many 
managers simply felt it was not worthwhile making the investment in graduates because 
of this and preferred to recruit in-house from redeployed users) but chronic shortages of 
skilled personnel per se. Thus, one interviewee responded:
I have to be honest and say we are so desperate, we will take anything going 
(Systems Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Systems Managers also voiced concern about the abrasiveness of graduates. They were 
perceived by some to be 'snotty' and 'arrogant' and this was deemed a liability for such 
a delicate and sensitive post. Smith (1986, 1987) notes a similar display of hostility 
amongst non-graduate engineers to recently graduated engineers. More importantly, 
many systems managers I interviewed were concerned about the lack of experience of 
graduates, arguing that they tended to be 'wet behind the ears' and lacking the 
organisational and social skills deemed to be important to the analysts job. It was also 
felt that at a time when systems departments were themselves coming under tighter 
financial and auditing constraints, they could not afford the salaries, benefits and 
promotional opportunities that many university graduates expected. Even stronger 
concern was expressed about the overly technical content of many computer science
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degrees and the type of people which these produced, i.e. 'techies' who were seen as 
inappropriate to the job of systems analyst. One interviewee put it succinctly:
I couldn't imagine a worse animal for the job of systems analyst than a computer 
science graduate ... In my view, people with non-technical degrees make better 
analysts. The reason is personality. Someone with an arts degree is far more 
outgoing and choppsy, open and able to communicate and to smooth systems 
implementation, rather than introduce it as some sharp cataclysmic jolt. 
Computers are about people: if you can't communicate, you can't gather 
information needs ... Therefore, you are useless as far as analysis goes ... 
'Techies' on the other hand are quiet shy and introverted, reserved and would 
like nothing better than to go home and take their screens to bed with them ... I 
run psychometric tests on all our staff and on other companies staff and I can tell 
a 'techie' a mile off... The fact that most systems designed in the past were 
designed by techies is one reason for the mass of failed systems around and the 
bloody awful image the computer industry has ... Techies do not like change, yet 
it is they who are supposed to be at the forefront of change. I couldn't imagine a 
worse type to be in charge of change ... These people are frightened and resistant 
to change, a breed apart, scientists in their own right... but... completely out of 
touch with business needs (Director of Software/Consultancy House, Wales).
This lack of business, communication and social skills in computing graduates was a 
factor emphasised by a majority of interviewees:
Companies are finding an immense shortage of IT people with sound business 
skills ... who can hold a sensible conversation with business professionals (IT 
Consultant, Major UK Consultancy, Wales).
Friedman and Greenbaum (1984) found the same. DP managers were looking for 
'Renaissance people': generalists, with business experience, who would fit into 'flexible 
team structures'. Buckingham makes the same point:
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The analysis of information needs, and the design of systems to meet them, 
requires far more than ability to apply computer technology. It demands also a 
knowledge and understanding of human organisations and the process of 
decision making, of the structuring and management of information, of methods 
of quantitative analysis and modelling, of methods of human communication and 
interfacing with computer systems, and of proper project management. This 
differs, in major respects, from the education and training required, say, by a 
computer technologist or software engineer (1988: 37).
One of the problems, however, and one which Buckingham ignores, is that systems 
analysis may form only one part of a much larger skills set, where other factors (like 
technical knowledge) may be as great or even more important. The reason for this is that 
systems analysis, itself, may be only part of a broader job remit as IT labour becomes 
more multiskilled and polyvalent (Friedman 1989).
The problem then for colleges and universities is how to deliver the requisite skills within 
the confines of a three or four year degree course. As one university lecturer and course 
leader commented:
Each year our computer science degree has got broader as we try to keep up to 
date with not only changing technologies - hardware, software and methods but 
changing practice ... It's becoming a nightmare. We have those at the front end 
of IT telling us there's too little social science ... We have industry crying out for 
bloody COBOL programmers for Christ's sake! We have others requesting we 
include more software engineering tools ... We are trying to please everyone but 
in the end pleasing no one [and] certainly don't produce good analysts ... Sixty 
per cent of the degree is at the back end: programming, maintenance, languages, 
etc. (Senior Lecturer, Computer Science, University, Scotland).
Concern over the content and usefulness of computer science degrees was strong:
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To be frank, we are worried about the content of many computer science 
degrees ... They produce technical whiz-kids ... mathematically astute and 
technically proficient but poor at the job of being able to design a real live system 
that you and I have to live and work with ... Okay its easy to blame the 
educational system ... I'm not ... It's a difficult one ... You can revise courses, 
put in more business component, take out more COBOL programming, add 
more 4GL and CASE technology, redefine the approach as in the development 
of software engineering or use of structured methods, like SSADM ... I'm not 
sure there is a one best answer (Systems Manager, Japanese White Goods 
Manufacturer, Wales).
There is also a tendency for the duplication of skills and training within the industry. 
Irrespective of whether graduates may already possess a computer science degree, they 
are often put through in-house training programmes and courses. Ironically, many of the 
systems analysts I interviewed had no formal systems analyst training. It was just 
something they 'gravitated into' both as part of a career progression out of programming 
and quite often because 'there was no-one else to do it'. The majority of these analysts 
undertook the four week course commonly run by consultancies like Hoskyns, at the 
end of which they obtained the NCC certificate in systems analysis.
The most common recruitment path into systems analysis was promotion through the 
ranks. This view was cited as producing people with 'in-house knowledge' and good IT 
skills grounding. But it, too, had its critics:
The systems analyst is someone who comes up from a programming background 
- a progression insupportable, in my opinion, as such a background reflects in the 
systems analyst being overly technical, or computer orientated, in their outlook, 
a fact which doesn't facilitate them in coming to grips with the business aspect x>f 
the work (System Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
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When you come up through the traditional path of programming you are not 
trained to be an analyst: you merely grow into being an analyst ... When I'm 
doing analysis I find that because of my training as a programmer, I have to 
constantly battle to fight this pull towards looking at the system in terms of how 
easy it will be to code, rather than considering whether the system meets 
business requirements (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
Paradoxically, although the majority of systems analysts I interviewed had progressed 
from programming, and although they referred to this route as producing the wrong sort 
of people for analysis, they were still pleased to have travelled this route, feeling that it 
added to their ability to design systems:
Theoretically, you don't need to be able to program to be a systems analyst, 
particularly if you are doing all your design using 4th generation technology ... 
But personally, I feel I design better systems because of being a programmer ... 
There's a logic and purity about it, it helps you understand the implications of 
your design proposals, you know how to handle programs and suits of programs 
... You won't end up designing systems that are an impossibility to program ... 
You also develop a good grounding [not only] in the strengths and weaknesses 
of various languages but also the limitation of the hardware and understanding of 
user interfacing, costings, etc. (Systems Analyst, Magnetic Tape Manufacturer, 
Wales).
Armstrong (1989, 1991) and Weiner (1981) have documented how management 
culture, particularly in countries like Britain, is anti-technical and penalises those who 
couch their claims to corporate power in terms of technical expertise. Many systems 
analysts, and particularly systems managers, recognise that career progression is 
intimately tied into senior management's perceptions of whether or not they have taken 
on board the requisite business acumen and culture:
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Whilst I started off in programming and was heavily involved in the technical 
side of computing...and it still gives me a buzz...its not the sort of thing I shout 
about in management circles....What counts here is that you can speak their 
language, understand their objectives and culture, show that you know what is 
good for the organisation.... You will not go far if you do not have these skills 
and if you do not impress management with them (Systems Analyst, Financial 
Services Company, Scotland).
You must distinguish clearly between a theoretically perfect technical system - 
one that from a programming perspective does everything asked of it and a 
system which does what users and management want of it....gold medals are not 
given out here for technical brilliance and I would suggest if you push that line 
you will rapidly be seen as a misfit by users and user managers (Senior Systems 
Analyst, US Electronics Multinational, Scotland).
Clearly, analysts recognise the importance of technical and particularly programming 
skills. The more astute however, also recognise the need to repress their enthusiasm for 
this aspect of their work when in the company of management. I found that quite often 
analysts felt uneasy about discussing their technical expertise. They would silently 
acknowledge its importance whilst continually stressing that they were, nonetheless, 
business orientated. Analysts often subordinated the continued importance of technical 
and particularly programming skills to their job and sense of self worth to what appeared 
at times to be an insincere business rhetoric. This produced an almost schizophrenic 
atmosphere in many of the systems departments I studied. Such schizophrenia is 
reflected in the attempt on the part of many organisations to provide dual career 
structures for IT professionals - to reward both technical and social skills alike. 
However, from the analysts' point of view this dual career model is inappropriate in that 
no analyst I interviewed wanted to be placed on the technical ladder. All wanted to. be 
placed on a managerial one and duly recognised for their managerial and business skills.
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Many analysts thus repress a central part of their education, training, skills and 
enjoyment to satisfy this career objective.
General Skills Requirement of Systems Analysts
The BCS argues that systems analysts should have most of the following characteristics:
be literate in English and numerate
have a good general education, preferably to degree level
be able to get on with people
be able to articulate ideas coherently and clearly
be prepared to work hard
be resilient and adaptable
be highly motivated
be able to absorb and apply new technical knowledge (1988: 2-3).
My interviewees confirm this BCS emphasis. Recruits into analysis are, generally, 
expected to have a degree, good 'A' levels or experience in business, preferably IT - 
related. There is general agreement that technical degrees are not necessary and that arts 
or social science degrees are as valid. Analytical and communication skills are given high 
priority, and there is widespread criticism of computer science degrees, with their 
emphasis on programming, at the expense of business and social skills. Daniels and 
Yeates (1986) argue that the systems analyst needs to possess logic, perception, stamina, 
intellectual discipline, a sense of purpose and a flexible outlook and strength of character; 
in other words, skill is defined in terms of logic, and personal qualities.
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Because of the diversity of personnel undertaking systems analysis, and because of the 
diversity of applications worked on, from traditional office systems to large scale 
manufacturing processes, it is difficult to make general statements about the precise skills 
required. For example, whilst business consultants and systems managers in traditional 
data processing environments put considerable emphasis on the acquisition of business 
and social skills others, for example in heavy engineering, also recognise the need for 
good technical skills:
To be a good systems analyst in Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer 
Aided Manufacture (CAM), you need to have been in manufacturing and 
engineering, and you need programming because of the way you have to 
structure operations ... You have to be able to split various bits of systems and 
software, and this requires certain programmer skills ... That's why we don't call 
ourselves systems analysts, systems engineer is a more appropriate term 
(Managing Director, Software and Robotics Company, Wales).
When one reviews the course content of IT degrees, or BCS, IEE and Systems Journals 
- trade and academic, and when one speaks to practitioners in the field, one is struck by 
the diversity and depth of knowledge and skills systems analysts are expected to 
possess.4 What we are talking about here is a Nietzchean superman of computing and 
one needs to question whether or not it is at all possible to embody in one person such a 
diversity of skills:
It can be very tiring continually updating skills sets, and it's becoming more so as 
users get more choosy and technologies change ever faster ... Many of my 
analysts cannot keep pace ... Some simply don't have the skills sets ... let's say 
knowledge of particular application or language ... I try to offset this by bringing
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in consultant analysts - high fliers ... You pay through the nose for them but they 
are light years ahead of most of my department when it comes to latest 
technologies and methodologies, etc. (Systems Manager, Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
You need to distinguish between your analyst, working in a stable IT 
environment where there is little new innovation and more or less well worn 
systems of communication and procedure ... from your analyst working in a 
department that is on fire ... flooded with user requirements, expected to be at 
the forefront of change ... In the latter department you can get burnt out fast as 
an analyst ... The way forward, as I see it, is better project management and 
project teams, bring in more users ... outside expertise, consultants and even 
analysts and programmers, if you have to (Systems Manager, US Electronics 
Multi-national, Scotland).
Deskilling of Systems Analysts?
Braverman (1974), Kraft (1979) and Greenbaum (1976) have argued that a process of 
deskilling is taking place within the computer industry. My own research indicates that 
the development of certain tools and techniques - for example, structured methods, 4gls, 
CASE and software engineering tools more generally, offer the possibility of deskilling. 
However, the majority of analysts and systems managers I interviewed rejected such 
arguments, and for a variety of reasons:
Bits of the puzzle can be automated [and] we've made enormous inroads in 
some areas towards making the role of the systems analyst smoother and more 
structured, e.g. 3D auto CADs, programming generators, paperwork flows, 
techie flows, third normal form, entity modelling, data flow descriptions, etc. ... 
But what I call the IPSEs, 4GLs, report writers, systems builders, etc., ... these 
are not going to substitute for the systems analysts unless they can get out there 
into the business environment and do the analysis for me (Systems Analyst, 
Large Public Service Institution, Derbyshire).
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Some of the tools and techniques we use include context diagramming, data 
flow diagrams, organisational diagrams, prototyping, etc. ... Often, however, it is 
quicker to draw by hand than use, for example, a Yourdon package or 4GL ... 
Tools and techniques like 4GLs do take away the donkey work but they don't 
substitute ... getting out and talking to the users and setting requirements ... If 
you can provide the tools that can say do forty per cent of the analyst's work 
then you have got an ideal tool... But the big trouble is with all these 4GLs and 
everything, that you need big costly computers to run them They are also slow 
... and the information you get is only as good as the information you put in ... I 
find that, often as not, the best systems design comes through smoking a fag 
whilst having a natter with a few colleagues, using pencil and paper and flip chart 
which you take an A4 copy of (Systems Analyst, Multi-national Manufacturing 
Company, Wales).
Structured methodologies make it a hell of a lot easier to do a good systems job, 
forcing you through the steps a good analyst would do anyway. But there are 
considerations in designing systems which users, even with the most powerful 
CASE tools, are not best suited to, such as sizing considerations, ensuring 
compatibility, corporate usability of data etc. ... If you could devise a CASE tool 
to do all this and go out and talk to various users at all levels then you might be 
talking about automating the systems analyst function (Systems Analyst, Large 
Private Utility, Wales).
Methodologies are not God's panacea ... They are certainly no substitute for the 
skills of a good systems analyst. We use methodologies, particularly for large 
scale projects. One such methodology is Jackson's Structured Programming and 
Design ... We've looked at James Martin's Workbench and its a pile of crap ... 
You can't automate the systems analysts skills (Systems Manager, Large Public 
Service Institution, Derbyshire).
The whole reason why we want expert systems is that there is no substitute for 
human experience ... Some methodologies like SSADM are an attempt to 
partially automate some systems analyst functions and, likewise, 4GLs to 
automate certain programming functions but neither, in my opinion, will replace 
the need for analysts or programmers (Systems Developer, US Multi-national, 
Wales).
It is always cost effective to have a data modelling methodology - but all 
methodologies are just tools and cannot substitute for the skills and experience 
of the systems analyst (Systems Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
I do not think it at all true that either the programmer or systems analyst 
functions are being deskilled or automated by new technology and new 
structured techniques. There is a dearth of good data modellers and no amount 
of CASE tools will actually teach a person to sit down and sort out entities and
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relationships. This is just a gift you have, or learn ... You can take something like 
Automate and SSADM and the tools and techniques they provide will help the 
good analyst to concentrate his mind. Exactly the same as engineering disciplines 
in the engineering profession concentrates the mind of the engineer into a 
reasonably constrained and focused effort. (Senior IT Consultant, leading UK 
Hard and Software House, South West England).
Generally systems analysts felt that, under conditions of severe labour shortage, 
expanding work loads and demand from users for increasingly diverse applications, they 
were becoming more skilled. Rose (1987) argues that there is a need to move away from 
the simplistic work degradation thesis to recognise the diversity and variability of ways 
of organising computer staff. One can, however, recognise this diversity whilst still 
accepting that attempts towards assertion of managerial control over the systems design 
process and the development of tools and techniques to both routinise and deskill 
analysts work will take place:
Given that management is about monitoring of deliverables, then methodologies 
have to be great news for managers in that they allow inspection and breakdown 
of the systems design process and the systems analysts work (Systems Manager, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
Without doubt, one of the things about getting systems analysts to use 
methodologies is that, as a manager, you can closely monitor their work, check 
they have followed the right procedures, done the correct documentation, etc. ... 
Some may resent this kind of close inspection, particularly those used to 
designing systems on the back of a fag packet (Systems Manager, Private Utility, 
Scotland).
Certain methodologies can be used by managers to monitor and control the 
work of their systems analysts ... They are a project control and management 
tool ... They structure the work of the analyst because the analyst has to detail 
everything ... But there are other tools available to us for monitoring the work of 
our analysts, including reporting package software, whereby the analyst has to 
key in what he has done, how long it has taken him, etc., and the computer 
prints out calculations direct to me, like his performance and productivity,
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quality of work, etc. ... So, yes, these help me manage the output and quality of 
my analysts' work (Systems Manager, US Multi-national, Wales).
No-one's out to deskill for the sake of it... and, in one sense, the most important 
- the front end or political end of an analysts job, ... [it] is just not possible or 
desirable to deskill... the ability to get on ... and the very real need to put people 
at ease ... But at another level, there are things I can do to monitor my analysts' 
work and, indeed, to an extent control it ... We introduced software to monitor 
the number of lines of error-free code produced by programmers and analysts 
two years ago - they didn't like it but accepted it... I want to see tighter use of 
structured methods and particularly SSADM which is a first class methodology 
... Software engineering, generally, could also be perceived as deskilling some 
analyst work ... Software will also be introduced here, when the time is right, ... 
to monitor analyst output in terms of both quantity and quality (IT Manager, 
Financial Services Company, Scotland).
Discussion of deskilling needs to be set in the context of an expanding industry with 
severe labour shortages. According to Oakely
The future for the IT sector looks bleak. All evidence points to rising demand for 
IT professionals. Hopes that developments in software productivity will offset 
this demand are illusory (1989:12).
Houghton (1989) and Towndrow (1988) argue that skills shortages are compounded in 
Britain by lack of investment in IT and indifference and ambivalence on the part of the 
UKs top managers. Given the persistence of skilled labour shortages in the industry 
(NCC 1994) one could reasonably expect professionals within the industry to secure 
good terms and conditions for their labour, and indeed, this is what appears to be 
happening. Harris (1975) and Rose (1987) argue that where job losses and deskilling is 
likely to have greatest impact, is on operating staff, i.e. those running large mainframe
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installations, as shifts towards more powerful micro and mini computing, and 
dissatisfaction on the part of users with traditional DP systems design grows.
The majority of systems managers and analysts I interviewed believed that it was neither 
possible or desirable to automate or substitute for the 'front end' - interpersonal, 
communication, organisational and business skills of the analyst. Getting user 
requirements and acceptance to a particular system is perceived by the majority of 
systems managers and analysts as a process requiring 'nouse', 'intuition' and 
'experience'; these are perceived as highly valued characteristics which cannot readily 
be substituted. 5 Ironically, the move towards engineering standards and structured 
methods on the part of professional bodies like the BCS or IEE downplays the 
importance of precisely those skills deemed so vital by practising systems managers and 
analysts.
Systems Analysts Values
Technical Rationality and the Analyst
Implicit in much of the work of systems analysts, is a technicist ethos, similar to that 
displayed by engineers. Habermas (1971), Ellul (1964) and Mumford (1970) are among 
those who have commented on this as a general, albeit pervasive phenomenon. More 
specifically, in relation to systems analysts, Mackay and Lane (1989) have documented
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two consequences of technical rationality: first, systems analysts tend to have a strong 
faith in the capacity of IT to solve human problems; second, despite some analysts 
acknowledging design is a political process, the majority of analysts take account, only 
marginally, of the human, social and political elements of systems (Mumford 1972, 1981, 
Bjom-Anderson & Hedberg 1989, Newman & Rosenberg 1985, Murray 1989). The 
majority tend to consider the political, only in terms of the politics of information 
extraction, and the process of manipulation of users to get the system requirements. In 
effect, they consider the social and political aspects of systems design only inasmuch as it 
influences their job of analysis; the ramifications of their designs on users are largely left 
to others to deal with.
This is not to say that analysts were not aware of the ramifications of their designs on the 
organisation and control of others work and their possible impact upon jobs and skills. 
Rather they were visibly unhappy about discussing analysis in these terms, particularly if 
as a consequence of their designs significant job losses or deskilling of others work had 
occurred - at which point, they would invariably seek to invoke the sphinx of technical 
rationality, justifying their designs in terms of lesser evils.
Obviously, at one level, having such a viewpoint serves to comfort and cushion the 
impact of systems analysts work from the systems analysts themselves:
Your traditional DP environment, with its thick technical coat, tends to isolate 
the systems analyst from the broader consequences of his work [with] political 
considerations tending to be left to others ... It is easier then for the analyst to 
comfort himself in the knowledge that his own decisions are purely technical and
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done solely for technical reasons ... Obviously even with this thick coat many 
can't face the consequences of their designs and have deep personal traumas 
(Systems Manager, Multinational Electronics Company, Scotland).
The DP culture with its traditional routes of entry into analysis, up through programming 
and via recruitment from technical degrees, with its heavy emphasis upon control and 
systems theory and the 'hard' sciences, helps to foster a technological paradigm within 
systems design. This is reinforced by the division of labour within systems design. 
Analysts usually carry out their analysis in project teams, consisting of users and systems 
staff, which serves as the crucible in which strategies and important political decisions 
are 'democratically' melted down. Likewise, senior staff, i.e. project manager, systems 
manager, or above, tend to make and be responsible for, the strategic political decisions 
within a given design.
As with engineers (and unsurprisingly) many analysts perceive the accumulation process 
as essentially technical, and accounting and profit as an indicator of systems success, 
rather than as (for example) an indicator of labour exploitation. Because accumulation is 
seen as technical, rather than social, analysts can perceive their own work in likewise 
technical terms: they are the ones ensuring that inspection, monitoring, overseeing and 
control of organisational functions is carried out 'effectively'.
Wedded to this notion of technical rationality is a model of the analyst, as information 
technocrat, within the new information society economy (Bell 1984, Naisbett 1982, 
1990, Toffler 1980). Here we have a similar theorisation to that of Veblen who saw
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engineers as the rightful heirs to the process of industrial capitalism, the ones most suited 
in terms of skills and training to be the guardians of production and society. If engineers 
were perceived as the technocrats of early 20th century capitalism, a number of analysts 
and systems managers perceived a similar role for systems staff, as the new technocrats 
of the emerging information economy:
If steam, coal, machinery and production line technology were the base line of 
industrialisation ... information and information technologists will be central to 
the new post industrial ... leisure society (Senior Systems Analyst, Financial 
Services Company, Scotland).
Whilst the majority of analysts and systems managers I spoke to were less sanguine 
about the coming of a new post-industrial information society, there was, nonetheless, a 
general consensus that systems staff will be key personnel in the 21st century economy:
Information is the key to business success ... The revolution is only just 
beginning ... I see massive demand in the years ahead for systems staff and,.in 
particular, excellent analysts who will be at the forefront of this revolution [and 
will be the] catalysts ... advancing the technology (Systems Analyst, US 
Multinational Electronics Company, Scotland).
In sharp contrast to the often run-down departments, facilities, tawdry image and low 
self-esteem which I encountered in my field studies of engineers, in systems departments 
I found staff with a glossy high tech aura about them which conveyed a sense of 
optimism. They were riding the crest of a technological tidal wave that they perceived 
was about to come crashing down on an unsuspecting and often unprepared business
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community, rather than receding into the prehistoric past like many engineers. This was 
recognised by both the systems analysts and engineers I interviewed:
We are at the forefront of changes in manufacturing and, indeed, society 
generally... ours is a high tech holistic technology that permeates every aspect of 
life ... Its potentiality is only just being realised [and] the pace of change is fast in 
this industry ... You've got to be young, fit and have flair and intelligence to 
survive but the rewards, in terms of income and status, can be immense if you 
are a high flier (Systems Analyst, Financial Service Institution, Scotland).
I suppose IT does have a better image than we do ... Engineering is a low status 
and ill-rewarded occupation in Britain ... People want to leave this profession 
before they've even started ... I and many of my colleagues, get pissed off" with 
the ridiculous money and prestige systems staff can get in this company ... It's 
out of all proportion to their skills and training (Mechanical Engineer, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
Whilst the engineer was perceived as working with tools and getting dirty and oily, the 
analyst was seen as working with knowledge - an esoteric commodity, one that 
bestowed higher status, was cleaner, more important and more central. This point was 
made forcefully by one young analyst I spoke to in one of Britain's largest clearing 
banks:
The substance of our work is communication ... Knowledge flows, knowledge 
processes ... It's a far more esoteric commodity than a car engine or machine 
tool... This knowledge is central to business success and central to society ... we 
don't carry bags of spanners around ... What we carry is the formal and informal 
politics of the organisation and of who does what and who should do what here 
in our heads (Systems Analyst, Major High Street Bank, Scotland).
Analysts tended to see themselves as modemisers. In my research I sensed both the 
urgency and the centrality of their work to organisational effectiveness. This was
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reflected not only in terms of the number of new posts created, the plushness of offices 
and furnishings, the restructuring of company boards to give greater voice to IT 
representatives but, more importantly, in everyday organisational discourse: talk was of 
changes in, or modifications to, work practices, operating systems, new communication 
flows, robotics, computers and more computers. This contrasted sharply with the 
discourse of worry about closures cutbacks and deteriorating status that many engineers 
experienced.
Technical Rationality and Disaster Planning
I found, however, that systems analysts' notions of technical rationality and their 
visionary perspectives concerning the future information society were thrown into sharp 
relief in my interviewees discussions of IT fragility and disaster planning. This is one area 
where the majority of systems managers I interviewed expressed concern, worry and 
notable unease. Several cited examples of the fragility of their systems:
We have a planning section whose job it is to put through disaster plans and we 
look for possible weaknesses or vulnerability within the system. I am very aware 
of the responsibility on IT for trying to minimise fragility ... We try to build 
flexibility into the systems we design ... But let's face it, NALGO could pull the 
plug on the mainframe and grind us to a halt (Systems Manager, Large Private 
Utility, Wales).
Disaster planning becomes very important, as more and more of your strategic 
operations become computer reliant. The plane that crashed on the Ml caused a 
real fright to Bank Co. It missed their main computer building by a few hundred 
yards. The real disaster, however, is not so much a bomb blowing the 
mainframes up, as to how to keep your data current, as systems become ever 
more complex. Think of the risk to ATMs if mainframes went down, in fact to
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all aspects of banking ... and how do you plan for things like industrial action? 
(Systems Manager, Major High Street Bank, London).
Many interviewees referred to the fragility of systems in terms of potential fires, 
industrial action, etc. Others, however, saw fragility in more sophisticated terms, viz., of 
what IT did not have, that manual procedures do:
To a certain extent, our CAD based system, could be said to embody a certain 
deskilling of the craftsman's feel for the part and his experience of the metal. 
This can be lost in a computer-aided design system as you become over reliant 
on drawings rather than on experience and feel. It's a problem and one reason 
why you shouldn't employ non-engineering trained people to design on CAD ... 
We used to be a paper factory. Paper factories have a certain flexibility, now we 
are moving fast towards a paperless factory ... which can be very fragile. You 
need to build in safety factors, duplication of essential functions, security, etc. 
otherwise you are asking to be cream crackered ... There is a hell of a delicacy 
and lack of flexibility about a fully computerised factory ... We got one hell of a 
hammering from the auditors ... shit flew [and] they said we were totally 
vulnerable and couldn't function without a computer... It's one reason why I am 
currently in the middle of producing a justification report to ensure adequate 
disaster planning ... But of course you can't plan for every contingency: 
industrial relations, a nutter, a miss-keying of information ... it's a nightmare ... I 
can see big problems for some companies in the future (Systems Manager, 
Aerospace Industry, England).
Cooley argues that factories that are nearly workerless lack robustness:
If you have highly skilled workers who understand the system then you will have 
a more robust system in the sense that it can cope with a whole range of 
uncertainties and disturbances - and the real world of manufacturing is always 
full of uncertainties and disturbances (Cooley cited by Cannon 1988).
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Cooley, working on a project concerned to counter the Taylorist approach to the 
elimination of uncertainty, is aiming to develop human centred systems which enable the 
operator to over-rule the machine, as opposed to ones which minimise operator skill:
Automated systems work well in an ideal world. As soon as you take computer 
systems into the real world they hit unexpected problems (Slaven, cited Cannon 
1988).
Cooley's approach has been articulated by others. Caulkin (1989) cites examples to 
show that computerisation and automation are not panaceas for all business ills. He 
argues that more often than not, less computerisation will mean more competitiveness 
and flexibility and that the answer lies in getting the right blend of organisational culture, 
skills, product structure, suppliers and investment in IT:
Manufacturing goals these days are summed up in one word, zero. Zero 
inventory, zero delay for the customer, zero defects, zero batch size excess, zero 
bureaucracy, zero industrial conflicts with labour. For the time being most firms 
have a better chance of achieving the aims of new manufacturing with a PC and 
a drawing board than with all the MIPs in the world (Caulkin 1989).
In the same vein, Evans (1989), Adler (1987), Kelly (1986) and Clarke(1995) have 
examined the low take up of CIM and FMS, arguing that manufacturing needs 
organisational change, not necessarily more computing capability.
The possible fragility of IT systems means that, the logic of many systems analysts and 
systems managers - that more IT is better - often crashes upon the rocks of
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organisational practice, in which more IT can simply mean more fragility and more 
nightmares for systems managers. A number of systems analysts, and particularly 
systems managers, were aware of this contradiction indicating that this was a sign of 
their maturity and the fact that they were not merely 'techies', like many in the field:
There are many systems I have looked at on the shop floor and decided to leave 
well alone, either because they were too complex to computerise or operations 
are so simple and efficient as they are, that to computerise under present levels 
of skill and job demarcations, etc., would just cause too many problems and 
wouldn't be worth the hassle. I don't believe in developing computers for 
computers' sake. I am more an engineering man than a computer man (Systems 
Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
In this business you've got to know when it's worth computerising and when it 
isn't... I have to restrain some of the younger lads who are keen to computerise 
everything in sight ... Some operations are best left as they are ... for example, 
there are a number of highly skilled - and I mean highly skilled - craftsmen here. I 
was pressured by salesmen to introduce CIM and a certain amount of 
automation ... But, unlike the sales reps, I know the firms' product structure and 
value the flexibility and skills of the shop floor ... It's better left alone [and] 
production management agreed with me ... I think they were pleasantly surprised 
that I wasn't just trying to advance our department but actually thinking in terms 
of the broader interests of the organisation ... In fact, I was promoted several 
months later to systems manager and I'm sure this played a part in it (Systems 
Manager, Japanese Electrical Goods Manufacturer, Wales).
Sargent argues that systems designers need to be aware of failures which
are important learning situations because they ensure that designers will in their 
future work properly explore the new design idiom these failures represent and 
the possibility of failure [as] part of the culture of engineering (1994.391).
However the drive on the part of organisations like the BCS towards the development of 
systems analysis as a design science with a coherent, logical and fail safe, set of methods, 
tools and techniques, fails to acknowledge the essentially incoherent and contested
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nature of design and the variety of competing design tools, techniques and paradigms 
(Sargent 1994, Vmcenti 1990, Warfield 1990, Bucciarelli 1984). Consequently, as 
Sargent argues
Any design science is therefore strictly limited in its predictive power except in 
very mature domains using very well established design idioms - in these cases 
it is arguable whether such a routine process is design or whether it is mere 
form-filling (1994: 392).
The prescriptive nature of the industry and much of its tools and techniques encourages 
analysts to "get it right' first time. Consequently analysts have not yet grasped, as many 
engineers have grasped, the significance of failure as part of the learning curve of 
successful systems design (Petroski 1985). It is only because of increasing user 
dissatisfaction that recent developments in prototyping software are now giving analysts 
the possibility of creating models that can fail and that failure itself is slowly entering 
design discourse. In this sense analysts are beginning to realise what many engineers 
have known for a long time - that an engineer is someone who turns specifications into 
malfunctions (Seargant 1994). 6
Business Rationality and System Efficiency
If technical rationality was the old altar upon which systems analysts both worshipped 
and were slaughtered, 'business rationality' is fast becoming the new one. Systems 
analysts and managers would justify their autonomous decisions - including less IT if 
necessary - in terms of their understanding and interpretation of what the organisation
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needed. Many analysts and systems managers saw themselves as the 'guardians' of the 
organisation, the new high priests, whose unique technical and business skills, coupled to 
their key location within the division of labour, gives them a 'panoramic' perspective that 
users may not have. This places them in a uniquely favourable and privileged position 
from which to make pronunciations regarding what is the most suitable strategy and 
design to pursue:
I would say that analysts, and the department as a whole, because we are a 
service department, with fingers in every other department... because we know 
their business... because we write the systems for their business ... because more 
than anything else we know them and how they think ... we more than anyone 
else within the company should be in a position to know what's best for the 
company (Systems Manager, Private Energy Utility, Wales).
The higher one progresses up the systems hierarchy, the more important overt display of 
business awareness becomes. Career progression is intimately tied into senior 
management's perceptions of analysts understanding of business and their organisational 
and communication skills. Two factors are responsible for the rapid rise of business 
rationality within systems design. First, the immersion of analysts into dominant business 
cultures has been greatly reinforced via a new emphasis within government and 
managerial circles of the virtues of the 'free market'. Almost without exception, the 
companies and organisations I studied, including the public sector, had undergone 
processes of restructuring both in terms of job losses and rationalisation of processes but 
also, and importantly, in terms of new organisational cultures, emphasising 'cost 
effectiveness', 'reduction of waste', 'slack', and the 'need to end restrictive practices'. 
Second, the shift towards graduate recruitment and the increasing emphasis upon
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business and organisational skills within degree and course curricula has helped foster a 
culture in which graduates see themselves as part of management and anticipate 
managerial rewards.
Many of the analysts I interviewed used notions of'business rationality' to explain away 
their designs, often almost confessionally. My suggestion that market needs are open to 
interpretation and that analysts might be interpreting them in a particular way, simply to 
justify their particular systems design was often met with a near religious invocation of 
the market and market principles:
I don't determine what the market needs ... The market is neutral ... I simply 
deliver systems that the market dictates ... I don't personally choose or desire to 
see people lose their jobs, or carry out less satisfying forms of work ... If I didn't 
build systems this way, the market would penalise us all [and] we just wouldn't 
be competitive (Systems Analyst, Japanese Electronics Company, Wales).
At a practical level, unitarist perspectives, like technical or business rationality, with their 
emphasis upon 'efficiency', either technical or business, but invariably both, can save 
analysts a lot of soul-searching, for example, not having to become overly emotional 
about job losses, deskilling or routinisation of others work:
I have designed systems where I have had to take away decisions from users ... 
because it would complicate their tasks [and] run the risk of messing up 
programming (Systems Developer, Hardware/Software Manufacturer and 
Consultancy, Wales).
Sometimes it is necessary to alter job definitions as a consequence of systems 
developments. For example, in banking a lot of our systems were designed 
expressly to shed labour and increase productivity ... But it has to be done, if we
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are to remain competitive and efficient (Systems Analyst, Major High Street 
Bank, London).
If you look at the operatives in this mill ... Look at them (analyst gesticulates 
with finger to shop floor) ... Many are trained gorillas ... You can't blame them 
... but really I'm not going to give them the opportunity of wrecking my system 
by getting them involved in the design stage or offering them all kinds of options 
... You cannot jeopardise efficiency for the sake of a few hot heads ... The 
interests of the organisation must come first or we will all be out of a job 
(Systems Engineer, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Analysts justify their designs in terms of 'efficiency' but never really define or question 
the concept. It serves as a prayer, whose continual rendition serves to obliterate enquiry. 
What is more, the continual repetition of the symbol is not without its problems. The 
eagerness of many analysts to enter the discourse of business efficiency - matched only 
by the crispness of their blue suits - was often parodied by users and even older, senior 
and, in this instance, presumably wiser systems managers:
It's okay rushing round preaching "modernise, modernise" ... "efficiency 
improvements" here, "cost savings" there ... God they make me cringe 
sometimes ... I have to restrain some of the younger analysts' enthusiasm ... and 
at times I wish they would be a little less business orientated ... Well, er ... I 
mean less bloody open and proselytising about it... What you need to appreciate 
is that in this company people get set in their ways ... Users don't readily grasp 
or even appreciate the need for change ... We're not some financial company full 
of yuppies [and] even management here gets its hands dirty ... Some of my 
analysts really piss some of the users off... I've had them come up to me and 
complain .. One manager said, "Are all your youngsters [expletive] Tories or 
have they just swallowed Milton Freidman" ... It's not the way to go about 
design ... You need to be more subtle ... (Systems Manager, Heavy Electrical 
Engineering Company, Scotland).
I'm not a fanatic and I hate fanatics [and] this new business creed worries me ... 
I don't particularly like the ideas many of my younger graduates have ... I don't 
like their attitudes either ... They can be too abrasive and abrupt... I've worked 
as System Manager in this company for years. If I don't need an Italian Designer 
suit, why do they ... This job's not about antagonising people it's about 
facilitating them in securing their aims ... Some of my analysts frighten users with
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their creed of change ... it's just unnecessary and naive (Systems Manager, 
Regional Power Generating Utility, Wales).
What these managers are alluding to is that the doctrine of 'efficiency' - technical or 
otherwise - is just that - a doctrine. It doesn't square with the reality of systems design 
as compromise, and it upsets and alienates many users whilst in the process ridiculing 
systems departments through its evangelistic creed and pronunciations on organisational 
problems. As one systems manager put it bluntly:
Free market philosophy and business efficiency is meaningless ... There is no free 
market ... and all systems are compromises ... We are lining ourselves up for a 
good kicking if we approach systems design with the attitude we've got the 
most effective, efficient solution to your problems ... I say to those peddling such 
a philosophy shove it... and leave design to the professionals (Systems Manager, 
Electronics Contractor Defence Sector).
Whilst the majority of systems analysts I interviewed and observed justified their work in 
terms of business or technical rationality, and in most cases both, there were a couple of 
notable exceptions, including one young analyst. He related how he could not face 
integrating a particular work station into the broader CIM facility, as he knew it was 
going to mean two of his best mates would lose their jobs (these were childhood 
buddies, who lived in the same village, went to the same school; indeed, one had been 
best man at his wedding):
I was working on a team introducing new CIM facilities, part of my remit was to 
analyse job functions in assembly "B" with a view to automating procedures 
there ... My pals worked there ... I was dreading it ... I priced several bits of 
hardware and robotics ... I did my best to find the most expensive and elaborate
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... In my presentation I emphasised the difficulties that might emerge in 
installation and the cost and lack of flexibility ... I portrayed the whole exercise 
negatively ... emphasising how efficient and well the current system worked and 
how disruptive and costly it would be to alter. I was lucky they believed me, 
probably because they never seriously questioned my figures ... and probably 
because the budget was running ahead anyway ... But I could, if I had wanted, 
persuaded them to go automatic ... It was so irrational... so unprofessional... I 
felt guilty for weeks ... I still do feel guilty but my loyalty to my friends is more 
important than to the company I suppose ... (Systems Analyst, Japanese White 
Goods Manufacturer, area omitted at interviewees request).
What is remarkable about this admission is not just that the analyst recognises that 
systems are often the outcome of 'irrational' choices, but that he felt so guilty, both in 
terms of not being loyal to the company but also in terms of disregarding the dominant 
culture of'efficiency' within systems design.
It should also be noted that whilst many systems analysts were waiting in the wings, 
ready for the limelight to fall on them in recognition of their incorporation into the 
business community, others were far from happy at the prospect of entering that 
community or having their work presented in such overtly business oriented language. 
One systems manager argued that traditional DP environments with their thick technical 
coats tend to cushion some analysts from the political ramifications of their designs. 
Some, because of their particular training and career progression, up through 
programming, were probably best left at the back end, out of the limelight. The sheer 
weight of analysts who have come up through the technical ranks should caution the 
making of sweeping statements that all are ready to grasp the business mantle. More
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importantly, a minority simply do not wish to accept this mantle because they do not 
accept the dominant business ideology:
I suggest that a lot of those you may study working in the high tech, high flying 
companies and areas ... and particularly the younger ones, will have a pretty 
uncritical stance towards the business credo sweeping through systems. I 
personally am not a monetarist, I'm a socialist... at heart. I know that there are 
conflicts of interest within organisations between those that own and those that 
don't... I see myself as trying to be humane ... I have to fight constantly to resist 
unthinking calls for IT ... from some of the younger personnel (Senior Systems 
Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
I could be earning far more money if I were an analyst in the private sector... but 
I'm not prepared to sacrifice all my principles for the sake of personal greed and 
company profit ... I feel that here there is less accounting pressure on systems 
and more scope for people centred systems development ... the kind which, in 
my opinion, makes for not only a happier workforce but healthier organisation 
(Systems Analyst, Regional Council, Scotland).
Productivist culture
Like the engineers discussed in the previous chapter, many systems analysts 
conceptualise their work in similar productivist terms. The analogies with coal mining 
and getting down to the coal face and getting ones hands dirty, frequently entered 
systems analysts' discussion of their own work. It is as if they draw strength and 
self-esteem from emphasising the directly productive nature of their work:
We don't just sit around pushing pens and doing paper work ... We get down to 
the coal face - talk with the users [and] get things built (Systems Analyst, 
Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
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Above all else, we are designers [and] engineers ... We build systems - physical 
systems ... The nature of our work involves us getting our hands dirty ... getting 
out to user departments ... sorting out their requirements ... Physically building 
the system ... and maintaining it (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
Ironically, discussion of analysts' tools and techniques took on a similar macho tone. 
Tools and techniques were described in terms of 'toolkits', with emphasis placed upon 
their 'engineering' content:
We can pick and choose from a variety of tools when it comes to design ... I 
have my own personal toolkit which I prefer to use and other analysts have 
theirs ... Which particular tools you use depends on the situation you are 
modelling (Systems Analyst, Major High Street Bank, London).
Listening to systems analysts one could be forgiven for thinking they actually had a bag 
full of tools which they carried around with them from job to job, rather like a mechanic 
or plumber, whereas, of course, the tools and techniques they are referring to are paper 
methodologies and computer software neither of which tend to leave the systems 
department.
Ironically, systems managers, rather like senior engineers and production engineers, 
whilst still emphasising the productivist nature of their staffs work, are less sanguine 
about presenting this work in terms of a vocabulary of production, seeking also to 
emphasise more esoteric qualities like managerial, organisational, inter-personal and 
communication skills:
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Obviously, we have a whole series of tools and techniques that we deploy in 
building systems ... these are heavily engineering orientated, particularly the new 
Case tool kits and new Virtual Reality Software that we are beginning to use to 
good effect ... But one should not forget that we are not engineers as such ... 
Our work is also managerial ... increasingly more so I would suggest (Systems 
Manager, US Multi-national Electronics Company, Wales).
It's important to recognise that our work is productive ... but I'd caution those 
trying to advance the cause of systems in such terms ... Analysis is more 
managerial ... requiring inter-personnel and organisational skills as well ... It's 
unhealthy to make too close an identification with production ... (Systems 
Manager, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
It is possible that these two managers recognise that status and career rewards do not 
come from identifying too closely with the vocabulary of productivism. Too strong an 
emphasis on the practical and technical content of their work may discredit them in the 
eyes of senior managers and users. Certainly, the blue suited image and shift towards 
graduate and in-house recruitment, with emphasis on non-technical degrees and business 
understanding, would seem to indicate that systems analysts are becoming less wedded 
to productivist values than engineers.
Design Purity
I found that systems analysts, rather like engineers, had strong opinions on what 
constituted a 'pure' design. Unlike engineers, however, who utilised imagery of Italian 
engineering to epitomise design purity, systems analysts, albeit unconsciously, utilised 
Weberian imagery of technical-rational efficiency:
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Systems should be efficient ... By that I mean they should have singularity of 
purpose ... Ideally they should not be compromised ... and cluttered with too 
many bells and whistles ... which require inordinately long programming hours 
and, anyway, divert the user from the task in hand ... When I go about designing 
a system, I consider what the user's function is and how I can apply the 
technology to enable the user to carry out the function, more rationally ... more 
efficiently... (Systems Developer, Regional Water Authority, Wales).
The vocabularies of systems analysts and engineers are very close here: both refer to the 
need to follow form and cut back on unnecessary complexity and details - an 'over 
engineered' state. Both utilise notions of design purity to legitimise and evaluate their 
own activity:
Of course, I could have given users this and that... but this would have infringed 
the solidity of the design ... It's not wise to give too much decision making to 
users, if you can actually encompass that in the software ... Your system will be 
more robust and less prone to crashing (Systems Analyst, Automotive 
Components, Manufacturer, Wales).
You don't compromise the design of the system just because of human factors ... 
Users have their own particularistic interests ... You can never please all users 
and that's not my main concern ... My concern is to deliver a system that's pure, 
uncomplicated and fulfils the requirements set by management (Systems Analyst, 
Financial Services Institution, Scotland).
The first analyst argues that giving users too much input and autonomy would 
compromise the solidity of the design. The second argues that you cannot compromise 
the purity of the design simply because users may be upset or dissatisfied by it. In effect, 
notions of design purity act to cushion analysts from the implications of their designs on 
users and to legitimise their own practice in terms of a higher rationale than merely 
'particularistic' user interests.
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Interestingly, as with engineers, a number of systems analysts felt their designs had been, 
or could be, compromised on the altar of cost benefit analysis and user sanctity:
Obviously, there are systems we have worked on here which could have been a 
lot better ... But they ended as compromise because of lack of funds and 
financial insight (Systems Analyst, US Electronics Company, Scotland).
Our intention is to support and maintain the user functions ... but users do not 
always appreciate the issues or complexities of a particular design ... But, 
because you are there to support them and not vice versa, you sometimes have 
to compromise the purity of the design ... The design becomes less than ideal 
from our perspective (Systems Manager, Regional Energy Utility, Wales).
Implicit in this is the notion that there is some abstract model or set of values that 
analysts work to, a higher rationality, or sense of purpose, concerning what a system 
should look like and how it should function.7 Ironically, given the number of analysts 
who emphasise that design is invariably a compromise, one wonders why such a 
rationality should be so pervasive. One possible explanation is that notions of design 
purity, along with other values (for example, technical and business rationality) act to 
constitute a particular world view which, in turn, reinforces the role of systems analysts 
as corporate guardians. In effect the notion of design purity serves to legitimise calls for 
privileged status and position. This in itself is interesting because whilst systems analysts 
and particularly systems managers continually reiterated that their role was to 'support 
the user functions' they also felt that users did not always know what was in either their 
own, or the organisation's, 'best interest'. After several years interviewing and observing 
systems analysts and systems managers I am left with the clear impression that many of
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them think, but few will openly state, that they should have privileged status and more 
organisational power commensurate to their roles and strategic importance to the 
organisation.
Systems Analysts Autonomy
The majority of systems analysts and even systems managers interviewed did not like to 
acknowledge openly that they had a degree of autonomy over systems design, and even 
less would they admit they used this autonomy. Many panicked when I pressed them on 
the issue of autonomy over the design process, not only asking for the tape recorder to 
be switched offbut visibly blushing and becoming uneasy.
Whilst a number of analysts and managers refused point blank to discuss the issue of 
autonomy, contenting themselves that they were merely 'executing user requirements' 
and 'working to spec', others were more forthcoming:
Nobody can develop a system without imposing their own personal preferences 
and views upon it, so I suppose this is an area where we have autonomy ... We 
are able to engineer into systems our own particular world view, we shouldn't 
but we do ... (long pause and consternation) ... Er ... what I mean is ... er ... it 
can be dangerous, particularly, if you are a rookie who doesn't understand the 
nature of the business and users ... (Systems Manager, Aerospace Industry, 
England).
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This particular manager admits his analysts exercise autonomy but then shocked at this 
realisation, emphasises that it is a politically dangerous game, one best played by 
experienced professionals. Another systems manager was even more forthright:
There is little in this organisation that hasn't got systems department written all 
over it ... our values embodied within it (Systems Manager, Regional Energy 
Utility, Wales).
Another manager argued that:
We are neither autonomous nor subordinate ... we work for the good of the 
company (Systems Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
Obviously, determinations of what is good for the company are pretty unproblematic to 
this particular manager. In conversations I had with him, determinations of what is 'good 
for the company' unsurprisingly coincided with what he believed was good for 'systems' 
i.e. the systems department and 'business generally'.
One systems consultant highlighted the ways in which analysts' autonomy can be 
exercised:
[Often analysts and their managers will] bring down a big book and say [to the 
user] that's what you asked for, now sign off for it ... and the user in all 
likelihood will take one look at this book, probably won't understand it -.too 
much to read- and say, "Fuck this! The DP guy seemed a reasonable enough sort 
of bloke. I'm sure he knows what he's about" and sign off for the system ... It 
happens often.. it's manipulation (IT Consultant, Major UK Consultancy).
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In effect, the analyst hides his ulterior motives within the design process behind the 
'technical jargon' and excessive documentation procedures that accompany the design 
process. One particular analyst indicated that:
We are in a position to influence choice of hardware and software ... We don't 
like to see good hardware and software being rejected out of hand by users ... 
We can be stubborn here ... I can't compromise on this ... We use all our powers 
of persuasion to make users see sense (Systems Analyst, Major Public Service 
Institution, Derbyshire).
Analysts exercise autonomy but they sought to assure me they exercised it with 
discretion and in the 'interests of the system' and 'company', the two usually being 
conflated. Analysts and systems managers would, when pressed, also pride themselves 
on the mature exercise of this autonomy.
Experience brings with it both judgement and organisational jurisprudence ... It's 
important to know how to exercise judgement... and to know when to push and 
when to back off(Systems Manager, Regional Energy Utility, Wales).
A good analyst knows ... instinctively, how to exercise discretion ... Who to talk 
to and what he needs to know to build the system ... This is exercise of 
autonomy ... but it's exercised with maturity and in the interests of the system 
(Systems Analyst, Financial Services Institution, Scotland).
That so many analysts justified this exercise of autonomy, in terms of protecting or 
securing systems/company interests, indicates the unease which they felt over the issue 
of autonomy. To openly admit one exercises autonomy, is not something analysts readily 
do. However, when they do, they often justify this in terms of defending system interests,
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broadly defined. Open recognition that systems design may, after all, involve 
compromise in which analysts exercise arbitrary authority rather than acting as dutiful 
'servants', risks alienating them from users and undermining their professional credibility 
and sense of identity as 'servants' to the user functions.
Not only do analysts exercise varying degrees of autonomy within the design process 
vis-a-vis users, but also vis-a-vis their own managers and with regard to the exercise of 
their own labour power:
Obviously, in one sense, my work is structured. I am accountable to Andy (the 
systems manager) and most large scale work takes place within project teams in 
which I would also be accountable to particular project managers ... Andy also 
emphasises that we are accountable to users [managers] ... There are also a 
variety of techniques available to management to monitor your productivity and 
quality of your work ... But even so, I still largely plan my own working day ... I 
decide, usually, which user or group of users I need to speak with ... I decide 
what might be the most appropriate development scenarios to suggest, what 
software or hardware to use ... So yes, I do have a lot of responsibility and 
autonomy over my own work (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
Roger (the systems manager) is pretty laid back ... He just leaves us to get on 
with it ... There are no really solid rules you have to adhere to ... I think you 
need the autonomy to be reflexive and adaptable to changing work loads, tasks 
and users (Systems Analyst, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
If you increase control over analysts and over how they go about doing their 
work, if you try to straight-jacket this work and make it procedure and rule 
bound, you risk losing creativity and adaptability (Senior Systems Analyst, 
Financial Institution, Scotland).
Analysts argue, like many professionals, that autonomy and discretion are important 
parts of their job, in the sense that they need 'freedom' to be 'creative' and 'reflexive'.
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This open recognition of the need for exercise of autonomy contrasts sharply with their 
unwillingness to recognise the implications of the exercise of that autonomy over others' 
work. By and large they failed to communicate to me the connection between this 
exercise of autonomy within their own work as a powerful precondition for their 
exercise of autonomy over others' work. This is one reason why some systems managers 
and senior users are trying to more tightly circumscribe the nature of analysts work.
Professionalism and Status
Professions, according to 'trait theory', are defined in terms of a set of in-built qualities 
and characteristics (Johnson 1972). Thus, Millerson (1964) offers an account of a 
'model' profession as one exhibiting some, or preferably all, of the following 
characteristics: skill based on theoretical knowledge, an extensive period of education, 
the theme of public service and altruism, the existence of a code of conduct or ethics, 
insistence upon professional freedom to regulate itself and the testing of the competence 
of members before admission to the professions.
Attempts on the part of the BCS, IEE and NCC to secure professional status for systems 
analysts follow similar functionalist paths with emphasis upon examination, education, 
standardisation of tools and techniques, ethical codes of conduct and self-accreditation 
and regulation of membership.
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A central argument of the ffiE (1989, 1992), the BCS (1986, 1989) and NCC (1987) is 
that they are contributing to the establishment of a professional structure for systems 
analysis practice. The BCS 'Performance Standards Extract' (1986) is designed with 
four purposes in mind:
1) To provide a set of guidelines that will assist both employers and employees 
to define training needs and also to create career development structures for all 
types of information staff.
2) To provide an industry-wide broad standard set of definitions for the jobs that 
are carried out within information technology, independent of any equipment or 
application bias.
3) To provide a set of performance and training/development yardsticks against 
which, those who seek to become professionally qualified within the industry, 
can be measured in terms of experience gained and training received.
4) To, similarly, provide a set of performance yardsticks which can be used by 
those already qualified professionally within the industry, to maintain an 
independently validated record of skill and knowledge updating (1986:1).
The document thus attempts to strengthen the professionalisation of the industry by 
delineating job categories and suggesting relevant qualifications, experience and rewards. 
It constitutes an attempt to impose a structure and standardised practices on a new, 
dynamic, fluid and very non-standardised industry - one which is said by some to involve 
a heterogeneous and disparate group of people, high labour turnover, uncoordinated 
training schemes, competing tools, methodologies and techniques, a cavalier work 
culture, shoddy work, lack of standards, quality and continuity, systems failure, late 
delivery and lack of back-up and maintenance (Comes 1988, Eason 1987, Martin 1984, 
Wainright & Francis 1984, Willcocks & Mason 1987). The Manpower Services 
Commission, the IT Skills Agency, the Engineering Training Board, the Computer
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Services Industry Training Council, the Department of Trade and Industry and others 
(Meissner 1986, Jenkins 1986, Buckroyd & Cornford 1988, EDP Analyser 1976) have 
all supported moves towards standardisation of the industry. A number of hard and 
software houses and IT trade journals have also stressed that professionalism is vital to 
getting user and public acceptance and legitimacy of the IT industry.
However, there are several problems with the BCS approach. First, less than half of the 
systems analysts I interviewed were members of the BCS which simply did not have the 
recognition in systems analysts eyes that accrues to the engineering institutes. Second, 
many employers are so desperate to recruit systems staff that entry into the industry was 
and still is relatively easy. Third, many systems managers and IT directors I interviewed 
were not keen on recruiting graduates because they were perceived as demanding higher 
salaries, were more likely to leave an organisation in search of career promotion, and did 
not always have sufficient business experience. Fourth, the plethora of competing tools, 
techniques and changing hardware and software, mitigate against the establishment of 
professionalism in terms of a definable, recognised and fixed body of practice, methods 
and ethics. Fifth, routes of entry into analysis are varied, many companies prefer in-house 
end users to be trained up in the systems culture to do analysis, others prefer school 
leavers who are bright and show initiative. This diversity of entry is exacerbated by the 
fact that there is no professional control over entry, training or standards. Sixth, moves 
towards user orientated design and utilisation of project team approaches, external 
consultants and industry/business experts further weakens attempts to establish 
professional status. Seventh, many within the industry and outside it, argue that the
209
occupation has a poor image. Systems analysts have been characterised and parodied 
along a variety of spectrums from 'teenies' to 'yuppies'. Likewise the 'me now' culture, 
as one systems manager described younger graduate analysts, is detrimental to public 
and user acceptance of analysts as professionals. Finally, attempts on the part of some 
managers and organisations to deskill and routinise analysts work, either through the 
introduction of specific tools and techniques, or through tighter project management 
(Friedman 1989), further undermines professionalism.
Professional work is generally deemed to have a service element either to some notion of 
'common good' (for example, in education or health), to an individual client or within an 
organisation (i.e. the provision of a staff service to line management). Typically, moves 
within the IT industry towards professionalisation are closely tied to perceptions of 
systems departments and IS staff servicing user needs. Yet the reality is that user needs 
may be shaped, moulded and even decided by systems departments. This can pose 
dilemmas for some systems staff:
We are supposed to serve the user function ... That's what we are here for ... 
But what happens if the user request is not compatible with that of the rest of the 
organisation? ... Do we still serve them? (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, 
Wales).
We are a service department and frankly we are perceived as servants ... Loyal 
and trusted servants ... (interviewee smiles knowingly) .. and servants must serve 
(Systems Manager, Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
Our proper title is 'Systems Department' ... We tend to be out on a limb. I don't 
think you can serve two masters. And if your boss is part of the function you are 
supporting, as one of many, it can be unhealthy... We come under admin, yet we 
design systems for admin, and everyone else... look I'll be honest with you (tape 
recorder turned off)... We are answerable to a department that may know fuck
^ t r\210
all about IT, I'm not saying that is the case but it could be ... Why should we 
come under someone else's department? ... We get put over a barrel... I don't 
see why we shouldn't have a head of IT because were not just DP any more 
where you have a stack of punch cards and a couple of magnetic tapes under 
your arms ... We are now part of mainstream business [and] we're central to 
business success ... But we are not duly recognised politically or rewarded 
commensurably, in terms of status (Systems Manager, Aerospace Industry, 
England).
Clearly, systems analysts and systems managers were expressing ambivalent feelings. On 
the one hand they recognised, in line with the policies of their own professional bodies, 
that they were a service function and sought to draw their status and esteem from this by 
arguing that they were 'trusted' and 'loyal servants' to the business function. It was also 
argued that they should be duly accorded status and respect. On the other hand, they 
tended to display hostility and even contempt towards the very users they were there to 
serve acknowledging, with wry smiles and gestures, that they were not really absorbed 
into this client-servant function. More importantly, there was general consensus that it 
was they, as analysts, who were in the best position to know what their political masters 
should want and how they should act.
Professions often present themselves as ethical and altruistic occupations in which the 
central relationship of trust between client and professional is supposed to rest on the 
belief that professionals will act in the clients' interest. Yet, as a number of systems 
analysts demonstrated, they may either act directly in their own interest, however 
perceived; or more commonly, they will attempt to persuade the users into accepting a 
system which complies with the needs of 'the system' as defined by the analysts and IS
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department. Difficulties of establishing ethical codes of practice are further complicated 
by the fact that there is a variety of different hardware and software vendors trying to 
promote their particular packages and by the fact that general business interests may be 
put before those of specific user interests:
In this industry there is dealing from top to bottom [and] people are making lots 
of money selling systems that may be totally inappropriate ... There are hundreds 
of different vendors ... They pressure us [and] they pressure users directly 
[where] bribes and persuasion all play their part... In this context, it's not easy to 
be ethical... Is a consultant from CPL being ethical if he advises a user function 
to utilise his hardware or software? ... Or is he putting his own interests first? 
(Systems Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
One consultant I argued that the IT industry may have a glossier image than engineering 
but that it has also attracted unsavoury people who do nothing for the industry's 
professional image:
The greed of people in this industry is unbelievable ... £45-50,000 salaries for 
good analysts at the business end is nothing extraordinary ... They are young, 
very materialistic and don't give a damn about culture, only their Porsches, and 
quite frankly couldn't give much of a damn about the implications of their 
designs, so long as they keep getting contracts ... Such is the state of the market, 
it is easy to get contracts (Senior IT Consultant, Major UK Consultancy).
Another systems manager pointed to the professional contradiction of interest that can 
arise between users and systems staff:
On the one hand we are there to serve users [and] to enable them to carry out 
their functions ... We do this and we build up close relations with different users
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[and] they begin to trust you and respect you and that's a good basis for sound 
analysis ... It makes it easier ... But sometimes you have to report various users - 
users who might be resistant, obstructive or not prepared to accept your 
proposals ... It's betrayal in one sense ... I try and instil in my analysts a sense of 
balance and perspective [and] the difference between a good and bad analyst is 
this sense of perspective, knowing when the limit's reached and then doing 
something about it ... diplomatically (Systems Manager, US Multi-national 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
Hughes (1975) and Esland (1980) argue that it is a characteristic feature of professions 
that they guard their monopoly of knowledge very closely and seek to 'mystify' this 
knowledge, to make it appear that while long training and experience are necessary and 
that there are indefinable skills that only members of the profession possess or even 
understand. Certainly many systems analysts and systems managers I spoke to couched 
their claims to professional status in more esoteric language than that being advocated by 
the BCS and IEE which are seeking to define systems analysts' work, in terms of a tool 
kit like CASE - an approach which was met with alarm on the part of some systems 
analysts who argued it would reduce them to 'the status of technicians' and 'discredit' 
them in managerial circles. 8
Software production is a crucial area which capital has, so far, been relatively unable to 
commodity and tightly control.
Having bought the labour of programs and systems analysts, as a commodity on 
the market, capital is, at the moment, unable to raise the real subordination of 
this labour to capital to anything like the level it has achieved in hardware 
production processes ... The relatively high cost of software production is put 
down by management to the fact that designing and writing programs is a 
labour-intensive process. This means that the essential tasks in the production of 
software are largely executed under the control of labour, instead of being
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executed under the control of capital ... In software production the handicraft 
relationship between labour and its product exists to the point where a 
programmer frequently talks of a program he is working on as 'my program' ... 
The weapon capital is using [to gain control of the software labour process] is 
the division of labour (Duncan 1981: 184-185).
Jamous and Peloille (1970) have argued that where a high degree of indeterminacy exists 
in the work of a profession where tasks are variable and non-rationalised, so people who 
control them are likely to enjoy high status. Whilst analysts readily acknowledged that 
tasks were variable and that they had high status, in terms of the overall labour market, 
and particularly relative to engineers (whom many analysts perceived as getting a raw 
deal) they nonetheless felt that they did not always have the status they deserved:
I have a lot of responsibility ... I've helped design systems central to this firm's 
profitability ... Yet in terms of pay, office, invitations to meetings and a whole 
variety of perks that my equivalents in accounts get ... I'm not really 
acknowledged (Systems Analyst, Regional Power Generating Company, Wales).
Likewise, being part of a service function to some larger and more powerful user 
department was not without its problems:
Being a service function doesn't always help ... Some users like to wield the big 
stick at us sometimes and it can get you down (Systems Analyst, Large Private 
Utility, Wales).
More generally, lack of status could make the analysts job more difficult both in terms of 
being a subordinate colleague to possibly more senior and powerful user managers, and 
in terms of being perceived by users as primarily a service or technical function:
214
The benefit of letting someone like myself come into a company is that I would 
never let any manager, no matter who he was, prevent me from doing my 
analysis ... There are user managers who are very territorial ... who try and 
oppose the work of systems analysts... and quite frankly, I feel for the poor sods 
because I know that most SAs don't have much power vis-a-vis user managers 
... If these managers tried to oppose me, shit would fly. If I was brought in at 
executive level I would have them sacked (Senior IT Consultant, Major UK 
Consultancy).
Who is the systems guy? ... He's probably someone in his twenties up through 
the programming route, nervous and insecure in management circles. If he's 'in 
house' he's probably terrorised by fire breathing user managers with far more 
power than him ... This is not the kind of change agent to ensure that any bullshit 
is cleared so that effective business systems can be developed ... You need 
power to be a professional ... but in all honesty, look who the system analysts 
are, as a social and political group, and tell me, are they honestly in a position to 
get such status? ... The growth in IT undermines professional credibility - tossers 
and wankers are doing this job. Any self respecting dynamic go getter with guts 
and flair will be in at the management and hard guts end (Senior Consultant and 
IT Director, Major UK Consultancy).
However, not all systems analysts are in their twenties (the majority in my study were in 
their thirties and forties) and, most were remarkably resilient, persuasive and tactical in 
their dealings with users.
There are ways to persuade and cajole users, no matter how rude or abrasive 
they may be... I have co-opted other analysts to sit with me in such situations, or 
I have discussed the issues with particular key users over lunch in the pub - 
which I've paid for and ... which I've found relaxes them. Analysts, particularly 
where they know there's going to be some real system jolts as a result of their 
analysis ... can become very pally and chatty ... offering nice packages to users, 
software for the kids ... taking up the cudgel for them in meetings in which they 
are present... There's a lot you can do ... It requires experience though (Systems 
Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
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Likewise, not all systems departments are 'out on a limb'. In some organisations IT is 
part of the central business function and duly recognised with corporate IT directorships:
Within this corporation IT has recently been recognised as a prime business 
function. I can put it stronger than this: we are the business. Banking would 
collapse without us. Corporate management have had to recognise this [and] I 
sit on the most senior decision making boards of the bank. Nothing happens 
without me knowing about it. Over the years I have got my fingers in every pie 
and I have my eye on all users ... What is more, this position is strengthening 
daily, as is the position of systems generally ... Nothing gets done without us ... 
More and more strategic functions come under my control (IT Director, Major 
High Street Bank, London).
Not all user managers likewise breathe fire. Some were amazingly docile and ill at ease in 
the company of systems analysts, not just because they often stood in awe of the analysts 
technical knowledge - which the analyst often 'dressed up' - but, more importantly, 
because they were concerned to show their departments in good light and to be seen as 
co-operative, willing exponents of'modernisation' - particularly if they felt big brother 
might be watching:
Generally, I find user managers once they get to know you and once you have 
calmed their fears ... respect your technical skills and understanding of their 
problems. As you work through the analysis with them and sweat out the issues 
... and get down to the details of hardware and software and who's going to be 
doing what - a process which can last weeks or even months ... you become 
involved, so caught up in the process of change that you become very close ... 
Some of the hardest, rudest, toughest bastards I worked for ... are the ones who 
keep calling me back ... It's like knowing a good mechanic or doctor : you're 
never satisfied with any other ... You build up deep bonds and understanding 
over the years (Systems Analyst, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, 
Scotland).
There aren't many users in this company that aren't aware of the state of the 
market and that we must modernise working practices to stay competitive ... It's
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become part and parcel of everyday language ... It's kind of taken for granted 
[and] not many users can resist this kind of culture ... (Systems Analyst, 
Japanese Electronics Manufacturer, Wales).
Whilst information technology and information technologists have become more central 
to business, I found that they were still, generally, well removed from the formal loci of 
power and organisationally subordinate to user functions, lacking in status, rewards and 
prestige bestowed. This can cause serious tensions as I have indicated above and as the 
systems manager below captures:
I don't think we will ever have the status or size to stand on equal terms with the 
larger user functions ... But they know that we know it is our finger not theirs 
which is on the organisation's pulse. We get the general perspective they get the 
particular perspective. The general can always ridicule the particular in meetings 
(Systems Manager, Regional Power Generating Company, Wales).
The loyal servant, true to his master to the last but wishing, if only every now and then, 
that his master would give him due recognition and praise for the services he renders.
Summary
Like engineers, systems analysts are not merely the passive recipients of some dominant 
ideology of 'capital interest' which regulates design and informs its rationale. Rather, 
they actively interpret through their own experience, values and methods what that 
interest is or ought, to be. Unlike engineers, analysts were rather uncritical of the 'free
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market' credo. It seems ironic that notions of technical beauty or rationality so often 
happen to equate with business requirements.
However, like engineers, analysts often find their work compromised, for example, on 
the altar of cost benefit analysis. Likewise, either through personal predisposition or 
because of the features of analysts' culture (for example, systems theory) they may 
either be affronted by requests for particular designs or feel that they cannot deliver 
those designs because to do so would be to compromise some core values. Likewise, 
discussion of analysts' autonomy within the design process opened up a clear 
dichotomy. On the one hand they felt obliged to reiterate that they were a 'service 
function' to user departments, whilst on the other hand, they indicated that perhaps users 
were not always in the best position to know what was best for them. This caused 
obvious tensions and brought into question issues concerning their legitimate role and 
function within the design process, that they may be working to implement management 
drives for tighter control. At the same time they, too, are subject to managerial controls 
through project supervision, the application of standardised methods and, above all, the 
reification of the user function within systems discourses.
One of the central arguments of my thesis is that analysts actively interpret through a 
distinctive culture and set of values what is 'best' for the organisation. However, their 
particular interpretation of' system interest' does not always coincide with that of users. 
Indeed, there is an alarming rate of user dissatisfaction and system failure in the West 
(Forester 1989, Jones 1989, Rada 1994). One is obliged to ask whether analysts
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themselves are, at least partially, to blame for this. Consequently, in the chapter below I 
focus upon systems analysts' practice and demonstrate the ways in which analysts own 
design activity, values and culture exacerbate the tendency towards user dissatisfaction 
and system failure.
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The Software Bottleneck: 
Democracy, Design and the Analyst
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Introduction
This chapter focuses upon the software bottleneck within systems development. Through an 
examination of this bottleneck and the proposed solutions to it I open up the work of 
systems analysts more fully and demonstrate the ways in which their own particular culture 
and practice conditions definitions of system success or failure. Importantly, I also 
demonstrate how that culture and practice reinforces particular systems design approaches 
and undermines others.
Various solutions have been proposed for overcoming the software bottleneck by both 
practitioners and writers in the field. These solutions range from attempts to automate and 
systematise large aspects of the analysis and design procedure - utilising a mix of technology 
and refined methods - to more open recognition of the need to instil in the analyst as 
'change agent' (Bennett & Kemble 1991) the necessary social, political and organisational 
skills. For many years there have been increasing calls for more user involvement in the 
analysis and design process (Dickson & Simmons 1970, Guthrie 1972, DeBrabander & 
Edstrom 1977, Lucas 1978). Greater user involvement in this process is often presented, in 
itself, as a panacea. I demonstrate, however, that the definitions of'user' that analysts use 
are intentionally vague and that user involvement in design is consequently both limited and 
not without its problems.
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Finally, I examine the contradictions between private ownership of the means of production 
and democratic systems design. I argue that 'systems' perspectives to design are inherently 
uncritical of the dominant power relations within organisations. Consequently, systems 
analysts tend to be victim of their own ' systems' perspective. On the one hand they may 
seek to 'socialise' the process of design so as to tap into employee experience and creativity 
and to win employee consent to change. On the other hand they can do so only within the 




One of the key challenges for systems designers is to be able to map accurately increasingly 
complex user environments in software. Evidence suggests that there is a 'software 
bottleneck' both in terms of systems developers' inability to deliver the systems that users 
require or expect, late delivery of systems, and poor software performance (Boehm 1987, 
Jacobson & Bennet 1993, Gibbs 1994, Rada 1994). Within the IT industry, it is 
acknowledged that there is a need for better systems:
Traditional data processing methods of implementing systems have led to many 
human problems and have not often been successful (Eason 1987:22).
Wainwright and Francis (1984), the Economist Informatics Unit (1988) and Price 
Waterhouse (1989) all document the high rate of systems failure pointing out that data 
processing strategies are matched to business strategies in only one in ten installations. A 
survey of 288 UK firms indicated that over two thirds of them did not expect their IT 
systems to be delivered on time (PAGG 1989). Schware (1989) reports that one quarter of 
large software projects are never completed and of the remainder, the average application is 
delivered over one year late and at double the original budget. Gibb (1994) argues that 
software failure in America is still alarmingly high. Rada (1994) argues that the gap between 
the demand for new complex software systems and their actual delivery in a form which 
meets user expectations is rapidly widening. The difficulties of bridging this gap have been
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described as the software crisis, a crisis which has worsened as systems have become larger, 
more complex and moved 'real time' (Rada 1994, Gibbs 1994).
There have been numerous prominent examples of system failure. Quintas (1991) 
documents how American Airlines lost $50 million as a result of software errors in its flight 
booking system. In Britain the Department of Social Security's computerisation programme 
will cost an estimated £1,749 million, instead of £713 million, when it is completed in 1999. 
Estimates for telecommunications increased by 714%, programming by 215% and running 
costs by 136%; and the Ministry also admitted that it had given a £4.75 million contract to 
computer consultants for work which it did not need to undertake (Hencke 1989).
Quintas argues that
Cerebral and interpersonal activities remain key elements of software development. 
Software is the bridge which spans the gap between the binary logic of the machine 
and the altogether more unpredictable world with which the system user has to deal. 
This process is so complex that some observers maintain that software development 
will always be labour intensive and prone to error (1991:360).
The push for radical change within the software development process, for example, the 
Alvey Programme into the development of software engineering tools, indicates an attempt 
to break with what Hoare characterises as an 'arcane and error prone craft activity' (1982:4) 
and the desire to establish that activity in terms of an 'engineering discipline'. My own 
research and that of others (e.g. Peleaz 1988, Friedman 1989, Blum 1994) suggests that
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modelling the social in the technological is a far more complex, labour intensive and political 
process than seems to be believed by many advocates of engineering solutions to the 
problems of systems design.
My research indicates that there are a number of reasons which are understood to be 
responsible for the limited quality of systems design:
1) The separation of the analyst from the end user, and the centralised nature of DP 
departments.
2) Lack of business acumen on the part of computer systems personnel and of 
business managers on the potential of IT.
3) The inertia in existing systems, i.e. sheer number of applications running COBOL 
and similar systems which not only require considerable maintenance but inhibit 
decentralisation.
4) The failure to establish, correctly, the needs of users - because of a failure to 
apply either the appropriate tools and techniques (e.g. 4GLs, CASE, SSADM, etc.) 
or an appropriate 'soft' approach.
Unsurprisingly, the bulk of literature on systems design is overtly prescriptive, concerned 
with advancing particular tools and techniques - ranging from user co-option to project 
teams, use of prototyping, elaborate requirements capture software etc. - the bulk of this 
literature does not, however, address the broader social, political and theoretical issues 
involved in systems design. Nowhere is this more readily observed than in the literature and 
daily systems discourse, which reduces a complex social division of labour into an essentially 
dualist model: systems staff and the rest of the world, i.e. 'users'. On the basis of this dualist
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model, trade journals, software and hardware vendors and many systems practitioners offer 
their particular solutions to analysis and design problems . Solutions which usually embrace 
one or more of the following panaceas:
1) Greater user involvement in the analysis and design process, either through 
utilisation of software engineering-tools, or closer collaboration between user and 
analyst, possibly through decentralising DP out to user departments.
2) Utilisation of more rigorous analysis and design methodologies like SSADM or 
LSDM, likewise more rigorous applications of CASE tools, formal methods and 
expert systems.
3) Automation of as much of programming and analyst work as possible.
4) Better management of analysis and design process with due regard being given to 
the cultural, political, social and organisational factors that can impinge on design.
5) Equipment of analysts with not only technical but also organisational and business 
skills.
6) Letting users design their own system and facilitate this by supplying them with 
appropriate tools and expertise and by moving away from mainframe systems to 
more distributed and networked mini and micro computing facilities.
7) Improving management's awareness of IT, particularly in relation to establishing 
importance of IT to a firm's corporate objectives, and develop IT training on the 
part of management and users.
A useful way to present the range of these solutions is to consider a spectrum from 'hard' to 
'soft' (Checkland 1981). The 'hard' approach emphasises the use of mathematical modelling 
techniques, CASE tools and automation of as much as possible of the analysis and design 
process. By contrast the 'soft' approach emphasises the social context, allowing human 
actors in the problem situation, greater freedom of choice and more autonomy over the
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design process. Willcocks and Mason (1987) suggest that the 'soft' approach is necessary 
for the analysis of organisations involving large associations of people pursuing individual 
and collective goals that are, not necessarily, the same and may even be incompatible - 
where decision making can be compromised and risky and where objectives are changeable, 
ill-defined and complex.
While there is a shift from hard modelling techniques towards those in which the user enjoys 
a closer relationship to the process of systems development (Meissner 1986, Uzzi 1995, 
Blum 1994, Long etal 1995) user involvement per se does not necessarily signify an 
abandonment or weakening of 'hard' systems' philosophy. CASE and structured methods 
generally can facilitate user involvement whilst at the same time tightening managerial 
control over users, for example through imposing rigorous methods whilst at the same time 
reinforcing management conceptions of the unreliability of labour - i.e. perceiving it as 
dysfunctional to the 'system'(Bjerknes et al 1987).
The notion of'users' that either approach adopts is, however, vague. Most of the literature 
on systems design is weak in defining the 'user'. The user is usually conceptualised in terms 
of managers of user departments. Consequently, the variety and complexity of labour within 
different departments is obscured and over-simplified - brought into debates begrudgingly 
and within the parameters defined by the manager and systems analyst. Usually in terms of 
'how best can we harness direct users' skills' and 'experience to meet the objectives we have
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decided upon', and 'how best can we incorporate users into the system', or gain 'their 
acceptance of the system', so as to minimise conflict and disruption (Tan 1994, Carroll 
1994, Watson et al 1994). Systems analysts and systems managers had varying 
understandings of the term 'user' - some referred to only senior management, others user 
departments, others to supervisors and a few to actual operatives. Interestingly, whilst in 
daily practice experienced systems analysts and systems managers would recognise the 
diversity of users and user interests, in terms of defining the software bottleneck and 
proposed solutions to it, they habitually dropped the vocabulary of complexity to replace it 
by the simpler dualist model of the analyst-user.
To have a rigorous definition of users, one which recognises their diversity and 
heterogeneity and the real possibility that interests of users may not coincide - not even 
within the same department or function - and that clashes of interest and antagonism can 
arise between users (for example, antagonisms rooted in different objective class relations) 
would be to shatter the systemic model which analysts use to rationalise their own work and 
to justify particular system choices. The systemic model is explicitly functionalist. To 
recognise possible sources of irreconcilable interest is not only to recognise such interests as 
dysfunctional and in need of elimination, more importantly, it is to overburden and increase 
the complexity of the analysts' task: which is one reason why the boundaries of a system are 
often tightly determined1 . This was precisely the argument of one systems manager I 
interviewed:
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From the point of view of practical design, you can't have your analysts spending all 
their energies trying to discuss and incorporate all the possible permutations of user 
interest within the system ... The poor sod would become so enmeshed in eliciting 
requirements that he would never be able to define the parameters of the system... If 
you define these parameters, in advance you don't need to talk to every level of user 
... or get embroiled in the political debates (Systems Manager, Major Public Service 
Utility Wales).
Ironically, analysts are praised for having good organisational skills and yet it would appear 
that there is a limit to just how sophisticated their organisational understanding need be. 
Several analysts, particularly senior analysts, indicated a relatively rich understanding of user 
relations and of specific organisational politics and power. However, even they habitually 
dropped their earlier more sophisticated models when it came down to practical design. For 
example, while they would convey to me the need to listen to users and 'build in' user 
requirements into the system, in practice they listened to only certain groups of user and 
incorporated only certain perspectives - those which were 'manageable' and 'met with 
systems approval'. One possible explanation for this is that they must advance the 'system' 
interest as defined by either senior management, user managers or themselves. Often, to 
advance the system interest they must drop their earlier more complex models which 
recognised user diversity and possible sources of antagonism and friction. In effect they 
content themselves with recognising that whilst the system is not ideal from all user 
perspectives it is up to personnel to sort out the problems.
229
Another reason why analysts perennially use a one dimensional model of the user has to do 
with both the service nature of information systems departments and the commodification of 
software packages, tools and techniques used for modelling and analysing the user 
environment. Historically, IT has played a secondary role, a supporting role to business 
functions. IT has thus grown up in a close relationship to user managers and heads of 
business functions. System origination, funding of projects and the setting of requirements is 
thus a process influenced historically by business users - that is, by management. He who 
pays the piper calls the tune:
Obviously in an ideal world it would be nice to speak to Joe down on the shop floor 
and maybe once in a while design something just the way he would like it ... But 
people like Joe don't pull the purse strings and don't have any muscle ... It's sad but 
true ... Really we are very close, possibly too close, to management of the business 
function [and] sometimes it obscures clarity (Senior Systems Analyst, Defence 
Sector Electronics Contractor, Scotland).
Likewise, the commodification of software packages, tools and techniques used for 
modelling and analysing user environments, reinforces a systemic, functionalist, view.of the 
user. Paleaz (1990) highlights how software production is becoming increasingly 
commodified. Major manufacturers and vendors servicing the IT industry and business seek 
to sell their own particular solutions to potential buyers. Manufacturers of software and 
business purchasers share a discourse and products are sold on their capacity to tighten 
control, increase productivity, quality and efficiency (CASE Strategies 1989, Cybernetics 
and Systems Analysis 1992, Handbook of Systems Management 1993). Often the very
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architecture is such that it not so much inhibits open recognition of user diversity and 
heterogeneity, but channels the analyst down a particular information gathering path which 
has, as its premise and conclusion, pre-set objectives. This is how one Senior Consultant 
described one particular proprietary methodology:
The logic behind the methodology [and] its architecture ... is such that it suggests to 
the analyst, particularly the younger and more inexperienced, what the logical 
procedures of analysis should be and what weight you give to each particular phase 
of the analysis programme ... This particular methodology, like most on the market 
nowadays ... puts a lot of emphasis on the front end [and] on setting the parameters 
and defining the requirements of the system... It emphasises that each process of the 
analysis needs to be validated and checked off with the appropriate personnel, for 
example user managers ... If at this initial stage he or she feels the parameters and 
requirements don't comply with what they want the analyst is cautioned and told to 
proceed differently ... It's a form of control ... and inbuilt into the tool (Senior 
Consultant, International Consultancy).
I turn now to five different approaches to systems analysis and design. My objective in 
examining these approaches is to demonstrate the issues practising analysts face when 
designing systems and in particular to determine which approach analysts favour and why. 
These approaches represent a broad cross spectrum of proposed solutions to the software 
bottleneck. All aim to improve the process of systems analysis and design. With the 
exception of the fifth approach, the collective resource approach, such improvement is 
generally defined in terms which include conventional notions of organisational efficiency, 
i.e. profitability. All advocate or prescribe a particular solution or practice. All are concerned 
with greater user access or involvement though this is defined in a variety of ways, and from 
a range of political perspectives - from technicist efficiency through humanist commitment to
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the dignity of work, to notions of the interests of workers and management being in conflict 
- some of these approaches are methodologies while others are concerned with tools or 
techniques; some are concerned with both of these.
Automate and Decentralise
This is the solution advanced by Martin (1984), who argues that the software bottleneck has 
created a backlog of some two to four years in application software which has been caused 
by the growth in demand for systems, the increasingly competitive environment, and the 
increasingly complex nature of systems as they have moved from batch, to on-line and now 
decision support. He advocates better analysis and design, and better software. Traditional 
systems analysis and design, Martin argues, is too costly, too slow, and too cumbersome. 
For example, Martin argues that the stage of writing lengthy and complex specification 
documents should be eliminated:
The last act of a dying organisation is often to write an all encompassing rule book 
... One methodology sold and used in many installations consists of 32 two inch 
thick binders which spell out in detail how to create requirements and specifications. 
They expand the methods of the 1970s, which are so inadequate, into a bureaucracy 
which is immensely time-consuming, entirely non-rigorous, prevents automation of 
code generation and is unchangeable (1984: 36).
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Systems are needed quickly, more quickly than such an approach allows. As he sees it, the 
prevailing life cycle, which so dogs the automation of systems development, grew up before 
the advent of:
1) Non-procedural languages
2) Techniques that generate program code automatically
3) Computable specification languages
4) Rigorous verification techniques
5) On line graphic tools for design
6) Formal data modelling tools
7) Strategic design planning techniques
8) Information engineering
9) Languages for rapid prototyping
10) Languages for end users
11) Distributed processing and mini computers
12) The information centre concept.
Martin advocates the automation of both analysis and programming.
Programmers and analysts have automated many people's jobs but are remarkably 
reluctant to automate their own (1984: 19).
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He refers to a range of ways in which programming needs to be automated: small query 
facilities, complex query and update languages, report generators, graphics languages, 
decision support tools, application generators, computable specification languages, 
parameterised application packages and very high level programming languages.
Systems analysts can use tools that generate code automatically. Even highly complex 
systems, Martin argues, can be generated from specifications; and end users can themselves 
create systems.
He argues that techniques are now available to generate mathematically provable error-free 
code:
This methodology is so powerful that it needs to be regarded as a major new 
technology for creating systems which in a sense makes obsolete earlier structured 
techniques (1984: 145).
He recommends that DP departments buy high order software (HOS) to eliminate errors, 
omissions and inconsistencies.
Finally, to optimise the use of these tools and techniques, the information centre is crucial:
[The] growth of information centres is the most vigorous new trend in DP 
management. An information centre is a facility designed to encourage, train and 
support end users who use computers directly, generating reports or creating 
applications. At the same time, the information centre should manage user-driven
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computing so as to avoid its many potential problems ... The overriding objective of 
information centre management is to greatly speed up the creating of applications 
that end users require. The queue for conventional development, with its long 
applications backlog, is bypassed (1984: 101).
The information centre enables the management of end users and it should be 'a natural 
division of labour between the end-users and DP stafF(1984: 104).
Often the centre is staffed by people trained as systems analysts. Their job changes 
fundamentally. They no longer write program specifications, draw data flow 
diagrams, and so on. They act more as consultants, listening to the end-users' 
problems, solving them, determining the user's needs for information, encouraging, 
training, and selling ideas to end users (1984: 117).
Martin's approach is staunchly supported by a number of writers on systems analysis 
methodology and tools and techniques (Beynon-Davies 1989, Bennet & Kemble 1991, 
Occelli 1993, Hardgrave & Wilson 1994, Finkelstein 1994) and a number of teachers of 
systems analysis (Lane 1989). Whilst a number of those I interviewed argued that Martin's 
approach was a useful attempt to address some of the major problems contributing to the 
software bottleneck, the majority were sceptical of the claims Martin was making for 
particular tools and techniques:
People like James Martin are trying to bring home the need for programmers 
and analysts to be aware of the tools and techniques available to help them in 
their task. But there is no way these tools or techniques will replace the 
programmer-analyst function. (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
A lot of Martin's arguments are pie in the sky. His advocacy of tools such as 
4GLs, downplays their limitations. Vision dreams and reality don't always tie up 
and so we make an adjustment. And the adjustment in 4GLs is that, yes, within
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certain limited criteria, they are useful. But they haven't been developed to a 
level of sophistication which will yet allow them to duplicate the expert. 
(Director, Micro Computer Unit, Wales).
Fenton (1993) argues that the claims advanced by various proponents of software 
engineering for a 'technical fix' to the software bottleneck are impressive but rarely live up 
to expectations. The main problem with Martin's approach is that he focuses on DP practice 
and applies hard techniques in that area. Thus, he falls into a technicist trap, for the problem 
in system design may lie elsewhere - in industrial relations, worker attitudes, user 
co-operation, status, skill requirements, or the priority attached by management to training, 
to name but a few. A number of interviewees argued that Martin's methods are no better 
than others at modelling these social variables and that he over-estimates the capability of 
the tools, which do not solve the central problems of systems analysis, design and efficiency. 
The tools, techniques and information centres will only facilitate the quicker and more 
accurate translation of perceived requirements into concrete systems: they do not remove 
the ambiguity surrounding the various interpretations of what the requirements might be, 
what unwritten or unspoken rules or knowledge may exist about an operation, or how the 
firm's market position may change due to competition, or other unforeseen circumstances.
Martin and everybody else say they have got the solution to this problem, be it 
tighter structured methodologies or better developed tools, techniques and practices. 
But they haven't. If you can't standardise the end user, you can't standardise the 
service industry to support it, no matter how hard you try ... If COBOL is manual 
and RPG3 is manual with overdrive, then 4GLs are automatic ... and as everyone 
knows, automatics are heavy on fuel and if you take your hands off the wheel you 
still crash (Director, Software Consultancy, Wales).
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You can't develop a sophisticated system or write a program for it on the basis of 
4GLs and other CASE tools ... The plethora of tools, techniques and systems we 
have today is because of the discontinuity of system design ... If you get modelling 
right, you don't need a plethora of other technologies. Systems are far more 
bounded than Martin thinks ... In my opinion Martin is creating obstacles or 
difficulties which do not exist (Senior Systems Analyst, Major Private Utility, 
Wales).
However complex the mathematics, it cannot eliminate errors in the concept of what a 
program is trying to do it can only correct errors in meeting the specification. As many 
interviewees said, you cannot program for every contingency. Any IT system will have 
repercussions on the organisational environment, not all of which are possible to predict or 
contain (Newman & Rosenberg 1985). In other words, the systems analyst has to map not 
only the social world, at the point when the system is introduced, but also the changes which 
may take place in the future as a consequence of, for example, changes in markets or labour 
relations (Ernest-Jones 1989a, 1989b, Caulkin 1989, Uzzi 1995, Blum 1994). It would seem 
quite impossible for anyone to foresee all of these, nor could any tools or techniques 
encompass all such variables and, in this sense, successful systems analysis will always be 
limited or relative2.
Another criticism of Martin is of his claims for CASE tools and for prototyping tools in 
particular. Martin (1984) and Hardgrave and Wilson (1994) see software engineering and 
prototyping tools in particular as the solution to the software bottleneck. A number of 
analysts in my study used prototyping software to sit down and create design scenarios with 
users. However, they argued that these do not replace the 'front end' skills of the analyst i.e.
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the setting up of requirements, terms of reference and boundaries of the system. Whilst 
useful in enabling analysts to work with users to produce workable prototypes they do not 
replace the organisational and communication skills of the analyst at the critical stages of 
extracting information and communicating needs and objectives. The code they generate 
was also seen to be less efficient (i.e. more costly in terms of speed and/or space) than 
manually produced codes (Goyal 1993).
One respondent explained his rejection of Martin's approach at length:
I don't think it at all true that either programmer or systems analysts functions are 
being automated by new technology and new structured techniques. There is a 
dearth of good data modellers and no amount of CASE tools will actually teach a 
person to sit down and sort out entities and relationships ... A good CASE tool and 
methodology can go a long way to focusing the effort of the programmer and 
analyst, and can partially automate certain parts, like doing Third Normal Form ... 
Application generators are very good at automating things like extract and print. 
They will take 80% of programming off your hands, but remember the other half of 
the 80 : 20 rule, 80% of the volume takes 20% of the time, so the remaining 20% of 
the volume still takes 80% of the time. Things like all your protocols, interfaces, and 
complex algebra still have to be designed and written into the system and all" have to 
be hand coded, no machine as yet will do all that for you. 4GLs only do 80% of the 
simple programming functions and consequently have only limited use in simple 
designs like data processing. Their use in developing sophisticated systems like the 
front-end of a guided missile system is non-existent ... At the front end there is 
nothing that can automate the setting up of the requirements specification. It is down 
to the business analyst to be able to actually sort out what it is that people need, 
setting the terms of reference, setting the boundaries, extracting the information and 
communicating needs and objectives, along with drawing up the data model, etc.. 
All this is very manual at the moment and I can't realistically see how the functions 
can be automated ... There is a limit to what the techniques and CASE tools allow 
you to do despite Martin's assertions to the contrary (Senior Consultant, Major UK 
Systems and Methodology Consultancy, Bristol).
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It might be that systems analysts and their managers oppose Martin's approach out of some 
sense of self-interest. Most saw structured methods and CASE tools as useful within defined 
parameters, but as no substitute for the skills and experience of the systems analyst:
It is all well and good giving end users the means to generate their own systems. 
But only when your mainframe systems are intact and your major business 
systems and databases are up and running, designed by the systems department 
... Only then can you talk of allowing end users to manipulate his own database, 
write his own reports, possibly create smaller databases that he can manipulate 
or download on to a PC ... Quite frankly, we prefer to keep IT in our hands by 
design ... We had a classic case here in the early '80s when various departments 
were out buying turnkey systems, the end result was a ... balls-up, a mess of 
unintegrated systems and partial... solutions. (Systems Manager, Major Private 
Utility, Wales).
Martin portrays those staffing the information centre as pioneers of new technology and 
technique, liberated unselfish servants of the organisation, whilst those staffing the traditional 
DP departments are perceived as backward-looking and reactionary, putting their own 
limited interests first. This model does not square with my findings, that one cannot make 
such clear cut and arbitrary pronunciations. Some of the most far-reaching, successful and 
advanced systems I have seen were developed within traditional centralised systems 
departments. Similarly, the use of many of the latest CASE tools and user-orientated 
languages are to be found within many traditional centralised systems departments. There 
was general recognition amongst those I interviewed, that although it was vital to get user 
involvement in systems design, the information centre concept was not the ideal medium for 
achieving it:
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Users know their own job best... Users also differ enormously, some may be up to 
date with the latest IT developments [and] others may have just progressed to the 
pen ... If users are designing systems they are not doing what they are paid to do 
which is their job ... And if they are designing systems without a centralised IT 
facility and strategy you are asking for disaster ... What relation will the information 
officer from Martin's centre have to the user? ... If he or she is close, it can get 
incestuous and user interests can be put before organisational interests ... If the 
officer is young, inexperienced or lacking organisational muscle they will get 
stamped upon by more powerful user managers ... that's the reality ... That's why 
we need centralised DP (IT Director, Major Multi-national Bank, London).
Martin's approach and the shift towards more rigorous application of structured methods, 
tools and techniques is represented in the growth of 'software engineering' solutions to 
systems design. Software engineering is not only perceived by many as the solution to the 
software bottleneck (Finkelstein 1994) but is growing in importance as a design discipline 
(Bennet & Kemble 1991) and in its influence upon the education and training of systems 
analysts. Programmes like Alvey shape or construct a particular discourse and world view 
amongst the design community. Good design becomes design that can be rigorously 
checked, codified, controlled and reproduced in different institutional contexts. This is the 
dream of many within the software engineering community. However, as a number of 
writers within the field note, despite the plethora of tools and techniques and increasingly 
sophisticated modelling and prototyping software, not only is take up of these techniques by 
practising analysts low but the gap between the demand for new complex software systems 
and their delivery is widening (Rada 1995, Fenton 1993, Gibbs 1994, Goyal 1993).
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Socio-Technical Systems Design
The socio-technical approach to system design has informed a range of systems analysis 
methodologies in Britain, Europe and Scandinavia. Developed by the Tavistock Institute and 
in accord with the Tavistock philosophy, it is concerned with questions of psychology, 
motivation, personal enrichment and values; and focuses on the organisation of work 
groups. With an emphasis on consensus and the common interest of various parties within 
an organisation, it constitutes the theoretical underpinnings of a variety of participative 
design methodologies. The essence of socio-technical philosophy is that systems should not 
be considered as solely technical systems to which workers must adapt, nor as purely human 
systems in which the human aspects alone dominate. The argument is that systems should be 
designed as integrated wholes, consisting of both social and technical elements to optimise 
technical systems, human systems must be harnessed. Under the Tavistock socio-technical 
approach, decisions about how work is carried out are taken by the individual and work 
group rather than supervisor.
The socio-technical approach, thus, has much in common with soft systems approaches and 
participatory design methods, (Willcocks & Mason 1987, Mumford 1984, Eason 1987, 
ffirscheim 1985, Tapscott 1982, Carter 1989). It is prescriptive and does not raise 
fundamental questions about the organisation of work. Most soft systems theory is some 
variant of the socio-technical approach. The leading proponent of the application of the
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socio-technical systems approach in Britain is Enid Mumford (1972, 1981, 1983, 1987). 
Mumford is concerned that human factors should be taken into account in systems design. 
She refers to herself as having
played a proselytising role in trying to make technologists and systems designers 
aware of the poor fit between technological solutions and socio-technical problem 
requirements (1987: 9).
Socio-technical design has clear ethical principles associated with it. This is, to 
increase the ability of the individual to participate in decision-taking and ... to 
exercise a degree of control over the immediate work environment ... In addition, 
through recognising the interaction of technology and social organisation and the 
need to try and optimise the behaviour of both of these, it increases productivity and 
provides the opportunity for individual learning and the development of multi-skills 
(1987: 67).
Bjorn-Anderson and Hedberg (1983) work from a similar perspective: they advocate user 
involvement in system design for three reasons, one of which is:
Because organisations ought to respect human dignity and basic human rights, all 
members should have a right to participate in decisions about changes that are likely 
to affect them (1988: 135).
In contrast with such an approach, Mumford reports finding systems generally designed with 
technical factors at the forefront. She sets out to establish the extent to which a 
rational/technical ethic influences the design of computer systems (1983: 8). She starts with 
the hypothesis that:
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Industry, commerce and government were not getting clerical computer systems 
which were consciously designed to increase job satisfaction because the values 
which influence system designers are not of a kind which motive them to do this 
(1983: 4).
Her focus is on the value systems of the analyst and the mismatch of these to the user. Her 
analytical framework draws on Talcott Parsons' pattern variables 'to provide a logical 
framework for examining values and needs in our research situation' (1983: 27) and she 
defines job satisfaction by drawing on Parsons' notion of 'needs disposition' and 'role 
expectations'.
She argues that there is a realisation - though she does not substantiate this - that 
Tayloristic methods are no longer suitable; we are moving towards 'shared decision 
taking and industrial democracy' (1983: 2).
Today most industrialised countries are concerned with improving the quality of 
working life for their employees (1983: 1).
In accord with the Tavistock philosophy, her concern is with increased user participation 
and satisfaction within a framework of improved business efficiency. In the same vein, 
Bjorn-Anderson and Hedberg's (1988) other two reasons for involving users in system 
design are that:
1) This makes the system more realistic and reduces resistance
2) The user probably knows the job best.
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'Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer Based Systems 1 (ETHICS) is 
Mumford's system design methodology. This has three distinct characteristics:
1) a high level of user involvement
2) an increase in user job satisfaction as a specific system objective
3) an equal emphasis on good organisational design and good technical design.
She argues that ETHICS is the answer to poorly designed computer systems.
There are however, a number of problems with Mumford's approach. First, Mumford 
assumes that moves on the part of certain employers towards more autonomous forms of 
working and multi-flexibility signify some kind of qualitative transformation of capitalism as 
it enters down a new road of industrial democracy and concern for the quality of life of its 
employees. Such analysis abstracts these changes from the broader socio-political climate 
which has been characterised by recession, high unemployment, anti-trade union legislation, 
monetarist policies, increased part-time and temporary working, and, often, concerted 
attempts on the part of employers to tighten control over labour, be it through new forms of 
internal policing, such as quality teams, or through reassertion of more Tayloristic forms of 
management (Wood 1989, Hyman 1989, Brodsky 1994, McLoughlin & Gourlay 1994, 
Thompson 1995).
Second, participative design in the context of capitalist social relations of production may 
actually generate new problems, for example bringing underlying grievances to the surface
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which cannot then be resolved, opening up decision making and power distributions within 
firms, heightening possible antagonisms of interest between management and workers, or 
undermining the legitimacy of shop stewards and official trade union representatives 
(Wilmott 1988, Thompson 1995, McLoughlin & Gourlay 1994, Marsh 1993).
Third, Mumford's case studies are of the office and public sector which leaves one 
wondering about their broader applicability: would management in more highly 
capitalised sectors be as prepared to involve users? The culture, social relations of work 
and production processes within the office can be regarded as atypical and possibly 
more amenable to limited 'participative' design changes.
Finally, Mumford's methodology operates in the context of an 'efficiency' specification 
which subordinates worker representatives to the consultant's and management's agenda. 
More importantly the design team itself is highly unequal: you cannot by-pass existing 
authority and command structures which ensure employee deference to management simply 
by introducing a participative design methodology. Many employees will feel uneasy about 
commenting upon or criticising management suggestions and will not want to be seen to be 
standing in the way of managerial objectives. This was brought home vividly in one of my 
case studies where analysts, consultants and managers had opted for an 'open' and 
'participative' approach to design, similar to that of Mumford's. Despite attempts by 
consultants and management to put employees at ease, employee deference to management
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was high. Sitting round the table, I could sense that many of the secretaries and users from 
the department under study were tense, nervous and ill at ease. In discussions afterwards, 
many voiced their fears that management would ask their opinion and that they were 
frightened to voice their feelings through fear of either appearing ignorant or possible 
management recrimination. Obviously, not all employees may be so intimidated. 
Nonetheless, despite managerial attempts to empower workers and encourage their 
participation in design and change, most of my interviewees, whether users, union oflBcers or 
systems analysts, recognised that fear and distrust of managerial objectives in times of high 
unemployment, changing organisational cultures and anti-trade union legislation - does 
little to boost employee confidence in participatory schemes (Thompson et al 1994, Snape 
1994, Gall 1994, Grant 1994, Brodsky 1994, Marsh 1993).
Only one of my interviewees had heard of Mumford's methodology:
Concerning user-designed systems, I have read Mumford's work and spoken to 
her personally, and regard her arguments as gibberish. Mumford is- a little 
do-gooder but her systems won't work ... Trade unions are the biggest brake on 
technological progress there is and Mumford wants to involve them in the design 
process. It is management's job to tell trade unions what to do. (IT Consultant, 
Multi-national Hardware and Software Manufacture).
The point about this statement is not that Mumford is denigrated, but that, like many 
interviewees, he sees user issues as management's problem. Such a perspective was 
displayed most clearly by systems analysts working on relatively 'hard' systems for heavy 
industries and with relatively manual operatives.
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It doesn't make good management sense to get systems analysts to speak to shop 
floor operatives, it could cause a whole load of industrial relations problems ... 
It's not up to you to convince the workforce of the validity of the system, that is 
the manager's task ... As far as I am concerned, there is no human engineering 
involved in the design of the system, apart from ergonomics and colour choice, 
etc.. We do not get involved with issues such as 'do we want to strengthen or 
weaken certain departments?'. We work in terms of business efficiency. What 
problems arise in terms of human relations from our systems is not really our 
concern ... Management is there to manage and it doesn't make good 
management sense to get systems analysts to speak to shop floor operatives. We 
are in the business of providing management with the necessary information and 
control over production to carry out their function ... You can't afford to get 
involved with what motivates people at work ... The fact that there is a human 
being at the end of the technology is irrelevant. It sounds callous but we are 
talking and operating in terms of business efficiency. (Director, Industrial 
Engineering and Consultancy Firm, S. Wales).
Recession and recent trade union legislation leads to a greater acceptance of IT 
on the part of the workforce. We feel a twinge of conscience when we go in to 
design knowing the workers won't be there in six months time (Systems Analyst, 
Aerospace Industry, England).
Whilst some interviewees were more sensitive than others to user issues, many users and 
analysts alike expressed an overwhelming, unstated, assumption that systems analysts were 
in the business of'efficiency', and that user issues were management's concern. Such an 
approach clearly circumscribes the utility of Mumford's approach.
User Centred Design
Eason provides us with another form of socio-technical analysis. He argues that although 
many new design methods are ostensibly more user-centred, they do not have the methods
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to deal with users. Eason, then, like others, identifies the problem of inadequate systems as 
the lack of suitable tools and techniques, and prescribes his favoured method. Eason 
distinguishes five design methods:
1) Traditional DP design
2) Structured design methods
3) Participative design methods
4) Local technician developed systems
5) End-user developed systems.
He argues that any one method on its own is only a part of what is needed and that in 
relation to some of these methods there are neither the techniques nor the expertise. Eason's 
proposals are essentially threefold: first, a user-centred strategy to get user considerations 
embedded in the system design process. Second, techniques to achieve this which can be 
used within existing design methodologies. (In other words, he provides a tool kit rather 
than a methodology.) Third, he proposes both a top-down and bottom-up approach, to 
ensure both co-ordination and the meeting of personal needs. Eason advocates the use of 
particular (user-centred) techniques at particular stages of the design process:
Design stage User-centred Techniques
1. Feasibility Analysis of socio-technical options
Cost benefit assessment 
Team composition and strategy
2. Requirements specification Organisational and task analysis
Job design and organisational change 
User specification of technical system
3. Selection, design, evaluation Usability design and testing
Prototype evaluation
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4. Implementation, support and evolution Customisation
Workstation and environmental design 
User support and system evolution
Clearly, all of the difficulties associated with the socio-technical approach apply to Eason's 
work. In addition, Eason assumes the homogeneity of users and that it is not problematic 
who users are. More importantly, he assumes that it is practicable to balance the interests of 
senior managers with operatives, and of individuals with technical efficiency. Like Martin, he 
makes a list of approaches but he does not say who is to choose which approach is taken, or 
who is going to ensure its 'neutrality' will it be a systems analyst with his or her own 
preferences, working within a brief of management? He does not say how user needs are to 
be met nor what to do if they are in conflict. The advantages of a technical system cannot 
merely be weighed because they may accrue to, or affect, different people who may have 
conflicting interests. He does not discuss the differential power of those participating in 
systems design. Finally, he identifies application generators and CASE tools as promising 
developments for user-centred design, but these can be employed to Taylorise work, rather 
than democratise it. In other words, he fails to address some fundamental questions, the 
answers to which constitute the underpinnings of his prescription.
Politically Contingent Design
249
Willcocks and Mason (1987, 1992) argue that to exploit IT, one has to understand its social, 
political and organisational context. Their approach is to integrate the system development 
process with notions of organisational behaviour. They argue that the systems analyst can 
react in several ways to designing a computer-based system:
One is to adopt the hard systems approach in the belief that it will still produce the 
best result in the end. A second approach is to design human activity out of the 
system, or at least reduce it to the minimum possible, given the technology and 
finance available. A third approach is to under-characterise the human being's 
relationship to the technology as that of an isolated user, subject only to biological 
limitations. Thus ergonomics and human factors engineering brought into systems 
design. A fourth approach, the one followed here, is for those responsible for 
computer systems projects to integrate much broader human factors into the work 
of analysis, design and implementation (1987: 8).
They are concerned that the hard systems approach still holds so much sway at a time when 
more complex human-based systems are being developed. Their advocacy is not of a 
particular methodology, but of a more humanistic, soft approach. They argue that human 
factors should be taken into account in the achievement of business or organisational 
objectives. Their perspective on organisational structures and the system design process is 
what they term a 'political contingencies' approach: organisations are made up of various 
'stakeholders' with competing interests; clashes between them can be resolved by 
negotiation, and by managers of change being aware of the delicacy and complexity of issue 
and choices, and by consciously managing the politics of computerisation.
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Their argument - that human factors should be taken into account in the achievement of 
business objectives - is dependent on decoupling the organisation from a macro analysis. 
Whilst they accept that not all 'stakeholders' have equal power, or capacity to influence 
decisions or have their views heard, they do not explore the basis of this unequal power. 
Implicit in their approach is that stakeholders' different interests can be resolved by 
awareness and negotiation, and in this sense their approach offers an essentially status quo 
model of power: the organisation is presented as neutral, or technical, albeit embodying 
contest.
Those responsible for computerisation need to become aware of other people's 
perspectives, but also need to adopt an appropriate perspective on technological 
change, the one most closely approximating to the pattern of power relationships 
and how the specific organisation functions (1987: 23).
This pluralist approach pervades their work, e.g. in their discussion of 'human resource 
planning for IT':
Personnel management is concerned with managing conflicts and tensions that result 
from trying to use the efforts of human beings who all wish to make their own use of 
the organisation they join (1987: 43).
Willcocks and Mason argue that:
Many of the problems of employee conflicts and sub-optimal systems running during 
or after implementation could be avoided by better human resource planning, more 
employee participation, going back as far as the design stage, and deeper
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consideration of the industrial relations' implications of decisions over systems 
design and how computers will be applied (1987: 156).
However, such analysis underplays the historical particularities of the environment within 
which UK organisations operate, i.e. recession, rationalisation, anti-union legislation, high 
unemployment and reassertion of managerial prerogative. Given this context, as Murray 
argues:
One wonders what power employees are to mobilise to give them a degree of 
control over new systems. This is particularly so for women employees, who so 
often bear the brunt of the worst effects of technological change. There is scant 
evidence in the UK, or elsewhere for that matter, to suggest that a sufficiently 
enlightened managerial class will tackle, let along positively resolve, issues of this 
nature (1989: 294).
It is a strength of Willcocks and Mason's approach that they bring the organisation into the 
picture, but they seem to be aiming to harness social or political factors within the 
organisational context to achieve the best possible system. They are selling a philosophy for 
managing change, and one which is idealist and pluralist in that it is premised on the capacity 
of systems analysts to step outside their own interests, perspectives and methodologies as 
well as those of the employers they are working for.
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The Collective Resource Approach
A variant of the socio-technical approach is the collective resource perspective. In 
Scandinavia the socio-technical approach held sway until recently, when it became apparent 
to trade unions that it was failing to change the nature of worker influence over the design 
process (Ryner 1994, Thompson, Wallace & Sederblad 1994). The Swedish labour 
movement argue that:
In its development projects the Swedish Confederation of Employers stressed the 
individual in a form which complicated collective solutions and the possibilities 
available to the trade union movement (1987: 24).
The socio-technical approach came to be regarded as anti-trade union and anti-democratic 
by the majority of Scandinavian trade unions (Bjerknes 1987, Ryner 1994). Traditional 
participative approaches were seen as insufficient for the following reasons:
1) The appointed project group participants are often not trade union representatives
2) They have no real means of exerting power on the project group
3) There is thus the danger of union representatives becoming integrated in the 
employer's decision making process
4) The language, attitudes, philosophy and values of management's technical and 
organisational design experts has a tendency to spread
5) Trade union experts are then sometimes offered an expert position, and in this 
way the union loses access to information which its representative acquired whilst 
on the project
6) Union representatives are sometimes unable to comment on alternatives, so have 
to approve developments without having had a chance to explore alternatives
7) The gain to the union for giving management access to shop floor information is 
unclear and
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8) Trade union participation is too often a management strategy to make it easier to 
implement planned change 1987: 40).
It was, then, precisely the failure of the socio-technical approach which stimulated the 
development of an alternative approach for participation, work organisation and democracy: 
the collective resources approach. Sandberg (1979) developed a critique of the ideology of 
the dominant systems design approaches in Scandinavia. He found that new technology did 
not always deskill, that management sometimes proposed more collective forms of work 
organisation than Taylorism, and that workers sometimes gained from the introduction of 
new technology.
Bjerknes proposes an analysis which identifies the processes which:
are important for understanding opportunities and constraints to democratic and skill 
enhancing design and use of computer-based systems and tools (1987: 36).
He discusses four processes which constitute his premises. First, capital accumulation, or the 
generation of profit, is the basic driving force of changes in the labour process. In the long 
run changes that are contradictory to this interest are unlikely to occur. Second, the 
intensification of work and use of new technology are two basic strategies for capital 
accumulation. However, when really new technology is introduced it may imply increased 
skill requirements, when those with experience of the technology are sparse. Third, direct 
control and responsible autonomy are complementary strategies for capital accumulation.
254
Opposition from workers to a Tayloristic division of labour may mean high production costs 
and the relative profitability of alternatives; also, Taylorism leads to a loss of the skills of a 
workforce. 'Responsible autonomy' strategies (Friedman 1977, 1984) are an opportunity for 
trade unions to improve working conditions, and, at the same time, a threat - in that they 
may lead to competition between workers, and to control remaining with management 
(Arthur 1994, Grant 1994, McLoughlin & Gourlay 1994). The outcome of tendencies to 
rationalisation, however, is contested rather than determined. Finally, class struggle is an 
important aspect of the systems design process.
The collective resource approach seeks to go beyond the limits of the participatory 
approaches of Mumford and other proponents of the socio-technical school, involving trade 
unions in the design and use of IT systems.
Bjerknes argues that the process of system design must be seen as a part of the broader 
organisational development process, which he conceives in terms broader than those of 
traditional organisation theory, in that it encompasses a trade union response and looks at 
system design in terms of labour process theory. System design is conceived in terms of 
constituting the division of labour between conception and execution.
Advocates of the collective resource approach argue for new trade union initiatives which 
focus employee attention on the design and content of work rather than distribution issues
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i.e. demarcations, skills, pay etc. Clearly, the latter is the area in which trade unions have 
traditionally been involved, whilst their demands and strategies in relation to the former are 
only vaguely formulated (Sandberg 1979, Thompson, Wallace & Sederblad 1994)).
Trade union accumulation of knowledge is seen as the central prerequisite for trade union 
participation in the management design process.
The most important prerequisite for trade union participation in management's 
design process is a parallel and independent process of accumulation of knowledge 
on the part of the union (Bjerknes 1987: 40).
Such participation has included the negotiation of local data agreements, the appointment of 
data shop stewards, the formation of investigative groups by union clubs, and the 
arrangement by unions of courses on influencing the design and use of computer systems.
Clearly, Scandinavia differs from Europe in that the historical development of business has 
occurred on the basis of labour shortage, trade union strength and heavy state regulation 
leading to the development of what Ryner (1994) calls a 'moral economy' in which workers 
are in a prime position to negotiate change and become involved in the design process. This 
contrasts markedly with the conditions experienced in the UK (Thompson, Wallace & 
Sederblad 1994, Marsh 1993) which raises questions about the applicability and viability of 
the collective resource approach elsewhere.
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The collective resource approach offers a model for independent trade union participation in 
management project groups. However, the model is limited in its ability to allow local unions 
to generate their own knowledge base in new areas or to extend their technical competence 
and knowledge of systems design processes. Where are unions to get the resources to fund 
their own independent knowledge base? Likewise, the model cannot be generalised, in a 
context where inter-union competition for contracts is high and individual unions are 
desperate to maintain and secure membership at almost any price (i.e. with 'no strike' and 
'sweetheart deals') and prepared to abrogate basic trade union principles, such as the right 
to strike and collective solidarity. What serious resistance to or involvement in management 
projects can they be expected to have?
The collective resource approach to systems design is grounded in reformist conceptions of 
capitalism and the state. Bjerknes argues that:
In a democratic society the state should play an important role in supporting 
research and development of a more democratic technology ... and give 
opportunities for domestic markets for realistic size or at least initial production of 
this kind of technology (1987: 48).
It fails to acknowledge the bourgeois nature of the democratic state (Milliband 1973) and 
the rationality of the capitalist system with its concern not with the production of use-values 
- democratically arrived at or not - but with the production of exchange-value. Further, there 
is no evidence that either the state or corporate management are about to weaken their grip
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over the design process via inclusion of worker representatives and openly democratic 
systems procedures (Brodsky 1994, Gamble 1994, Thompson 1995). Even in the favourable 
labour market conditions in Scandinavia, the degree of participation in the design process is 
highly proscribed which must bring into question the applicability of the collective resource 
approach as a medium for securing active worker involvement in the design process.
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The Project Team Approach
In my research I found that systems analysis practice was based on none of the above 
approaches. The most common approach I found was that of the project team. Friedman 
(1989) referred to the developing practices of organising DP staff on a team basis. The 
project team was seen, by the majority of analysts and systems managers I interviewed, as 
the best means of tackling systems design in that it utilised the skills of a variety of people - 
end user, systems analyst, project manager, and senior manager alike. It was argued that it 
could thereby overcome the problem of the general inability of any one person or tool to 
embody the fiill range of required knowledge and skill:
The [project teams] that are able to perform the best have teams of complimentary 
skills and the total team knowledge can be harnessed and, in my opinion, this is the 
best way to design systems because you cannot incorporate that wealth of expertise 
and knowledge in either one person or in a piece of expert software (Director, 
Micro Computing Centre, Wales).
Both systems analysts and systems managers seem convinced that:
so long as you pick the right project team encompassing the right personnel from the 
right departments and with the right skills, you overcome the system design 
problems (Senior Analyst and Project Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
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However, in practice, project teams differed enormously, in both terms of skills and 
knowledge prevalent, and in terms of choice of'right' project team members. Project teams 
also differed in terms of size and resources and this was argued to have an important impact 
upon the quality of systems developed:
For several years now we have been tightening belts in this company across the 
board including systems ... The project we are currently working on ... in my 
opinion, requires greater user involvement and more time spent talking to users at 
the coal face ... We would also benefit from a couple of experts in ergonomics ... but 
financial and time constraints won't allow it... Obviously the system is going to get 
compromised as a result (Systems Manager, Defence Sector, Electronics 
Contractor, Scotland).
Budgetary constraints are but one of many factors that can influence the working of the 
project team. Project teams are often steered or led by one or two powerful individuals who, 
either through position or knowledge, or both, are capable of capturing the ideological high 
ground and orchestrating the debate. This was brought home forcefully in one particular 
project I studied at a major private utility. The systems manager and a couple of senior users 
- managers in accounts and customer services were keen to see the introduction of hand- 
held terminals which would allow both meter readers and workmen in the field to key in vital 
information on bills, repairs needed, work in progress, tools and equipment needed, etc. 
However, a senior user manager and several line managers in customer services and 
maintenance opposed the idea on the ground it would give either too much autonomy to the 
workforce over data entry, or that it would mean job loss and deskilling, or that the
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terminals simply would not withstand the abuse they were bound to get out in the field. The 
systems manager and senior systems analyst went to copious lengths to ensure that the 
project team which would look into the feasibility of hand-held terminals would find in their 
favour:
Dave has decided to call in a couple of top knobs from the military and from the 
manufacturer to prove that these terminals can withstand anything our workforce 
can throw at them ... It will be a surprise ... I have also been spending a large 
proportion of my time considering the possible job savings in terms of by-passing 
typists and operators in customer services and maintenance, stores, etc. ... We can 
make some major headway [and] we had the foresight to let Frank in accounts and a 
couple of senior managers know about this ... We've also been pushing the sexiness 
of terminals and how this will fit in with our new corporate image ... It just looks 
nicer [and] more efficient if a man is standing there reading your meter, or ordering 
work via a hand-held terminal, rather than scruffy pieces of pencil and paper ... We 
are also bringing down some staff from East Midlands who have run the scheme 
successfully for the past 12 months ... Whatever happens ... we will be doing all we 
can to ensure our interests are represented strongly, both at next week's meeting 
and within the project team (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
Not only were the systems manager and senior analyst orchestrating the proposed systems 
development but they were also manipulating the actual composition of the project team:
Obviously we want key players in at the start on our side ... I see this as an 
important project for the department. I'll be putting my best analysts and 
programmers into this and using my contacts and resources to bring in reputable 
consultants and expertise ... I've already spent a number of weeks trying to butter up 
some pretty heavy user managers but I'm confident that Frank and me can pull it off 
... One concern is possible job losses or redeployment [and] it's going to be a thorn 
we are going to have to deal with ... Hopefully, the unions won't get up-wind of this 
[and] we shall certainly try to downplay losses [by] emphasising redeployment and 
security of jobs created (Systems Manager, Large Private Utility, Wales).
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The systems manager argued that unions would not be 'troubled' with the earlier stages of 
the design proposals and they were certainly excluded from negotiations during my two 
month involvement in this particular project. Likewise, the seniority of staff that the systems 
manager had mustered to his side for the first 'open meeting' was quite remarkable and 
obviously flustered the 'opposition'. The first meeting of the project team took place in the 
systems department in a well appointed and plush office; a variety of drinks and refreshments 
were available. The initial meeting was light-hearted and a video was used to woo 'the 
opposition', as the senior systems analyst referred to them. The video mixed cartoon 
characters and real life characters to demonstrate old and new practices, the video was 
produced by the retailer of the equipment and tailored for this particular company. Most of 
the discussion afterwards was initiated by the systems manager, who insisted that all they 
were really there for today was to look at the technology and talk to the users and 
manufacturers of it. After the meeting, a lunch was laid on via private caterers. At lunch, the 
senior systems analyst explained the whole process to me:
As you can see, we've gone to great lengths today to convince Clive and others 
[initially opposed to the new system] that this is the system we need ... Its not just a 
question of arguing the technology but relaxing the user ... reinforcing in him a sense 
that he is in good hands ... that we know what we're doing ... and that we are 
working with him ... Round the table today we had Tony and Alien, two of our best 
analysts and well respected in the company. We had senior consultants from TPK 
and CLM, we had management and sales reps from the equipment manufacturer, 
user managers from our sister sites, accounts, finance, customer services, Katherine 
and Angela who will be liaising with customer accounts and who are respected 
within the department, myself and Chris who will be managing the project ... It all
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went very well don't you think? (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, 
Wales).
In practice then, the project teams are often, if not always, loaded as key personnel within 
the organisation, seek to ensure that their interests are represented. There was a spurious 
sense of democracy around the table with opinions being voiced quite openly and due 
respect being shown by relevant parties, but both the systems manager and senior analyst in 
the above example were concerned that not only should their proposals not be rejected by 
senior users but that direct users and particularly unions should not even be involved, at 
least, in the early stages. The overwhelming impression I was left with, was one of a well 
executed, neatly engineered exercise in manipulation, subterfuge and flattery.
Regarding the operation of the project team the systems manager stressed that the day to 
day functioning of the team would be the responsibility of the project manager. It was 
suggested that he may use SSADM as a project management tool, or at least part of it, 
because he was wanting to give it a try as part of an assessment of methodologies that the 
department were undertaking. Whilst the systems manager did not anticipate day to day 
involvement of all the users, he emphasised that his own staff would be working in close 
collaboration.
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So is good systems design reducible to knowledge, experience and skills? Certainly the 
majority of systems analysts I interviewed believed so, apart, however, from two notable 
dissenters:
It is naive to assume that the project team simply because it comprises suitably 
skilled and experienced personnel is, thereby, going to design good systems ... I've 
worked in project teams where we've had some of the best personnel and 
experience in the industry but still made a balls up ... Some things you just can't 
overcome or deal with adequately, like obstinate managers or an industrial relations 
dispute ... Successful systems can only be defined by management ... You can be 
involved in a project team which has made huge blunders and developed sub-optimal 
systems ... but still be regarded as successful because management liked it (Senior 
Systems Analyst, Major Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
Clearly, this analyst is alluding to the important fact that project team success is related to 
system success which, in turn, is going to be conditioned by prevailing notions of 
profitability and efficiency. The irony is that what may at one time have been thought a 
successful system, in terms of meeting these objectives, may, at another point in time, be 
seen as 'sub-optimal':
I remember working on a project in the mid-seventies ... in which our aim was to 
automate as much as possible ... Nowadays we are realising the mistakes, in terms of 
lack of flexibility and sheer problems of maintenance ... Today, management are 
emphasising flexible systems ... When I look back we all congratulated ourselves 
when the project was completed ... [I think] what a bunch of white coated misfits we 
were then... We wouldn't even be trusted to clean the floors if we took that attitude 
today (Systems Analyst, Large Electronics Company, Scotland).
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Project team success is thus measured, amongst other things, against whether or not senior 
management and executive decision takers are happy with the outcomes. Project teams that 
deliver systems which do not meet, or undermine, corporate goals can expect severe wrath 
from senior managers and corporate directors:
I remember working on a team several years ago in this company....we were toying
with the idea of allowing employees in customer accounts greater freedom over 
information inputs into the system which was then done through extensive cards 
and paper filling.....Many of us believed that rather than eliminate employee
involvement we would raise employee commitment and productivity by giving 
them a degree of discretion and decision making responsibilities which were 
previously held by supervisory grades......We thought we were doing a good
job.....but soon as senior management got wind of the system they came down on
us like a ton of bricks. We were all, individually, given severe bollockings and 
asked to explain what the hell we were playing at. The systems manager of the time 
was particularly shafted....he was told to disband the team .....and outside
consultants were brought in (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Public Utility, 
Scotland).
I asked this particular analyst if that meant an end to project team autonomy within the 
company. His reply was instructive:
It was not so much an ending of our discretion....! mean we didn't just become 
puppets of corporate management from that day on.....but we did learn...or at least 
most of us that we should keep designs to ourselves. We were too casual in the 
past...far too open. Too many individuals got wind of the system before we had the 
chance to put over a convincing package of arguments. Nowadays we play the cards 
close to our chest (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Public Utility, Scotland).
Rather than merely becoming the puppets of corporate management and forgoing all 
autonomy over design analysts leam to play the game. They ensure their interests are, at
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least in part, met through a variety of means including - keeping 'the project team tight', 
utilising technical discourses to whitewash over recalcitrant users and managers and ' subtly 
persuading' management that the system they are advancing is in the general interest of the 
organisation. In effect, they ensure design is kept, where possible, secretive. I found that 
project team composition was important. Invariably systems managers wanted 'teams that 
were tight,' 'knew the game' and were capable of manipulating others rather than being 
'manipulated by them'.
Discussion of tools and techniques designed to elicit greater user participation in design fail 
to acknowledge the political interests of project teams and in particular their essentially anti- 
democratic nature.
Democracy, Design and the Analyst
Marx (1981) argued that the development of the productive forces comes into conflict with 
the social relations of capitalist production as the further self expansion of capital manifests 
itself in a tendency to periodic crisis of overaccumulation and devalorisation.
Within the systems design process this antagonism, between the forces and relations of 
production, manifests itself in the form of a contradiction between, on the one hand, a 
companies need to develop technologies, techniques and practices capable of more
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accurately modelling the social world, so as to be better able to exploit it, and, on the other, 
the need to conserve surplus-value producing relations, that is, capitalist relations of 
exploitation.
In effect there is a tension between democracy and design within the capitalist mode of 
production. 'Democracy stops at the office door and the factory gate' (Einhorn 1982: 5). 
The secretive and anti-democratic basis of power and decision taking within the systems 
design process results not only in management shutting out trade unions from participation, 
or trade unions, generally, accepting that design is management's 'prerogative'; but also 
ensures that practising systems analysts, generally, acquiesce in this anti-democratic process. 
This acquiescence is often unconsciously mediated and rationalised in terms of 'value-free' 
design criteria. This rationality is not merely the result of particular routes of entry and types 
of training systems analysts receive, nor reducible to their position within the division of 
labour but is also, a reflection of the wider ideological stranglehold bourgeois commodity 
relations have over designers. Accumulation appears a technical process, a rational process, 
the market the most 'efficient' and 'effective' allocator of resources and medium of 
motivation. I found that systems analysts, more so than engineers, invariably have no 
alternative design discourse to that of the free market and tended to be uncritical of that 
market.
The spread of IT across the economy as a whole and its use in increasingly complex and 
sophisticated user environments, has done little to weaken this ideological stranglehold. The
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increasing complexity of systems being modelled has pushed management and designers into 
seeking and eliciting greater user participation in the design process (Friedman 1989, Tan 
1994, Edmonds et al 1994, Uzzi 1995), so as to be better able to map, model and modify 
the user environment. However, it needs to be remembered that a participative approach to 
design is not the same thing as democratic design. For example, Norman (1984) proposes 
that democratisation of system development should not pose a challenge to the structure and 
policies of the organisation. In similar fashion, a host of writers advocating user involvement 
in the design process and more 'open' systems design, do so but within narrow constraints. 
Thus, Nisenbaum (1994) emphasises user involvement in the design process but qualifies 
this by stating that the designer needs to be aware that users can be 'wayward', 'awkward' 
and need to be 'carefully managed'. As Williams argues:
Democratisation of systems design is explicitly divorced from consideration of other 
areas of industrial democracy, and is counterpoised to politicisation (1987: 81).
None of the participatory user centred design strategies secure democratic participation of 
users in the design process (Bjerknes, et a/, 1987). Indeed, structured systems design 
approaches actually inhibit democratisation of the process by structuring the problematic in a 
particular way:
I would suggest, systems staff think systemically... [and] analysts tend to 
perceive the system as a higher organism with its own needs ... Design and 
users, where possible, are subordinated to these higher needs (Software 
Engineer, University).
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Structured methods have an architecture to them whose purpose is to ensure the 
analyst asks all the right questions so as to elicit the necessary information from 
users to build the system ... The architecture is also important in the way it suggests 
to analysts which questions are important and what users need to be asked. More 
than this, structured methods treat users as information sources ... as inputs ... They 
are inputs into the system ... the system is contained in embryonic form in the 
architecture of the methods ... It is the interests of the system as laid down in the 
methods which structures the problematic and subordinates both user and analyst to 
them ... I would suggest structured methods are not just perceived as best systems 
practice but are an attempt to impose a systems perspective on users and systems 
staff alike... to inculcate in them a particular world view in which ... the systems 
interest predominates ... This is a powerful world view because it appears 
universalistic ... whereas users can always be brought over the coals for being 
particularistic as can systems staff who fail to recognise the rules of the game. Like 
all rules structured methods reflect the interests of those that make them [and] there 
is nothing democratic in them although they appear democratic (Systems Manager, 
Health Service, Scotland).
Systems analysts approach design with relatively rigid conceptual models in which notions 
of systems interest are embedded in a discourse of technical and business rationality. Within 
this systems discourse, human labour constitutes an area of uncertainty, a possible source of 
system dysfunction and instability: 'People are trouble, but machines obey' (The Engineer 
1978: 24-25).
It appears that it seldom occurs to analysts' to question the validity of project 
origination by senior management. And also they do not readily question the origination of 
the project team or methodology deployed3 . To question this would be to question the 
systems perspective which they hold and the rationale of their own labour within that
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process as deliverers and guardians of the 'system'. This was brought home, candidly, by 
one software engineer I interviewed, at length, over the issue of democracy and design:
I would suggest ... analysts live in a culture which inhibits truly democratic 
participation of users or, indeed, truly democratic systems design ... The outward 
development of participative design technologies and techniques masks the inward 
attempts to secure control over users and ensure system efficiency. More 
importantly, analysts are only part of a broader team [and] they are often 
subordinate to, but increasingly part of management broadly defined ... in the sense 
they share the same goals and aspirations (Software Engineer, University).
What this engineer is alluding to is that systems analysts' work is part of a broader 
fundamental division between workers and management, with systems analysts carrying out 
the conceptual work necessary to subordinate workers interests to the goals and aspirations 
of management, albeit interpreted systemically. One systems analyst I interviewed 
highlighted the material practice ensuring analysts 'accepted' the dominant goals and 
aspirations of management.
You are punished for designing systems with unnecessary bells and whistles [and] 
systems that do not deliver what management anticipated ... Too close an 
identification of interests with those of lower level users will be rewarded with lack 
of career progression, unrewarding projects, back end and routine analysis and a 
closing of senior user ranks ... which will prevent you working on prestige projects 
(Systems Analyst, Multi-national Electronics Company, Scotland).
Likewise, the development of prototyping and CASE tools fail to democratise the systems 
design. What they do is facilitate user involvement in the design process and, in this sense,
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make evident management's reliance on worker co-operation; but users are manipulated by 
the very architecture of these tools:
CASE is theoretically democratic ... A set of tools and techniques aimed at 
facilitating the analysts in getting the user involved ... But the architecture of CASE 
is such that it structures the issues of systems definition in a particular way [and] the 
methodology [and] the software itself forecloses certain scenarios whilst suggesting 
others ... It also puts the analyst in a commanding position vis-a-vis the user ... as he 
is more likely to know the theoretical architecture behind the models ... Often I 
would suggest even the analyst is unaware of the way the tool structures the design 
(Software Engineer, University).
Advocates of structured approaches to design or of greater user involvement in design 
fail to recognise the ways in which the actual architecture of the tools and techniques 
used structure the problematic in a particular way. Sitting down with a user in front of a 
screen using prototyping software and asking the user what they would like may appear 
democratic. Initially, when I sat down with analysts and users utilising this technology and 
approach, it appeared to confirm much of the literature emphasising user-centred 
'democratic' participation and the analyst's role as 'facilitator'. This was, however, not the 
case. The user did not always understand the broader parameters of the system - its overall 
objectives. Nor did they always know what was most suitable for themselves in terms of the 
system being proposed. Most importantly, both the analyst and the software structured the 
design problematic in a particular way:
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It's not a question of just giving the user everything he or she wants ... You can't 
just let a user loose at the screen and expect them to understand the systems 
objectives and the limitations as to what is practicable or possible ... The software 
structures the design down a particular path [and] it suggests to the user certain 
possibilities and options. It suggests where modifications may be useful and what 
they may possibly be ... it suggests but does not counter-suggest ... It advances a 
particular perspective [and] I guess I reinforce that perspective as I sit with the user 
... (Systems Analyst, Large Public Utility, Derbyshire).
Another analyst was even more straightforward:
User involvement is needed so long as it does not contradict the initial spec (Senior 
Systems Analyst, Large Public Utility, Derbyshire).
Participation is useful but some things are more sacred, namely, ensuring 'requirements' are 
met. But who is setting the requirements? One systems manager argued:
Requirements are set by management ... either user managers, or corporate 
managers, or user managers and ourselves, or even just ourselves ... It depends upon 
the type of system [and] it's scale ... Large systems tend to be initiated by senior 
management who have some vague idea about what they want - usually on a line of 
cost savings and productivity gains ... We then discuss at a preliminary meeting how 
these broader requirements may be met and depending on the scope of system ... I 
may suggest who and who not to involve in the project ... (Systems Manager, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Scotland).
'Requirements' are invariably set by either managing directors, senior consultants, or senior 
user managers and systems managers. These requirements are defined in an undemocratic 
way but their realisation often requires detailed involvement of different types and levels of
272
user, with the design taking place in an atmosphere emphasising co-operation, unity of 
purpose, and commonalty of interests of all concerned. Opposition where it is met, is often 
impersonal, and discussed in terms of dysfunctionality:
It's important to get users involved ... This is not just politics but a matter of 
urgency if you are going to tap into their knowledge and understanding of their 
particular business ... but you have to appreciate which suggestions and information 
is functional to the system and which is dysfunctional (Systems Manager, Large 
Public Utility, Derbyshire).
Analysts often present a particular design and the methodologies they deploy in securing it 
as simply a 'technical' issue while downplaying the consequences of possible work 
re-organisation, regrading, deskilling or work intensification that may follow on from a 
particular approach and design. Ironically, many users I observed perceived the tools, 
techniques and methodology deployed by systems analysts in similar terms. Users did not 
readily question the assumptions built into either the approaches, or technologies, used for 
eliciting user-information and likewise, seldom realised the impact of particular 
hardware/software configurations until the project was well under way. This was particularly 
true of lower level users and union representatives who were generally kept in the dark and 
not exposed to the broader systems architecture and overall methodology. By regarding the 
technology and systems practice as neutral, Jungk argues:
[We have] failed to recognise as anti-human, and consequently to oppose the effects 
of, values built into the apparatus, instruments and machines of their capitalist 
technological system. So machines have played the part of a Trojan Horse in their
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relation to the Labour Movement. Productivity becomes more important than 
fraternity. Discipline outweighs freedom. The product is in fact more important than 
the producer, (cited Levidow and Young 1981: 53).
A number of analysts admitted to me that they often dressed up their designs in technical 
jargon to push through particular interests. One software engineer stressed that this was not 
democratic:
The practice of design and the medium with which we are working - IT - is high 
tech and obscure to many users and we know this ... You can present personal ideas 
via the technology [and] the technology makes these personal ideas appear technical 
because they are originating within the software ... In scenario software we can use 
windows and menus to allow users a degree of involvement - democracy if you like 
over the choice of what they would like to include ... But they are choosing from an 
options list set either by myself or the software manufacturer who share similar 
perspectives ... Obviously the system rigs their choice ... It's not democracy, I 
suppose, because it's rigged ... but then so is government... You choose between a 
number of candidates none of whom you may like or whose policies you fully 
understand (Software Engineer, University).
Traditional design methods condition system designers' approaches to design. Reinforcing 
the dominance of dead labour machinery and technology, over living labour that is 
reinforcing the social power of capital over the working class. This takes the form of not 
only designing systems to eliminate human labour per se, but also to secure managerial 
control over its freedom and exercise of skill within the production process:
It is not my job to enrich workers' lives or make their work more rewarding or 
satisfying ... Workers are there to work and management to manage [and] my 
function is to support management in that task ... Consequently, I do not
274
recommend hardware and software or systems approaches which undermine that 
function (IT Consultant, Multi-national Hardware and Software Manufacturer).
Cooley (1981) cites the example of designers contemplating a robotic solution to the 
problem of tightening nuts on oil pipelines and scaffolding in the North Sea. The designers 
initially went for a robotic solution to eliminate human labour completely from the operation. 
However, they realised it was not that practical once they began to consider the 
programming complexities of getting a system to recognise which way a hexagon nut was 
about, and much less whether it had a barnacle or weed on it and then to select the correct 
spanner and apply the correct torque. More importantly, there was a whole area of 
'experience' which the human operator had that could not be replicated in the software - 
the experience of visually knowing, without measuring, what diameter a nut and bolt are, 
and how much torque to apply without wringing it off and yet at the same time tightening it 
sufficiently that it will not come loose:
This they can do without any 'scientific knowledge' such as torsional rigidity of the 
bolt or the shear strength of material, yet they will get it right repeatedly (Cooley 
1981: 59).
As Polyani states: 'There are things we know but cannot tell' (cited Levidow & Young 
1981: 59). It is this esoteric or 'tacit' knowledge and experience which traditional systems 
design approaches fail to recognise or build into their designs. One possible reason why 
management cannot readily tap into this esoteric world of experience and knowledge is that
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to do so would risk foregoing, to a large extent, its attempts to dictate the labour process 
and control labour power. Capital thus meets a barrier - that of its own surplus value 
producing relations. This barrier acts to inhibit management's capacity to further transform 
the labour process so as to secure further surplus-value within a particular branch of 
production.
There is, in short, a fundamental contradiction of interest between capitalism and 
democracy. For management to democratise the design process would be for them to risk 
foregoing surplus-value production and appropriation. This is not to say management do not 
develop strategies which seek to encourage worker involvement and participation in the 
design process, or that worker participation is, at times, advantageous from the point of 
view of surplus-value extraction; rather participation is not the same as democratisation - the 
participative exercises I observed were invariable exercises in manipulation. There is no 
indication whatsoever that either management or systems designers are about to openly 
democratise the design process. Indeed, far from IT being the harbinger of democracy, many 
corporate executives perceive an altogether different role:
Information Technology is basically a technology of co-ordination and control of the 
labour force, the white collar workers, which Taylorian organisation does not cover 
(Franco de Benedetti, Managing Director, Olivetti, cited Levidow & Young 1981: 
194).
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At a very general and profound level the very class relations of capitalism impinge upon the 
democratic design and take up of skill enhancing and job enriching technologies. As one 
union official argued:
Much as we would like to be involved in the design of technology and work 
organisation ... we are having to spend all our time bending over backwards to plead 
with employers to save and maintain jobs, terms and conditions ... in this climate our 
members first concern is the wage packet [and] issues of democracy and design at 
work which were coming to the fore in the 1960s and early 1970s, have been kicked 
in the head. We have never been further away from the recommendations of the 
Bullock Report (Regional Official, TGWU).
Interestingly, although there is a strong emphasis within systems design on 'soft' systems 
and more participative and democratic design processes there seems to be an accompanying 
emphasis on engineering and mathematical modelling of user environments (Blum 1994, 
Occelli 1993, Hardgreave & Wilson 1994). Equally, as Child and Tarbuck (1985), Legge 
(1989), and Wdlcocks and Mason (1987) argue, there is an increasing exclusion or 
marginalisation of personnel and human resource management specialists from the process 
of technological change.
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Possibilities of Analysts Transcending Dominant Design Paradigms
Although analysts generally took an uncritical and unquestioning approach to design, 
sharing, by and large, managerial definitions of efficiency and rationality, there were, 
nonetheless, a number of possible sites of resistance to, and disruption of, this dominant 
model. In particular, I noted that a number of analysts felt that 'their' systems had been 
adversely compromised by managerial requirements - usually budgetary - or that analysts felt 
management had defined systems' requirements incorrectly. A number of analysts, 
particularly younger ones, were intimidated and threatened by more powerful senior user 
managers. In addition, systems managers, in some organisations, were attempting to tighten 
control of systems analyst labour via tighter project control and a variety of performance 
monitoring tools and this was seen, by some, as posing the possibility of deskilling or 
reducing status. A number of analysts also voiced concern over the adverse repercussions of 
their designs on users jobs and skills. A couple of analysts were also adamant that they were 
socialists and not at all impressed with 'monetarism' or the 'market'. However, none of 
these factors, either singularly or together, prompted any analyst I interviewed or observed 
to reject dominant systems approaches to design.
Examples of designers rejecting dominant systems approaches to design are rare. One such 
example, was the case of the Workers Corporate Plan at Lucas Aerospace. Cooley (1981) 
highlights how the interests of technologists and workers coincided at Lucas Aerospace
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where joint design co-operation between engineers and workers proved to be a politicising 
experience for both parties. As one designer quoted by Cooley discovered:
Management is not a skill or craft or profession but a command relationship, a sort 
of bad habit which we have inherited from the army and the church (1981: 57).
A number of engineers in the Combine Committee highlighted that their work on socially 
useful products like telechiric devices or the 'hobcart' - a design to enable disabled children 
to move around more freely - were the 'most rewarding' experiences of their life. In short, 
they began to question the validity of their work at Lucas Aerospace and the 'negative' 
projects and technologies they had previously been involved in designing.
The work of the Combine Committee on socially useful products highlighted that the design 
methodology used in a 'socialist technology' would have to be radically different from that 
which applies in our current technology. As Cooley argues:
At present ... highly qualified designers and technologists spend months drawing, 
stressing and analysing a prototype ... These design stages involve rarefied, complex 
mathematical procedures which are necessary mainly because, for commercial 
reasons, materials have to be exploited to the full. Both the materials and the 
systems of the products are designed just to perform a precisely defined function for 
a very short length of time before the product is rendered redundant (1981: 57).
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Obviously, designers in different countries and different sectors, public or private, may have 
different degrees of leeway when it comes to designing democratically or considering issues 
of skill and worker satisfaction within a particular design. Factors like the nature of the 
market, government legislation, type of product, technology, and specific balance of class 
forces, etc., all play their part in conditioning the design process. Thus one systems manager 
I interviewed highlighted how, for him at least, it was preferable to work in the public as 
opposed to private sector because he did not particularly want to be involved in designing 
systems whose sole purpose was the enrichment of shareholders. However, he also 
recognised that even in the public sector design remits were tightening and that control and 
accountability were becoming key features inbuilt into many of the new operating systems:
There was a time when you could approach a design in a more open ended way, for 
example, considering the needs of specific users and even suggesting to them needs 
which they might not have thought about ... Rather like, well, currently you are 
doing such and such but you could be doing it with bells and whistles attached or in 
a more rewarding way ... Nowadays even here things are tightening up as systems 
design becomes more subsumed under the accounting mentality to 
life[and]everything is to be costed to the last penny: no more bells and whistles or 
fancy frills on the systems ...then there is this insidious pressure from above for 
control ... for mindless, repetitive control and accountability of every last action of 
every last user ... Creativity in design and personal preference get subsumed under 
this accounting, cost cutting control mentality (Systems Manager, Health Service, 
Scotland).
One senior systems analyst I spoke to referred to the change in political climate and the way 
this has affected the 'quality' of the system design:
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In the seventies unions and shop stewards were pushing generally for improvements 
in the quality of working life[and]for a while this posed interesting possibilities for a 
minority of us in the profession who quite frankly would have liked to have built 
more qualitative systems. That is systems with more than one or two dimensions ... 
Too much systems design today is influenced by the new politics of control and 
costing [and] in many ways it is reflected in a newer breed of analyst [who are] more 
materialist and ruthless. I've been over to Norway and also to Germany and it seems 
to me that there, at least, they build more quality systems. Systems which do more 
than account and control ... systems which actual enrich employees lives and you 
know this makes design more rewarding and worthwhile ... It does to me at least 
(Senior Systems Analyst, Pharmaceutical Industry, Scotland).
Ironically, despite having developed more sophisticated methods for modelling the social in 
the technical, the systems design profession is, by and large, doing so merely to wed users 
ever more tightly to the new managerial and business credo of efficiency and rationalisation. 
This credo, as I discussed in chapter three, is becoming a dominant philosophy in the IT 
community and in one sense is a reflection of the commodification of more and more aspects 
of the practices of this industry. Having developed tools and techniques to better analyse and 
model user environments analysts are responsible for delivering systems which utilise the 
information gleaned from users, and particularly lower level users, so as to exploit them 
better. This is achieved through emphasising only one or two aspects of the systems design 
(e.g. control and cost savings) in contrast to a possibly more multifaceted systems build. 
This worries some analysts and systems managers, but the overwhelming majority of 
analysts and systems managers I interviewed and observed were largely ignorant of these 
issues and active proponents of the very business credo that is making their design activity 
more one dimensional.
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Probably, the most cited case of a mass producer attempting to redress some of the more 
deleterious aspects of capitalist labour processes, via an 'opening up' of the design process, 
to a more democratic involvement of parties - management, designers and unions - is Volvo, 
in its Kalamar but particularly Uddevalla factories.
It is worth looking at the Uddevalla example because it shows some of the limits of what is 
possible and practicable within a capitalist economy. Uddevalla represents an attempt to 
'socialise' production on a scale never seen before by a manufacturer. The specific aim was 
to reverse tendencies towards the deskilling and routinisation of labour. The plant was 
designed on a co-operative basis, with full trade union participation right from the start. 
Utilising a socio-technical design remit, key sections of Volvo management sought to give 
equal weight to social and technical considerations within the design. Volvo devoted huge 
resources to what Clarke (1990) calls the 'socialisation of production'. This involved the 
introduction of flexible technologies enabling complete build and a reskilling of the 
workforce, and facilitating the utilisation of small work teams who were largely responsible 
for the scheduling of their own work and collectively responsible for job allocation. Working 
conditions in the plant such as noise levels, cleanliness, safety and facilities, were also given 
high priority. Indeed, the company went to enormous lengths to create an attractive working 
environment where rest lounges with fully equipped kitchens and showers were provided 
and the wearing of track suits rather than overalls was permitted for workers and a
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redevelopment of all hand tools so that female workers could use them comfortably. One 
manager stressed why Volvo went to such lengths:
Our workers wear designer clothes. They ski in Austria in winter. They go to the 
Greek islands in the summer. They have a professional lifestyle. They cannot 
understand and will not accept being treated differently at work (cited by Clarke 
1990: 15).
It has been suggested by a number of writers (Clarke 1990, Berggren 1989, Hammerstrom 
& Lansbury 1991, Littler 1990) that the reasons why Volvo undertook such detailed work 
redesign is because of the specific nature of Scandinavian industrial relations and the 
particular nature of Volvos market. Historic labour shortages, powerful union federations, a 
corporatist and long-standing history of social democratic governments, coupled to a high 
value added, limited production, market sector meant that employers had to give 
consideration to workers' interests in the design process and that, in turn, unions and worker 
representatives were in a relatively strong position to secure those interests.
However, it is often forgotten, as Berggren (1989) points out, that many managers and 
industrial engineers within Volvo were opposed to the design and still are. Plant managers, 
in particular, feeling too much discretion has been given to the workforce at the expense of 
tried and tested systems of control. Other sections of management, as Hammerstrom and 
Lansbury (1991) have argued, are worried that Volvo's rising company sales which strongly 
inclined the company to experiment with work improvement will rapidly decline, particularly
283
with Japanese entry into the luxury car market. This indeed is what happened during 1990 
and 1991 when Volvo experienced significant losses and had to begin initiating 
rationalisation plans to ensure its survival (The Times 1990, 1991).
The irony is that this experiment, the most advanced of its kind has ended. Volvo closed 
down its Uddevalla plant in 1994 as a result of intensified competition from more main 
stream manufacturers.
Summary
I have argued that a software bottleneck exists in the IT industry and that the proposed
solutions to it, ranging from more sophisticated modelling tools through to more 
participatory design approaches, do not resolve the fundamental causes of that bottleneck - 
an inability to accurately model the social in the technical.
Debates on securing greater user involvement in the design process through developing 
more participatory design tools and methodologies fail to recognise that, in a society in 
which design is geared towards the production of exchange-values rather than use-values 
and in which labour power itself is reduced to a commodity, the scope for democratically 
designed work systems is minimal. Further, I have argued that the actual origination,
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composition and aims of the project team - the most common approach to design - is anti- 
democratic.
Likewise, I have argued that tools and techniques of design perfected within the capitalist 
economy are embedded with the philosophy of exploitation of that society and cannot 
simply be lifted and applied to the construction of a socialist economy, or be rendered 
democratic merely by being used Participatively. Systems designers have developed tools to 
more accurately model the social, however, the majority of those tools, both in their 
architecture and use, model only one particular dimension of the social. In effect the interests 
of the various groups that constitute the social are not always encompassed in a particular 
design build. Despite attempts to ensure greater user participation in design the interests of 
dominant power elite's and their need to maintain and extend relations of surplus-value 
extraction remain, more or less, unchallenged; indeed, they are reinforced through many of 
the tools, methods and practices of analysts.
In the following chapter issues relating to user participation in design are discussed in the 
context of trade union policy and strategy. I examine the ways in which dominant power 
relations and bargaining cultures act to distort and limit employee involvement in design - 
thus inhibiting management in tapping into the experience, skills and creativity of workers - 
and consequently reproducing tendencies towards user dissatisfaction and system failure.
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In the above chapter I argued that although there are increasing calls for greater user 
participation in the systems design process, this participation remains restricted. One 
manifestation of this restriction is the practice of the project team approach to design. 
Ostensibly, project teams, in as much as they may encompass user representatives, can 
appear relatively open and democratic. In practice, however, the project team serves to 
reinforce the domination of particular interests over others and is anti-democratic in both 
its workings and in its intent - which is to secure the ' system' interest.
With the development of complex real time systems management increasingly require 
employee participation in design; however, senior managers and systems departments, 
generally, do not want to relinquish their control over the systems design process or 
encourage forms of participation which may lead to critical evaluations or even rejection 
of the systems they propose. Importantly, few systems managers I interviewed felt 
unions should be involved in systems design at the detailed and practical working level of 
the project team. Rather, members of the project team may ask trade union 
representatives for their views on a particular topic and then report back to the project 
team but they did not want union representatives involved in the day to day decision 
taking activities of the project team; these areas were seen, by systems staff and user 
managers alike, as sacrosanct - as strictly managerial domains. In effect unions are 
largely excluded from involvement in project teams and the crucial design work they 
carry out.
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On the basis of interviews of trade union officers and shop stewards this chapter 
examines the more general involvement of trade unions within the design process and, in 
particular, union attempts to utilise New Technology Agreements (NTAs) and establish 
joint consultative procedures with employers. The types of agreements unions make, 
their assessment of these agreements and the difficulties unions face in securing their 
members interests within the design process are explored. It also examines the impact of 
new technology on skills, work organisation, control and trade union membership 
patterns. Finally, it examines the changing industrial relations climate that is emerging, 
partly as a consequence of the broader processes of restructuring discussed in Chapter 
One and, more specifically, as a result of particular government and trade union strategy 
and policy 1 .
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Trade Unions and New Technology
Trade unions have always been concerned with the results and implications of technical 
change on job demarcations, skills, pay and job security (Batstone 1987, Coats 1988, 
Hyman 1989, Jackson 1991). However, widespread concern over the implications of 
micro-electronics based technologies and in particular the use of information technology 
as a rationalising technology (Ryan 1991, Thompson 1991) has prompted many trade 
unions into producing a spate of documentation and policy statements in an attempt to 
clarify their position vis-a-vis this technology and process of change2 .
The majority of trade unions I interviewed recognised the need for investment in new 
technology but qualified this with the need to ensure that their members' interests will 
not be undermined as a result of technological changes taking place in the workplace. 
This is the official position of the TUC (1979) document Employment and Technology. 
However, the degree of individual union acceptance of technological change, along with 
awareness of the issues involved and strategies and programmes to tackle it, differ 
dramatically.
The EETPU, for example, argues that whilst many other unions' reaction to new 
technology:
Is increasingly strained, tested and ... found wanting. The EETPU is different 
and proud of it. We are unequivocal. Technological progress is vital to 
industrial survival. Our concern is to ensure that it is successfully harnessed, not
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fearfully rejected by the industrial backwoodsmen in some short-sighted 
emotional spasm (Hammond 1987).
The EETPU sees itself in a 'pioneering' role, riding the crest of a technological wave. 
To this end, the union runs its own training colleges, with the latest micro-electronic 
equipment explicitly seeking to achieve higher status for its members through a 
programme of education, retraining and monopolisation of key positions (EETPU: 
1987). Whilst the EETPU is relatively optimistic about the benefits accruing from the 
introduction of new technology, NALGO, argue that:
We are convinced that the changes brought about by new technology can only 
be accommodated by society with appropriate and radical Government measures 
at the national and international levels ... The extreme free market philosophy of 
the present British Government ... is wholly inadequate to the social challenge 
posed by new technology (1989: 4-5).
NALGO strongly believe that:
There is no automatic route whereby new technologies will be translated into 
social advance, rather: Trade unions must have a positive role in persuading 
governments to adopt appropriate policies for dealing with technological change 
(1989: 54-55).
This view was echoed by an official of the MSF who argued that whilst:
The union accepts new technology, as a fact of life, its introduction and use must 
be carefully negotiated to protect members' interest (Regional Officer MSF).
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The real issue for many unions is not the technology itself but the social context of its 
introduction. ASTMS (1986), for example, are acutely aware of the impact of new 
technology on jobs, skills and working practices. Indeed, all the unions I interviewed 
sought some kind of consultation or negotiation with employers over the introduction of 
new technology. Some unions attempting to achieve this through specific technology 
agreements; others through existing collective bargaining procedures, but all emphasise 
that it is difficult to get employers to negotiate with them over these issues.
The TUC (1981) recommends that unions attempt to sign new technology agreements 
(NT As) with employers. NT As were originally pioneered by trade unions in Scandinavia 
in the early 1970s (Benson & Lloyd 1983, Gill 1985); their adoption in Britain reflected 
trade union concern in the late 1970s with extending democracy in the workplace 
(Benson & Lloyd 1983). The TUC (1981) issued a set of negotiating guidelines for 
member unions wishing to secure NT As with employers3 . In practice many of these 
guidelines relate to issues of staffing, health and safety, earnings and hours. Apart from 
a general emphasis on the need to ensure that new technology is introduced through a 
process of collective bargaining and consultation the TUC guidelines offer no practical 
advice as to how union representatives are to actively intervene in the process of design. 
TUC guidelines and member policy, generally, does not address the importance of union 
involvement in the project or design team at the critical stages of requirements setting 
and system boundary definition; these areas still tend to be perceived as' managerial' and 
sacrosanct.
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Most unions try to respond to technological change by developing a ' model technology 
agreement' which consists of a set of guidelines relating to issues such as pay, 
demarcation, skilling, manning, health and safety, etc. Only two unions, the GMBTU 
and TGWU, said that they do not operate model technology agreements. This is not to 
say that they do not attempt to seek agreements with employers over the introduction of 
new technology, rather:
Due to the specific structure of the T & G and the multiple business, industrial, 
public and private sectors, in which our members work, it would not be 
practicable to operate a model technology agreement (Education and Research 
Officer TGWU).
Unions that operate model agreements emphasise that, in reality, a number of variables 
intervene to ensure that the final agreement adopted with the employer comes now 
nearer, now further, from the model agreement:
This is just a model agreement ... a guideline for our negotiators ... we pride 
ourselves in being able to custom our agreement to suit various employers, in 
other words, it is not rigid dogma (Union Officer MSF).
Many unions argue that employers often refuse to enter into negotiations over new 
technology. Thus BIFU note that:
New technology, its implementation and development in banking and finance 
continues to progress in the United Kingdom at a very fast pace, without 
negotiation and little consultation with BIFU. As a result... the BIFU National 
Executive Committee resolved to ... promote an awareness among all financial 
staffs of the needs for union membership to protect them from redundancy 
resulting from developments in micro technology and also to arouse public
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opinion on the social irresponsibility of such wealthy employers on this issue 
(1986:2).
An USDAW official highlights the difficulties many unions face in trying to get 
technology agreements by detailing how, in the retail sector alone, employers use 'the 
vulnerability of part-time and temporary workers to undermine union organisation and 
forestall any discussion concerning technological change, or work reorganisation' 
(Regional Officer USDAW).
All unions, whether they had model technology agreements or not, sought to get 
negotiation with employers. However, different unions have different problems and 
degrees of success in achieving these aims. BIFU, for example:
Have had a concerted policy of trying to get employers to enter into new 
technology agreements, but banking employers just don't seem to want to have it 
(Union Officer BIFU).
ASTMS and TASS argue that they have been relatively successful in securing 
technology agreements with employers because their members are in a strategic position 
vis a vis new technology and management strategy, and are better able to see what is 
going on; they also win the confidence of employers due to their white collar status, a 
view shared by APEX, which has the highest number of new technology agreements.
However, even where unions do achieve a relatively high number of agreements, one 
should be careful of over exaggerating the capacity of the union to influence the shaping
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of new technology because: 'In most cases, there is no negotiation by employers' (Union 
Official MSF).
It is also worth noting that APEX, ASTMS and NALGO have signed mainly procedural 
agreements regarding the future introduction of computer based office and 
administrative systems, whereas TASS has signed more specific and combination 
agreements regarding the introduction of specific changes, usually the introduction of 
computer aided drawing technology into the drawing office (Williams & Steward: 
1985).
Only a few of these agreements allow for worker involvement at the design stage of a 
new system and even less at the earlier required planning stage (Daniel & Millward 
1993, Mcloughlin & Clark 1994). Unions' ability to achieve their aims differ widely, 
depending upon a number of variables from co-operation of the employer, the type of 
technology being introduced, the occupation of union members, their awareness and 
strategic position visa vis controlling the changes, the competitive state of business and 
the nature of union solidarity.
Most of the union officers I interviewed believe that the TUC policy in relation to new 
technology is the best that can be expected:
Given that the TUC only has the power its members give it (Union Officer, 
USDAW) and given: current political/economic climate (Union Officer MSF).
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An ASTMS official argues:
Whilst the TUC may have a role for smaller unions in assisting them in coming 
to grips with the issues surrounding new technology, it can be of little help to the 
larger unions, nor would its interference be welcomed (Regional Officer 
ASTMS).
However, some officials argue that TUC policy on new technology and the guidelines 
and assistance it gives to various unions on this matter, is not enough, one official of the 
EETPU arguing that:
the TUC has done bugger all concerning making individual unions aware of new 
technology issues (a) because the TUC have not got the experience, (b) it has 
not got the funding, and (c) it has not got the willpower. As a consequence, 
individual unions are forced to go it alone, using their own limited resources to 
finance their own research and training programmes (Regional Officer EETPU).
NALGO argues that the TUC directives on new technology are 'abysmal' and:
Its lack of action during the period 1979-1987 when all these changes have been 
going on, is worthy of contempt (Union Officer NALGO).
Two hundred and forty NT As were concluded between 1977 and 1983 (Williams & 
Steward 1985). However, by the mid 1980s the new technology agreement initiative lost 
impetus for a variety of reasons (Batstone & Gourlay 1986, Jary 1987, Millward etal 
1992, Daniel & Millward 1994). First, TUC plans to negotiate NT As were formulated at
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a time of relatively full employment and when union bargaining power was strong. 
However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s this power has been eroded through 
successive government legislation and rising unemployment. Consequently, many unions 
have found it difficult to achieve even the modest aims set out in the 1979 TUC 
directive. Indeed, a CBI survey of 225 NTAs concluded that even in the larger 
workplaces, under 20% of employers negotiated over technical innovation. Overall, 44% 
'communicated', 42% 'consulted' and a mere 9% negotiated (Mcflroy 1991). Second, 
management has always been reluctant to concede power over issues relating to the 
design and organisation of work. - favourable employer legislation buttressed by high 
unemployment rates and legislative changes have merely strengthened such views 
amongst management (Hyman 1989, Behagg 1990, Marsh 1993). Third, the lack of an 
alternative 'vision' on the part of many trade unionists to the dominant managerialist and 
free market philosophy sweeping through managerial and political circles has served to 
curtail possible 'alternative' design proposals. Fourth, the TUC's long standing 
commitment to technological change as inevitable led to a focus on employment rather 
than job content and work organisation (McLoughlin & Clark 1994). Fifth, TUC policy 
underestimated the resources required in terms of education and research to effectively 
service union negotiators. Finally, divisions within the trade union movement mitigated 
against establishing a united front policy vis-a-vis the trade unions and employers 
(Clarke et al 1984, Moore & Levie 1985).
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Union Involvement in Pre-Technology Negotiations
Trade unions tend to see technology and systems design generally in a deterministic 
fashion. The technology is often taken as given and likewise the logicality of its design is 
seldom questioned. Areas relating to the actual processes of design and the possible 
ways in which the interests and values of designers, managers and suppliers may shape 
the products and systems designed is generally ignored by most unions. - these areas are 
invariably seen as "managerial'. Union response to new technology is further conditioned 
by prevailing collective bargaining culture which both legitimises and limits the unions 
role to one of negotiating over terms and conditions within the prevailing status quo. 
Consequently the technology often appears 'black box', closed and neutral and remains 
unquestioned.
Because the majority of union officials I interviewed perceive technology in this way 
their strategies for dealing with technological change tend to be limited. McLoughlin and 
Clark stress the need to 'open' up the black box and understand technologies as 
'engineering systems':
That is, rather than just being pieces of hardware and software, technologies are 
also conceptualised as systems based on certain engineering principles and 
composed of elements which are functionally arranged (configured) in certain 
specific ways. In this way technologies, or more accurately engineering systems, 
can be defined in terms of three primary elements: 'system principles', an overall 
system configuration, and a system implementation or physical realisation in a 
given technology. The first two elements we call architecture, and the third 
technology (1994:132).
297
Most union officers I interviewed fail to recognise that at critical junctures during the 
process of change, for example, through particular design decisions over architectures or 
choices of technology concerning their implementation, the key technical features of a 
given engineering system become frozen' into a specific form - a process referred to by 
Pinch and Bjiker (1987) as 'closure'. This closure refers to the 'stabilisation' of an 
artefact as consensus emerges amongst key social groups involved in the design process. 
These technical influences shape the 'design space' available to organisational actors 
(McLoughlin & Clark 1994); however, most unions tend not to participate in this 
'design space' and consequently too readily accept as given that which is contestable and 
negotiable.
Lack of union recognition of technology as an 'engineering system' and consequently 
something that is not immutable or incontestable is further hampered by the fact that 
management do not want unions involved in design. Rather, in the best of cases, 
management would inform the union of the company's decision to bring in new 
technology and then seek to secure the unions co-operation over the 'working details', 
once implemented, via some form of technology agreement, or, through existing 
bargaining procedure. In the worst cases, the company would simply by-pass the union 
altogether. This was substantiated by a number of analysts and consultants I 
interviewed:
It really doesn't make much sense to bring unions into pre-technology 
negotiations ... and the actual detailed process of design.....it is up to
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management to define the parameters and objectives of the system ... obviously 
it is advantageous, however, to involve the unions in part of the exercise ... to 
secure good will... but also to fine tune the system ... usually once the system is 
up and running (Systems Analyst, US Electronics Company, Scotland).
If you catered to every passing whim of the trade unions ... you would never see 
a design implemented ... its simply not their area its management prerogative to 
decide the system ... you can discuss with the unions issues of ergonomics and 
possible job allocation and demarcations, but you don't pander to them and 
compromise the system (Senior IT Consultant, Major Software/Hardware 
Manufacturer).
The difficulties unions face in securing involvement at the critical design stage was 
brought home in a major survey of over 2000 workplaces where it was found that:
So great has been the support of workers and trade union representatives for 
technical change that management have not had to use consultation, 
participation, or negotiations to win their consent to change. Even major 
changes have been introduced with suprisingly little consultation (Daniel 
1987:32).
I found minimal union involvement in the actual choice of technology, its applicability, 
make, cost, design features, or criteria regarding its integration or replacement of 
existing work processes. However, unions could refuse to co-operate with management 
over the operation of technology, so management might actively seek union 
co-operation in order to obtain maximum utilisation of the initial investment:
Because of the breadth of changes taking place here, I felt it essential we involve 
all the unions in the process and I managed to convince senior management of 
this ... you can't just introduce CIM and JIT out of the blue ... it's better to get 
the unions involved ... besides we have excellent relations here and there are 
some very experienced and qualified representatives in manufacture and design 
whose expertise and knowledge has greatly enhanced the development of the 
system ... why exclude them for the sake of some dogma (Systems Manager, 
Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
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Equally, unions might go so far as to hire private consultants to propose an alternative 
system of working to that being put forward by management (TGWU 1983). In many 
cases, particularly where advanced work systems were being introduced i.e. flexible 
work station technology, computer-aided design and manufacturing systems, or 
computer integrated manufacturing systems, neither the actual management, or union, of 
the firm introducing the changes may have sufficient expertise to understand the 
complexity of the technology, or system (TGWU 1983). Particularly with large scale 
changes, involving sophisticated technological systems, it is often the case that an 
employer will set out a series of objectives (e.g. increased productivity, better quality, 
etc.) and present these to a variety of 'specialists' - engineers, systems analysts, 
consultants, and firms specialising in the design and manufacture of specific 
technological hardware, who in turn, will present their proposals to the firm in the form 
of a series of achievable goals for a certain initial investment (Brown 1985). Thus, 
Westinghouse Furniture Systems installed flexible work environments into its factory, 
after consulting Ergo-Tech, who convinced Westinghouse that for approximately £600 
investment per employee, Ergo-Tech flexible work stations would save Westinghouse 
space, allow for better tool placement, provide flexibility, reduce employee interface, 
noise levels, work in progress, parts shortages and provide an orderly environment, 
better position in the labour market and enable the company to attract and hold onto 
employees (Brown 1985: 50).
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Of course, not all firms introduce technology on the scale of a fully integrated 
manufacturing system. One survey of engineering firms in South Wales indicates many 
companies lack the capital to invest on such a scale, rather seeking to introduce a 
particular technology to produce a certain component, with high demand (Thomas 
1986). An MSF official commented on the general process of new technology 
introduction:
the most enlightened employers recognise new technology costs a lot of 
money.....they thus want staff who are trained; this is particularly important 
because some employers actually consult with us before introducing new 
technology. However, the majority simply introduce it through the back door in 
piecemeal fashion (Regional Officer MSF).
APEX reports that
neither at national, or local level, are we involved in pre-technology negotiations, 
management and employers keep the union in the dark concerning the design 
and implementation of new technology. Any negotiations that do take place, 
arise only over issues resulting from that technology's introduction, i.e. health 
and safety, demarcation, etc. (Union Officer APEX).
A regional officer of BIFU stresses that the union has tried to get technology negotiating 
rights for years:
and in one or two places, there have been genuine attempts to consult and 
identify problems for the negotiating committee to deal with, but even these do 
not add up to much (Regional Officer BIFU).
ASTMS argues that although the union:
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wasn't in on pre-technology design negotiations, we do add to its specific 
working out... i.e. who works on what, for how long, where machinery should 
be situated, how long it should be operated, rates of pay, etc. (Union Official 
ASTMS).
A shop steward at an electronics company in South Wales, who is also an engineer for 
the company, said that in choosing a new machine he did not consult the operators who 
would be using it, let alone his fellow APEX shop stewards. Unsurprisingly, he chose the 
machinery in terms of criteria of: ' efficiency, cost effectiveness, and reliability'. A similar 
approach was displayed by two analysts I interviewed:
I choose the hardware and software I think is going to be most efficient... I can't 
afford to complicate matters by leaving these decisions to users, or getting union 
representatives involved, too deeply, in the design process (Systems Analyst, 
Major Electronics Defence Contractor, Scotland).
Once the boundaries of the system are settled and only then ... you need to 
discuss the workings of it with the various unions whose members will be 
affected ... here one would discuss possible demarcation issues, re-grading, 
ergonomics and health and safety ... the union input here can be quite useful ... 
but even here I know a lot of analysts just perceive union involvement as more 
work and pain ... they shouldn't but they do (Senior Systems Analyst, Large 
Medical Equipment Manufacturer, Scotland).
Trade union capacity to influence crucial pre-technology negotiations is extremely 
marginal. However, once a particular system has been decided upon by management, 
then the process of negotiation surrounding its use usually begins with different unions 
being now more, now less able to exert influence over the changes taking place. Thus, 
whilst the GMBTU argue that 'the union has no influence, whatsoever, on the design or
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introduction of new technology' (Union Officer GMBTU); others, like ASTMS have 
been able to:
secure new technology agreements which stipulate that the company cannot 
introduce new technology for a period of six months and even then, only after 
consulting the union (Regional Officer ASTMS).
However, all the unions I interviewed argued that it is the refusal of most employers to 
involve them in such 'sensitive areas' that is the biggest obstacle to limiting the scope of 
union influence on technological change and work reorganisation.
Union Involvement In Job Re-design
Lack of union awareness of technology as an ' engineering system' and their ability to 
intervene at the crucial level of the design team prior to the ' stabilisation' of the design 
has already been noted. Union awareness of the job issues that may flow from a 
particular design configuration once it is "stabilised' is, however, more developed.
Many union officers I interviewed were particularly concerned, for example, about the 
ways in which management are utilising new technology to support the introduction of 
so called 'Japanese style' management practices. New bar coding, laser scanning and 
surveillance technology often supports these practices as the following union officer 
candidly reports:
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You don't clock on in this factory....there are very few foremen and
supervisors......quality inspection is also reduced. Quality personnel are no longer
over your back.....it can give the impression of freedom, management may
peddle it as co-operation or high trust work relations.....underneath the surface
however you have employee numbers activating machines, technology surveying 
when a machine is turned on and off....at what speed it is run...more technology
scanning quality....and all this in a culture which emphasises individual employee
responsibility....its control in a new guise (Shop Steward, Multinational Car
Manufacturer, England).
Most unions are apprehensive about the introduction of new job re-design schemes at a 
time of intense market competition, recession and a political climate openly hostile to 
trade unionism, arguing that they are an attempt to subvert traditional working practices 
and union negotiating structures. Some, however, argue that these practices can be 
made to benefit employees, so long as the union can get good negotiating rights.
More than one systems analyst made the link between the nature and speed of systems 
development and the current political context:
When you really think about it... much of the growth in IT has taken place over 
the last eleven years under a Thatcherite Britain where political and social 
conditions were right... but they are not always going to be right... God, when I 
think about how much is stored on the mainframes and how reliant we are on IT 
its unnerving, we're lucky not to have serious union problems and militancy 
(Senior Systems Analyst, Major Private Energy Utility, Wales).
I've got to be honest with you and say some of the unions here have good cause 
for concern regarding a lot of the technology introduced recently ... the figures 
speak for themselves, not only in job losses, but increase in work loads ... we are 
all in a similar boat... management want to see a return on their investments and 
they expect this return to show cost savings and productivity improvements ... 
certainly we wouldn't have got half as far ... had the political climate been 
different (Systems Analyst, Major Public Utility, Midlothian, Scotland).
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One union that is very conversant with the issues surrounding job re-design is APEX, 
which delineates five major methods of job re-design: (1) Scientific management, (2) Job 
rotation, (3) Job enlargement, (4) Job enrichment, and (5) Semi-autonomous work 
groups. Concerning scientific management, APEX argues:
This theory does not really deserve the title of a job re-design method. It is a 
technique to be avoided at all costs ... skill, decision making, responsibility, 
variety and ultimately, all thought are removed from work (1985: 14).
Importantly, the union argues that:
A wide range of efforts are now under way in Western Europe ... to introduce 
this method in banks, insurance companies, the retail trade and even hospitals, 
whereas, originally, it was a system applied to manufacturing (1985: 14).
Job rotation, APEX argues, involves:
The planned rotation of a worker through a number of jobs of roughly equal skill 
and challenge (1985: 15).
This system too, is regarded by APEX as unsatisfactory:
Because it neither attempts to improve the quality of individual jobs, nor to 
reward additional skills ... tacitly admitting that each job in a group need not be 
changed. We refute this. The basis of our whole approach is to redesign 
individual jobs from component tasks. It is questionable whether the method 
will be relevant in the future. New technology can be used to take apart a job, 
redefine its elements and merge these with other tasks or whole parts of other 
jobs. This is particularly true of office work (1985: 15).
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Concerning the issue of job enlargement, APEX cites the European Trade Union 
Institute (ETUI) definition as: 'that process through which several simple elements are 
combined into one more complex job' (ETUI 1981). APEX notes:
The major limitation of job enlargement, like job rotation, is that the enlarged 
jobs may merely consist of boring tasks combined in a new way (1985: 15).
Career development is also:
Difficult to achieve, since jobs are still restricted by horizontal levels of work 
experience (APEX 1985: 15).
On the issue of job enrichment, APEX again cites the ETUI definition:
By job enrichment, one normally means a scheme, whereby the employee is 
given more responsibility for planning, organisation of work and daily checking 
of production (1985: 16).
Job enrichment is a component part of many Japanese style management practices, such 
as the use of Quality Circles and organisation of production along the Kanban system, so 
that although job content may be extended, it also tends to lead to a vertical transfer of 
tasks. However, APEX regard this system of job design as conforming better to their 
definition of job design than the other methods, in that it gives:
306
Employees greater involvement in decisions that have traditionally been the 
responsibility of management or specialist functions (1985: 16).
Other unions, however, particularly those whose members are affected by new work 
practices and associated technological changes, are more critical:
Quality circles are being used by senior management to replace many 
supervisory staffs and to undermine some of our members jobs by getting 
workers to self-police their own activity... this method of work organisation can 
also weaken the authority of shop stewards as management appeal directly to 
workers in the team (Union Official ASTMS).
This point was also made by one of the systems managers I interviewed:
The workforce here carry a little plastic card rather like a credit card. It is used 
not only to clock on but to switch on the machines and log both the productivity 
and quality of their work ... by logging number of defects and stoppages ... we 
also have a variety of shop floor data capture technology including cameras, 
transducers in bearings to monitor performance and running times of the lines ... 
this is connected up to a computer system which gives senior management a 
direct picture of production at any time of day or night... it has also enabled us 
to dispense with some supervisory grades (Systems Manager, US Electronics 
Company, Scotland).
The final method of Job design, APEX considers, is semi-autonomous work groups 
which the ETIU regard as:
A broadening of the job enrichment idea to the whole work group (1985: 16).
The work group is given responsibility for planning, ordering of supplies, organisation of 
work and checking of production. APEX note that:
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Total autonomy of the group is very unusual. Middle management and 
supervisors still have responsibility for overall co-ordination. However, there are 
cases were supervisors are made obsolete. Their duties are transferred to the 
work group. Either the workers collectively share these responsibilities, or 
someone inside the group is appointed as team leader (1985: 16).
Whilst regarding this method, on the whole, in a favourable light, APEX notes that it can 
cause problems between work groups, resulting in competition and friction, further:
Over zealous group loyalty may cause problems for staff representatives trying 
to represent a multi-departmental concern (1985: 16-17).
Other unions, however, seem to have a better grasp of the social context in which 
semi-autonomous work groups are being introduced and the aims of management in 
introducing them. An official of the MSF argued that many companies seek to introduce 
these systems as part of a package, involving single union agreements, no strike clauses, 
and multi- flexibilisation of the workforce. He cites the case of Nissan, in Sunderland:
The effect of such practices, coupled to the social and political context of their 
introduction, has meant both an increase in the exploitation of workers: 
lengthening work hours, increased pace of line, reduced breaks, compulsory 
overtime, etc., and also a disillusionment with the union on the part of the 
workforce with less than 20% feeling the need to join the AEU because of its 
patently collaborationist role with the employer (Regional Officer MSF).
A TGWU official argued that trade unionists should be wary of management's objectives 
in introducing quality circles, multi-flexibility, Kanban, etc. He cites the example of 
Ford, whom he argues are:
308
Trying to introduce new technology and cultural changes into the workplace, in 
an attempt to subvert traditional union structures, by going behind the backs of 
shop stewards and appealing directly to the workforce... but they can't introduce 
Japanese style work relations into Britain ... you end up with a mutant child, a 
deformed system (Union Officer TGWU).
Concerning the use of Kanban, this official argues:
Ford like many car manufacturers are using this system, or attempting to extend 
its use ... one of the consequences of this system being that the market now 
becomes a direct disciplining force, acting upon each individual worker, who is 
directly made responsible for quality, etc. (Regional Officer TGWU).
Kanban requires the internal flexibility and mobility of labour to enable management to 
re-deploy labour to whatever tasks are in hand. The system has its problems, in 
particular, it requires a set of supportive stable industrial relations and secure and reliable 
supplies (Oliver & Wilkinson 1987). If one part of the system should have any 
problems, for example, breakdown or industrial action, the whole system can grind to a 
halt. One TGWU official is adamant that the system cannot work in Britain:
Britain is not Japan ... the whole history of British industrial relations, union 
structure, shop floor politics and social, political, cultural and ideological climate 
is different to Japan ... I cannot see Japanese style management taking root 
(Regional Officer TGWU).
Yet, a number of manufacturers are attempting to introduce the system (e.g. Fords After 
Japan project, Pirelli, Nissan, Lucas Girling). The TGWU official admitted that it had
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many benefits for employers, not just in reducing the amount of capital tied up in stock 
but in enabling them to meet new market conditions characterised by over-production 
which require firms to specialise and be flexible, produce limited batch runs and keep 
costs down.
However, according to one union official, it would be naive to assume that Japanese 
companies operating in Britain were adopting closer working practices with trade unions 
or designing more humane work systems because of this:
In my experience Japanese management offers no more collaboration in the process 
of work design than any other management. Indeed, Japanese firms operating here 
are not high tech but low tech ... whilst these may not be representative of Japanese 
companies back home, in my experience, they operate neither with more 
sophisticated technology, or management practices, than either Swedish, German, 
American or even British companies ... there is nothing unique about what the 
Japanese are doing ... Given the economic climate, all companies are having to 
review managerial practices (Regional Officer ASTMS).
In contrast an official of the EETPU said that:
Very few complaints come from our members working for Japanese companies 
... many of these Japanese policies are progressive (Regional Officer EETPU).
However, the Chairman of the Welsh TUC was less enthusiastic:
Japanese style management is a hollow shell... workers don't have any real say in 
the management of plant or operating decisions ... rather they vote on what 
colour overalls to wear, or what should be on the menu the coming week ... QC 
circles are a thinly disguised sop, masking employers' attempts to increase the
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exploitation of workers by getting them to align with the Company (Chairman 
WTUC and Regional Officer GMBTU).
No company he knew of would be prepared to tolerate workers' control of the 
productive forces:
Even the Bullock Report which sought to bring unions and management 
together, on these issues, was little more than a piecemeal tinkering of the 
system ... and we have never been further from the substance of this report, or 
from tripartism (ibid.).
The TGWU and MSF have been in bitter dispute with the AEU over the latters 
acceptance of Ford's offer at Dundee and its attempt to sign another single union, no 
strike deal, involving Japanese style practices with A. C. Delco in Dunstable. The 
Japanese practices mentioned, are only a small part of the various strategies open to 
management to re-design work relations An APEX Regional Officer argues, 'some 
employers are even attempting revitalised forms of Taylorism'. One should also 
remember that it is not a one way process: management has to take into account a 
number of variables when contemplating introducing a new work system, e.g. will 
productivity be increased, will quality be improved, is the market buoyant enough to 
justify the investment and risk associated with changes, is it worth antagonising unions, 
can union co-operation be sought, etc.?
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Impact Of New Technology On Skills, Work Organisation And 
Control
In general terms new technology has had a disruptive effect on established occupational 
boundaries and skill demarcations and in some instances has challenged traditional 
boundaries between male and female jobs (McLoughlin & Clark 1994). Batstone and 
Gourlay (1986) argue that significant changes have taken place amongst maintenance, 
production and some categories of clerical workers. Similarly the WIRS (1990) 
Workplace Survey found that manufacturing establishments using advanced technology 
were more likely to have flexible working practices in both production and maintenance 
areas.
There was divergent opinion among trade union officials concerning the nature and pace 
of de-skilling. Some argue that in a market economy, new technology is bound to be 
used by employers to increase labour productivity and reduce the value of labour-power 
by simplifying its functions. Others argue that technology is not the most important 
factor in reducing members skills and control over the workplace but changing 
managerial practices, such as the introduction of multi-flexibility, JIT, part-time working 
or job sharing. Others argue that whilst technology, on the whole, accelerates both 
de-skilling and directly replaces living labour, its effects are not linear, rather, certain jobs 
may be de-skilled, others re-skilled, as a consequence of technological changes. 
However, virtually all agreed that once the initial time element of its introduction was
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overcome, they could foresee less and less labour being involved in the production 
process. Some argue that the labour remaining will be of higher skill, others that it will 
be de-skilled, yet others foresee the development of a central core of full time, relatively 
highly skilled workers and a mass of unskilled auxiliary and temporary workers, with 
little or no rights, moving in and out of firms to meet changes in market demand. All 
unions see the definition of skill as something to be determined by collective bargaining 
and negotiation; many argue that the effects of de-skilling can be offset by good 
negotiators. To give some idea of the complexity of the situation, we can look at the 
following cases.
SOGAT (now subsumed into the GMPU) argue that new technology has replaced the 
traditional skills of the saddle stitcher and bookbinder:
We become, if you like, machine operators, not crafts people; and, in fact, we 
are an industrial union now ... printing is now a mechanised process, not a craft 
(Regional Officer SOGAT).
The apprenticeship used to be seven years, now it is two years, but on the other hand, 
there has been an extension of skills for some of SOGAT's members, for example:
Tele-ad girls in newspapers used to just have to sell, now they operate VDUs 
too. Warehousemen used to drive truck or hand pallets but now they are driving 
more sophisticated trucks which has increased their bargaining strength and 
wages (Regional Officer SOGAT).
An ASTMS official argues:
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It is not possible to make general statements on technology and de-skilling ... for 
example, a plastic engineers company in Treforest introduced more sophisticated 
quality control equipment which led to a reduction in the number of workers but 
higher skills were needed to service these machines (Union Officer ASTMS).
However, this contrasts with ASTMS own publication highlighting in detail the 
de-skilling effect of new technology, in industry, manufacturing and services (ASTMS 
1986). One union official argued that basically his:
Members welcomed new technology on the grounds that it either (a) enhanced 
their skill, or (b) reduced boring repetitive work (Regional Officer NALGO).
This official also argued that his members' conception of skill was 'purely subjective':
In reality, new technology had reduced the amount of time employers spent on 
training certain employees, as well as facilitating the use by employers, of lower 
grades, to do formerly higher grade work (Regional Officer NALGO).
A NALGO shop steward confirms the use by employers of lower grades on formerly 
higher grade work arguing that in her experience the introduction of word processors 
into the office has led to an increase in the workload as the 'girls were now expected to 
carry out a whole host of auxiliary functions, using the word processors'(Shop steward, 
Borough Council, Wales). This steward emphasised the need for union negotiators to 
be able:
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To negotiate wage rates, skill levels and grade commensurate to the changes 
taking place ... the union's ability to do this will become the decisive factor in 
determining members' skill (ibid).
An official of the EETPU argues that his members are:
In a unique historical position ... whilst the use of new technology has led to the 
de-skilling of the general workforce, EETPU members' skills are either being 
maintained or increased (Regional Officer EETPU).
By extensive re-training programmes, the EETPU aim to increase members' skills and 
bargaining position (EETPU 1987).
BIFU reports that technological changes, besides leading to job losses, e.g., the loss of 
5,000 technical and service staff, due to computerisation of cheque transactions between 
banks, also facilitate management in downgrading staff and simplifying functions:
For example, a cashier was a front person for the bank, being expected to be 
able to deal with a variety of transactions and enquiries, now they have been 
reduced to stamping machines ... and even this job will soon disappear as a result 
of technical change (Union Officer BIFU).
A GMBTU officer, argues:
There is nothing intrinsic to technological change which unions should oppose, 
indeed, in many cases, it actually benefits our members, most of whom see new 
technology as a necessary corollary of efficiency and productivity ... any impact it 
has upon job demarcation, skill levels, etc., can be minimised by good negotiators 
(Regional Officer GMBTU).
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McLougnlin and Clark (1994) argue that WIRS evidence confirms the picture that new 
technology is not leading to significant job losses or de-skilling4 . However, most union 
officers I interviewed argued that the cumulative impact of new technology will be to 
create significant job losses. Whilst individual unions could cite examples of skill 
enhancement the obverse of this was usually significant job losses as a precondition, or 
consequence, of the introduction of most new technology. A further factor to bear in 
mind is that most new technology is precisely that, i.e. new - its knock-on effect on skill 
levels, as a consequence, has not been evenly felt and its ' de-skilling' potential has been 
mediated by workers currently operating through the changes. For example, an official 
of TASS reports that a company manufacturing circuit breakers had introduced 
computer aided drawing equipment into the office, whilst trying to maintain current rates 
of pay. The company and union entered into dispute and ACAS was brought in to 
arbitrate. ACAS found in the union's favour, arguing that employees should receive a 
5% pay increase for operating CAD, as it represented an increase in the level of their 
skills. Yet in the union's own literature, it is argued that CAD reduces the overall skill 
level of the drawing office (TASS 1985). So why the anomaly? The official responded:
The decisive argument was whether, or not, there was a new skill attached to.the 
use of CAD and VDLTs in the drawing office ... the key word being new for 
given a set workforce operating an existing practice, it is obvious effort must be 
exerted on its part to learn a new skill, if confronted with a new technology ... 
ultimately, however, by the second or third generation that technology has 
removed not only the need to learn traditional draughtsmen and secretarial skills
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but probably removed the need for that worker altogether (Regional Officer 
TASS).
Buchanan and Boddy argue that
Computing technologies make demands on human information processing and 
decision making skills, reduce the need for some manual effort and skill, and 
introduce new forms of work discipline and pacing (1983: 246).
However, the absence of a clear managerial strategy vis a vis new technology can enable 
workers to exercise considerable influence over job content resulting in an informal 
clawing back of skills by those groups of workers who are able to re-negotiate the 
content of their jobs and present the case for re-skilling on the basis of them taking on 
additional tasks and knowledge.
Trade Union Reaction to Government Policy on Manufacturing
All the trade union officers interviewed, with the exception of the EETPU and AEU, 
thought that the Government's monetarist free market philosophy was both misguided 
and damaging to the long term economic prosperity of British industry. Most unions 
argued for the re-election of a Labour Government, committed to some form of reflation 
of the economy, re- nationalisation of recently privatised industries, extension of social 
services, health and education and implementation of a more collectivist structure for 
negotiating economic development and industrial relations. A minority of union officers 
argue that they do not believe it is possible to reconcile the interests of labour and capital
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in a market economy stressing the need for a ' caring social system based upon a planned 
economy'(NALGO 1989:11). The introduction of new technology and changing 
working practices by various employers has coincided with recession, rationalisation and 
mounting unemployment which has had the effect of masking specific policy choices of 
Government, or rather giving them a sense of inevitability, making it difficult for some 
unions to perceive whether the changes taking place are a result of specific policy, or 
ongoing technological processes. Most unions, however, argue that the Government 
has fostered a political and social climate enabling employers to go on to the offensive 
and introduce new working practices.
An official of the EETPU argues that such rapid introduction of new technology and 
changing working practices would not have come about, were it not for this 
Government's stand and the consequences of recession:
Which have made everyone aware that efficiency must be increased (Regional 
Officer EETPU).
As far as this official is concerned:
Britain needed a shake out anyway (Regional Officer EETPU).
An official of the NGA (now subsumed into the GPMU) argues that it is not the 
introduction of technology per se which has threatened its members:
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But the political and economic environment created by this Government which 
has allowed certain newspaper owners, like the Thompson group, ... to smash 
the NGA's power over compositing (Regional Secretary NGA).
An official of ASTMS argues:
It is quite clear that new technology and changing working practices have been 
introduced with less cost for British Industry than in the past, under Labour 
Governments, because of the hard line monetarist philosophy of this 
Government which has put employees on the defensive (Regional Officer 
ASTMS).
A TGWU official argues that this government:
Is a Government of landlords and stockbrokers ... but then British Government, 
generally, has never been attuned to the needs of industry ... Wilson was going 
in the right direction ... Thatcher talked of increasing efficiency and service but 
did nothing to ensure the viability of British firms, she simply let market forces 
take their toll ... we can't hope to be competitive without state directive and 
co-ordinated planning, along the state capitalist lines of Japan or Sweden (Union 
Officer TGWU).
According to an official of the MSF:
This Government has done bugger all to help British industry ... look at the 
cut-backs in R & D and in manufacturing investment... this will have devastating 
long term effects ... This Government is butchering British manufacturing and 
handing it on a plate to foreign competition ... her rhetoric of fitness and 
efficiency is simply ideological ballast to attack labour ... the reality is she has 
done nothing concrete to help British manufacturing, whose output is lower 
today than in 1979 ... the Government is also dismantling the labour markets 
through neglect (Regional Officer MSF).
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I put it to this official that maybe it was not a question of neglect but Government belief 
in 'free market philosophy' - that the weak go under, the fitter survive, with 
unemployment acting to discipline labour, and recession facilitating employers in the 
restructuring of labour markets:
Yes, this is what she wants but it won't work because other countries like France 
are bailing out their industries and providing the R & D and finance to put it on 
its feet... it's all right saying the weak can go to the wall... but when you are in a 
system constituted by chronic over-production all companies are volatile and 
need all the help they can get (Union Officer MSF).
Union critique of government policy flows from a belief in some form of Keynesian pro- 
active state policy vis a vis planning of the market economy and social provision of jobs 
and services. The majority of union officers believe that monetarist 'hands off state 
policy has considerably weakened British manufacturing, particularly in the light of 
substantive state support in countries like Japan and Germany. Moreover, unions felt 
that by pursuing a policy of non-communication with unions the government has 
undermined many of the possibilities of new technology through creating a climate of 
fear and recrimination rather than co-operation.
Single Union and No-Strike Agreements
There is virulent polemic between the various unions over the issue of single union and 
no strike deals (Hyman 1989, Marsh 1993, McLoughlin & Clark 1994). It is not so
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much the issue of single union agreements, in themselves - which most unions seek, and, 
argue are nothing new in Britain - but the specific content of these agreements which 
have been changing, along with the changing economic and political climate. The most 
heated area of controversy is the signing of no-strike deals and the poaching of other 
union members.
The EETPU, in particular, comes in for condemnation from virtually every quarter. 
Mark Gregory (1986) uncovered the material basis of this condemnation in the EETPLTs 
signing of no less than 18, out of 21, single union no strike deals in 1986 alone. The 
EETPU is currently the leading exponent of the 'no-strike' single union accord. For the 
EETPU the strike free path to union representation has become more of a philosophy 
than a negotiating ploy. As Eric Hammond, the Union's General Secretary puts it:
Of course there are people, sects and nuts who actually believe that in being 
involved in strikes, workers find out how to struggle and this leads them on for 
the revolution. My view is that the trade union function is to deal with matters 
in a way which doesn't involve workers in industrial action (cited by Gregory 
1986:32).
This non-adversarial approach to industrial relations has become the basis of an 
extensive and highly publicised marketing campaign to coax more employers into signing 
up with the EETPU. Hammond admits that often as not, it is also directed against other 
unions:
I see myself in competition with my colleagues in the British Trade Union 
Movement (cited by Gregory 1986: 32).
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An official of USD AW argues that most unions, his own included, sought single union 
agreements and had done so for years. However, the substance of these agreements has 
changed:
The decline of traditional industrial sectors like steel, shipbuilding, motor 
manufacturing, engineering, etc., themselves the repository of multi-craft based 
and industrial unionism, has given way to the formation of newer industries often 
based on green field sites and it is these that are the repository of the new 
'no-strike1 multi-flexibility deals (Regional Officer USDAW).
For USDAW one of the biggest problems is:
Persuading anybody in a shop, certainly in many shops, that they have got 
anything to do with the working class ... thus a saying which certainly applies to 
the larger and better shops, that 'snobbery kept them in poverty' ...Particularly in 
the big stores, these people see themselves as professionals like doctors, or 
lawyers, or something ... of course, in food retailing it is not so, but this 
highlights our problems as a union (Regional Officer USDAW).
Because of the nature of the retail trade, the high numbers of part-timers involved, the 
ideology of professionalism, particularly in big stores like Marks and Spencer, 
Debenhams or House of Fraser, it is difficult for USDAW to organise and get single 
union agreements. Where the union does have agreements, the official argues, it does 
so:
Not on the basis of tendering for them or stabbing another union in the back ... 
we usually get them at companies where no other union has any interest ... I'm 
not for unions coming into an area they think holds the possibility of potential
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members, without them having the facilities and the organisational expertise 
behind them (Regional Officer USD AW).
The GMBTU stress they have to take account of the fact that many employers, 
particularly on green field sites, are now tendering out contracts to various unions:
We have to get in there and offer the best deal we can, if we don't other unions 
will... there are three types of employer: (1) Those who know what union they 
want from past experience; (2) those who tender out for the best deal they think 
they can get; (3) those employers who don't want any union at all (Union Officer 
GMBTU).
This official argues that:
Competition between trade unions for a declining number of 'contracts' with 
employers is fierce, as each union attempts to produce the most favourable 
package for the employer (Union Officer GMBTU).
This situation produces:
Deplorable tactics such as those of the EETPU at Wapping but even agreements 
like the AEUs at Nissan are anti-trade union agreements (Union Officer 
GMBTU).
This is a remarkable series of statements given the GMBTLTs own signing of single 
union no-strike agreements.
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Like most union officials interviewed, MSF reiterate that single union agreements are 
fine, in principle, but that the changing economic and political climate has had a 
profound impact upon the substance of the agreements and not just on green field sites. 
For example, at an electronics in Abercynon, the employer tore up the old multi-union 
agreement involving APEX TASS and the AEU, and argued that it now sought single 
union representation at the plant:
[the company] now expects us to parade on stage like in a fucking beauty 
contest with other unions from whom it will pick and choose whoever is best 
suited to its needs ... well its not fucking on ... already APEX and ourselves have 
refused to go on parade. We are not prepared to satisfy [the companies] 
demands ... it's no to multi-flexing, part timing and job. losses ... but what have 
the AEU done ... true to fucking form they have agreed to accept the company's 
terms (Regional Officer MSF).
This highlights the dilemmas arising out of a strategy of single union agreement. Yet the 
same official still maintains that the single union agreement strategy is fine so long as 
cordiality between unions can be maintained! Yet the reality would seem to suggest this 
is less and less practicable - the same official said:
Unions like the AEU and EETPU are fucking disgusting. They are traitors to the 
working class ... they brag they have sole negotiating rights but they havent 
because most of the bloody workforce simply don't want to belong to a union 
that is collaborating with the employer ... For example, at Nissan less than 20% 
of the workforce are in the AEU, even though it has sole negotiating rights.... We 
are going to oppose the 'new realism' of unions like the AEU and EETPU more 
and more and so is the TUC ... the EETPU should have been kicked out of the 
TUC for what the Bastards did at Wapping ... the TUC should have acted firmly 
(Regional Officer MSF).
324
Whilst this particular union official believes the fight against 'new realism' has begun, 
other union officials are less sanguine, arguing that the TUC only has the power its 
constituent unions give it, or that if it did discipline unions like the EETPU, others would 
follow, 'thus leading to further demoralisation's and weaknesses' (Interview Chairman 
Wales TUC). I asked the MSF official why he thought his union lost the recent Pirelli 
agreement to MATS A, the staff section of the GMBTU:
We've looked long and hard at why we didn't get the Pirelli agreement ... I can 
only conclude we are a moral union, we defend our members' interests 
unashamedly ... Pirelli management were in search of the Holy Grail, they 
wanted an agreement that was Utopian (Regional Officer MSF).
In response to my reply that yes, but nonetheless they still got it this official replied:
Yes, but at what cost to the GMBTU, they have ridiculed themselves in the eyes 
of fellow trade unionists ... they have signed away the right to strike and agreed 
to all manner of changes in working practices ... the GMBTU say, look its only a 
piece of paper ... but I say if this is so, if this is all it is, why did you sign it... it's 
more than this, you must also police it (Regional Officer MSF).
An ASTMS official argued he was :
Very happy with single union agreements, particularly on green field sites. It is 
helpful to have them because the workforce can speak with one voice ... but in 
other industries it is helpful to have more than one union, particularly if you have 
a lot of hierarchical differentiation in work, i.e. different crafts, skill levels, 
demarcations, etc. ... However, all too many companies seek one union 
agreements without the facilities, or structure, to back up the agreement... really 
all they want is a quiet docile union, or preferably none at all (Union Officer 
ASTMS).
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ANALGO official stressed that:
Our unions would never sign a no-strike agreement, or scab on another union 
like the EETPU did at Wapping (Union Officer Borough Council, Wales).
He argues that because NALGO operates primarily in the non-competitive public sector, 
it has not really had to deal with the issues surrounding single union agreements. As far 
as this official was concerned:
A multiplicity of unions within a single plant, or across sectors, can undermine 
the unity of labour but, equally, single union agreements result in a danger of 
compromise with employers, complacency on union officials' part and lack of 
accountability to members. The system of employer tendering out of contracts is 
also undermining Trade Union solidarity as a whole (Union Officer NALGO).
An APEX officer believes single union agreements can be of benefit to the workforce, 
particularly the traditionally weak sections:
For example, Clerks/Typists within a manufacturing company ... traditionally 
come the annual round of negotiations, the big unions representing production 
workers and craft workers would set the pace and often these girls were left 
behind ... or were negotiated for as an after-thought ... with single union 
agreements, the union can negotiate for everyone equally (Regional Officer 
APEX).
However:
A strategy of go it alone negotiation, is bound to lead to actions like at Wapping 
... single union agreements do have their drawbacks in terms of overall labour 
movement unity... but what other way is there? (Regional Officer APEX).
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Increasingly trade unions are embroiled in bitter disputes between themselves over 
negotiating and representation rights with employers and employees. The strategy of 
collective bargaining serves to undermine union solidarity and facilitate employers in 
pursuing policies of divide and rule. That union officials still cling so vehemently to 
existing collective bargaining procedures and feel fundamentally that there is nothing 
wrong in them highlights the scale of the problem facing British trade unions. Rather 
than acting collectively, unions are increasingly going it alone and this can only serve to 
weaken their ability to defend worker interests at a time when employers are introducing 
radical technological and organisational change.
Membership Patterns
British trade unions are in a crisis. Some unions are fighting for their lives, all are fighting 
to staunch the decline in membership. In 1981 there were 414 trade unions affiliated to 
the TUC today there are only 268 (Employment Gazette 1994). Since 1979 union 
membership has fallen by 4.2 million and now stands at 9 million the lowest level since 
1946 (Employment Gazette 1994). This is the fourteenth consecutive fall in total union 
membership from its peak of 13.3 million in 1979 (AAS 1995, Government Statistical 
Office 1995). Union density among people in employment has fallen from 32% in 1992 
to 28% today (Government Statistical Office 1995). David Metcalf predicts that by the 
end of the decade union membership will be below 20% density rates (Financial Times 
1992), a drop from 55% since 1979 (Towers 1989). A number of reasons were cited
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by those union officials I interviewed, for this decline. These included the shift from an 
industrial to a serviced based economy, the increasing use of female and part time non- 
unionised labour, technological unemployment and the deregulation of various industries 
and services leading to a growth in subcontracting and the use of non-unionised labour.
Most of the unions recorded in 1994 were small; 163 (61 per cent) had fewer than 2,500 
members and together accounted for just 1% of the membership of all unions. At the 
other end of the scale nine unions (just 3 per cent of the total) accounted for 60% of the 
total membership. Similarly the 20 largest unions account for 79% of all trade union 
membership (Employment Gazette 1994, AAS 1995).
Whilst most unions report membership losses, often dramatic, there are some who have 
been able to stem the loss through merger and amalgamation. UNISON, for example, is 
now Britain's largest union with some 1.5 million members. UNISON arose in July 
1993 as a result of the merger of NALGO, COHSE and NUPE. Likewise in 1988 the 
AEUW-TASS and ASTMS joined forces to form one super union - the Manufacturing 
Science and Finance Union (MSF). Similarly in May 1992 the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and the Electrical, Electronic Telecommunication and Pluming Union 
merged to form the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union with 944 thousand 
members (Employment Gazette June 1994). However, the absolute number of union 
members shows a continued downward trend for both men and women, manual and 
non-manual, public and private sector employees (Employment Gazette 1994, AAS 
1995).
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Without amalgamations (where two or more unions join to form a new union) and 
Transfers of Engagement (where a union is subsumed by another union and thus loses its 
legal identity) all unions would have experienced sharp falls in membership. For example, 
TASS argue that although membership was greater in 1995 than 1979, this was due to a 
whole series of mergers it had undertaken, beginning with the National Union of Gold 
and Silver workers in 1981, then the Sheet Metal Workers Union, Pattern Makers 
Union, Metal Mechanics and Tobacco Workers Unions and finally its merger along with 
the AEUW and ASTMS to form the MSF:
Without these mergers, real membership would have fallen some 40-50% due 
mainly to the dramatic contraction of steel, coal, shipbuilding and motor 
manufacture...and consequently our ability to defend members interests and have 
the weight to negotiate with employers would have been seriously undermined 
(Regional Officer TASS).
On the other hand, some unions, for example, BIFU have been able to expand 
membership without merger or amalgamation because the financial services sector has 
been expanding rapidly:
Despite certain rationalisations and staff cuts like in the Midland Bank, there is 
still extremely high membership recruitment potential... just take the four major 
clearing banks, let alone all the other financial institutions, within these four 
banks there are a possible 240,000 staff to recruit... we haven't even begun to 
touch the tip of the iceberg ... (Regional Officer BIFU, see also BIFU 1987).
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Most union officials blame recession, the run down and rationalisation of many industries 
and deflationary government economic policies for membership losses. A number were 
also worried that changed managerial attitudes - in particular the emphasis upon 
'harmonisation' strategies and 'flexibility' were creating climates of fear and intimidation 
within many companies that was adversely affecting membership patterns:
Since management here introduced its so called "harmonisation" policy we [the 
union] have been marginalised....management don't explicitly say it but its well
known around here that union activists are seen by management as "undermining 
harmony"...... they would rather have us out if they could...it makes it difficult to
recruit members (Shop Steward UNISON).
Many union officials are also concerned about 'technological unemployment', although 
they have different estimates of the tatter's impact on jobs and membership; some 
reporting that new technology has directly replaced, or undermined members' jobs, 
others reporting that it is not the introduction of new technology per se which is leading 
to membership losses, but recessionary pressures.
APEX, for example, predicts that some 20,000 office jobs were lost between 1978-1981 
alone, as a consequence of the introduction of micro electronics into the office (Regional 
Officer APEX). NALGO argues:
Information occupations, of which office work is a major one, include 65% of 
the working population. The scope for automation in office work, by 
introducing new technology, is vast and estimates of consequent unemployment 
of office workers vary between 25% and 40% (NALGO 1989:55).
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Various unions also cite examples of micro electronic technology directly reducing the 
amount of labour needed to make a particular product, or provide a particular service. 
For example, it now takes only 11 hours to assemble electronic telex machines, 
compared to 75 hours to assemble a mechanical telex machine (ASTMS 1988). The 
only union in the survey which did not believe new technology would lead to further job 
and membership losses was the EETPU, who were confident that expansion of micro 
electronics and the skills required to service them would secure their members' interests. 
One EETPU official said he:
Feels sorry for many of the other unions ... they are backing a losing horse, they 
simply don't have the skills demanded, whereas we do (Regional Officer 
EETPU).
However, this optimism seems to be contradicted by the fact that since 1979, the 
EETPU has lost 40,000 members - a fall stemmed only through merger with the AEU. 
For a union professedly based on new technology realism and the expansion of high tech 
industries it has also recently lost a number of potential agreements at high tech 
factories; for example, Pirelli's computer integrated manufacturing cable factory in 
Aberdare, South Wales, offered the single union contract not to the EETPU but to 
MATSU, the staff section of the GMBTU.
Whilst trade unions attempt to minimise the impact of new technology on job losses, 
through negotiating redeployment, re-training, and reduced hours, etc., the fact is that 
they have been largely unsuccessful. Recession, high unemployment and increasing 
anti-trade union legislation has enabled employers to introduce new technology, to 
increase labour productivity and reduce the size of the workforce, with little appreciable 
benefits to trade unionists. Unions like NALGO, are only too well aware of arguing, that 
even a 'successfully implemented reflationary alternative economic strategy' will not
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bring back full employment, nor redress losses in overall union membership (NALGO 
1989).
Future Direction of British Trade Unions
There is strong consensus amongst those interviewed that there will be a steady increase 
in the number of union mergers and amalgamations over the next decade. Old 
craft-based industrial unionism is seen to be declining along with the sectors that 
sustained it (Thompson 1995, McLoughlin & Gourlay 1994). Further, new technology, 
changing management practices and methods of work organisation, are seen to 
undermine traditional unionism based on craft, skill and demarcation. Increasing use of 
new technology, as in the print industry, or the latest computer integrated manufacturing 
techniques in manufacture, along with increasing drives towards flexibilisation, quality 
circles, and JIT are seen to require a 'fresh', often 'business orientated', 'professional' 
and 'enterprise union' union approach both to recruitment and trade union roles (Marsh 
1993).
An official of the EETPU argues:
There will be increasing moves towards greater amalgamation and concentration 
leading to the formation of fewer but more professional unions ... this will not be 
a smooth process, however, ... a lot of animosity and jealousy between unions 
will have to be sorted out before we see a strengthened union movement 
(Regional Officer EETPU).
According to an official of the TGWU.
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The effects of recession and mounting anti-trade union legislation are making it 
difficult for unions to keep their head above water ... certainly, there is also a real 
danger that future developments, particularly those involving single union no 
strike deals and acceptance of multi-flexibilisation and drastic changes in 
working practices, could reduce many unions to rubber stamps (Regional Officer 
TGWU).
For one particular union official unions may need to take on a more professional role, 
acting rather like a society, offering services to its members, for example insurance 
discounts, saving funds, discounted clothing and holidays, pension facilities etc., rather 
than emphasising their traditional class based roles:
Trade unions must realise that they have to provide services to their 
members........to move away from overtly political roles...and to give members
what they want and need, and to do this unions have to be of a critical mass and 
size ... generally the bigger the better (Regional Officer ASTMS).
An official of the NGA, however, disputes whether the trend towards greater union 
centralisation and concentration and an increasing emphasis upon service provision and 
status is a good thing:
As the larger unions may be unable to voice the interests of specific workers, or 
understand the vagaries of a particular craft skill.....talk of dropping our 
traditional role as first line of defence for workers against possible victimisation 
by employers, and instead replacing it with debates as to who can offer the best 
services is a dangerous road to travel down...it could lead to the fragmentation, 
demoralisation and ineffectiveness characteristic of company unionism (Regional 
Secretary NGA).
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NALGO foresee a growing climate of inter-union competition for a declining number of 
contracts, which will lead to increasing fragmentation of the labour movement:
Unless the TUC act to discipline those unions who openly flout its ordinances ... 
and do more to foster a climate of collaboration and inter-union joint initiatives, 
rather than just sitting back and letting the forces of reaction push unions 
towards increased competition and fragmentation, i.e. single union no strike 
deals, multi-flexibilisation etc., then certain pernicious Japanese work practices 
and attitudes will take their toll (Regional Officer NALGO).
Whilst most unions see an increasing tendency towards amalgamation and do not 
particularly oppose it, an official of USDAW argues that he is opposed to the formation 
of fewer but more centralised unions:
Amalgamation is entirely the wrong basis on which to decide union structures ... 
what could happen and what we are already seeing, is unions splintering and 
amalgamating for political reasons, for example, the recently formed MSF ... to 
construct a trade union structure, on the basis of political opinion, is 
outstandingly dangerous ... what we should be doing is looking at mergers in 
terms of industrial sense, rather than political compatibility (Regional Officer 
USDAW).
However, just the opposite view was put forward by an official of the MSF, who 
stresses that it is a question of survival that many unions amalgamate and that further:
We are a political union ... I see a growing fracturing of trade unions along 
political centres, with certain unions amalgamating or occupying one position, be 
it centre or right, others occupying a more left position ... it is difficult to foresee 
who will go where, at the current moment, but certainly, I would not rule out a 
right block composed of unions like the EETPU and AEU, a centre block of 
unions such as the GMBTU and APEX and possibly the TGWU and a left bloc 
comprising unions like NALGO, NUPE, COHSE, and the NUM, etc. (Regional 
Officer MSF).
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This particular official was almost alone in his presentation of the future direction of 
British trade unionism. The majority of those I interviewed argued that far from forming 
into definite political blocs, there was more likelihood of the union movement 
fragmenting, becoming de-politicised and more sectional. A particular sinister 
development for many trade unionists I interviewed was the shift towards 'business' or 
'enterprise' unionism. Often associated with companies who had sought to relocate 
manufacture to 'greenfield' sites. These companies were often seeking substantial 
concessions from trade unions and were perceived by a number of union officials I 
interviewed to be undertaking far broader and more sinister social experiments:
These companies are not just seeking to impose restrictions on some of the most 
fundamental trade union rights...but they are seeking to engineer a new political 
climate within work.....they often use agencies and outside bodies to not only 
psychometrically test the workforce for passivity and docility, but to check that 
workers have no prior trade union experience, that they are compliant and 
malleable....overt displays of class solidarity are severely frowned upon by these 
companies (Shop Steward UNISON).
The move towards greenfield manufacture and detailed employee record 
checking by companies is part of a new managerial culture aimed at creating 
'harmony' within companies.....management do not want to see politically 
motivated trade unions...they want passive docile workers and unions that will 
serve them in this aim. Greenfield sites enable firms to start afresh, to recruit 
from a wider social base, to overcome the problems of multi-union 
representation on many brown field sites and most importantly to pick virgin 
workers from virgin "new towns" (Union Officer TGWU).
The shift towards 'greenfield manufacture' (Jessop 1989, Murray 1983, Gamble 1994, 
Handy 1995) and the increasing willingness of both employers and some unions to seek
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single union agreements, often with detailed restrictions on union practices and legal 
penalties attached to those unions that cannot police the 'agreement' (Marsh 1993, 
McLoughlin & Gourlay 1994) is facilitating the growth of 'enterprise unionism' and 
serving to fracture and undermine what little solidarity there has been within the British 
trade union movement (Hyman 1989). Whilst British workers are still, by and large, 
represented by industry wide unions with historically broader allegiances and more 
radical policies than Japanese style enterprise unions (Littler 1982, Halliday 1979, 
Japanese Ministry of Labour 1995) there is still nonetheless a decisive shift towards 
sectionalisation of the British trade union movement, a sectionalisation accelerated by 
the signing of' no strike' agreements, inter union competition for representation, and the 
lack of clear directive and a united front strategy on the part of the TUC.
Trade Unions and Change
APEX (1979), ASTMS (1983), NALGO (1989), BJJFU(1986) and other unions, have 
produced a series of articles and guidelines concerning the introduction of micro 
processors, VDLTs and computer aided drawing equipment, etc., to broader issues of 
job re-design, job content and evaluation of various forms of work organisation. 
However, Dodgson and Martin (1987) argue that unions on the whole have failed to 
establish firm priorities, or to distinguish between objectives which are attainable and 
those which are not.
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A number of factors have conditioned the nature of the trade union response to the 
issues posed by new technology and changing working practices:
(1) as a consequence of the unevenness of technological changes and different 
managerial practices, both within and across different sectors of the economy, 
union response has surprisingly been uneven and varied (Jary 1987)
(2) the structure of individual collective bargaining imposes constraints on 
inter-union co-operation and solidarity (Wilkinson 1983, Batstone & Gourlay
1986. Marsh 1993)
(3) the role of the TUC, in particular, its reported inability to move beyond the 
policies envisaged in its 1979 report Employment and Technology, with its 
implicit attachment to tripartist structures which were firmly rejected by both the 
CBI and Government in October, 1980 (Dodgson & Martin 1987, Marsh 1993)
(4) the political backdrop of mounting anti-trade union legislation making it 
increasingly difficult for unions to act, a factor compounded by the consequences 
of recession and the disciplining effect this has upon unions' willingness and 
ability to successfully prosecute their members' interests (Dodgson & Martin
1987. CIS 1981, 1980, 1984, Hyman 1989, Marsh 1993)
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(5) the changing structure of capital, not simply its concentration, centralisation and 
'internationalisation' but also, and in consequence, its combined and uneven 
development both within and across the various branches of production. This 
poses problems for trade union organisation, not only in terms of unity, levels of 
control of internal labour markets, ability to deal with differing technological 
levels, etc., but also in terms of coming to grips with increasing calls from 
management for organisational changes associated with the over-used term 
'Japanisation' (Ackroyd ct al 1987).
Whilst most unions can agree on certain issues relating to new technology, in practice, 
the significance of various issues affects different unions differently. I have already noted 
how white collar unions, like APEX, were among the first to develop a strategy of 
implementing ' new technology agreements' as a means of dealing with issues arising 
from technological and work organisational changes; but other unions, for example, the 
GMBTU, have been slower to develop such a strategy, due in part to the fact that their 
members have not been so directly confronted with issues relating to new technology 
and job re-design and because of the ' difficulties and desirability of negotiating a formal 
strategy for a membership which is spread across diverse occupations' (Regional Officer 
GMBTU).
Equally, different unions do not necessarily attach equal importance to the various issues 
arising from new technology and job re-design. The AEU, for example, sees de-skilling 
as a major problem, particularly with the spread of numerically controlled machine tools,
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flexible work stations, computer integrated manufacture and robotics; but on the other 
hand, is not so concerned with reduced employment opportunities for women (Dodgson 
& Martin 1987).
The EETPU believes that the expansion of the electronics industry, coupled to its 
'realistic union policy will secure and even strengthen its members status and prevent 
de-skilling' (Regional Officer EETPU). ASTMS on the other hand is worried about 
limitations on the promotion prospects of certain of its members, for example, 
draughtsmen, and lower management, etc., as a consequence of both technological 
change, i.e. CAD in the drawing office, and work reorganisations involving 
'rationalisation' of organisations through the use of both computing technology and new 
working practices, such as QC circles, which can tend to undermine traditional 
supervisory and management structures (Regional Officer ASTMS). Other unions, 
including the NGA, have sought to get agreement with employers and other unions in 
the print industry in order minimise the damage caused to NGA members through the 
technology of direct inputting. However, SOGAT has not sought agreement in the 
belief that their members will benefit from the introduction of direct inputting and 
subsequent loss of NGA members' jobs (TUC 1987, Gennard & Dunn 1983). The 
TGWU is particularly concerned about the increase in managerial control resulting from 
changes in working practices such as multi flexible working, JIT, and QCs, as can be 
seen in its rejection of Ford's terms at Dundee (Regional Officer TGWU; Western Mail 
1988).
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The variety of economic sectors unions are located in profoundly conditions their 
attitude and response to issues relating to technological and organisational changes 
tending to mitigate against the formation of a coherent united front strategy for the union 
movement as a whole. The problems emerging can be seen quite clearly in the polemic 
between the AEU and TGWU concerning Ford's conditions for proposed investment in 
Dundee. The AEU accused the TGWU of being 'backward looking', the TGWU for its 
part, pointed out that the proposed changes Ford were intending to implement - 
multiflexibilisation, weakening demarcation, introduction of QC circles, and JIT - will 
undermine workers bargaining power, not only in the new plant but throughout Ford's 
operations in the UK (Regional Officer TGWU, Western Mail 1988).
The structure of individual collective bargaining has itself caused difficulties for the trade 
unions, given the trend on the part of many employers, for single union, no strike 
packages, encompassing comprehensive restructuring of work, breaking down of job 
demarcation and increasing calls for flexibility and the use of non-craft labour. As"one 
union official put it:
Unions have become more like businesses, each trying to recruit as many 
members as possible and, of course, as a consequence, each entering into 
competition with the others - a process exacerbated by employers' increasing use 
of the tendering out system, particularly on green field sites (Union Officer 
GMBTU).
None of those interviewed denied that fierce inter-union competition took place to 
secure the prize of union recognition at these sites. As one official said over Nissan:
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We were forced to parade before prospective employers like beauty queens and 
if the situation arose again in the future I suspect we would all be on parade 
again (Union Officer SOGAT).
The problems this is causing for the Trade Union movement in terms of solidarity and 
ability to represent workers interests cannot be over-emphasised.
Whilst most trade union officials argue that for many years individual unions have sought 
'sole recognition' agreements, the nature of these agreements, along with the ground on 
which they are taking place, is changing rapidly. Many employers are seeking to use 
changed economic and political climates to push through working and industrial 
relations practices that only several years ago would seem unthinkable. For example, 
Pirelli closed down its cable manufacturing plant in South Wales, laying off the entire 
workforce, only to re-open a new plant on the same site two years later. This plant, 
heavily funded by the Welsh Development Agency, represents the pinnacle of up to date 
technologies and managerial practices. An integral part of the company's adoption of 
these practices was the signing of a single union, no strike deal, encompassing radical 
organisational changes in working patterns, career progression, demarcations and 
modular working with MATSA, the staff section of the GMBTU (South Wales Echo 
1987, Pirelli 1987).
The dispute at AB Electronics at Abercynon further highlights the breadth of changes 
taking place. AB management decided that as part of its switch to ' surface circuit
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board' manufacture, as well as its future ability to produce to consumer specification, 
greater flexibility of labour and ending of traditional job demarcations was required. To 
achieve this, AB tore up its old multi-union agreement and declared it sought only single 
union representation at the plant. Three out of the four unions at the plant rejected AB's 
proposals. The AEU, however, said it would accept AB's terms, thus leading to bitter 
dispute among the unions concerned.
Even in relatively favourable times of economic boom and 'full employment' the 
structure of collective bargaining between individual unions and employers did very little 
to enhance overall trade union solidarity and inter union co-operation (Pimlott 1991, 
Marsh 1993). In a climate characterised by over-accumulation, intensified market 
competition and increasing intemationalisation of capital, traditional structures of 
collective bargaining are becoming more and more obsolete and incapable of securing 
workers interests (Beaumont 1995). The policy of each individual union, out to secure 
the best deal it can get, may prove, ultimately, self defeating, given the changed political 
and economic climate in which these new deals are being won. Certainly, as many union 
officials argue, concessions have been made to employers which five or ten years ago, 
would have been unthinkable. Not only has the practice of each individual union going it 
alone led to increased inter-union competition for a declining number of contracts but it 
has also led to an abandoning of concern on the part of many trade unionists with issues 
relating to the design of work, increased part-time working, equal opportunities for 
women, or reduction in the working week. Too many unions are now concerned to win 
a contract at virtually any cost. The question must remain as to just how far the union
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movement can venture down this concessionary road, without losing credibility. Even 
where unions win contracts, there is no guarantee that they will be able to maintain, or 
expand membership. Unionisation of the workforce at Nissan in Sunderland, where the 
AEU has sole negotiating rights, has recently fallen to only 16% of the workforce; the 
AEU being seen by many as little more than a 'rubber stamp' for the company (Regional 
Officer MSF).
Certain union officials argue that the TUC only has the power its constituent members 
give it and that, given the reality of a long history of collective bargaining, with each 
union more or less going it alone fiercely conscious of its independence, it would be 
difficult for the TUC to take any real directive or disciplinary action against unions such 
as the EETPU which openly contravene its ordinances and policy. Other trade unionists 
disagree and believe the TUC could, and should, take a more directive role, not only in 
relation to disciplining unions like the EETPU but also in providing information, 
guidelines, organisational support, and directives over issues relating to new technology 
and work re-design. Two officials and several shop stewards went even further, arguing 
that the TUC's lack of action over these issues, as well as its refusal to organise against 
anti-trade union legislation and various aspects of government policy, was little short of 
' scandalous' (Interviews with MSF and NALGO Officers and APEX and NALGO 
shop stewards).
The 1979 TUC policy document Employment and Technology, of course, does little 
more than reflect already existing union practices, merely suggesting that unions should
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attempt to deal with the issues relating to new technology and changing working 
practices through the establishment of NT As. The document presents guidelines and 
recommendations, and documents the dangers to trade unions that may arise from the 
careless introduction of technology. As a whole, however, it represents little more than a 
' populist' encouragement of investment in new technology and its dispersal throughout 
the economy. Given the traditional role of the TUC, it is left to individual unions to 
develop their own strategies for securing effective involvement in the design process. 
Consequently, a very uneven level of awareness of the politics of design exists among 
the various trade unions. Unions like the MSF, APEX, ASTMS and NALGO are in 
quite favourable positions to negotiate changes, having members who are often key 
personnel in the process of design. Thus, for example, one software engineer I 
interviewed who was in the MSF argued:
Generally our members are in a good position to negotiate with management 
over new technology because we often are more aware of its consequences and 
implications than they are ... and certainly at this site we have influenced'the 
choice of equipment purchase and software used in a variety of systems ... and I 
think on the whole our involvement has been welcomed by management 
(Software Engineer, US Electronics Company, Lothian, Scotland).
Other unions, however, fare worse. All, however, have to look to their own limited 
resources and research expertise, to provide themselves and their members with 
information concerning the issues involved before developing appropriate strategies 
(Clark et al 1988, McLoughlin & Clark 1994). Two unions which assessed the situation 
and developed specific strategies to meet it are the AEU and EETPU. The latter, runs
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its own training colleges, designed to win employer support for retraining electricians in 
new skills. The former operates a similar programme but through liaison with local 
technical colleges, businesses and the union. Both unions seek to update their members' 
skills, in order to be able to keep abreast of technological developments and secure their 
craft status within the division of labour. Notably, both unions are also pursuing an 
active policy of trying to recruit all employees at a given plant, irrespective of craft 
(AEU 1988, EETPU 1987).
The CBI (1994) suggests that agreement to the introduction of new technology has 
involved the removal of restrictive practices, the adoption and extension of shift 
working, reduction in numbers employed, increase in part-time female labour and the 
introduction and extension of piece rate and incentive payments and other productivity 
improvements. McLoughlin and Clark (1994) argue that both the adoption, and 
content, of technology agreements have been limited compared to original TUC 
objectives. They found that only a small number of unions, mainly white collar, actively 
used technology agreements as part of a general policy. Batstone and Gourlay (1986) 
found NTA's and TUC negotiating guidelines were of little, or no benefit, to shop 
stewards in dealing with specific technological changes, whatever influence worker 
representatives had on the process of change, being related more to traditional control of 
internal labour markets than to specifically developed strategies relating to the 
introduction of new technology, or new working practices.
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Marsh (1993), Hyman (1989) and Knights and Willmott (1988) argue that the concern 
of many employers is to keep trade unions confined to traditional bargaining areas. As 
such, they prefer consultation rather than bargaining per se. Ironically, the WIRS (1990) 
survey indicates that management are reporting more consultation with employees over 
the introduction of new technology. However, the key word is consultation and not 
negotiation as more and more organisations make direct appeals to the workforce in an 
attempt to subvert traditional trade union negotiating machinery (McLoughlin & Clark 
1994). Management is asserting its 'right' to select the particular technology, its detail 
specification, the way it is to be used, to what end and the way work is to be organised 
around it (Hyman & Mason 1995). Giles and Starkey (1987) argue that many 
employers are making use of anti-trade union legislation and the disciplining effects of 
recession on the working class to introduce new technology and new methods of work 
organisation much as they please. The increase in part-time and multi-flexible working, 
QCs and JIT, along with the break up of traditional job demarcations and the 
decomposition of existing pay and salary structures reflects firms attempts to reduce 
costs, tied up capital, improve quality and increase labour productivity in an attempt to 
maintain and increase profitability.
I've seen the company alter demarcations on the line several times in as many 
years ... full time are replaced with part-time and students ... you've got a new 
category of maintenance ... we no longer have electricians, fitters, mechanics and 
the like ... likewise jobs on the line have been downgraded ... we've taken pay 
cuts and anyone can do this job ... it takes hours to learn ... that's all... through it 
all they've been too frightened to resist... any job is better than the dole...and the 
thing is that even to get a job as a packer you now have to go through a 
screening agency and sit specific psychometric and arithmetic tests (Shop 
steward AEU, US Electronics Manufacturer, Scotland)
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The Trade Union Research Unit cites four reasons why trade unions might not be able to 
resist new moves towards changing working practices:
(1) managers might appeal to workers over the heads of union representatives.
(2) Such an appeal may carry weight because for groups to be pushed to the 
periphery, this might be preferable to redundancy, and for groups to be retained 
in the core, the improvements in conditions of employment, wages, etc., might 
be preferable.
(3) Management can present these moves as the simple extension of existing 
practices, i.e. use of temporary workers.
(4) It could be presented as part of a new technology/security agreement which is 
likely to be attractive to existing employees (Trade Union Research Unit 1995).
With unemployment levels high and with sweeping changes in social security and 
housing benefit legislation, designed to foster insecurity, offers of job security allied to 
changes in working practices, however unpalatable, are often too tempting to resist:
As Dodgson & Martin argue:
It is perhaps a sign of acquiescence, or indeed fatalism, that the TUC's 
Employment and Technology Committee - composed of representatives of 
major interested unions, supported by TUC research staff - has not met since 
November, 1984(1987:36).
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Under the impulse of recession and economic stagnation, a new ' realism' has swept the 
British political scene. Bitter memories of the ' winter of discontent' under Callaghan, 
coupled to the Labour Government's attacks on trade union bargaining power, at a time 
of rising inflation, along with Labour's inability to resolve the economic crisis, or deal 
with rapidly rising unemployment, facilitated a political shift to the right.
This shift is occurring, in large measure, due to the failure of parties of power to manage 
the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production (Coats 1980, Marsh & King 
1985, Hyman 1989, Marsh 1993). As Callaghan made clear in 1976:
We must make a success of the mixed economy by adhering to an industrial 
strategy worked out and agreed by both the TUC and the CBI, which aims at 
giving absolute priority to industrial needs, ahead of even our social objectives 
(cited Coates 1980: 35).
Giving ' absolute priority to industrial needs' meant implementing Phase I, n and HI of 
the Social Contract, undermining trade unionism, in particular its most militant sections, 
and cutting back on non-productive, i.e. unprofitable capital expenditure (CIS 1984). 
Yet the basic malaise of the economy remained unresolved, the weakness of British 
manufacturing being reflected in a 70% increase in imports between 1973-1974 (Coats 
&Hillardl986).
In 1980 Keith Joseph, prioritised the Conservatives key areas of attack:
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The visible signs of Britain's unique course as it slides from the affluent western 
world towards the threadbare economics of the communist bloc are obvious 
enough. We have a demotivating tax system, increasing nationalisation, 
compressed differentials, low and stagnant productivity, high unemployment, 
many failing public services and increasingly growing public expenditure; an 
obsession with equality and pay, price and dividend controls, a unique set of 
legal privileges and immunities for trade unions and finally, since 1974, we are 
top of the Western league for inflation, bottom of the league for growth (Joseph 
cited by Gamble 1981: 132).
Under the guise of an attack on inflation the Conservative Government proceeded to 
isolate, discredit and fundamentally weaken the trade union movement, as well as 
implementing a series of measures to tackle the problems outlined by Keith Joseph above 
(CIS 1984, Hyman 1989, Marsh 1993).
For its part, the TUC and trade union movement as a whole were wholly unprepared for 
what was about to befall them. Indeed, the TUC is still arguing for policies similar to 
those advanced in 1979, namely reflation of the economy, selective import controls, 
restrictions on capital export and increased investment in public services. With its strong 
attachment to tripartite structures fuelled by its experience of two decades of post war 
boom and working within governmental, business and public institutions, it has been 
unable to seriously counter Conservative Party calls for increased efficiency, 
productivity, reduced public spending and the need to reduce inflation. Trade unions as 
a whole are marginalised and weakened further by the rapid rate of job and membership 
losses accompanying rationalisation and closure of many plants, factories and offices.
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That many workers and rank and file trade unionists are prepared to fight for jobs and 
services is clearly evident in the case of metal, steel, water, automobile and mine 
workers' struggles. These struggles were, nonetheless, isolated - not only by 
Conservative strategy and legislation (CIS 1980, 1984, Hyman 1989), but also by the 
TUC and Labour Party's own lack of directive and initiative (Hyman 1989, Marsh 1993, 
Beaumont 1995). Whilst many Trade Union officials and Labour Party leaders proved 
unable and unwilling to 'rock the boat', Conservative governments proceeded to 
introduce a whole series of measures designed to curb trade union power and aid 
employers in restructuring industrial relations. The 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts 
profoundly shifted the legal ground on which trade unions operate. These Acts were 
further buttressed by the 1989 Employment Act and the Trade Union and Employment 
Rights Act of 1993. Unions must now forego many traditional forms of action including 
solidarity strikes, blacklegging or secondary picketing. Combined, this legislation has 
also made it easier for employers to sack workers on strike, undermine the closed shop 
agreement and encourage the use of non-union labour, and very importantly, unions are 
now liable to pay civil damages for any industrial action undertaken. This legislation 
alone removes one of the most important immunities for trade unions. There is now no 
right to strike in Britain, merely some defences and immunities striking workers can use 
if employers take them to the courts (Hyman 1989, Weston 1992, Goodhart 1992).
Accompanying direct anti-trade union legislation are a whole series of measures from 
abolition of the low wage councils, changes in social security, unemployment and 
housing benefit entitlements, to cut backs in public services, transport, nursery provision,
350
education and health which act to weaken working class resistance and solidarity 
(Hyman & Mason 1995, Regini 1994). It is against this background of recession, rising 
unemployment and political attacks on working class rights and living standards that 
trade unions have had to deal with employers attempts to introduce new technology and 
changing working practices. As an officer of AC AS argues:
It is no coincidence that the signing of single union no strike deals and 
acceptance of many new working practices, such as QC Circles, flexibilisation, 
etc., have taken place when they have...employers are feeling confident and 
unions are on the defensive (Regional Officer AC AS).
It is interesting to note that employers, management and consultants are emphasising the 
need for greater ' harmonisation' and 'flexibility' precisely at a time when the economic 
and political climate is predicated upon intimidation and coercion (CIS 1984, Giles & 
Starkey 1987, Marsh 1993). Management are seeking to 'enhance' employee 
commitment and create new forms of'employee participation' in ways which undermine 
and further weaken institutionalised collective bargaining agreements (Hyman & Mason 
1995, Beaumont 1995). The vacuum created by the collapse of these traditional 
bargaining agreements increasingly is being filled by a management keen to 'break with 
bureaucracy' and keen to emphasise the unique contribution of the 'individual employee' 
to the organisation (Beaumont 1995).
With the rationalisation of industry and services in the face of both over production, 
intensified competition and tighter public expenditure, with the continual rise in the ratio 
of industrial inputs away from labour and towards capital (Employment Gazette 1993)
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and with the new 'high tech' industries unable to generate sufficient employment, it is 
little wonder that many trade unionists are not hopeful about the future. Where firms are 
restructuring and re-investing, for example, Pirelli at Aberdare in South Wales or 
Vauxhalls at Halewood, they are doing so on the basis of new technology and new 
working practices specifically designed to reduce the quantity of labour needed whilst at 
the same time increasing productivity.
Faced with the fear of unemployment, bludgeoned by an ideological barrage of 
competitiveness and anti-trade unionism, lacking a TUC capable of organising successful 
resistance to Government and employer-led offensives, it is unsurprising that many 
workers are being forced into accepting changes in working practices and conditions 
which several years ago would have been unthinkable. Along with the restructuring of 
capital, many firms are attempting to restructure labour markets and introduce new 
technology and organisational practices. Some union officials argue that companies are 
seeking to create dual labour markets with a central core of full-time, skilled, relatively 
highly paid workers operating and servicing new technologies whilst a mass of 
semi-skilled or unskilled labour with little security and poor wages, serve as a reservoir 
of temporary and casual labour to be brought into the production process as and when 
market demands. As in Japan, this will pose large problems for both union solidarity and 
the ability of unions to recruit members (Haliday 1975, Sayer 1986).
As British, European, American or Japanese firms look to organisational changes and 
new technology, to improve their competitive position, organised labour is put under
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increased pressure to accept the new discourse of 'harmonisation' and 'work flexibility' 
(Marsh 1993, Beaumont 1995). Indeed, the idealised model of the happy Japanese 
worker and of 'corporate familyism' is becoming a new discourse in managerial circles 
- the model to which all should strive. But what happens when, in part or in total, the 
model is attained? Research into industrial relations at various Japanese firms shows that 
all is not rosy. Compulsory overtime - often unpaid - increased working hours and 
intensity of work, reduced break times, numbing uniformity, ideological bludgeoning in 
company values and culture, excessive vetting of employee records, fierce competition 
within and between quality circles and work teams, produce their own problems and 
anxieties (Hague 1987, Turnbull 1987, Ackroyd et al 1988). How successful various 
companies efforts will be in pushing through and maintaining these practices is open to 
question, as is employee acceptance of, and attachment to, them. If these practices 
become widespread, it simply means the competitive struggle between firms is lifted to a 
new and higher plane, obviously the question then is what further measures will 
management be able to adopt to secure further competitive advantage. Management 
itself may experience crisis, not least because much of the information technology 
revolution is directed at rationalising middle management posts (Handy 1995). 
Certainly, one union official was keen to point out the implications for management of 
their attempt to get workers to swallow the" harmonisation and flexibility' medicine:
We are told if only we make sacrifices now ... if only we agree to be flexible ... if 
only we agree to put in more effort... give a little more ... all will be well ... but 
what if it isn't? What if after making all these sacrifices workers are no better off 
and firms are still struggling to survive ... hell will break loose and management 
and unions will have to face up to this ... it will be an ideological crisis of 
immense magnitude (Regional Officer GMBTU).
353
Perhaps it might be useful to understand managerial moves towards 'harmonisation' and 
new 'flexible' working practices as an attempt to overcome one of the central 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production - namely, its tendency to socialise 
the forces of production in order to better harness and utilise labour-power - to gain its 
consent (Burawoy 1979) - but at the same time expressing its inability to do so without 
violating the laws of private accumulation and appropriation on which that mode of 
production is predicated (Marx 1977).
Summary
Union involvement in the systems design process in the UK is far more circumscribed 
than that of the collective resource approach in Scandinavia. Despite union officials 
positively encouraging investments in new technology, their deterministic views of 
technology tend to downplay its significance and inhibit their involvement in the process 
of system design. Unions are largely excluded from this design process by management 
and have been unable to achieve even the TUC (1979) guidelines on new technology. A 
variety of factors are responsible for this including union officials perceptions of what 
constitutes legitimate spheres of interest. Issues relating to the choice of technology and 
the design of work are usually seen as management's prerogative. Union involvement in 
the design process tends to be confined within existing collective bargaining procedures 
to resolve working details such as job demarcations, staffing and retraining. Unions that
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have more input into the design process tend to be those whose members occupy key 
positions vis a vis new technology implementation; these tended to be white collar 
unions like APEX or the AEUW TASS. These unions are also able to achieve the 
highest number of NT As.
The overwhelming majority of union officials believe the current governments' 'free 
market' philosophy is both misguided and damaging to the long term interests of British 
manufacturing, arguing that it leaves business vulnerable in the face of state supported 
foreign competition and creates a climate of fear and distrust which inhibits management 
from tapping into valuable employee knowledge thereby undermining the smooth and 
efficient restructuring of manufacturing.
There is general consensus that the TUC has not done enough to make individual unions 
aware of the issues relating to new technology and work redesign. TUC guidelines on 
new technology are seen as dated and ineffectual. Likewise there is heated debate 
amongst the various unions concerning single union agreements. Most union officials 
argue that they are not a bad thing in themselves, but that their changing 'content' is 
controversial, e.g. no-strike clauses, agreement to multiflexibility, ending of job 
demarcations.
Most unions recognise that new technology is being used to rationalise work processes 
but that it is difficult to isolate the technology per se as a source of unemployment and 
falling membership when other factors like business closures and changed political
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climate, managerial culture and work practices could be playing an equally significant 
role.
Finally, there is some disarray regarding the future direction of British trade unionism. 
Some officials believed that the trend towards amalgamation and merger would continue 
- leading to the formation of' super unions' and increased potential for representation of 
members' interests. Others pointed to the increased inter-union competition for contracts 
which could lead to the formation of distinct 'political blocks' within the union 
movement. All unions, however, with the possible exemption of the EETPU, were 
uneasy about the future and concerned with government legislation and its adverse 
impact on trade union rights and trade unions' ability to prosecute their members 
interests. Running a close second was their concern over changes in working practices 
and work culture, such as management emphasis upon 'harmonisation' and quality team 
strategies, which were seen by many as attempts to by-pass traditional trade union 
bargaining procedures and practices.
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In previous chapters I have argued that notions of capital interest are vague and belie the 
complexity of interest groups, coalitions and factions that have an impact upon the 
design process within modem corporations. Each of these may try to shape any 
particular system to suit their own particular objectives. In focusing upon the work, 
values and methods of engineers and systems analysts (Chapters 2,3 & 4) I have 
highlighted how engineers and systems analysts do not automatically or simply 
reproduce the interests of capital within the design process, but rather bring to bear their 
own personal experience, values and world views some of which may act to reinforce 
particular dominant notions of efficiency or rationality and some of which may serve to 
question them. I have argued that engineers and analysts have degrees of autonomy 
over the process of design and the types of systems that get built. This autonomy is, 
however, relative and in practice has seldom been used by engineers and analysts to 
assess critically the systems they build. I have offered several explanations of why this 
might be so, for example, in terms of engineers' and analysts' education and training, the 
tools and methods they deploy and the values they hold. To elaborate on the possibilities 
of engineers and analysts exercising this autonomy in a critical fashion I examine their 
class background to see if this colours their approach to design - through, for example, 
placing them in an antagonistic position to specific groups of employees or through 
making them more receptive to certain kinds of culture, theory or practice.
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Whilst engineers have often unwittingly been lumped under the heading middle class 
(Poulantzas 1978, Ehrenreich 1979, Abercrombie & Urry 1983), there has been little 
attempt to specifically analyse the class position of systems analysts. At a general level 
they are perceived as 'professionals' (BCS 1988) and by association middle class - 
occupying a distinctive place in the social division of labour exercising responsibility and 
possessing polyvalent skills - including managerial (Friedman 1989). In this chapter I 
assess a number of different attempts to theorise the class position of engineers and 
systems analysts. My argument is that much of the theoretical debate on the 'middle 
class1 is formal and ascriptive 1 and that the term middle class ends up being used too 
indiscriminately - for example, to cover all 'white collar', 'professional' or 'non- 
productive' workers, as though these are clearly defined discrete social entities, with 
corresponding forms of class practice and consciousness. I argue that engineers and 
systems analysts by and large are part of the ' collective labourer' and that the concept 
'collective labourer1 , unlike the concept 'middle class', captures the heterogeneity, 
contradictory and changing relationships different sections of this labour experience at 
different historical conjunctures. The concept of'collective labourer1 is intimately tied to 
the development of capitalism and the unfolding of the accumulation process, whereas, 
in conventional usage, the concept 'middle class' is static and has no necessary relation 
to the broader process of capitalist accumulation and reproduction2 . Finally, I highlight 
engineers' and analysts' different perceptions of class and the ways in which these have 
an impact not only upon their designs but upon engineers' and analysts' 
conceptualisation of their own labour and its product.
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Relational and Gradational Models of Class
Nichols (1986) argues that an entire history of political sociology could be written on the 
theme of the 'new middle classes', with recent declines in manufacturing and an apparent 
increase in mental, rather than manual labour, providing a general impetus to the 
theorisation of'intermediate strata' in most advanced capitalist societies.
In trying to identify and make sense of the 'middle class', particularly the huge mass of 
'white collar1 workers and 'professionals' that emerged with the growth of monopoly 
capitalism and the increasing activity of an enlarged state and organisational apparatus in 
the developed capitalist economies, many theorists, both neo Marxist and neo Weberian, 
have, inadvertently, pursued an analysis which stipulates class in terms of its own inbuilt 
divisions or imposed categories, for example, skilled, unskilled, 
productive/non-productive, etc. Classes are then broken down in pyramidal fashion 
according to a set of shared descriptive criteria - type of work, income levels, voting 
behaviour, demographic position, attitude to race, sex, police, etc. This approach, whilst 
enriching our understanding of different social groups at particular moments in history, 
lacks dynamic. In effect, no sooner has this ascriptive sociology defined a certain social 
group in a particular way (for example, Lockwoods (1966) 'traditional', 'deferential1 and 
'privatised1 worker) than history and events move on and social relations change;
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meanwhile, theorists are still busy gathering the latest up to date statistics on income, 
voting behaviour, attitudes and lifestyles, so as to revitalise their ahistorical analysis.
Thompson (1979) argues that what is needed to make sense of the above ever changing 
empirical findings is a relational analysis of class. Thompson argues that the notion of 
class entails the notion of historical relationship:
Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis, if we try to stop 
it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure ... the relationship must 
always be embodied in real people and in a real context ... class is not just a 
relation but a bi-polar relation, the dialectical relationship of opposites ... We 
cannot have two district classes, each with its independent being, and bring them 
together into relationship with each other ... class happens when some men feel 
and articulate the identity of their interests between themselves and as against 
others whose interests are different and opposed to theirs (1979: 9-10).
Without such analysis, Thompson argues all kinds of anomalies and contradictions 
emerge, leading to a curiously static presentation of class3 .
According to Thompson, there is today, an every present temptation to suppose that 
class is a 'thing'; for Thompson, this error vitiates much latter-day Marxist writing, but is 
contrary to Marx's original methodology which stressed the relational aspect of class. 
For Marx:
The separate individuals form a class only in so far as they have to carry on a 
common battle with another class ... these individuals find their conditions of 
existence predestined, and their position in life and ... personal development 
assigned to them by their class and become subsumed under it (1969: 714).
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This notion that groups within society are the bearers of deeper social relations, which 
may act behind their backs to condition their practice, is central to Marx's analysis. Thus 
Marx argues:
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of 
the direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows 
directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining 
element ... it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of 
production to the direct producers - a relation always naturally corresponding to 
a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and, thereby, it's 
social productivity - which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty 
and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of state (1962:772).
Clearly, these texts have been interpreted as turning politics into an epiphenomenal 
activity and ascribing to the economic a totally determining role. Cohen, for example, 
argues that:
The proletarian is the subordinate producer who must sell his labour power in 
order to obtain his means of life (1978: 73).
Marx maintained the centrality of analysing class, as a relation - 'the separate individuals 
form a class only in so far as they have to carry on a common battle with another class1 
(1969: 714). Cohen, however, contents himself with defining class specifically with 
reference to the position of its members in the economic structure (1978: 73). Whilst
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Cohen stresses that property relations locate people in the class structure his 
interpretation of Marx is, nonetheless, 'economistic'. Marx states that whilst the 
economic form determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, the latter, in turn, react 
upon the economic as a determining element. This is not contradictory but central to 
Marx's dialectical method. Cohen's formulation, that the proletariat encompasses all 
'subordinate producers who sell their labour-power1, is too vague and does not really 
advance the perennial structure - agency debate stemming from Marx's notion of a 'class 
in itself, and a 'class for itself - namely, why do some sections of the subordinate 
producers perceive their interests to be different from others?
In focusing upon the mode of production and the production of surplus value, in 
particular, Marx sought to highlight the exploitative nature of capitalist social relations, 
to demonstrate how the production of surplus value was contingent upon one class 
appropriating the unpaid labour of another class and how this, in turn, manifests itself in 
a struggle both within and outside the factory, over the division of the working day 
between 'necessary' and 'surplus labour' - wages and profit, a fact which led Marx to 
focus attention on what he identified as the two main classes in capitalist society - 
bourgeoisie and proletariat4 .
Marx's focus on the production of surplus value and his utilisation of an abstract pure 
model of capitalism does not, however, provide a detailed analysis of the 'middle classes', 
or their relation to other classes. Weber (1964), on the other hand, is particularly
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concerned with the composition of the 'middle classes'. Weber drew attention to forms 
of stratification other than class, notably status and ethnic stratification. His sociology of 
class starts with two 'basic categories of all class situations' namely property and 
propertylessness, but differentiates a large number of both positively and negatively 
privileged classes with reference to education as well as property (Weber 1961: 182). 
Weber distinguishes between two types of positively privileged classes, namely 
ownership or property classes and acquisition or commercial classes. The latter includes 
all those who possess goods, services and skills that can be offered on the market. 
Weber also distinguishes three types of 'negatively advantaged' classes, namely, the 
'unfree', the 'declassed' and the 'paupers' and three types of negatively privileged 
commercial classes, namely, 'skilled', 'semi skilled' and 'unskilled workers' (1968: 304). 
In between both types of positively and negatively privileged classes, Weber noted the 
existence of various middle classes - ' peasants, craftsmen, public and private officials, 
liberal professions and groups of workers with exceptional credentials or skills' (1968: 
304). For Weber a social class 'makes up the totality of those class situations within 
which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical' (1968: 302). Weber 
stressed that class advantages flowed from knowledge or skills and that there was a need 
to distinguish between class situations and status situations (Weber 1961).
According to MacKenzie:
Academic sociologists have almost universally recommended Weber's approach, 
as both appropriate and realistic, for an understanding of the complexity of class
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differences to be found in late twentieth century capitalist society (despite the 
fact that) ... as a theory of class relations and, in particular, of class boundaries, 
Weber's approach is at best, incomplete, at worst, superficial; for at the end of 
the day, his identification of four social classes is merely descriptive (1982: 66).
Goldthorpe extends Weber's analysis into a seven class schema (1987, 1992) in which 
individuals are accorded specific class places largely in terms of the credentials and skills 
they posses rather than whether or not they stand in specifically antagonistic 
relationships to each other. This kind of gradational definition of class typically involves, 
as Edgell (1993) points out, a trichotomous structure characterised by many divisions, 
each of which is considered higher or lower than the others. The obliteration of 
antagonistic relations between gradational levels within the Weberian model enables 
writers like Goldthorpe to lump together heterogeneous groups into one class - the 
service class. Yet, as Abercrombie and Urry have argued, there are problems with 
Goldthorpe's presentation of the service class:
First, it is an aggregation of occupations rather than a class united by the 
performance of services for a capitalist or within a bureaucracy. Secondly, it is 
not an intermediate class but it is rather at the top of the hierarchy (1983:32).
Weberian analysis invariably enhances the significance of the service class at the expense 
of the capitalist class. Further, assigning routine white collar employees and small 
proprietors to a broad class labelled 'intermediate', is contradictory and confusing. For 
example, some small proprietors may be in a very precarious class situation, likewise
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compared to many private sector bureaucratic employees, some small proprietors may 
be in a very advantaged class position.
Weber's inability to explain why certain individuals and social groups consistently end up 
at certain points on the power hierarchy is a major limitation and one which prompted 
Weber to acknowledge the importance of property in class formation. Weber roots his 
analysis of class in an analysis of the market which sees class as derivative of the 
distribution of market power which is seen as determining life chances and class 
position5 . For Marx, the conflation of income categories with social classes masks class 
struggle between the bourgeoisie and working class, replacing it with a multitude of 
intermediate groupings delineated in terms of income vying for improved market 
position.
Finally, Weber ties class formation to an onward march of bureaucratisation and 
rationalisation (Weber 1968) but offers little theorisation of who is carrying through this 
process and why. Like Burnham's (1962) managerialist and bureaucratisation thesis, 
Weber's class model conflates social formations by abstracting their specific class 
content and replacing it with an almost unlimited gradational content of credentialists 
contending on the power hierarchy. The problem with this approach is that it presents 
history in ideological fashion as the unfolding of the 'rational ideal', the onward march of 
'progress'. This analysis fails, to explain, for example, why processes of rationalisation,
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routinisation and de-skilling of work take place; and it offers a limited theory of crisis 
and class struggle.
Boom, Bust and Reassessment of Class
The post war boom informed academic and working class conceptions of capitalism; 
rising employment and living standards seemed to confirm the view that capitalism was 
essentially stable. Between 1945 and 1962 average weekly wage rates rose 90% and 
average earnings by over 130% (Chivers cited in Roberts 1966). The considerable 
increase in labour productivity led to a tremendous rise in output and allowed the 
working class to obtain more use-values for its wages6 .
Full employment, subsidised housing, more extensive social security and improved health 
and welfare facilities in the 1950s - 1970s coupled to an unprecedented consumer credit 
expansion in the late 1960s increased material standards of living and seemed to confirm 
the benevolent face of the free market, particularly, when contrasted to the austere 
images of the Soviet Union, fostered in this Cold War period. The Conservative Prime 
Minister in Britain told us, 'you've never had it so good'. Meanwhile, intellectuals in the 
British Labour Party, like Crosland, Strachey and Jay, were arguing that Labour, as a 
'national party', should cut its ties with the working class and appeal to an all class 
alliance. Too close an identification with the working class was regarded as an electoral 
liability. The document, Industry and Society, adopted at the 1957 Labour Party
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Conference, accepted the need for an all class party (Milliband, 1972). Membership of 
the Labour Party fell 20% between 1952-1965 and that of the British Communist Party 
from 56,000 in 1942 to 32,000 in 1962 (Felling 1975). Daniel Bell (1969) proclaimed 
the 'end of ideology', asserting that we were moving towards a 'post industrial society', of 
entirely different complexion to the one that characterised the industrial era; namely, it 
was managerial and technocratic in structure and social classes had become fragmented 
into clusters of overlapping interest groups with an end of polarised politics.
Trade union organisation however, was strong throughout the period, a strength shown 
in the capacity of the labour movement to counter the offensive of the state once the 
boom began to tail off in the late sixties. Workplace organisation was strong and the 
labour movement confident and combative - reinforced by virtually full employment 
(Hyman 1989, Pimlott 1991). Unions reacted to government offensives on pay restraint 
and policies directed against the closed shop and union rights with spirit and 
determination, reaching a peak of militancy in the early 1970s. This was the period of 
the release of the Pentonville dockers, the closure of Saltley Gates by thousands of 
miners and engineers and the rout of the Heath Government; but even in this period, the 
political weakness of the working class was evident. The bourgeoisie was able to achieve 
a number of partial victories to be consolidated under the 'Social Contract1, the 
imprisonment of the Shrewsbury Pickets, legislation against secondary picketing and the 
later monetarist drive of the Conservatives under Thatcher (CIS Anti-Reports, 1981, 
1984, 1986).
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To make sense of this political weakness and to counter theorists like Bel] who were 
arguing Marxism was defunct, a whole school of sociologists and radical Marxists, in 
Britain and abroad, began to examine the class structure in more detail, in a process of 
critique and reassessment (Newby 1979). Many theorists believed the 'Proletarianisation 
thesis' to be inadequate, or in need of serious clarification, arguing that far from there 
being a polarisation of classes under capitalism either, (a) the reverse had occurred and 
the transition to monopoly capitalism had generated other classes; (b) that the proletariat 
was a declining proportion of the population; (c) that the working class was becoming 
more internally differentiated; (d) there was a decline in the traditional central core of the 
proletariat; (e) that there should be a distinction made between productive and 
non-productive workers, the latter rising in numbers, and that these could no longer be 
regarded as part of the working class7 .
Through an analysis of some of the key contemporary debates on the middle class I now 
proceed to analyse the class position of engineers and systems analysts. The debates that 
follow from Poulantzas' (1978) categorisation of engineers as part of the 'new petit 
bourgeoisie' to Whalley's (1986) characterisation of them as 'trusted workers' reflect 
both the conceptual difficulties encountered in locating this strata within the class system 
and at the same time they enrich our understanding of the issues involved in assigning 
class positions to specific groups within society.
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Engineers and Analysts: The New Petit Bourgeoisie?
One of the earliest and most systematic Marxist reassessments of the class position of 
'intermediate strata' is the work of Poulantzas. Poulantzas (1978) argues that classes 
cannot be defined exclusively, at the economic level, stressing the importance of the 
political and ideological level, in determining social classes. However, it is an essentially 
economistic analysis that Poulantzas produces8 .
The boundary between Poulantzas' 'new petit bourgeoisie' and the working class is 
constituted by the distinction between productive and un-productive labour9 . 
Poulantzas' definition is:
Productive labour, in the capitalist mode of production, is labour that produces 
surplus value whilst directly reproducing the material elements that serve as the 
substratum of the relations of exploitation (1978: 216).
Yet Marx rejected the criteria of material production, devoting considerable effort to 
attacking Adam Smith for including this within his definition of productive labour10 . The 
concept 'productive worker' as used by Marx has absolutely nothing to do with any 
particular use value produced but is solely about whether the worker produces surplus 
value. Marx was insistent that:
the characteristic feature of the capitalist mode of production ... separates the 
various kinds of labour from each other, therefore also mental and manual labour
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but this in no way alters the relation of each one of these persons to capital being 
that of wage labourer and in the pre-eminent sense being that of productive 
labourer (1969: 411).
For Marx, the distinction between productive and unproductive labour is:
not derived from the material characteristic of labour - neither from the nature of 
its product, nor from the particular character of labour as concrete labour - but 
from the definite social form, the social relations of production within which the 
labour is realised ... the use value of the commodity, in which the labour of a 
productive worker is embodied, may be of the most futile kind. The material 
characteristics are, in no way, linked with its nature which on the contrary is only 
the expression of a definite social relation of production (1969: 157-8).
The narrowness of Poulantzas' definition of productive labour particularly manifests itself 
when he discusses 'service workers'. He contents himself with categorising them as 
'unproductive' because their labour is exchanged for revenue. However, as Marx argues:
From the standpoint of the individual capitalist who invests both labour power 
and capital in the production of the service, the worker in the service industry is 
paid from variable capital and not revenue, and the service produced sold as a 
commodity, irrespective of whether it has a material form or not. As a result 
surplus value is appropriated by the capitalist (1959: 856).
Wright (1985) argues that no one has ever suggested that the distinction between
productive and unproductive capital represents a class boundary between the capitalist
class and some other grouping. So why, he argues, should it, between the working class?
Wright argues that, typically, the productive/ unproductive capital distinction is treated
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as one element, defining a fractional boundary within the bourgeoisie, such as between 
banking and industrial capital. However, it could be argued in much the same fashion as 
Poulantzas argues for the working class, that unproductive capital lies outside the 
dominant capitalist relations of exploitation and, thus agents occupying the place of 
unproductive capital should not be considered members of the capitalist class. However, 
as Wright argues, such a theorisation would be fallacious:
This argument, of course, would be absurd, because it is obvious that whatever 
the short run conflicts of interest there might be between productive and 
unproductive capital, their fundamental class interests are the same. The same 
can be said for the distinction between productive and unproductive labour 
(1985: 50).
If the non-productive labourers are not members of the working class, where do they 
belong? Poulantzas1 answer is that they are part of the 'new petit bourgeoisie1 , which 
unlike the old petit bourgeoisie, is thrown into being by monopoly capital, rather than 
being swept away by it. Thus, the 'new petit bourgeoisie1 is located within the enlarged 
state apparatuses and bureaucracies of large companies (as administrators, scientists, 
engineers, technologists) or distributed amongst the expanding service economy (as 
clerks, shop workers, MacDonalds workers, etc.). Indeed, all kinds of odd bedfellows 
are thrown together within this new class, with the result that glaring anomalies and 
inconsistencies arise. For example, according to Poulantzas1 definition, a road sweeper 
being a non-productive worker (i.e. not directly producing surplus value in the material
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process of production) should sit in the same class as a corporate manager, doctor or 
lawyer.
Poulantzas attempts to get out of this dilemma by asserting the importance of political 
and ideological criteria in the determination of class. Thus, for Poulantzas, an agent who 
is like a worker at the economic level but deviates on the political or ideological level, is 
excluded from the proletariat. According to Wright, this:
Treatment of ideological and political criteria, as effectively coequal with 
economic criteria stems, at least, in part, from Poulantzas' usage of the notion of 
the "technical" division of labour ... he incorrectly identifies the technical division 
of labour, with economic criteria, whenever he discusses the role of political and 
ideological factors (1985: 51).
In his discussion of engineers and technicians Poulantzas argues:
We have seen the importance of the mental manual labour division for the 
supervisory staff and for engineers and technicians. This played a decisive role, 
in so far as, by way of the primacy of the social division of labour over the 
technical, it excluded these groupings from the working class, despite the fact 
that they too perform capitalist productive labour (1978: 251).
Poulantzas is equating the performance of productive labour with the technical division 
of labour. But if the dominant capitalist relation of exploitation constitutes the essential 
definition of productive labour it seems unreasonable to treat productive labour as 
strictly a technical category. Poulantzas roots economic criteria in the technical division
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of labour and political and ideological criteria in the social division of labour. To the 
contrary, both should be considered dimensions of the social division of labour. 
Poulantzas separates engineers from productive manual workers and locates them in a 
different class because they are supposed to have a different ideological and political 
determination, i.e. the execution of mental supervisory labour. One engineer I 
interviewed succinctly captured the improbability of Poulantzas1 definition:
I may be a brain worker but that does not make me middle class, it does not 
mean I think and act middle class ... anyway, I do as much productive work - 
design, fixing machinery, organising work teams, etc., as anyone else ... am I less 
productive than the operator watching over the CNC machine ... it's stupid ... I 
work shifts ... I get tired, I don't earn enough money, much of my work is 
routine ... I live in a council flat in Wester Hailles for Christ's sake ... (Electrical 
Engineer, Post Office, Scotland).
Presumably, a host of ideological criteria could be used to differentiate classes. For 
example, identifying certain jobs as female and of subordinate status to men's would put 
men in a position of ideological domination. Yet as Wright argues, 'this hardly makes a 
male worker not a worker!' (1985:53). Poulantzas' use of the term 'new petit 
bourgeoisie1 to denote a new class of agents, not directly engaged in material production 
and not ideologically subjugated by capital, indicates his unwillingness to break with 
Marx's three class schema. Yet he is quite aware that both the 'traditional petit 
bourgeoisie' and the 'new petit bourgeoisie' 'occupy totally dissimilar positions in 
production' (Poulantzas 1978:37). To resolve this dilemma, he argues that the two 
groups can be linked because they 'have the same political and ideological characteristics'
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(ibid: 37). To substantiate this he resorts to schematic labelling, attributing a range of 
common beliefs, values and attitudes, which he holds both the new and old petit 
bourgeoisie share:
These common ideological and political characteristics provide sufficient 
grounds for considering the two ensembles with different places in the economy 
as constituting a relatively unified class, the petty bourgeoisie (1978: 38).
We are, thus, back with a descriptive sociology of class that affronts the common sense 
of those whose position Poulantzas tries to theorise.
Engineers and Analysts: Professional Managerial Class?
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979) argue that the 'middle class' category of workers 
which has concerned Marxist analysis for the last two decades must be understood as 
comprising a distinct class in monopoly capitalist society - the Professional Managerial 
Class, which:
Cannot be considered a stratum of a broader class of workers because it exists in 
an objectively antagonistic relationship to them ... nor can ... be considered a 
residual class, like the petit bourgeoisie ... (because)... it is a formation specific 
to the monopoly stage of capitalism (1979: 9-10).
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They argue that this class consists of salaried mental workers who do not own the means 
of production and whose major function in the social division of labour is the 
reproduction of capitalist culture - the
total repertory of solutions and responses to everyday problems and situations 
and everyday class relations (1979:-12).
In short, the PMC is composed of reproduction specialists. This class emerged in force 
with the transition to monopoly capitalism and the need to contain rising worker unrest 
and secure control of work processes (1979). Similarities can be drawn here with 
Poulantzas' model of the 'new petit bourgeoisie', located in the growing state apparatus 
and inserted between capital and labour, at the point of production, as agents of control. 
Like Poulantzas, Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich argue that the PMC is a socially coherent 
class, with its own culture, values, and shared beliefs (1979). However, Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich do not present a 'managerialist society' thesis, like Bearle and Means (1932), 
Bell (1973) or Galbraith (1967); but maintain:
The central dynamic in our society ... lies in the contradiction between the 
socialised nature of the production process and the private appropriation of 
production. The interests of the capitalist class remaining fundamentally 
antagonistic to the interests of wage earners of all kinds, including those we have 
defined members of the PMC (1979: 42).
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Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich present a society in which capital stands in fundamental 
antagonism to generals, managing directors, the judiciary, senior civil servants and police 
officers. The PMC as defined seems to me too large and too loosely defined: everyone 
from a low grade secondary school teacher, technician, doctor to high level executive 
management is swept into the same class11 .
Engineers are a central concept to Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, because they are placed in 
one of the 'more clearly PMC occupations'(1979:31). It is in the work of engineers that 
the unity of production and reproduction is most clearly seen; and with it, Ehrenreich 
and Ehrenreichs' folly of defining a class, which includes engineers, merely in terms of a 
function, called reproduction. To argue that all engineers are 'reproduction specialists' is 
to ignore the part they play in developing the forces of production and is to assume that 
all engineers consciously set out to reproduce relations of capitalist domination.
Two concepts critical to Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich are dealt with problematically: class 
and reproduction. For Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, the PMC is a class whose function is 
capitalist reproduction. Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich utilise too narrow a definition of the 
working class - essentially defining it as productive manual labour. The PMC is divided 
into two sections, those who carry out their reproductive function explicitly and those 
who do so implicitly. Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich lump teachers, advertisers, entertainers 
and media presenters, into the former category and engineers, technologists and lower 
level middle managers into the latter. Do all teachers really explicitly reproduce capitalist
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social relations and, likewise, all technologists implicitly reproduce them? Ehrenreich 
and Ehrenreich foreclose the possibility that some teachers and technologists may be 
highly critical of capitalist relations and neither explicitly, or implicitly, seek to reproduce 
them. One analyst I interviewed was adamant that just because he may design systems 
which secure managerial aims, does not mean he, in turn, either accepts those aims, or 
sees himself as aligning with a different class:
Possible consequences of a system I may be working on ... could be to ... let's 
say lead to an increase in workloads for the girls in accounts ... this does not 
mean I agree with policy ... like most people, I have my own views ... but you 
have to repress them in work ... I may design systems which support 
management in work but I don't necessarily support them at the ballot box 
(Systems Analyst, Financial Institution, Scotland).
For Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich it is the function of 'reproducing capitalist culture and 
capitalist relations' (1979: 12) which binds together a relatively disparate bunch of 
people. Are we to assume that an entire class, as heterogeneous as the PMC, 
consciously reproduces relations of capitalist domination? For Marx, capital reproduces 
itself in the process of commodity production and at the same time produces the 
conditions of its own transformation. Reproduction for Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich stops 
history. The implication is that the law of value can be overcome and the capitalist 
system planned. By divorcing reproduction from production they turn historical 
materialism on its head.
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Engineers and Analysts: Contradictory Class Locations?
Wright (1978, 1985) argues that rather than bunching together heterogeneous groups 
into classes, for the sake of maintaining a three class model of society, why not simply 
recognise that many positions in the class structure will be ambiguous?
Wright argues that the development of capitalism has generated a number of classes in 
contradictory locations. In particular, he focuses on three inter-related structural 
changes: (a) the progressive loss of control over the labour process by direct producers; 
(b) the progressive differentiation of the functions of capital - emergence of joint stock 
companies, functionaries without capital and capital without function; and (c) the 
emergence of complex hierarchies of control on the basis of differentiation of functions.
Wright argues that these hierarchies emerge in conjunction with three components of the 
basic capital-labour dichotomy: control over the physical means of production, control 
over labour-power, and control over investment and resource allocation. Under such a 
schema the proletariat is directly excluded from control over the physical means of 
production, over the exercise of its labour-power and over investment and resource 
allocation. Thus, it occupies a definite bi-polar, unambiguous class relation to the 
bourgeoisie. By contrast, according to Wright, middle managers and technocrats have 
one foot in the bourgeoisie and one foot in the proletariat, in that they exercise control 
over others' labour power. The contradictory quality of this class location is evident in
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the supposed exercise, once again, of a particular set of values and attitudes 
characteristic of'professionals'.
It is not true that all workers exercise no control over the physical means of production, 
their own labour, others' labour, or even investment. Many skilled workers and trades 
people exercise a large degree of control over their own labour and the tools of labour. 
More importantly, changes in manufacturing philosophy such as extended quality teams 
and responsible autonomy strategies, may entail a significant exercise of control by 
workers over their own work and labour. Likewise, within work teams team leaders, 
chargehands and a variety of informal works' leaders may be responsible for allocation of 
tasks, rewards and punishment. Regarding control over investment decisions, whilst 
senior management may not readily wish the 'books' to be opened, and even less to have 
workers dictating investment strategies, in certain sectors and in certain countries, it 
organises their 'participation' 12 .
Likewise, to lump together all middle managers and technocrats, en masse, into a 
contradictory class location mid-way between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, is to miss 
out on the diversity and range of, for example, engineers work, education, training and 
background. Whilst many engineers may have little, or no control over others' labour or 
investment decisions, others may be corporate directors, or managers of large 
production divisions:
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Within this company, you will find a range of engineering practice and degrees 
of responsibility and control ... a lot of your electrical and mechanical engineers 
are working on specific "black box' applications - they are, if you like, technical 
specialists with little, if any, control over others' labour ... your design and 
particularly production engineers will have more control, often over large groups 
of workers and colleagues ... really a lot depends on the particular engineer and 
type of industry (Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
Like Poulantzas, and Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, Wright locates disparate groups of 
people in the same class boxes, albeit more of them. Yet to regard a skilled craftsman, a 
professor in an elite university and the owner of a petrol station franchise, as belonging in 
the same contradictory class of'semi-autonomous employees' is to resort to a descriptive 
schema of class.
Whilst wishing to stress the ways in which historical changes in the development of 
capitalism have conditioned class structure and, in turn, been conditioned by class, 
Wright never satisfactorily explains the logic of capitalism. For example, he offers little 
exploration of the accumulation process and the impact of the ebb and flow of capital 
into and out of different branches of production in search of above average rates of 
profit upon skills formation, labour market segmentation, professionalisation and control 
at work.
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The Devaluation Of Engineers And Analysts: The Rise Of The 
Employee?
One writer who does focus upon the centrality of the accumulation process, in 
structuring class relations is Carchedi. Carchedi's (1980) main thesis is that a process of 
devaluation of labour-power is intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production and, 
historically, this devaluation can be divided into three phases of capitalism:
(1) the initial phase of capitalist industrialisation;
(2) the advent of monopoly capitalism prior to the 2nd World War;
(3) the stage of monopoly capitalism following the 2nd World War and up to the 
present 13 .
Within monopoly capitalism, Carchedi argues, the number of employees increases not 
only absolutely but, relatively, to the total industrial population. At the same time there 
is an:
Acceleration of the process of dequalification of the employees functions; of 
devaluation of his labour-power, i.e. the knowledge and training necessary to 
carry out functions which become more and more fragmented, more and more 
specialised, more and more repetitive in nature (1980: 257).
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In this phase, Carchedi argues, the employee finds himself in an increasingly 
contradictory situation, his condition approaching more and more, that of the 
proletarian, whilst at the same time he:
Is asked to stick to an ideology and political practice which is based on a lost 
position of privilege (1980: 25).
Carchedi sees an increasing deterioration of pay and conditions for many of this 'strata'. 
For example, private offices are replaced by large work areas and increasing control and 
surveillance. He also argues, contrary to Poulantzas, that the:
Only difference between a girl punching cards and a worker on a conveyor belt, 
is that the former works on a paper conveyor. Any sociological distinction of 
the type that the former performs intellectual labour, while the latter performs 
manual labour, is simply absurd. Both meet the requirements needed to be 
classified within the working class, i.e. neither owns the means of production, 
both perform the function of the collective worker, are economically oppressed 
and are paid a wage, the extent of which is determined by the value of their 
labour power (1980: 258).
Carchedi goes on to argue that in this third phase, employees are increasingly alienated in 
the work process, losing sense of purposeful activity with the steady de-skilling and 
routinisation of their work. The growing discontent of this strata can be seen in the 
attempts to introduce 'job enrichment', 'job enlargement', projects and their increasing 
readiness to join unions and take part in united front activities with "blue collar1 workers. 
However, Carchedi argues that none of this is to suggest that proletarianisation
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necessarily brings about proletarian class consciousness (1980: 259). A number of my 
interviewees acknowledged these changes:
I can foresee a time when more and more work will become routine and boring 
and we will all be either reduced to machine minders, or unemployed ... You 
only have to scan the computer and systems literature to see that management is 
trying to secure tighter control over.our work ... it's not just the technologies but 
the division of tasks ... I've seen work become more and more specialised over 
the years and it's difficult to keep abreast of developments ... there is also far 
more emphasis on control, within the analysis and design procedure - structured 
methods, detailed report writing, etc. ... I feel less and less involved in the system 
design, as a whole, and more alienated from the design ... as we go over to the 
next generation of user centred languages and packages ... I may even become 
obsolete (Analyst/Programmer, Financial Institution, Scotland).
I remember when there was a difference between an employee and a worker ... 
employees were white collar ... workers wore overalls ..: now, particularly with 
these Japanese companies, everyone wants to be an employee ... everyone is 
called an employee ... but what does it mean? ... Personally, I have witnessed 
the loss of privileges I used to have - the separate office, the status ... the respect 
people showed ... we are all open plan here ... we were told it was to break 
down barriers ... to encourage communication but I think ... (long pause) ... it's 
all happened with cut backs and job losses and falling differentials ... I've begun 
to realise that nothing's sacred ... not my job ... no engineer's job ... we are all 
dispensable ... it's scary really ... (Mechanical Engineer, Engineering Company, 
Scotland).
In effect, Carchedi draws attention to the contrasting forces operating on ' middle class' 
employees. Of particular interest here, is his argument that market enhancement of any 
particular occupational group reflects the extent to which that group serves the 'function 
of capital'. If an occupation plays an important role in the control and administrative 
functions of capital, crucial to the production of surplus value, it will command more 
market power and prestige, which will be reflected in terms of income and status.
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However, if a profession has tenuous links with these fundamental capitalist processes, 
its occupational prestige will be more marginal. This is a provocative analysis which 
prompted interesting responses from some of my interviewees. Thus one senior 
accountant working in one of Britain's largest energy producing companies argued:
As an accountant, I regard myself as a professional... you only have to look at a 
cross section of British industry to see the self evident truth that senior 
management and money crystallise around accounting and finance ... it's 
probably unfair and, personally, I feel more engineers should be at the helm to 
give a new direction ... yes, I am aware of the arguments ... I bet that surprised 
you!! (interviewee smiles knowingly and refers to the arguments of Finneston 
and "manufacturing excellence") ... on the other hand, why do we get these 
relatively higher rewards and status. The answer, in my opinion, is because we 
are in at the very personal and strategic decision making end, where expert 
knowledge and experience but, above all, professionalism and strength of 
character matters (Account Manager and Systems Auditor, Private Utility 
Wales).
Carchedi talks of the rise of the 'collective worker1 , in the monopoly capitalist phase and 
an associated process of de-skilling and deterioration of 'employees' leading towards 
their, presumably, ultimate proletarianisation. Poulantzas, however, draws exactly the 
reverse conclusions, arguing that it is precisely on the basis of monopoly capitalism that 
the 'new petit bourgeoisie' derives its existence, as the 'mental' workers of an enlarged 
state and business apparatus. These workers, unlike Carchedi's 'employees', are not 
susceptible to proletarianisation but emerge as a strata with skills and capabilities specific 
to this phase of capitalism - both technical, administrative and control skills; and unlike 
Carchedi's 'employees', far from feeling a progressive deterioration in their terms and
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conditions so moving over to the side of 'blue collar' workers, they remain 
economically, politically and ideologically opposed to them.
The differences between Poulantzas and Carchedi notwithstanding, there are a number 
of weaknesses in Carchedi's analysis. First, Carchedi theorises the nature of the 
accumulation process in such a way that he sees capital as systematically dequalifying 
'employees'. A more sophisticated analysis would recognise that as capital moves into 
and out of various branches of production, in search of above average rates of profit, so 
old skills are destroyed and new ones are created. In effect, skill compositions of 
workforces are partly contingent on the ebb and flow of capital and cannot be read off 
from some pathological desire on the part of 'capital', which in any case only exists as 
many capitals competing in the market place, to de-skill.
Second, and flowing from the above, Carchedi's analysis of why late capitalism should 
manifest this tendency towards dequalification of the middle class, is unclear. As 
MacKenzie (1979) argues, cost cutting may be an explanation, or alternatively 
'functionaries without capital', may pose a threat to the system so that their 
proletarianisation, or removal from the scene could then be seen as logical.
Third, Carchedi, following Braverman, presents an omniscient capital, veritably 
conscious of its own self-interest and systematically and progressively de-skilling 'the 
middle classes' which passively accept their plight and offer no resistance. This fails to
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capture the process of change, downplaying the fact that it is Carchedi's 'employees' who 
are often in the position of formulating policy and interpreting capital's interest and how 
best to achieve it. As I discovered in my case studies, one only has to listen to the 
squabbles and clashes of interest between various protagonists (for example, finance 
managers, marketing and production) to realise that determination of best interest and 
how to achieve it is far from clear cut but is shaped by the power of respective parties 
concerned and their ability to drive through, or block, a particular strategy. Carchedi's 
analysis cannot even begin to tackle such anomalies because his model assumes certain 
actors to be in either middle class, or in contradictory class positions and pursuing a set 
of politics appropriate to those positions.
Finally, Carchedi reduces occupational status to whether one carries out the 'function of 
capital1 . This definition, whilst having a gut feel as being right for a number of those I 
interviewed, nevertheless seems inadequate. Certain occupations with high status and 
material rewards cannot, automatically, be read off from carrying out the 'function of 
capital'. For example, Carchedi ignores how the relative high prestige of doctors, 
university professors, barristers and lawyers, reflects professionals' own attempts to 
establish status and rewards through monopolisation, self-certification and policing, 
proscribed and elite routes of entry, and broad and complex ways in which society 
acknowledges and rewards 'professionalism1 (Johnson 1972).
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The Degradation of Engineers and Analysts?
Braverman (1974), in his seminal work on deskilling, asserted the primacy of labour 
process theory within Marxist analysis of class, arguing that the location of class 
boundaries should be examined in terms of the organisation of the labour process and 
that class boundaries should be seen as a direct consequence of the accumulation 
process14 .
Braverman was concerned particularly to show how capital had come to progressively 
de-skill and proletarianise larger and larger sections of the labour force15 . However, 
Braverman's perception of the relationship of the labour process to the accumulation 
process is unclear. He tends to see the onward march of accumulation leading to a 
progressive degradation of labour. Resistance to de-skilling on the part of direct 
producers themselves is downplayed in Braverman's analysis with the consequence that 
he ignores the fact that accumulation itself is conditioned historically by class struggle 
and is not an exogenous, pre-determined, process. Braverman also fails to recognise 
that, as capital moves into and out of various branches of production in search of above 
average rates of profit, skills will be destroyed and new ones created, e.g. the growth of 
programmer and analyst skills with the development of information technologies and 
their increasing centrality to business operations .
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Braverman, has also been criticised for over emphasising 'de-skilling' as a control 
strategy. Friedman (1977), Thompson (1984) and other labour process work on 
managerial strategies, have sought to highlight how a variety of alternative strategies to 
'scientific management' are possible for securing the production of surplus-value. 
Friedman, for example, demonstrates how 'responsible autonomy' is a means of:
Getting workers to identify with the competitive aims of the enterprise so that 
they will act responsibly with a minimum of supervision (1977: 48).
Likewise, Edwards (1990) differentiates between several forms of control - direct, 
technical and bureaucratic. Braverman exaggerates and misinterprets the nature and 
degree of control it is possible for capital to impose (Child 1984). As Cressey and 
Maclnnes (1980) argue, in doing so he ignores the fact that any tendency towards the 
real subordination of labour is a process which is 'internally contradiction ridden'. If 
capital is to exploit labour's ability to create surplus value it cannot rely solely on control 
regimes based around the tight subordination of labour which is implicit in Braverman's 
analysis; rather, it has to try to harness workers' knowledge, experiences, co-operation 
and consent. As Burawoy argues:
The dilemma of capitalist control is to secure surplus value while at the 
same time keeping it hidden (1985: 32).
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He suggests that capital relies on a degree of consent and co-operation in the labour 
process, without which surplus value producing relations within monopoly capitalism, 
would break down.
Over-emphasis on control and deskilling is particularly inadequate when it comes to the 
work of systems analysts and engineers. Many of those I interviewed exercised a high 
degree of autonomy over their own labour power and argued that far from being 
de-skilled they were continually learning new skills:
The pace of change in IT is dramatic ... no sooner have you mastered one 
language, or technique than another more sophisticated, or elaborate comes 
along. There is a real shortage of even basic Cobol programmers ... it's crazy but 
we can't even get enough Cobol programmers ... we are crying out for people 
with IT skills at all levels (Systems Manager, Automotive Components 
Manufacture, Wales).
Much of analysis is intuitive and based on sound business understanding, 
interpersonal and communication skills ... you can't replicate this in a bit of 
expert software ... only when you can get a machine to go out and talk to users, 
at a variety of different levels and for it to be able to apply all the means of 
persuasion and flattery that is needed, will you get anywhere near automating, or 
deskilling the work of analysts. Analysts are professionals ... you need to allow a 
degree of self-administration and freedom for creativity ... otherwise you will not 
get the best out of people (Systems Analyst, Major Public Utility, Wales).
Whilst recognising that 'professionals' need space and freedom for creativity, engineers 
and analysts seem to fall short of recognising that their own work process may also be 
rationalised in the name of efficiency (Greenbaum 1976, Kraft 1979). As Jamous and 
Peloille (1970) argue, this is a classic response of professionals working in areas where a
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high degree of indeterminacy exists, that is, where tasks are variable and 
non-rationalised, the people who control this uncertainty being likely to enjoy high status 
and to combat any attempt to routinise work in terms of infringement or compromisation 
of professionalism.
Whilst one might expect a tendency towards de-skilling within capitalism, Braverman, 
nonetheless, offers too deterministic a process of labour degradation, presenting an 
image of an omnipotent capital capable of automatically mustering the strategies and 
technologies necessary to de-skill. Such analysis downplays agency on the part of 
designers and managers and assumes that both capital and designers share a common 
understanding of the task in hand and dutifully proceed to develop strategies and 
technologies accordingly. My research indicates that this is hardly a realistic scenario. 
Many designers, even managers, do not automatically accept, or understand the logic of 
'capital interest', or the need for labour degradation. Indeed, they may actually oppose 
this logic on purely personal, 'irrational' grounds:
We had spent several million pounds integrating our existing information 
systems, in an attempt to standardised hardware and software throughout the 
bank ... it has been an ongoing process ... involving a number of sweeping 
technical and organisational changes ... there has been a lot of risks and 
negotiation ... for several months corporate management were made aware ... by 
myself and others of a number of system discrepancies.....we were finding 
decimal points in the wrong places ... thousands of pounds out ... withdrawals 
and entries in accounts that did not make sense ... I was under a lot of pressure 
... at first, we thought it was technical error ... eventually we found the sources 
... a senior manager in one department was intentionally tripping the system ... 
why, because restructuring had meant the loss of some of his staff and in 
particular a number of secretaries - who will remain nameless ... his behaviour
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was totally irrational and unprofessional ... it cost the bank dearly ... you've got 
to admire the guy for having the balls ... I mean, as a person I know him well ... 
we've played a few rounds of golf, etc. ... but it's not the kind of thing we wanted 
public, so this manager was asked to resign quietly! (IT Director, Major High 
Street Bank).
The IT director lambastes a senior manager for "irrationally' opposing and, indeed, 
sabotaging, the new IT system stating, that such behaviour was 'unprofessional'. Yet 
he, nonetheless, relayed the above episode to me with some degree of admiration and 
even sympathy for the man who made his life difficult for so long. Braverman's analysis 
fails to capture the dialectic of control and resistance in the work of the very 'strata1 
whom, he asserts both assume 'capital's logic' or 'principles' and systematically seek to 
impose them on others. Within monopoly capitalism, decisions over investment and 
strategy are made and influenced by a variety of actors within the 'collective labourer1 
and as the above account demonstrates, even within senior management, there may be a 
plurality of interest groups and individuals entering into discourse and pulling in different 
and, often, contradictory, directions.
Engineers and Analysts: Trusted Workers or Distrusted 
Professionals?
Whalley (1986) finds little evidence of a trend towards the de-skilling of engineers, 
arguing that unlike craft workers, engineers do not control access to a specialised body 
of knowledge, so the need to de-skill them is absent. They do, however, according to
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Whalley, occupy a distinctive place in the division of labour based on trust; the nature of 
that place, access to it, and even the qualifications required for it, however, are 
controlled by management.
It hardly seems reasonable to argue that engineers do not possess specialised knowledge. 
The engineers I interviewed certainly believed they did, as did managers within the same 
companies:
I've spent several years at university getting the necessary qualifications for my 
job and this does not count the large number of specialist courses I have 
attended, for example, in software engineering ... if this is not specialist 
knowledge, what is it? (Electrical Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering 
Company, Scotland).
Our engineers are highly trained people ... in fact, they have become more so as 
the years have gone by ... probably what confuses people is that they have 
become more specialised and less general ... to keep abreast of the technology, 
you have to continually update your learning - I fail to see how you can argue 
that this is not specialised knowledge ... it is surely this that we pay for (Chief 
Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Engineering Company, Scotland).
My research indicates that engineers and analysts do possess specialised knowledge and 
partly because of this are a much more difficult strata to control than Whalley suggests. 
If the need to de-skill is absent, why are so many trade journals like 'Case Strategies' 
(1989) full of products, technologies, methodologies and strategies for controlling and, 
indeed, automating parts of the analysis, design and developmental processes of 
computer software? Maybe managers would like to deskill engineers' and analysts'
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work but find, for a variety of reasons, that it is not easy or worthwhile to do so. A 
number of managers I interviewed acknowledged this to be the case:
The principle means (of exercising control and de-skilling) is through the division 
of labour and the project team ... tasks are allocated to specific individuals and 
they have to report back through the project managers to me. Obviously, you 
do not always know in advance how long a particular task will take, for 
example, information gathering, or sorting out bugs in a program ... To a large 
extent, you are reliant on the skills and initiative of your staff... but there are 
tools and techniques available to managers to enable them to monitor labour 
productivity and quality of programmers and analysts - for example, we have 
software which can monitor the number of lines of error free code written, we 
have structured methodologies which lay out standard systems analysis and 
design procedures ... there are also other tools available - software that can 
monitor systems analyst productivity, clocking on and off and even qualitative 
appraisal of designs ... but it's all very embryo and easily by-passed ... to be 
honest, it would probably be counter productive to impose too rigid a control 
structure in this line of creative work ... analysts need the status to converse with 
users and need the self respect being a professional brings ... anyway, they could 
always retort that they work at home, or that they want charging for the time 
that they think ... or alternatively, they can just get up and leave secure in the 
knowledge they can walk straight into another job (Systems Manager, US 
Electronics Company, Wales).
Whalley's concept of engineers as 'trusted workers' fails to acknowledge that capital 
relies on the trust of a variety of sections of the labour force, even unskilled operatives, 
otherwise, the production of surplus-value would rely solely upon coercion and 
expensive and, ultimately, counter-productive means of rules punishment 1 .
Whereas for Whalley engineers are 'trusted workers', Armstrong (1989) argues exactly 
the reverse: that is, engineers are held in subordinate positions in the lower middle class
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by a senior management which, Armstrong argues, is fearful and distrusting of engineers 
'productivist1 knowledge and culture 18 .
Armstrong perceives management as part of unproductive labour, not being surplus 
value producing labour carrying out functions of control and co-ordination. However, I 
found that many engineers carry out highly discretionary tasks, often exercising large 
degrees of control over others' labour, along with a large degree of co-ordination of 
labour processes:
It is complete balderdash to claim engineers only carry out technical, or 
productive tasks ... it depends upon which engineers you are referring to. I 
manage this entire factory, hire and fire labour, organise work, meet suppliers, 
do orders and do design ... all my engineers have high degrees of managerial 
responsibility for the work of others ... I'm fed up with all this bleeding heart 
stuff about engineers being mere technicians ... in reality, we are managers with 
technical skills (Managing Director and Senior Production Engineer, 
Medium-sized Chemical Company, Scotland).
The whole purpose behind graduate entry and the inclusion of managerial and 
business syllabi into the engineering curriculum is to provide sound managerial 
skills for engineers ... I agree that in Britain, engineers tend not to make it to the 
top ... but in Japan, France, Germany, or the USA they do ... so it's a peculiarly 
British thing ... but I think things will change as curriculum improve and the 
latest graduates feed through the system (Professor and Director, Artificial 
Intelligence Centre, Scotland).
Armstrong's (1989) reduction of engineers to subordinate elements of the middle class, 
by dint of their possession of 'productivist' knowledge and their perceived unfitness for 
senior managerial positions by a managerial elite steeped in a 'gin and tonic' culture of
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finance and short term profitability, has appeal; for example, this interpretation formed 
the backbone of the Finneston Report. However, Armstrong fails to recognise the 
diversity of engineering jobs and, consequently, the diversity of engineers' 
responsibilities and exercise of co-ordination of others' labour. Likewise, he offers a 
one-dimensional analysis of class which is presented along a 
productivist/non-productivist axis, with the consequence that there is no relational 
understanding of class, for example, engineers changing relationship to shop floor 
workers, or the owners of capital (Smith 1986).
Engineers and Analysts as Collective Labourers
Most engineers and analysts I studied are part of the 'collective labourer1 (Marx 1959: 
508) but they are not, generally, subordinate elements of that collective labour. Indeed, 
some are not, accurately speaking, part of the 'collective labourer1 at all, in that they 
occupy ownership positions within their companies, or are self-employed working 
contracts, or running their own consultancies; yet others may have dual roles - doing 
their own fee paid consultancy work whilst also being employees within a larger 
organisation.
The nature of most engineers' and analysts' work - the tools, techniques and 
methodologies they deploy, along with their specific position within the division of 
labour as repositories of knowledge and skills won from craft labour - ensures that
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bourgeois class interests broadly defined become concretised within the design process. 
This is not to argue, however, that the majority of engineers, or analysts, are 'agents' of 
the bourgeoisie, or part of a 'new middle class'. The term middle class is too vague and 
too imprecise to capture the reality of their work and their broader social existence. The 
group is too diverse and too heterogeneous both in terms of types of work undertaken, 
positions held, social background, education, training and routes of entry. More 
importantly, both engineers and analysts are prey to the vagaries of the market, the cycle 
of accumulation and the rationalisation and cost cutting exercises that other sellers of 
labour-power experience.
Class theorists have paid insufficient attention to the differential impact of the 
accumulation process on different sections of the 'collective labourer1 - that is, on the 
formation and transformation of classes and class consciousness. This is particularly 
alarming, given the nature and breadth of contemporary changes in manufacturing. For 
example, recent changes in the job remits, demarcations, tasks and status levels of 
managerial and technical workers, as a consequence of work reorganisations around 
information technology and, in particular, around JIT, CIM, CAD/CAM and robotics 
(Ribbens 1989, Swords-Isherwood 1980, Rajan 1985, Senker & Beasley 1986, 
Goodridge 1991). Not only are traditional job boundaries becoming blurred, as many 
employees and managers redefine their skills and status, but the physical composition of 
the workforce is changing dramatically, both in terms of a shift towards services,
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credentialism and a dramatic increase in female and part-time employment (AAS 1993, 
Employment Gazette 1994).
New organisational cultures and particularly the emphasis in a number of companies I 
studied on 'harmonised' non-conflictual work relations, are having an impact on the 
class consciousness of employees at a variety of levels. One personnel manager who was 
directly involved in the creation of single status 'harmonised' policy in her company had 
the following observation:
We abolished formal status differences within the company and went for a single 
union flexible package with the EETPU ... the workforce love it ... we have 
improved facilities, single status canteen, parking, toilets and services, everyone 
here is salaried ... it's good because it abolishes snobbery and status differences 
between the workforce and managers ... we share a unity of purpose a common 
interest for the company (Personnel Manager, Japanese Electronics and 
Software Manufacturer, Mid-Wales).
I asked if having single status and 'harmonised' work relations applied to everyone and 
what impact it had on employee consciousness:
We chose this greenfield site because we wanted to start afresh with no history 
of conflict, unions, or demarcation, etc. ... all management and core workers are 
on salaried status ... and in our profit sharing scheme ... out intention is to abolish 
overt status differences and opt for a new kind of industrial relations based upon 
harmony, shared responsibility and oneness ... some managers have found this 
difficult, they feel their authority should be recognised ... they will either have to 
change their mind or leave ... our objective is to have conflict-free industrial 
relations ... through eliminating the most obvious signs of class and status 
difference within the company ... we are well on our way to achieving this ... I
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doubt the majority of the workforce are even aware of class at all (Personnel 
Manager, Japanese Electronics Manufacturer, Mid-Wales).
The argument here is that class consciousness will be suffocated under an ideology of 
co-operation and harmony, suitably reinforced by the removal of the most obvious signs 
of status and class and buttressed by employee profit sharing schemes. That a significant 
number of companies are going down this path and taking advantage of favourable 
labour market and legislative conditions to try and engineer this new culture, indicates 
the seriousness with which they treat the issue of class.
As capital ebbs and flows into and out of various branches of production in search of 
above average rates of profit, so new businesses are opened up and less profitable ones 
rationalised, or closed down. Information technology is at the cutting edge, not only in 
the sense that it is a new and expanding industry, in its own right, but also that 
information technology and information technologists are becoming increasingly key to 
the restructuring and rationalisation of other businesses. Resources within companies are 
being channelled into information technology as it becomes a more central part of their 
operations. This not only puts key IT staff in strong bargaining positions, vis a vis 
salaries, terms and conditions, but generates an air of optimism and vitality which 
informs systems analysts' perceptions of their status and class.
399
A startling contrast emerged in my research between engineers' and systems analysts' 
perceptions of self-worth and status and the way these fed into their conceptualisation of 
class. Analysts were generally perceived by both engineers and systems analysts as 
riding the crest of a technological wave and drawing their status and esteem from this:
Many in this industry think the bubble wont burst. That they are technological 
front runners who will always be in demand and will always be able to get what 
they want...and maybe they will...but it certainly affects their attitude to users 
generally and I would suggest their politics in particular....it can make them 
elitist...well maybe that's a bit harsh...but certainly many are your archetypal 
yuppies and stupidly cultivate this image both in dress, style and manner.... 
(Systems Manager, Large Financial Institution, Scotland)
In effect, analysts are the social group implementing the rationalising technologies that 
capital requires to secure profitability in the 1990s and they feel confident about their 
centrality to business and the development of their own careers. Analyst status is, 
however, not derivative of the fact that they are carrying out the global interests of 
capital, as defined by Carchedi (1980), but rather, that they are taking advantage of 
severe skills shortfalls in the area of IT and because of management's general lack of 
awareness of IT and its capabilities:
If you are young, free and single and in this business, you are riding a 
technological tidal wave ... there is big money to be made ... now I prefer a 
steadier pace ... but even here the money is good, the job carries a lot of respect 
... you can really develop yourself... I suppose in one sense, I feel guilty because 
whilst I've been progressing and getting richer, I know millions have been 
experiencing the very reverse ... when I was a bit younger and more politically 
naive, I let things go to my head and I'm sorry to say, I voted Thatcher ...
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because I genuinely believed she was a moderniser ... I was wrong but I know 
plenty of other analysts who went down the same path and still believe they are 
right (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Financial House, Scotland).
Engineers, by contrast, are less riding a technological tidal wave as left wallowing in a 
sea of business closures and rationalisations. This has profound implications for the way 
engineers and analysts perceive themselves:
Engineering is not what it used to be ... I don't think we ever had the status we 
deserved but things are worse now ... industry is collapsing, projects are 
declining ... many of the skills are not required ... the steel industry, coal, 
manufacturing generally are all in recession ... I've seen my pay fall relatively 
over the years and conditions both here and elsewhere deteriorate ... it creates a 
situation of apathy and betrayal ... really, I don't think the majority of us are 
middle class any more ... where did it get us anyway ... we should have pursued 
a more rigorous policy in relation to pay and professionalisation ... the way I see 
it, it's no wonder many engineers are turning militant, or simply wanting to get 
out of the industry, it's dead end (Electrical Engineer, Large Electronics Defence 
Contractor, Scotland).
By contrast one systems analyst commented:
Many in this industry are perceived as yuppies. Young, professional, lots of 
money, flashy cars and lifestyle and no values ... it's sad but a lot are like this ... 
particularly, some of the younger ones, but this is part of the 
grab-it-while-you-can culture we live in ... we're not all like this though ... I 
recognise that we are in an advantageous position compared to engineers 
generally ... because we have the skills and expertise that the market demands ... 
and obviously this must influence your politics and attitudes ... but I try not to let 
it go to my head (Systems Analyst, Large Public Utility, Wales).
401
This image of the analyst as technological front runner, and engineer as part of a dying 
breed, was one which recurred. It is manifest not only in individuals' perceptions of the 
two professions but in the material world in which they both work. Invariably analysts 
would dress in smart suits, work in plusher, better decorated, brighter, airier and more 
well equipped offices, whilst engineers tended to be less fashion conscious, and work in 
shoddier, gloomier environments. This is explained in part by the fact that many analysts 
are at the managerial, business driven end of design. IT is also seen as newer, cleaner and 
more strategic; hence IT staff, generally, had better conditions and a glossier image than 
engineers, even though in terms of qualifications and training they fared worse.
According to Edgell (1993) one of the problems of defining adequately engineers' and 
analysts' class position is choosing which operational model of class to use - occupation, 
income, cultural or political traits, property possession, education or whatever. As I have 
argued, this approach to class tends to define classes in terms of inbuilt properties, rather 
than seeing class as a relational entity.
Ironically, engineers and analysts utilise the occupational and income model of class 
most frequently in trying to define their class position. Yet sensing the inadequacy of 
this model alone then seek to bring into the picture, broader conceptions of social class:
Ostensibly, I would say I am middle class because I am a professional - both in 
terms of my job and income, this is how I am classed for census purposes ... 
certainly, it's what my wife thinks ... but it's not this simple ... I don't vote Liberal 
Democrat or Conservative ... I was born in Govan ... I prefer going to a match,
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rather than the theatre ... I'd rather have a pint with the lads than go to a 
restaurant ... and I've voted labour all my life just like my father (Mechanical 
Engineer, Power Generating Company, Scotland).
I would see myself as middle class ... but not your typical middle class type ... I 
suppose many would see me as a yuppie ... I get ribbed about this by my old pals 
... they point to the salary and flashy car and think I'm different to them ... more 
successful ... I suppose I am, in many ways in that I've got a good professional 
job with good career and earning prospects ... but I'm not your cultivated type ... 
I suppose I'm still working class in many ways ... after all, I still have to work for 
a living and still get tired and pressured at work (Systems Analyst, US 
Electronics Company, Scotland).
As a professional, I would regard myself as middle class ... my job, my income ... 
the university background point to this ... so er ... (stops to pause for a while) ... 
er ... but I'm not quite happy with this definition ... it doesn't seem quite right... 
really it's pretty arbitrary ... I come from a working class family, my children 
have just started at the local comprehensive ... what can I say ... I suppose the 
further you climb the systems ladder, the more middle class you might become ... 
no, that can't be true, look at John (the systems manager) he's an animal... more 
working class than a worker ... (Systems Analyst, Automotive Components 
Manufacturer, Wales).
Goldthorpe (1972) highlighted how the growth in post war administrative and 
managerial posts widened the recruiting base of the middle class, to include substantial 
numbers of working class, who did not possess the cultural capital of the traditional 
professional managerial class and helped dilute it. The rapid growth in engineering in the 
1960s and 1970s and the even more dramatic growth of information technology, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, has stimulated demand for skilled labour, much of 
which is recruited from working class families. This is particularly so for systems analysts 
and IT professionals generally (University Statistical Records 1994). Samuel (1982) has 
painted an evocative portrait of the cultural capital of this new professional strata which:
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Distinguishes itself more by its spending than by its saving. The Sunday colour 
supplements give it both a fantasy life and a set of cultural cues. Much of its 
claim to culture rests on the conspicuous display of good taste, whether in the 
form of kitchen ware, continental food, or weekend sailing and cottages ... Class 
hardly enters into the new middle class conception of themselves. Many of them 
work in an institutional world of find gradations but no clear lines of antagonism. 
The new middle class have a different emotional economy to that of their 
pre-war predecessors ... making a positive virtue of their expenditure, and 
treating the self-indulgent as an ostentatious display of good taste (New Society, 
April 1982).
For Samuel, this strata is seen as a distinct class - the new middle class - whereas my 
own research indicates that groups comprising this strata, are, generally, better 
conceptualised in terms of non-subordinate elements of the 'collective labourer'. This 
model has the advantage that one can still discuss possible cultural capitals that different 
members of the collective labourer may possess whilst at the same time not having to 
reduce those capitals to specific class practices and pre-fixed class positions. Thus, 
whilst some of my interviewees displayed the traits noted by Samuel, others did not, and, 
importantly, were deeply offended by such caricatures:
On the one hand, there is this emphasis on lifestyles which took off in the early 
eighties ... key professionals, it seems to me, were targeted in adverts not only 
on television, but in the trade journals ... particularly IT journals ... so there's this 
image and expectation we have and others have about how we should act, what 
our tastes and politics are, or should be ... well it's all bullshit ... just image 
building and to be honest many of us find it offensive, particularly the older ones 
... it's not only damaging vis a vis your relations with users ... but it's tiring being 
the butt of countless Yuppie jokes ... (Senior Systems Analyst, Large Financial 
Institution, Scotland).
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Indeed, the new political realism fuelled in the eighties by the collapse of East European 
economies and the apparent bankruptcy of socialist politics provided fertile terrain upon 
which the seeds of populism and despair took root as a new cultural nihilism expressed 
in the 'me now culture', was given open legitimacy and reinforced by a revival of 
monetarist and free market policies. Many engineers' and systems analysts' conceptions 
of class, like those of other sections of the collective labourer, are interwoven within this 
new socio/political milieu. What is surprising, given this backdrop, is that many 
engineers and analysts so openly recognise the saliency of class. A significant number I 
interviewed argued that they come from working class backgrounds. Indeed, contrary 
to Samuel's presentation, some make great play on this, using it to establish their 
credibility and suitability for the job they were in:
I'm not wet behind the ears like some college-nosed graduate ... I can't be 
ridiculed and have the piss taken out of me so easily by the lads on the shop floor 
... because I've been there, I know how they think that what motivates them 
(Systems Analyst, US Electronics Company, Scotland).
This job requires basic common sense and strength of character some may see 
my background as a disqualification for this job ... but I think coming from a 
working class background enables me to do the job better, it gives me more 
insights (Systems Analyst, Large Private Utility, Wales).
In many instances, engineers and analysts would utilise notions of 'common sense', 
'nouse' or 'strength of character1 , to identify what were seen as noble characteristics of 
working class life which they admired and wanted to be associated with. Murray (1989)
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makes a similar point in his study of systems staff, citing one manager, in particular, who 
made the analogy with miners, leanness and absence of excess weight:
I liken us to coal workers. We dig coal. We deliver things that are tangible to 
our users ... we are lean, very lean. We've got no fat on us (Project Manager 
cited Murray 1989:7).
A few analysts and engineers went so far as to argue that not only was their work in 
many ways analogous to that of production workers producing tangible artefacts but 
that they were, in fact, working class.
I work for a salary ... I have to get up Monday morning and go to work ... 
whether I like to, or not ... work can be tiring and pressured and it has been 
recently, what with the pressure to meets demands for deadlines ... no really I 
know many people would see me as middle class ... but they are the same silly 
lads and lasses who see typists, junior office clerks and hairdressers as middle 
class (Systems Analyst, Regional Power Generating Utility, Wales).
One engineer, in particular, pointed to the detailed division, of labour, rise of specialist 
knowledge and lack of innovative and interesting work, to highlight why he felt he, as 
engineers more generally, were working class:
You need to remember that engineering is becoming more specialised, certain 
skills are in demand like CAD engineers ... but it's not like it used to be ... your 
rounded engineer, with broad-based skills, is simply not required, employers 
want specialist knowledge and they bring you in to do that one task ... then you 
are out ... there is also a lack of work ... and what work there is available is 
becoming more routine and boring ... I don't get a buzz out of this job, or feel 
I'm anything special... I'm struggling to pay the mortgage and moving from one
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short term contract to another it's very insecure ... I feel like a worker and in 
my opinion am treated like a worker (Electronic Engineer, Large Public Service 
Institution, Scotland).
Smith (1986) and Whalley (1987) agree that shifts towards graduate recruitment, within 
engineering, following the ending of the old seven year craft apprenticeship, have 
weakened ties between engineers and shop floor workers. My own research confirms 
that many engineering and systems managers feel that graduate recruitment is having an 
impact on the class composition of engineers and analysts and giving rise to different 
forms of conduct and behaviour:
My college graduates are bright boys, don't get me wrong but there is something 
not quite the same about their relationship to the shop floor that there was in the 
craft apprenticed engineer ... it is a vital element lost, in many firms ... it's not 
even a question of communication ... it's more than that, it's tacit knowledge, 
respect for, and joint appreciation of each other's tasks ... some graduates in 
some firms never go near the shop floor they remain aloof... I won't tolerate that 
here (Chief Engineer, Aerospace Industry, England).
With graduate intake, the image of professionalism has grown ... it's a good thing 
in one sense but something has been lost in the process. We need graduates and 
their specialist knowledge, don't get me wrong ... but they are often out of touch 
with workers in production ... engineering is about getting things made and this 
requires co-operation ... some of our graduates get up people's backs ... arrogant 
is a word that comes to mind ... they just want to delegate everything and not get 
their hands dirty. I cannot see these people having much in common with those 
on the shop floor. We've had a few, who on realising this, have upped and off 
(Chief Design Engineer, Heavy Electrical Equipment Manufacturer, Scotland).
One systems manager was forthright in his condemnation of graduates:
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I'll be frank with you, I don't want bloody graduates in my department, they are 
more trouble than they are worth ... systems design requires sensitivity and good 
communication skills and an appreciation of others' positions ... but too many 
graduates don't possess any of these qualities, they tend to be snotty and elitist... 
part of a different class ... this makes them abrasive with users (Systems 
Manager, Food and Drink Processing Industry, Scotland).
Not all systems managers were of this ilk. Indeed, most recognised the need for 
professionalisation and credentialism within the computer industry and that graduate 
recruitment was a way of achieving this. Ironically, graduates because they are 
perceived to be of a different class, can be seen as possible sources of tension and 
conflict within the design process at the same time as being a necessary part of analysts' 
and engineers' attempts to advance professionalisation.
However, not all graduates take an elitist view of design or shop floor workers and feel 
that it is either managers, or shop floor workers themselves, who cause the tension:
I graduated four years ago ... since then I have had two jobs, both in electronics 
... I sense the tension sometimes between colleagues and workers in production 
and myself... I think they think I am a bit snotty because I came out of university 
with a good degree ... it can get tiresome ... particularly when your own boss is 
reminding you continuously about good commonsensical values and intuitive 
design ... (Systems Analyst, Food and Drink Processing Industry, Scotland).
Just because I come from a solidly middle class background and went to 
university, doesn't mean I am anti-trade unionist and pro-Thatcher ... I actually 
belong in the MSF which is one of four unions organising technical and 
managerial staffs here. I am also a Member of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers, out of a desire to keep abreast of technological 
developments and to advance the profession ... politically none of the parties 
interest me ... they are all out to screw the working man (Electrical and 
Electronics Engineer, Japanese Domestic Appliance Manufacturer, Wales).
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This engineer was keen to highlight that his membership of both the MSF and the IEE 
represented something of a contradictory position in the sense that it recognised that 
engineers' position is deteriorating, both in terms of pay and professional recognition. 
He was adamant that there was no contradiction between professionalism and unionism, 
rather:
I, like all workers, need to maintain and improve my living standards ... many 
older and more senior engineers are aloof from this reality, that's why we are in 
such a bloody awful position with respect to other occupations ... at the same 
time, just because I want to see engineering have more recognition doesn't mean 
I see engineering in elitist terms ... rather without the professional recognition it's 
more difficult to bargain with employers ... who tend to treat you like shit 
anyway (Electrical and Electronic Engineer, ibid).
Interestingly, he argued that one reason why he joined the MSF was that he believed it 
would take a more militant stand in advancing engineers pay and status within the 
company. Smith (1986) highlights how TASS, which later merged with ASTMS to 
form the MSF, dropped its militant industrial unionism of the seventies to accommodate 
the separatist and elitist views of graduate engineers. Smith's argument is that elitism, 
whilst endemic to engineers' place in the division of labour, can also exist alongside 
values of co-operation and unity; much depends on the political organisation of the 
union and the development of class relations within the workplace. Cooley (1980) 
makes a similar point when he demonstrates how in the Lucas Aerospace Combine
409
Committee many engineers were won over to the side of striking shop floor workers in a 
united front against closures and redundancy.
Whilst engineers and analysts often design systems that de-skill, downgrade and routinise 
workers' lives, this does not make all engineers, or analysts either willing agents of the 
bourgeoisie, or as a consequence, petit-bourgeoisie themselves. Many workers intensify 
the exploitation of their fellow workers, be it within the competitive confines of quality 
teams, informal team leaders, union discrimination against female, part-time and 
un-skilled workers, utilisation of job demarcations and restrictive practices against other 
workers, or agreement to productivity and quality related bonus schemes, won at other 
workers' expense. In addition, many workers carry out supervisory functions - 
chargehands, foremen, setters, team leaders, or in informal work teams where individuals 
and groups emerge who seek to impose work and productivity norms. This does not 
mean they are not part of the collective labourer, although it does indicate that they lack 
consciousness of their own role in subordinating workers' interests to capital - that is, 
they lack class consciousness.
Most engineers and analysts I interviewed are part of the collective labourer but by and 
large they are not class conscious labourers. They tend to design systems which secure 
bourgeois class interests within the design process. However, these designs are not 
theorised in terms of securing a particular class interest but in terms of securing 'system 
interests' and 'efficiency' broadly defined. In effect, the tools, techniques, values and
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methods that engineers and analysts use, reinforce bourgeois class interest by presenting 
these interests in technical, rational and systemic forms. Thus, control and systems 
theory, cost benefit analysis, technicist and business rationality, and even notions of 
design purity can act together to constitute a design milieu which is both uncritical of 
existing power structures and design approaches, whilst, at the same time, legitimising 
the design approaches taken on the grounds that they are rational and the most efficient:
It is imperative within any design not to jeopardise the functionality of the 
system ... (Systems Analyst, Power Generating Utility, Wales).
Sometimes you have to make decisions on job allocation and possible 
demarcation, or skilling, as a consequence of your design ... nobody wants to put 
people out of work, or see them lose pay ... but you can't sacrifice efficiency ... 
for the sake of personal preference (Production Engineer, Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer, Scotland).
Habermas (1973) and Murray (1989) have highlighted the ways in which technical 
rationality can serve to mask specific class based decisions within the design process, 
behind an apparent value free notion of the organisation as a machine-like entity within 
which individuals are
Only cogs in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes them an essentially 
fixed route of march (Weber cited Giddens 1972: 47).
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It would be easy to dismiss engineers' and analysts' presentation of their work and design 
in this way as simple apology on their part. To do so, however, would be to downplay 
the way in which particular tools, techniques and approaches come to embody deeper 
value systems and act to structure often, unconsciously, designers' work. One engineer I 
interviewed was exceptional in that he openly professed that many of the tools and 
techniques analysts use are value loaded:
Cost benefit analysis is used to justify managerial decisions ... you can use it to 
prove any design you want... structured methods, imposed on analysts by many 
managers and consultants, emphasise getting the requirements right - 
management requirements - they do not encourage you to challenge the 
boundaries of a system ... Structured methods also act as a management control 
tool... CASE and all the other software engineering tools are just that - tools ... 
but their architecture and structure, the context of their use - the whole division 
of labour and control of projects through project management software and 
practices - is geared towards ensuring management's interests predominate 
within the design process ... and presenting these interests as rational and 
inevitable ... but I suggest most systems analysts would recoil in horror at this 
suggestion (Software Engineer, University, Scotland).
The same engineer highlighted how systems analysis and design takes place through 
institutionalised divisions of labour - project teams and often close senior user liaison 
which in turn acts to cushion the analyst from the consequences of their designs on 
others' lives - for example, leaving issues of job relocation, regrading or losses to 
personnel or senior user managers.
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However, even despite the array of tools and techniques and the specific divisions of 
labour within design, which tend to cushion analysts and engineers from the broader 
ramifications of their work, a small number of those I interviewed were visibly troubled 
by the consequences of their designs on other workers. They did not like to discuss the 
issue - they invariably presented their designs in technical - rational terms first, but the 
strength of this ideology was not always enough to hide the decisions taken and the 
political and social consequences which flowed from them:
Of course it bothers me, knowing I may be putting someone out of a job, or 
reducing their pay packet, as a consequence of my action ... it's painful ... We're 
only human ... many of these people you've known possibly for years ... like you 
they have a wife and kids and mortgage ... and you know ... at the back of your 
mind that it's you who has wrecked their lives (Systems Analyst, Large Private 
Utility, Wales).
Sure, I've had sleepless nights and nightmares about my work ... I try and 
rationalise what I do in terms of long term efficiency and job savings ... but 
watching some poor sod leave the gate on Friday afternoon after years of service 
... knowing you've put him there ... can cut right into you ... oh yes, it hurts 
(Industrial Engineer, Chemical Company, Scotland).
The fact that systems design is political after all and that analysts and designers make 
political decisions is too much for some to bear. According to one systems manager:
These types are better offered technical careers ... you can utilise their technical 
knowledge and reward them accordingly and leave the more up front work to 
those who are less troubled by making these decisions (Systems Manager, 
Automotive Components Manufacturer, Wales).
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However, it is not this easy because as more complex interactive systems come on line, 
IS staff generally are opened up to the political decision making process. Ironically, as 
Murray (1989) argues, many do not want this. Rather they wish to be 'strapped to the 
user1 and to let the user managers make the painful decisions on system requirements, 
etc. and just let the IS staff build the system. However, at the same time, they recognise 
that users are not always in the best position to define these requirements, that in effect 
user requirements might not meet systems requirements. Murray cites the case of one 
particular project manager, Mike, to highlight the point:
It is a strange autonomy, Mike lays claim to for, on the one hand, he appears to 
want to be dictated to, while, on the other, he wants to be able to say to senior 
management, "this is what you can have". And, while being "totally tied" to the 
business, he rather seems to want to run the systems development show all by 
himself (Murray 1989: 11).
Murray argues that many analysts and IT managers appear to articulate a service/servile 
mentality:
What they appear to want is someone who will tell them clearly what to do, who 
will subjugate them, and who will ensure they are totally tied to the business. 
This desire to be enslaved by, and hooked to, the business conjures up images of 
bondage and martyrdom Prometheus chained to the rock (1989: 12).
Obviously not all engineers and analysts I interviewed displayed concern over the impact 
of their design on workers' lives. A tiny minority expressed overtly anti-workerist
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sentiment. These were invariably consultant, or senior managers themselves - i.e. 
directors and significant shareholders in the companies they worked; only a few could be 
regarded as part of the collective labourer:
Workers are there to work and management to manage, it's not my job to 
improve the quality of workers' lives ... my task is to give management the 
power it needs to manager (Senior IT Consultant, Major UK Consultancy).
More often than not, it was not so much that analysts, or engineers were anti-workerist. 
Rather, they tended to perceive the human operator as an area of ambiguity and possible 
system dysfunction, and consequently the source of potentially extra work and stress:
I'm not against trade unions ... I recognise they do a vital job ... I'm in one myself 
... but they can make life difficult when it comes to design (Systems Analyst, 
Financial Institution, Scotland).
I don't think any of my lads have bad feelings towards users at whatever level... 
it's not bad feeling, more like ... sometimes you just wish you were dealing with 
the technology ... it's less troublesome (Chief Engineer, Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Scotland).
Marx (1959) analysed the various strata within the collective labourer by utilising the 
concept of subordination. A factory worker would be seen as carrying out subordinate 
functions, a manager non-subordinate functions. Which strata within the collective 
labourer carry out which functions is contingent on class struggle and the ever changing 
cycle of accumulation which acts to condition the particular social division of labour, at
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any point in time. In effect, what constitutes a dominant and subordinate section of the 
collective labourer at any one particular historical conjuncture, may not do so at another. 
For the sake of descriptive elegance, an entire school of sociologists define class in 
terms of inbuilt frozen fast parameters. However, struggle within the labour process 
over skills, pay and conditions, is an ongoing process intimately bound up with the cycle 
of accumulation and the appropriation of surplus-value. It is a process involving a 
variety of different actors, organisations, interest groups and ideologies which are 
different, in different places and times. By defining class in terms of fixed attributes like 
skill, politics, or ideology, or along arbitrary productive non-productive axis, one runs 
the risk (as many on the left have done) of ignoring key social groups, or consigning 
other groups within the collective labourer into different camps, in terms of whether they 
are more or less ideologically sound.
Marx's theorisation of 'collective labourer1 , recognises the domination of the mode of 
extraction of surplus value in determining the relations of rulers and ruled, whilst at the 
same time, recognising that these social relations, nonetheless, in turn impact back upon 
the mode of surplus-value extraction. Capitalist production, creating a mass of workers 
who are compelled into union to defend common interests but who at the same time are 
split in a myriad of ways - skills, pay, sexism, nationalism political persuasion, etc. (Marx 
1972). One can be a racist bigot, union hater and sexist but still be part of the collective 
labourer - the collective labourer is not a class or homogenous mass with uniform 
consciousness. Indeed, Marx utilised the concept precisely to accommodate the myriad
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fracturing of working class consciousness, as the capitalist division of labour and 
commodification of more and more sections of social life occurred. The key point is, 
that within the collective labourer, different groups will have different levels of political 
consciousness. That is, they will conceptualise their relationship to other groups 
differently and this consciousness may transform as relations between its bearers change 
over time. For example, blue collar male manual workers may at one time have 
constituted the core working class, standing in a particular articulation to management, 
organised around particular productive technique and articulating specific values and 
ideologies, for example, concerning the organisation and control of production. At 
another time it may be white bloused females, or high tech cerebral workers, who are 
standing in a new articulation to a differently constituted management.
The development and transformation of strata within the 'collective labourer1 is intimately 
bound up with the dynamics of this particular mode of production and particularly into 
capital's creation of a world market and the development of the international division of 
labour. Many class theorists overlook this crucial dimension with the consequence that 
in their analysis of class they often offer Anglo-centric accounts of class - for example, 
Poulantzas and Ehrenreich and Ehrenreichs's assertion of a declining working class 
abstracts class formation in America and Europe from a broader internationalist 
perspective. Once this perspective is included one can recognise the massive 
transformation of pre-capitalist social formations and often pauperisation let alone 
proletarianisation of whole countries and continents (Warren 1985, Littler 1985).
417
Summary
Through an evaluation and critical assessment of a number of key attempts to theorise 
the class position of 'intermediate strata' I have shown that none of these attempts 
adequately capture the class experience of the engineers and systems analysts in my 
study. I have argued that one reason for this is that the models of class advanced have 
been too formal and ascriptive - seeking to define class in terms of fixed and formal 
criteria like voting patterns, job categories, productive non-productive divisions etc., and 
consequently have failed to theorise class as a relation. Once one adopts a relational 
model of class then Marx's concept of the 'collective labourer' becomes a valuable 
conceptual tool for theorising the position of the engineers and systems analysts in my 
study in that it emphasises the domination of the mode of surplus value extraction whilst 
at the same time capturing the contingent and ever changing relations these groups of 
workers experience. I have also demonstrated the ways in which the class position of 
engineers and analysts has an impact upon not only the types of system they design, but 




Summary of the Main Findings
Most of the organisations studied are using information technology to 
restructure and rationalise their operations. In particular much information 
technology is concerned with reducing information processing, packaging, 
handling, storage, quality and design costs. Information technology is enabling 
organisations to raise the rate of productivity of a whole new army of white 
collar and managerial workers; ranging from routine clerks through to designers 
and line managers.
In one sense the increasing use of new technology reflects the changed terms of 
competition between firms and the need to cut costs and 'non-profitable' 
processes and procedures. On the other hand, it also reflects the growth in the 
organic composition of capital concomitant upon the development of the 
productive forces under the capitalist mode of production. In a very real sense 
information technology can thus be seen as the renewed domination of dead 
labour over living, of capital over the working class - and a specific 
manifestation of the present historical conjuncture.
Within flexible specialisation, post Fordist, regulation and post modern theory 
information technology is accorded a prominent place. It is often discussed in 
Ideological fashion - presented as a 'prime mover' initiating sweeping
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transformation in traditional modes of production, work organisation and culture 
- as an omniscient capital systematically removes all obstacles to profitability. In 
practice, however, different organisations respond differently to the changed 
terms of competition and balance of social forces that they experience. Some 
organisations are taking advantage of favourable legislation and labour market 
conditions to implement new technology, new working practices and radical 
organisational changes; others, however, are doing the reverse and taking 
advantage of favourable legislation to intensify existing work procedures and 
practice without any commensurate outlays of capital on new technology or 
alternative programmes of work restructuring. Change is far more contingent 
and contested than suggested by many of the sweeping paradigm models. With 
organisations reassessing and restructuring their operations, one needs to be 
cautious about asserting sweeping transformation in the mode of production; 
rather, specific organisational activity may simply be a response to local 
exigencies and circumstances - in turn a reflection of the current historical 
conjuncture and therefore open to modification or even reversal.
I have demonstrated how under monopoly capitalism - with its army of 
administrators, managers and designers - notions of what constitutes good and 
bad design are arrived at. Through identifying and documenting a distinctive set 
of values and methods that engineers and systems analysts hold and practice (i.e. 
formal theory, analytic theory, Taylorism and methods time measurement, 
control and systems theory, productivism, design purity, technical and business 
rationality) I have shown that these are one way in which what constitutes
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'capital's interest' is open to interpretation. Far from being omniscient and 
having one interest capital is a social system which in its monopoly stages 
engenders a profound and detailed social division of labour. I have demonstrated 
that engineers and analysts - key strata within this social division of labour - not 
only exercise degrees of autonomy within the design process, but also make 
sense of their own designs and design activity by reference to a specific set of 
values, methods and practice which constitute a 'design culture' or 'engineering 
system'. This design culture reinforces in engineers and analysts a sense of 
identity and self importance. It also legitimates their claims for status and 
corporate power, whilst enabling them to make pronunciations on not only what 
constitutes good or bad design but also what constitutes 'capital's interest' or 
their organisations interest.
Whilst some of the specific values and methodologies which engineers and 
analysts hold reinforce the social domination of capital within the production 
process, others can, at times, serve as point of condemnation of capitalism. I 
have identified the tension between those who see systems analysis in terms of 
an engineering discipline and those who see it as a more artistic or managerial 
activity. The latter are particularly conscious of the fact that too close an 
identification with engineering could jeopardise analysts' credibility with users 
and, particularly, senior managers. This tension between 'engineering' and 'art' 
permeates the discourse on tools and techniques. Those who are most critical of 
'software engineering' solutions are usually those who have most experience, or 
pride themselves on being able to design systems on the 'back of a fag packet'.
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They tend to be the ones who are more sensitive to the analysts' role as 
instigator and initiator of managerial and organisational change.
I have documented and discussed the controversy over recruitment and skills 
and have established that recruitment sources vary enormously and that attempts 
at imposing rigid recruitment criteria tend to evaporate in the context of severe 
labour market shortfalls of systems analysts. Similarly whilst specific tools and 
techniques are available to systems managers to tighten control over systems 
analysts work, by and large there is little evidence that any process of deskilling 
of analysts is taking place. Even structured methods like SSADM or the latest 
4gls and user workbenches are still widely reported by both analysts and 
managers alike as being no substitute for the skills of an experienced analyst.
By discussing disaster planning I have demonstrated how analysts' commitment 
to a technicist rationality often comes unstuck in the face of 'recalcitrant users' 
and that, far from IT being the panacea for organisational problems, analysts 
may have to recognise that better understanding of the social relations of 
production is necessary if designs are to succeed. Systems analysts, unlike 
engineers, have tended to be more organisationally assertive, seizing the 
language of business rationality and systems efficiency not only to impress upon 
others their commitment to organisational change but to advance an ideology 
which presents analysts as the key agents and guardians of change. Analysts tend 
to see themselves as advancing the 'system's interest' as opposed to the 
'particularist' interest advanced by users. Analysts' historic subordination to
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users causes tensions between the master and servant; these tensions may 
become more acute as IT becomes strategically more important to an 
organisation's success.
In discussing the software bottleneck I have demonstrated, through an analysis 
of a variety of systems design approaches, the difficulty of embodying the social 
in the technical, i.e. of mapping and modelling the user environment, procedures 
and practices in software. The software bottleneck reflects the contradiction 
between the socialisation of the forces of production on the one hand and their 
continual restraint within the dominant set of capitalist property relations on the 
other hand. Many of the solutions advocated for overcoming the software 
bottleneck represent an attempt to socialise the process of analysis and design 
through harnessing the knowledge, experience, skills and adaptability of a 
variety of users and designers and through 'opening up' or rendering more 
democratic the process of design. However, whilst management may seek to 
'socialise' the process of design so as to tap into employee experience and 
creativity and to win their consent to change they can only do so within the 
narrow constraints imposed by the dominant set of property relations and the 
prevailing configurations of power.
I have demonstrated that analysts' utilisation of the concept of 'user' weds them 
to a narrow and at times self - restricting model of organisational power which 
downplays differences between different types of user and serves to homogenise 
user activity. One reason why many analysts adopt this narrow definition of the
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user is that it helps to legitimise their own activity as advancers of the 'systems 
interest'. It also saves them much soul searching over issues of re-grading, re- 
training, or possible redundancy that users may face as a consequence of their 
designs.
Through an analysis of the project team approach to design I have demonstrated 
how systems staff can cajole users and surreptitiously advance the 'systems 
interest' as synonymous with the user interest. Many of the values and methods 
which systems analysts hold serve to reinforce anti-democratic design processes. 
For example, notions of systems purity are often used to justify excluding union 
officers or certain categories of users from the design remit in case they 
'unnecessarily clutter the system'. Likewise, systems analysts' systemic models 
of organisational activity reinforce functionalist views of users; consequently 
anything, or anyone, deemed to disrupt 'the system' tends to be perceived as 
dysfunctional. Whilst the outward development of participative design 
technologies and techniques conveys a sense of democratisation within the 
design process, particularly with recent emphasis on user centred design, many 
of these techniques in practice tie the user all the more readily to a dominant 
systems and business culture - one which forecloses alternative dialogue, 
discourse and design.
The predominance of a technologically deterministic view of change amongst 
trade unionists, along with their commitment to collective bargaining, has kept 
minimal employee involvement in the design process. Whilst union officials
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recognise the need for continual investment in new technology the majority are 
dissatisfied with the way employers are introducing it, i.e. 'via the back door' 
and without discussion. Ironically this dissatisfaction stands at odds with union 
officers' uncritical acceptance of design as 'management's prerogative'.
Union involvement in the design process tends to be confined to traditional areas 
of collective bargaining - for example resolving working details arising from the 
introduction of a particular technology, such as job demarcations, staffing or 
retraining. The unions that had most input into the design process and those that 
were able to secure formal terms between employer and union were often white 
collar unions like the MSF. One reason for this is that their members are often 
strategically placed to effect design outcomes. Overall, however, issues relating 
to democracy at work, quality of working life and the need to design rewarding 
jobs are today further from the trade union agenda than at any time since the 
second world war. The majority of union officers were content to wait for the 
re-election of a Labour government before they return to these issues.
Whilst the majority of unions have experienced dramatic membership losses over 
the past ten years, union officers attribute these losses to government policy and 
recessionary pressures rather than to the introduction of new technology per se.
With the exception of officials from the AEU and EETPU, union officers 
unsurprisingly, were critical of the governments free market philosophy arguing 
that it was both misguided and damaging to the long term interests of British
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manufacturing. Most union officers argued that Conservative governments have 
created a climate of fear and distrust which, with their monetarist policies, 
mitigates against the smooth introduction of new technologies whilst at the same 
time inhibits many employers from making the necessary capital investments in 
new plant and equipment.
There was general consensus from trade unions that attempts to introduce 
flexible working, personalised contracts and single union agreements represent 
an offensive on working class living standards and rights. However, many union 
officials conceded that the trade unions themselves were embroiled in the 
process. Reasons cited included falling membership patterns (which are 
prompting unions to poach other unions members), intensified competition for 
'representational contracts' from employers, and the growth of a 'new political 
realism' such as that displayed by the former AEU and EETPU - a realism 
which no longer acknowledges the need for class solidarity or socialist politics.
British trade unions were unprepared for the onslaught that befell them with the 
election of the Conservatives in 1979. The trade union movements adherence to 
collective bargaining and its reformist political programme means that it is weak 
to resist overtly anti union legislation. Rank and file members, particularly those 
most vulnerable to victimisation i.e. the unskilled, part time and female workers 
have consequently been poorly protected.
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On the basis of detailed interviewing and observation and through an analysis 
and critique of several key theoretical debates on class I have argued that most 
of the engineers and analysts in my study are part of the 'collective labourer'. 
The collective labourer is not a class, but a concept used by Marx to denote the 
diversity of labourers and the contradictory socialisation they experience as 
commodity relations under the capitalist mode of production extend ever wider. 
I have also shown that which particular strata within the collective labourer 
carry out either subordinate or non- subordinate functions is contingent on class 
struggle and the ever changing cycle of accumulation which acts to condition the 
particular social division of labour at any point in time.
I have demonstrated the ways in which engineers and analysts conceptualise 
their class position and how this in turn can influence their design practice and 
their relations with others in the design team and wider organisation. Whilst 
arguing that the majority of engineers and analysts are part of the collective 
labourer I have also demonstrated that the majority of those in my study are not 
class conscious labourers. Consequently, they tend to be implicated, sometimes 
consciously but more often unconsciously, in designing systems that tend to 
secure bourgeois class interests within the design process.
Contribution to Theoretical Debates
This thesis examines the process of business restructuring and the role of a key 
and largely uncharted group of workers within this process, systems analysts.
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Given the reflexive nature of the research, no one particular thesis was pursued 
from the outset. Rather, on the basis of fieldwork and relevant literature, I 
proceeded to develop (and modify) several theses as the work progressed.
I have argued that many of the key theoretical debates on changes in business 
and manufacturing are insufficient and based on a limited reading of economic, 
social and political trends.
Having critically evaluated the process of organisational restructuring and drawn 
out some of its key implications in chapter one, in chapter two I advanced the 
thesis that engineers are not merely the blind agents of capital, reproducing 
'capital's interest' through the types of technologies and systems which they 
design; but, rather, that they have autonomy over the design process and that 
they actively interpret the interest of capital via a distinctive set of values, 
methods and practice. Not only do engineers have autonomy within the design 
process but the values and methods which they deploy constitute a design 
culture which enables them to define their activity and relationship to others 
within the organisation.
One of my research objectives was to document who systems analysts are and 
the type of work which they do. Very little hitherto has been written on the 
work of systems analysts. I have developed a picture of their work, their culture, 
their role within the design process; their relationship with other organisational 
members and how these factors influence the systems which they build.
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Critically. I have established the ways in which they exercise autonomy within 
the design process and discussed in detail the ways in which they interpret what, 
precisely, is in 'capitals interest'.
One consequence of studying systems analysts was that I became familiar with 
the techniques they deployed to elicit information from users and the ways in 
which they tried to secure user support for their designs. This opened up a set of 
issues relating to design and democracy. Through discussion of the software 
bottleneck I have assessed a range of proposed solutions and advanced the thesis 
that there is a tension between, on the one hand, the socialisation of the design 
process (so as to better elicit information about the user environment and be 
better able to secure user support for the system) and, on the other hand, the 
need to impose the system upon users. To my knowledge this is the first 
research to specifically address these issues. Through my fieldwork and my 
assessment of the different tools and techniques available to systems analysts I 
have demonstrated the limitations of these tools and techniques and shown how 
systems staff are implicated in developing an anti-democratic design discourse.
My analysis of union involvement in the design process demonstrates that unions 
have a low level of involvement and an uneven level of awareness of issues 
relating to work design. In addition I have argued that many union officers hold 
deterministic views about technology and design which coupled with their 
commitment to collective bargaining, produces a discourse which fails to explore 
the social relations of production. The 'black box' remains closed, i.e. design
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remains a managerial domain and mysterious. This technicist discourse 
undermines the importance of employee involvement in the design process as a 
precondition to securing broader employee rights at work.
My research sought to examine a number of key issues affecting trade unions, 
including associated changes in working practices, specific legislation, 
membership patterns and agreements. The existing pattern of collective 
bargaining and trade union commitment to tripartism and reformism has left 
many rank and file workers unprotected against employers seeking to introduce 
new technologies and new organisational cultures. It has also put many unions in 
the unenviable position of policing and implementing policies which tighten 
managerial control over the workforce - for example, the signing of single 
union, no-strike and multi-flexible agreements.
From the outset of the research I was interested in debates on class and, in 
particular, attempts to theorise the position of the so called 'intermediate strata' 
or middle class. According to census definition, the majority of engineers and 
analysts I studied fell into typical middle class categories. However, I became 
more and more concerned that my findings did not square with this 'typical' 
categorisation. Consequently I began to focus on this issue. This was done not 
to prove or disprove specific theoretical debates to convey more accurately the 
sense of frustration and anxiety that such characterisations were causing many of 
the engineers and analysts in my study. I was also keen to develop a model 
which took into account the relational element of class and which tied analysis of
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class into the broader process of restructuring and capital accumulation 
discussed in chapter one. Finally, I recognised that engineers' and analysts' 
perceptions of class had some impact on the systems they designed as well as 
upon the allegiances and relations they established in work. No analysis of the 
process whereby systems come to be -designed would be complete without an 
exploration of engineers' and systems analysts 1 class position and class practices. 
Through interviewing and participant observation I was able to let engineers 
and analysts speak for themselves about their class and its impact on the design 
process.
General Themes Relating to Engineers & Analysts Work
From the outset of the research I was concerned with documenting the work of 
systems analysts and engineers and in extending labour process debates on 
autonomy and control. Importantly, I was concerned with opening up what 
McLoughlin and Clark (1994) refer to as the "black box' of technology to show 
how specific engineering values, methods and practice constitute an ' engineering 
system'. As McLoughlin and Clark (1994) acknowledge there is a dearth of 
literature relating to this area - the 'engineering system' remains essentially 
'mysterious'. However, on the basis of an extensive fieldwork approach and use 
of a critical reflexive methodology, I have been able to open up this 'black box'; 
and, importantly, through drawing out several general themes relating to 
engineers and analysts practice, shed light on the process of design and the 
nature of engineers and analysts work. It is precisely the diversity of
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respondents, their individual experience, training, sector, locale etc.. which 
enabled me to weave a rich tapestry of their work. The richness stemming from 
the number, variety and colour of threads used. In effect the ability to see the 
'general' picture as opposed to the 'particular'- is a consequence of the quality 
and diversity of the 'particular'. Some of these general themes are elaborated 
below.
First, engineers and systems analysts exercise autonomy within the design 
process - autonomy over the types of systems that get built and autonomy over 
the exercise of their own labour as designers. This autonomy is however, 
relative, it is exercised and circumscribed by both a distinctive set of values, 
methods and practice and by the specific division of labour, organisational 
culture and context in which engineers and analysts work. Thus, for example, 
whilst as professionals many engineers and analysts acknowledge they should 
have a degree of autonomy over design some analysts felt they could exercise 
more autonomy than others. For example, one Senior Consultant felt that he 
needed to be given a significant degree of autonomy and power an open remit' 
if he were to deliver the kinds of systems he felt management needed. That is 
one reason why he liked working for a leading UK consultancy and why he liked 
to be invited into companies at executive level. However, even relatively young 
and inexperienced analysts in 'tightly policed departments' are able to 
manipulate users and shape the type of systems that get built. For example, one 
young analyst I interviewed in a Japanese electronics company confided that 
'purely for personal reasons' he dissuaded management from automating a
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particular work process through emphasising in his analysis the unnecessary 
cost, disruption and loss of harmony that the proposed new system would entail. 
Likewise a very senior and respected systems manager within a large private 
utility indicated that it was relatively easy, given his standing, the 'logicality' of 
the proposed system and a 'decent systems budget', to manipulate various users 
into accepting his proposed hand held terminal system. This was done through 
selective presentation of argument, the 'rigging' of project teams, the bringing in 
of'outside experts' and plying potential user managers with good food, drink 
and smooth video presentations.
Most engineers and analysts, however, felt uncomfortable discussing the issue of 
autonomy. The younger and usually less experienced, along with those working 
on more back end' or detailed aspects of a design, would more readily say that 
they were 'working to spec' or merely 'executing user requirements'. This 
would be particularly true if they felt they were being overheard by more senior 
colleagues. Senior engineers, senior analysts and systems mangers would 
however, when pressed, acknowledge that not only did they exercise autonomy 
vis a vis users but sometimes wielded considerable power. Analysts in particular 
would often invoke crude functionalist systems discourse to justify this exercise 
of autonomy i.e. they were exercising autonomy for the 'good of the system' as 
opposed to 'particularistic' user interests. For example, one senior analyst in the 
aerospace industry prided himself on his ability to exercise 'autonomy' in a 
'balanced way' arguing it would be dangerous to let a 'rookie loose on users' 
because such a person would not have the intimate knowledge and experience of
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users at that particular plant. The more senior systems analysts, production and 
industrial engineers recognised that their work was in fact highly political. They 
were making choices affecting not only the quality of working life of employees 
using the system but the viability of the organisation itself. For example, one 
consultant analyst argued that it was precisely the 'political nature of the work' 
that attracted him to the job, he could use his position to get things done. His 
status, power, large salary, expensive car and high living standards were in his 
opinion a necessary part of the package. Likewise, an industrial engineer in the 
chemical industry argued you need power and autonomy to 'cut through the 
bullshit', 'get things done" and 'overcome' the 'obstinate and obdurate 
characters one comes across in this business'. The consternation felt by the 
majority of engineers and analysts, however, when discussing autonomy stems 
from the fact that, on the one hand, they present themselves as 'servants' of the 
organisation, 'unbiased professionals' 'committed to the user function'; whilst, 
on the other hand, their implication in a specific design culture incorporating the 
dominance of systems and control theory, technical rationality and design purity, 
acts to justify their intervention in that process in the name of some higher good.
The exercise of autonomy is contingent on a variety of factors, for example, size 
of project team, composition of project team, degree of management 
monitoring, tightness of management's initial specification, size of budget, type 
of sector and scale of system being built. Thus, for example, one systems manger 
in the highly competitive software industry indicated that he had been forced to 
introduce a variety of software to monitor the autonomy of a number of his
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programmers and analysts with the specific intent of raising their productivity. 
He recognised, however, that this could be counter productive because too tight 
a control over their labour was resulting in 'work to rule' attitudes and 'loss of 
flair'. He was also concerned that given the labour market shortfall of IT 
professionals he might alienate and lose some of his better analysts if he pushed 
too far down this road. A group of analysts in the aerospace industry argued 
that at one point there was so much government money flowing into the 
department that 'all kinds of wacky projects were underway' and analysts were 
given free reign to exercise their ideas. However, with the onset of recession, 
falling government subsidies and the 'ending of cold war', budgets dried up and 
management became more active in cost benefiting designs and tightening up 
control.
Second, engineers and analysts share a design culture which emphasises the 
unpredictability, uncertainty and volatility of human labour. They are taught 
through exposure to particular methods, i.e. formal logic, analytic theory, 
scientific management, and control and systems theory, to control and preferably 
eliminate human labour from any given system. The critical assumption of formal 
logic is constancy and the need to engineer 'stable systems'. This is reinforced in 
analytic theory through emphasis on 'scientific detachment' and 'rational' 
analysis - the assumption being that if each part of the system studied is perfect 
then the whole must be perfect too. Following from this tradition and likewise 
reinforcing it is Taylorism and Methods Time Measurement with their emphasis 
upon the efficacy of detailed division of labour and tight control of ' operating
436
units' so as to minimise uncertainty. Control and systems theory expand upon 
this discourse by providing the theoretical rationale for a detailed division of 
labour based upon the separation of conception and execution of tasks in which 
a specialised group of workers (i.e. designers) are privy to a specific body of 
knowledge - 'design science', which they use to rationally construct 'scientific' 
work systems. Engineers and analysts involved in a wide variety of different 
system designs across a variety of sectors were influenced by these assumptions, 
though age, experience, position and the type of project being worked upon all 
influenced their views. For example, with the introduction of graduate training 
programmes and the increasing reluctance of companies to take on non-graduate 
labour, there has been a breaking of more traditional craft routes of entry into 
engineering and analysis. Under the craft route many engineers and analysts 
grew up in a close relation to the shop floor and to users. A number of older and 
more experienced engineers and analysts argued that this made them 'less 
proselytising', 'opinionated' and 'arrogant' than the 'younger graduate breed' 
and consequently they felt less ' elitist' and driven towards the subordination of 
shop floor workers. They felt that because they were not exposed to the same 
bodies of theory and because there was not the same rupture between theory 
and practice as there is for graduate entrants, they were less 'fearful of going 
onto the shop floor' or getting too close to users. One analyst, for example, was 
adamant that 'coming from a working class background' enabled him 'to do the 
job better' and 'give him more insights'. Likewise, another analyst stressed that 
because he had worked on the shop floor he couldn't 'be ridiculed or 'have the 
piss taken out of him' so easily as some college nosed graduate'. A minority of
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engineers and analysts are, however, more critical of cruder systems discourses 
which fail to give due recognition to the satisfaction of human needs. Their more 
critical design stance can emerge as a result of some moving hands on 
experience with a particular group of users. Thus, for example, one designer 
working on a project for handling toxic chemicals argued that 'working 
alongside workers on the line and getting to appreciate their job, its dangers and 
their fears over loss of skill and their need to feel useful' affected him; and that, 
consequently, he 'will never feel the same again about design and all that 
Taylorist power shit'. For this designer, at least, this meant a rejection of much 
of the theory of control and deskilling he had been taught at college.
On the whole, however, these values and methods create such a culture of 
control that engineers and analysts invariably seek to minimise human override 
and disruption of their systems. This is reinforced through particular practices, 
for example, one analyst argued that college played a crucial role in inculcating 
in him that you do not design open loop' systems when 'closed' ones will do 
the trick. His college lecturer deducted marks from students who introduced 
such 'uncertainty' into their systems. The degree to which engineers and analysts 
see human labour as dysfunctional or a source of added workload or stress also 
depends on a number of other factors including the type of user of the system, 
the amount of time allowed for systems development, the type of system being 
built, size of budget and particular organisational cultures. Thus, for example, 
one systems analyst in the financial services sector argued that analysts will 
devote more man-hours to the design of systems for management than they will
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for lower level users. Management tended to pride themselves on having more 
powerful systems with 'more bells and whistles' and practising analysts quickly 
learn it is best to 'placate them' even if this means spending less time with lower 
level users. One industrial engineer explained that the reason he did not design 
rest bays on the production line of a steel mill or devote much time to noise 
dampening was that the 'Welsh workforce are fat lazy bastards' and that 'they 
should be there to work' not 'rest and be pampered to'. Clearly, this designer 
had no qualms that his designs reflected his opinionated, nationalistic and anti- 
worker philosophies. By contrast, several systems analysts working in the 
automobile industry indicated that it would have been possible to introduce 
systems which gave machinists more autonomy and control over the inputting 
of data into the system' but because of a change in management and the 
appointment of a ' particularly right wing chairman' who made clear his intent to 
rationalise and streamline the works, their systems manager advised it would be 
best to 'override manual inputting of data'.
A number of analysts pointed out that the shift towards complex real time 
systems had necessitated greater awareness of human issues and the need to 
incorporate user requirements into design build. Certainly analysts, more so than 
engineers, had a more sophisticated systems discourse in as much as they 
considered the needs of users more fully within systems design. However, as 
argued in Chapter 4, the tendency is still to incorporate the user within the 
system: that is, to wed the user to the system in such a way that the 
' functionality of the system' is not impaired, i.e. 'the system' is not jeopardised.
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This need to incorporate users to the system was articulated by systems analysts 
and systems managers across all sectors and organisations. An analyst working 
for a multinational electronics company stressed that 'too close an identification 
of interests with those of lower level users will be rewarded with lack of career 
progression, unrewarding projects, back end and routine analysis and a closing 
of senior user ranks'. Likewise the systems manager of a large public utility 
argued that 'Its important to get users involved....but you have to appreciate 
which (of their) suggestions and information is functional to the system'. Despite 
the diversity of sectors analysts are located within and despite differences in age 
and experience the notion of incorporating users needs in such a way as not to 
jeopardise the systems interests was striking and indicated the strength of 
systems discourse and the notion of'guardianship' that many analysts felt.
Third, engineers and analysts work is infused with a technicist rationality. 
Engineers and analysts have a strong faith in the capacity of technology to solve 
human problems. Importantly, despite the acknowledgement by some engineers 
and analysts that design is a political process, the majority take account only 
marginally of the human, social and political elements of systems. 
Unsurprisingly, both engineers and analysts perceive the accumulation process 
as a technical process and accounting and profit as indicators of system success, 
rather than as indicators of labour exploitation. Because accumulation is seen as 
a technical rather than a social process, engineers and analysts tend to perceive 
their own work in likewise technical terms. It is they who ensure that inspection, 
monitoring, overseeing and control of organisational functions are carried out
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'effectively'. Often engineers and analysts justify designs in terms of lesser evils 
invoking spurious notions of 'technical efficiency 1 to justify particular systems 
designs that may have led to job loss, work intensification or deskilling. Analysts 
in particular tended to see themselves as information technocrats and were far 
more proselytising in their desire to spread the technical creed. Many analysts 
believe they are riding a technological tidal wave as computerisation sweeps 
through the international business community.
However, a number of more senior analysts and systems managers pointed out 
the dangers of this technicist credo suggesting that maybe more IT is not always 
better; these were the ones who prided themselves on being able to say 'no' and 
who recognised the possible fragility's of computerised work systems. They 
were also the ones who tended to emphasise their organisational and business 
skills distancing themselves from younger and presumably less experienced 
'techies'. Thus, for example, one systems manager who had worked in the 
automotive components industry for over 20 years, doing a variety of jobs 
including engineering, argued that on the basis of his experience of the local 
workforce and his knowledge of the plant there have been times when he has 
'squashed' plans for more extensive systems development on the grounds that 
such developments would either upset industrial relations or were not justifiable 
'given the companies product structure and the nature of the market'. He also 
felt that this was why senior management put him in charge of systems because 
they new he was not a simple 'techie' but had rich and detailed knowledge of the 
plant and its personnel. Likewise, a senior analyst within the aerospace industry
441
conveyed how he and the systems manager agreed with auditors that the 
company was too reliant on computer based information flows and that a more 
manual paper based system had more robustness. According to this analyst he 
was one of the first to bring to the attention of management their over reliance 
on mainframe systems. He argued he could do this because for him being an 
analyst was more than being a techie' it was recognising what is good for the 
organisation and what the limits and weaknesses are of particular designs in 
specific contexts. A number of senior analysts, systems managers and 
consultants prided themselves on having organisational and business skills and 
not just technical skills. One consultant insisting that this was the major pre- 
requisite for the job. Similarly, a systems manager in the financial services sector 
conveyed how some of his younger analysts are organisationally and politically 
inept, and, how, in their desire to extend and develop systems further, they 
alienate users and bring ridicule on the department. Engineers were generally far 
more prosaic regarding the benefits accruing from IT and were more critical of 
the ways in which technology was being used to tighten up accounting 
procedures and rationalise organisations. Indeed many engineers were on the 
receiving end of this technology and process of rationalisation both in terms of 
its impact on the quality of their own work, on employment levels and on 
conditions and status. For example , one engineer in the electrical engineering 
industry highlighted how his own work had become devalued and more tightly 
monitored with the introduction of CAD/CAM, and report generators. Another 
engineer working in the chemical industry pointed to the lack of job 
opportunities and interesting projects in engineering with the run down of heavy
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industry and manufacture. Engineers in a variety of sectors generally felt unfairly 
treated compared to analysts - who were seen to have less skills, education and 
training yet more pay, status and decision taking responsibilities. However, not 
all analysts felt they were riding the crest of a wave and some, particularly in the 
more traditional manufacturing industries or those which had, as yet, made little 
investment in IT, felt far from privileged and were far less sanguine about the 
benefits accruing from IT or their own career progression.
Fourth, business rationality is rapidly becoming the new altar upon which 
systems analysts, in particular, worship. The majority of younger graduate 
analysts and more senior analysts and systems mangers would justify their 
autonomous decisions, including less IT if necessary, in terms of their 
understanding of what the organisation needed. For example, the systems 
manager of one private energy utility stressed that because the systems 
department has ' its fingers in every other department' and knows their business 
this makes them more than anyone else know what's best for the company'. In 
those organisations with large systems departments and a prominent IT function 
such sentiment was common place but even in smaller establishments similar 
viewpoints could be found. Thus the systems manager of an automotive 
components supplier that had recently developed a supplier/customer data base 
sharing design and product information, stressed that as more business functions 
move onto the mainframe systems, 'part of a global transformation in 
manufacturing', then 'systems staff more than anyone else are in a good position 
to take a strategic overview of business needs', they are able to see the 'general
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as opposed to the particularistic'. .Analysts definition of an efficient system 
invariably uses a narrow range of indicators like cost savings achieved or 
productivity gained. .Analysts use notions of business rationality to explain away 
their designs. Particularly in the private sector analysts would often invoke the 
market and market forces as the ultimate arbiter of system worth. For example, 
one systems analyst in his late twenties working for a leading Japanese white 
goods company justified the system he had built on the grounds that 'if I didn't 
build it this way, the market would penalise us all [and] we just wouldn't be 
competitive'. At a practical level unitarist perspectives like business rationality, 
save analysts a lot of soul searching, the market can always be invoked to justify 
why an analysts had to produce a particular design. For example, a systems 
analyst working for a major high street bank argued that 'in banking a lot of our 
systems were designed expressly to shed labour and increase productivity...it is 
unfortunate but it has to be done if we are to remain competitive and efficient'.
A number of factors are responsible for the rapid rise of this business credo 
within systems design including the fact that, almost without exception, the 
companies and organisations I studied, including those in the public sector, had 
experienced recent processes of restructuring both in terms of job losses, 
changes in working practices and rationalisation but also in terms of greater 
executive emphasis on new organisational cultures stressing 'cost effectiveness", 
the 'reduction of waste' and 'slack' and the need to end 'restrictive practices' 
and meet 'customer requirements'. Analysts immersion into dominant business 
cultures has also been greatly reinforced via government, trade and media
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emphasis on the virtues of competition and the free market, importantly here, 
many analysts are at the cutting edge of a technology which is being used to 
rationalise and which is expected to deliver improved market performance. 
Analysts own career progression is intimately tied into senior management's 
perceptions of analysts understanding of business and their organisational and 
communication skills. Finally, graduate recruitment with its increasing emphasis 
upon business and organisational skills within degree and course curricula has 
fostered a culture in which graduate analysts see themselves as part of 
management and anticipate managerial rewards.
Whilst many analysts are ready and willing to be incorporated into the business 
community, others, however, were far from happy at the prospect of entering 
that community or having their work presented in such overtly business 
orientated language. These tended to fall into three groups first, more 
experienced senior analysts and managers that had usually been within the same 
company for a long time and who felt that the proselytising business rhetoric and 
image of their younger analysts was alienating users and consequently making 
systems design more difficult. Second, a minority of analysts and systems 
managers who for personal or political reasons did not either want to be 
embroiled in the new competitive business credo or design systems which had as 
their sole rationale the increasing of dividends to share holders. Third those who 
were working in more traditional manufacturing industries or tightly costed 
public sector organisations with little investment in IT or generally within small 
systems departments. For example, the systems manager of a heavy electrical
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engineering company argued that his younger analysts 'modernise. 
modernise...efficiency savings here, cost savings there' attitude were not only 
'alienating users' and making him 'cringe' but fostering a climate of unnecessary 
uncertainty and disgruntlement which was making his job harder. One senior 
systems analyst, working in the public sector, indicated that he had turned down 
lucrative job offers in the private sector because he did not want to be part of the 
'nineties' competitive business culture. However, even he recognised that his 
values were being compromised with the pressure to save costs and deliver ' sub- 
optimal systems'.
Fifth, both engineers and analysts utilise the concept of design purity in a number 
of interesting ways. Whilst many engineers invoke the imagery of Italian 
engineering to epitomise design purity, systems analysts tend to utilise Weberian 
notions of technical - rational efficiency. Ironically neither engineers nor analysts 
could accurately pinpoint what precisely constitutes a pure design although all 
could cite examples of pure designs. Pure design was invariably something in 
which 'form followed function', that had 'singularity of purpose', that was not 
'too pinickity', or 'over engineered' and that had 'logicality' and was 
'uncompromising'. Engineers and analyst no matter what age or what sector 
they were in recognised design purity and their own personal and sectoral 
experiences helped them furnish examples of this purity. Thus the chief design 
engineer of a heavy electrical engineering company argued that the Italians are 
renowned for their pure design philosophy, unity of form and function, 
singularity of purpose. It gives their products charisma, it sells' he then goes on
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to stress that unfortunately he has had to design things which have not been at 
one with his 'instinct', which have been 'compromised'. Likewise a design 
engineer in the machine tool industry stated with pride that the latest drill bit he 
had designed was not compromised in its design 'its pure engineering'. Similarly 
a systems developer at a regional water authority argued that 'systems should be 
efficient.....they should have singularity of purpose...ideally they should not be 
compromised and cluttered with too many bells and whistles....which require 
inordinately long programming hours and, anyway, divert the user from the task 
in hand'. Another systems analysts in the financial services sector argued that, 
'You do not compromise the design of the system just .because of human 
factors 1 .
The concept of design purity is used by engineers and analysts not only to pass 
judgement on a particular product or system but to pass judgement on others 
involved in the design process. For example, a number of systems analysts 
interviewed at a US electronics company conveyed their dismay with 
management at the plant arguing that the system was compromised because of 
lack of funds and short sighted management strategies. In effect notions of 
design purity serve to reinforce in engineers and analysts a particular notion of 
their own labour and their relationship to others within the organisation. 
Engineers and analysts notions of design purity can be used to condem short 
sighted management who presumably would not know a pure design if they 
tripped over one; and at the same time they can be used by engineers and 
analysts to justify building a particular artefact or system the way they did. In
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practice I found that engineers in general, and particularly those located in the 
older industries and manufacturing sectors, used concepts of design purity to 
critically distance themselves from what they perceive as a 'gin and tonic' 
management who were seen to be 'unprofessional' and 'misguided in their 
strategy'; and often directly responsible for engineers own lack of status and 
career progression.
In effect engineers and analysts advocate design purity and in so doing 
distinguish themselves from non-engineering management. Ironically, when 
pressed, both engineers and analysts will admit that design is a compromise yet 
they still adhere strongly to the notion of design purity. Indeed it is the very 
uncompromising nature of some of the most pure designs cited which, for 
engineers and analysts, at least, gives them 'purity' status. One possible 
explanation for this is that notions of design purity help to constitute a particular 
world view which, in turn, reinforces in engineers and analysts a sense of their 
own self worth serving to legitimate their calls for privileged status. Notions of 
design purity also serve as ideological props, enhancing engineering mastery not 
only over nature but mere humanity which presumably should stand in awe, if 
not fear, of some of its most pure designs. Thus for example, many engineers 
and analysts I interviewed took a perverse delight in talking about some of their 
most pure designs - designs which invariably were feats of intellect and creativity 
and which they clearly wanted respect and recognition for producing. The 
concept of'pure' engineering certainly represents an idolatry of engineers own 
labour as uncompromising, practical and purposeful activity and in this sense
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notions of design purity serve to establish engineers own identity vis a vis the 
shop floor and management.
Sixth, engineers and analysts across a variety of different sectors, including 
manufacturing, finance and retailing, conceptualise their work in productivist 
terms. The analogies with coal mining and getting down to the coal face and 
getting ones hands dirty, frequently entered into engineers and, more suprisingly, 
analysts discussion of their own work. Thus for example, one design engineer in 
his thirties in the aerospace industry argued that unlike much of management, 
stuck in the office, I see myself as a practical person, designing and building 
useful products...not just dreaming up ideas and strategies but actually 
implementing them and producing something useful'. Likewise a young systems 
analyst in the automotive industry was insistent that 'we don't just sit around 
pushing pens...we get down to the coal face - talk with users...get things built'. 
Whilst yet another analyst in the financial services sector stressed that' our work 
involves us getting our hands dirty'! Those engineers who drew greatest pride 
from the productive nature of their work tended to be the more experienced and 
in particular those who had come up through the craft route and who were more 
directly engaged in the practical side of engineering. Younger graduate 
engineers were often ridiculed by more senior engineers and shop floor workers 
alike for being 'elitist' and 'not wanting to get their hands dirty'. However, I 
found that even the younger graduate engineers, particularly if in recessionary 
sectors, quickly drop their elitism as familiarity with management practice, lack 
of interesting projects and career progression makes them jaded and cynical.
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Similarly, younger graduate analysts tended to be more guarded about the 
productivist nature of their work. Whilst taking pride in the fact that they were 
not mere pen pushers or 'office wallies' they were more careful about making 
too close an identification with productivist values particularly if these might be 
seen to be associated with lower level users. Thus for example, one analyst in 
the financial services sector had no trouble talking about productivism because 
he was confident that this term did not carry the 'working class connotations' it 
might in more 'traditional manufacturing sectors'. Discussion of analysts tools 
took on similar productivist and macho overtones. Tools and techniques were 
invariably described in terms of 'toolkits' with the emphasis placed upon their 
'engineering content'. Thus one analyst at a major high street bank argued that 
'I have my own personal toolkit which I prefer to use and other analysts have 
theirs...which particular tools you use depends upon the situation you are 
modelling'. One could be forgiven for thinking analysts, unlike many engineers, 
actually had a bag of tools which they carried round from job to job when in fact 
the tools they are referring to are often paper methodologies and computer 
software which do not as a rule leave the systems department.
Whilst attachment to productivist values may constitute a vital distinction for 
many practising engineers and analysts between their labour and that of others 
within the organisation many senior engineers and analysts were wary of too 
strong an identification of their work with the vocabulary of productivism. This 
tended to be particularly so for senior systems analysts, systems managers and 
chief design and industrial engineers who felt that too close an identification with
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productivist cultures would discredit them in management's eyes and reduce 
them to 'technical status'. Thus, for example, the systems manager of a major 
pharmaceutical company cautions those trying to advance the cause of systems 
in productivist or engineering terms arguing that 'analysis is more managerial 
requiring inter-personal and organisational skills as well...its unhealthy to make 
too close an identification with production'.
Whilst engineers in the UK have been immersed in a culture of productivism, a 
culture encapsulated in Taylors belief that management knowledge should be 
rooted in the 'science of productive processes', my research suggests that 
analysts are becoming less wedded to productivist values than engineers and 
more assertive in their claims for managerial recognition. Some of the larger 
organisations, in an attempt to retain skilled personnel, are addressing this 
tension by offering 'equal status' career routes for those analysts happy to focus 
on the more technical side of their work and for others who want to develop 
more managerial skills. Thus, for example, the systems manager of one large 
private utility argued, ' companies like ours that can afford to retain the best staff 
have begun offering equal status career routes. That is, if you're the kind of 
personality that likes the technical side of systems you will be duly rewarded in 
terms of pay and status, equally, if you want to develop the more personal side 
of analysis you will be given equal opportunity'. However, dual career structures 
are hardly likely to bridge the cultural differences between technical and 
managerial careers and the higher status and rewards that attach to management.
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Seventh, analysts across all sectors i.e. manufacturing, finance, retail, have a 
narrow definition of users, one which fails to recognise user diversity and 
heterogeneity and the real possibility that interests of users may not coincide - 
not even within the same department or function - and that clashes of interest 
and antagonism can arise between users. In one sense this is unsurprising as both 
systems literature and practice fosters a dualist discourse emphasising two key 
players analysts and users. One possible reason for the simplicity of this 
discourse is that to recognise the diversity and range of user interests and to 
recognise the possible sources of irreconcilable interest is to overburden and 
increase the complexity of systems analysts tasks and risk shattering their 
essentially functionalist and systemic organisational model. For example, an 
experienced systems manager at an automotive components manufacturer felt 
that many younger inexperienced analysts could not handle the politics of 
systems design because they don't have sufficient practical experience of 
different users and of how to manipulate and balance the interests of different 
users etc. This manager argued that that is where more senior systems staff 
should step in to lend a guiding hand. Likewise, in some organisations relatively 
inexperienced analysts who have been working to supposedly fool proof 
methodologies have made fools of themselves and other more experienced 
systems staff through following dogmatically rules and procedures and failing to 
recognise or accommodate different user cultures and interests. Indeed, the 
more senior analysts and systems managers stressed that a primary reason for 
their seniority was their political awareness and in particular the fact that they 
had a more sophisticated user model than the one shared by many practising
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analysts in their departments. Thus for example, a senior analyst in the 
automotive industry suggested that it was only because of years of service to 
that company and because of the detailed knowledge and contacts he had built 
up among a wide variety of users within a range of departments that he was 
rewarded with senior analyst position. Certainly this analyst had the respect of 
the younger analysts I interviewed in the department, some of whom openly 
acknowledged that they called on him when they were unsure of particular users 
or how best to approach them. According to one senior designer in the 
pharmaceutical industry recognising user diversity and clashes of interest can be 
too much of a headache for some of the younger staff who sometimes just wish 
they were 'dealing with the technology as it is less troublesome'.
Reinforcing the narrow definition of users so prevalent in systems literature and 
practice is the fact that historically IT has played a secondary role, a supporting 
role to the business function. IT has thus grown up in a close relationship to user 
managers and heads of business functions. Systems origination, funding of 
projects and setting of requirements is thus a process influenced historically by 
business users. As one analyst candidly argued this closeness to the business 
function can 'obscure clarity' and prevent one from 'speaking to Joe down on 
the shop floor and maybe once in a while designing something just the way he 
would like it'. The commodification of software packages, tools and techniques 
used for modelling the user environment further reinforces in analysts a narrow 
systemic, functionalist view of the user. Not only do many of these packages 
have a narrow definition of the user - usually management, but they guide the
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analyst into a particularly narrow discourse with the user - one which has as its 
premise the need to incorporate information from the user and possibly the users 
themselves into the proposed system. Ironically it was reported to me by several 
analysts that the larger organisations with more systems staff and larger systems 
budgets, tended to push younger and therefore less experienced analysts onto 
these packages and encourage them to build systems according to the strict 
procedures laid down in them. One senior analyst in the automotive components 
industry was adamant that this was one reason for so many failed systems and 
dissatisfied users and that ' ironically design tends to be better when undertaken 
by knowledgeable in-house analysts who know the users and their culture'. In as 
much as analysts need to accurately model users in order to build systems they 
need an approach which enables them to get down to the 'coal face'. In practice, 
however, many analysts are not too concerned about speaking to 'end users' and 
satisfy themselves with speaking to user managers. It is user managers who % sign 
off the systems and who's needs and interests tend to be met within the design 
build. Importantly user mangers needs may not coincide with those of end users 
and systems analysts are wary of antagonising user managers by building 
systems which challenge their authority and interest.
Eighth, despite the plethora of approaches advocated for ensuring good systems 
design, the approach most favoured by analysts was the project team. The 
majority of analysts I studied felt that so long as the project team comprised 
individuals with complementary skills then problems relating to the general 
inability of any one person or tool to embody the full range of required
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knowledge and skill could be overcome. However, a minority of analysts 
disagreed, for example, one analyst cited in the text argued, 'it is naive to 
assume that the project team simply because it comprises suitably skilled and 
experienced personnel is thereby going to design good systems'.
In practice project teams differed enormously, in both terms of skills and 
knowledge prevalent, and in terms of choice of'right' project team members. 
For example, one systems manager working within a small division of a regional 
health authority argued that there was such a shortage of analysts in his 
department and no money forthcoming to 'buy any in' that.he was 'forced into 
asking one of the departmental secretaries' to do the analysis, 'basically I briefed 
her on the proposed system, told her which users to approach, who to look out 
for, and what questions to ask....fortunately she has worked here a long time and 
has an easy going personality which relaxed users...and I could deal with the 
more technical side.....but obviously the analysis could have been done better, 
having said that though the users were satisfied with the system we delivered. It 
just needed a bit of fine tuning'. By contrast a senior analyst within a large 
financial services institution said he worked on a project where there were' too 
many specialists' and 'know it all's' each wanting to pull the system in their own 
direction and none capable of resolving their differences. In that instance the 
problem was 'solved' by the systems manager and auditor 'laying down the law' 
and saying this is how its going to be done. Likewise, the systems manager of a 
major public utility argued that some organisations with too much money to 
spend often bring in outside consultants and experts when there is little need to
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do so. When in effect all the work could have been done in house. According to 
this manager large companies often do this to legitimise a strategy they want. 
However, this can cause friction and bad feeling between in-house staff and 
outside consultants. One analyst in a major private utility argued that on one 
occasion so bad was the friction between outside consultants and in-house 
systems staff that the project was 'set back some several weeks at a cost of 
thousands of pounds a day'.
Project teams also differed in terms of size and resources and this could have a 
dramatic impact upon the quality of systems developed. For example, one 
analyst in a major public utility argued that because of tight budgetary 
constraints imposed by central government less time was spent talking to users 
and getting their requirements than should have been and also that the project 
would have benefited from some experts in ergonomics but because of lack of 
funds they were not brought in. Many analysts stressed that their best work was 
undertaken in small project teams in which the systems department co-opted 
strategic users into the team for a couple of months. Other analysts felt that 
large projects necessitated significant financial backing and detailed project 
management but that many organisations, even the large ones, were often 
unwilling to provide the necessary financial and personnel resources. Some of 
the larger organisations I studied in the banking and financial services sector 
were directly addressing this issue by creating corporate IT directorships and 
ensuring that IT was given financial and political recognition. Projects are also 
often steered or led by one or two powerful individuals who either through
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position, backing or knowledge are capable of capturing the ideological 
highground and steering the project down a particular path. For example, on one 
particular large scale project in a major private utility the systems manager had 
struck up strategic allegiances and already persuaded key corporate personnel of 
the merits of his proposed system even before the initial project team was 
chosen and the system issues discussed with the respective user managers of the 
functions to be affected, this attention to detail was then carried over into careful 
choice of project team members, aids, support and background preparation. A 
senior analyst on the project stated openly that without securing corporate 
backing and finance the money wouldn't have been forthcoming to bring in all 
the experts and to produce the necessary background research and 
documentation, not to mention to provide plush luncheons and good drink. In 
smaller organisations with less money and in which the systems function is still 
seen as some what peripheral to mainstream business systems managers may 
have to work a lot harder and be even more cunning and manipulative if they are 
to convince senior management and strategic users of the merits of a particular 
system. Thus for example, one systems manager, in the automotive components 
industry, reminisced with pride how several years ago, 'before systems really 
took off, 1 he was working on a project that had virtually no financial backing, in 
an organisation that had maybe six or seven linked PCs and a couple of cnc 
machines and a 'stay as we are culture'. According to this manager trying to 
persuade anyone of the need for change let alone get them to be part of that 
change process was an uphill struggle. However, he prided himself on being able 
to use his knowledge of the workforce and different users and a small but
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dedicated systems staff to get the company to accept the need to move towards 
a more integrated just in time system of manufacture.
Project team success is related to systems success which in turn is often 
conditioned by prevailing notions of profitability and efficiency. The irony, 
however, is that what may at one time have been thought a successful system, 
may at another point in time be seen as sub-optimal. Thus for example, one 
analyst in the aerospace industry recalls how some of the projects he was 
working on in the mid seventies were infused with an ' automate everything that 
moves mentality' which if displayed today would mean 'we wouldn't even be 
trusted to clean the floors'. Furthermore, what may be seen as optimal from the 
point of view of certain project team members may not be seen as optimal from 
the point of view of users. More to the point project team success is measured, 
amongst other things, against whether or not senior management and executive 
decision takers are happy with the outcomes i.e. did the project team meet its 
objectives. Analysts argued that project teams which delivered systems which 
did not meet, or indeed undermined, corporate goals, could expect to be dealt 
with severely by senior managers and corporate directors. For example, one 
senior analyst in a large private utility, recalls how he was working in a project 
team which was 'toying with the idea' of raising employee 'commitment and 
productivity by giving them a degree of discretion and decision making 
responsibilities which were previously held by supervisory grades'. However, 
when ' senior management got wind of the system they came down on us like a 
ton of bricks', all team members were reprimanded and the project team was
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disbanded. Obviously larger organisations with large systems departments offer 
the potential for the cross fertilisation and trying out of new ideas, ironically, 
however, they also tend to be the ones who seek to impose structured methods, 
detailed control and who come down hardest once offended. Interestingly, in the 
example above, this did not mean an end of project team autonomy within this 
organisation, rather from that day on, ' systems staff learned to play the cards 
closer to their chest' and 'keep designs to ourselves'. Even where project teams 
are tightly monitored and audited, analysts through a variety of means including 
- keeping the project team tight, utilising technical discourses to whitewash over 
recalcitrant users and subtly persuading management that the system they are 
advancing is in the general interests of the organisation - can secure their 
interests and exercise autonomy. Importantly, I found that systems managers 
wanted teams that were 'tight', 'knew the game' and were capable of 
manipulating others rather than being 'manipulated by them'. It seldom occurs 
to younger analysts to question the validity of project origination by senior 
management, likewise they do not readily question the origination of the project 
team or the methodology deployed. To question this would be to question the 
system perspective which they hold and the rationale of their own labour within 
that process as deliverers, servants and guardians of the system.
Ninth, the increasing complexity of systems being modelled has pushed analysts 
into seeking greater user participation in the design process to be better able to 
map, model and modify the user environment. This is particularly true of those 
organisations who are moving towards complex computer based systems of
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design, manufacture and sale, but is also true for organisations who are seeking 
to utilise IT in a more holistic way to tighten and rationalise procedures and 
administration. Thus, for example, analysts within the banking and financial 
services sector are heavily engaged in the process of rationalisation and 
restructuring within those sectors and are often at the forefront of analysis in the 
sense that they are trying the techniques and packages for systems modelling and 
analysis and requirements setting. These organisations also tend to have more 
money and resources made available to systems departments. By contrast in 
some of the smaller and medium sized establishments analysts reported little 
change in practice. Whilst recognising the need to accurately map user 
requirements and get user commitment to systems they often did so through 
more traditional means of pencil and flip charts and through using their personal 
contacts and relations with users. These were also the organisations which 
tended to produce the characters who prided themselves on being able to design 
complex systems on the bag of cigarette packets. A participative approach to 
design is not however, the same thing as democratic design. None of the 
participatory user centred design strategies secure the democratic participation 
of users in the design process. Furthermore, the use of structured methods and 
sophisticated modelling software by many of the better funded systems 
departments, usually in the larger organisations, actually inhibits this 
democratisation by structuring the problematic in such a way that the user is 
seen as a site of dysfunctionality and uncertainty. I found that whilst user 
participation is useful something's are more sacred, namely ensuring that system 
requirements are met, These requirements are invariably set by managing
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directors, senior consultants, or senior user managers and senior systems staff. 
Much will depend upon the organisation and the scale of the system. For 
example, large scale projects such as that initiated by one of the major private 
utilities I studied, tend to originate in 'secret' meetings, in this instance between 
a couple of corporate directors and the systems manager, with the systems 
manager doing the initial introduction. Only after being given the green light by 
these personnel did the corporate machinery begin to turn and the resources and 
money begin to flow into the project and away from alternatives. In smaller 
companies analysts have reported a more 'open' process of system origination, 
but even here they recognise that open is not the same as democratic. Thus, for 
example, one designer in a medium sized electrical engineering company 
indicated that on the basis of his local knowledge he took the decision not to 
'frighten the workforce' through disclosing the full extent or possibilities of the 
proposed system.
System requirements are defined in an undemocratic way but their realisation 
invariably requires detailed involvement of different types and levels of user, 
with the design usually taking place in an atmosphere emphasising co-operation 
and commonality of interest. In the larger organisations this make take the form 
of large presentations, the assigning of large numbers of analysts to different 
users or the co-opting of users onto different project teams. In the smaller 
organisations it might simply reduce itself to an informal chat between the 
systems manager and a couple of users and their manager. In either case, 
opposition, where it is met, is generally presented as impersonal and discussed
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by systems statf in terms of its tiysfunctionality. Obstinate users may be pacified 
in a variety of ways depending on the organisation, the type of user and the 
resources at the systems departments disposal. For example, on the project cited 
above at the major private utility, some very senior user managers had to be 
persuaded to come over to the side of the system this was done by the systems 
manager bringing in selected personnel from other divisions which had used the 
system experimentally, through bringing in personnel from the ministry of 
defence to prove the integrity of the equipment being suggested, and through 
bringing in big gun names from highly respected private consultancies. In other 
organisations users have been persuaded by cheaper and possibly more cost 
effective ways. Thus, for example, the systems manager of an automotive 
components manufacturer, explained that he likes to keep things small and 
personal, take 'worried users to lunch', 'relax them over a pint', 'spend more 
time explaining things to them', 'talk about the rugby game that weekend, or 
holidays etc.'. This was relatively easy for him as he had been with the company 
thirty years and the company is the main employer in what is only a small town. 
When all else fails systems analysts can get hard headed and drag out the 
systems and technical/business discourse. For example, one analyst in the white 
goods industry felt compelled to tell a number of users that if they did not accept 
the proposed system the company would fall behind its competitors and 
hundreds would then end up losing their job and not just twenty or thirty. 
Analysts seek user participation but they are wary of the very users who's 
participation they seek. The older more experienced analysts pride themselves 
on being able to not only extract information from users but at the same time
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win users over to the proposed changes. With the increasing commodification of 
analysis and design - the use of standardised analysis and design methodologies, 
design software, etc., the scope for exercising this personal flair may diminish, 
particularly for analysts working in the larger more centralised systems 
departments. A number of analysts in the larger organisations and particularly 
those in the financial sector felt this process was already well underway.
Implications of Findings for Current Research and Practice
1) Engineers and analysts exercise autonomy within the design process. Yet the 
bulk of the engineering and systems literature and of practising engineers and 
analysts does not acknowledge this. This has a number of implications for the 
organisation and control of engineers' and analysts' work and on the tools and 
techniques which they deploy. For example, attempts on the pan of certain 
institutions and managers to impose either 'software engineering' or structured 
methods approaches, with their emphasis on 'de-politicising' the design and 
decision taking process, do not square with the reality of engineers' and systems 
analysts practices they result not only in contradictions and antagonisms in the 
education and training programmes for these groups but also in problems for 
practising engineers and analysts. Consider, for example, their 
professionalisation and status. Do they acknowledge their artistic, creative and 
intuitive role within the design process and develop similar strategies of 
advancement to management, or do they acknowledge (often in the face of 
practice) that they are merely technicians wielding tools in a non-creative
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fashion, and resign themselves to the status of technicians? In many ways an 
overemphasis on merely technical attributes and skills at the expense of 
emphasising political, social and managerial skills has already cost engineers 
dearly in Britain in terms of their low status. A significant number of senior 
analysts and systems managers were conscious of the fact that attempts to 
impose software engineering solutions and structured methods are not so much 
an attempt to de-skill them but to undermine their status and credibility with 
senior managers.
2) Engineers and analysts conceptualise their relationship to the design process 
and pass judgement on the validity of the systems they design and the use and 
worth of their own work by reference to a distinctive set of values and methods. 
There has been little research in this area and there is a dearth of literature 
dealing with these issues. This is ironic given that these values and methods 
serve such a vital, if (at times) unconscious, part in determining not only the 
forms of intervention and types of systems that engineers and analysts build but 
in establishing their own identity and defining their relationship with 'users'. 
Neither the engineering, analyst or management literature has focused on these 
issues, so our understanding of the culture and practice of design and of 
designers remains limited. This is all the more alarming given current managerial 
preoccupation's with 'manufacturing excellence' and 'design for manufacture' 
with an emphasis on getting design and build 'right first time'. It would seem 
appropriate at a time when design becomes increasingly critical to business 
success that attention be drawn to the values, methods, tools and techniques
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designers use and how these have an impact upon the types of designs and 
systems that get built.
3) There is a tension between the development of tools and techniques designed 
to elicit more accurate representations of the user environment and the need to 
preserve existing bases of power and authority. The majority of analysis 
techniques do not address the fundamental issues of power within organisations. 
Analysts operate with a limited conception of the user and the system which 
undermines their attempts to model more accurately and (importantly) to 
embody different user perspectives within the design. Given that millions of 
pounds a year are spent on developing tools and techniques to more accurately 
model the social in the technical it would seem appropriate that designers 
address their own limited methodologies and ask why, despite the reality of their 
own practices which recognises user complexities and power interests they still 
utilise relatively wooden functionalist conceptions of the user environment and" 
of the user.
4) There is a severe shortfall in the number of systems analysts and this affects 
the routes of entry and the types of qualifications and training programmes 
offered. I found a general consensus that traditional routes of entry into systems 
analysis through programming were inappropriate, costly and produced the 
wrong sort of analysts. Business and communication skills, along with 
organisational understanding, were high on the list of systems managers' criteria 
when recruiting analysts. Yet existing education and training programmes, with
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their heavy emphasis on technical subject matter and programming, largely fail 
to meet this demand. Indeed many senior analysts and systems managers were 
highly critical of undergraduate training programmes, arguing that they did not 
include enough social sciences material and that they tended both to recruit and 
to produce introverts or 'teenies 1 unsuited to the job of analyst. This was leading 
many systems managers to look elsewhere for systems analysts - to re-deployed 
end users or even school leavers who could be brought up in the culture and 
politics of the organisation. Further research into the type of recruitment and 
syllabus content which systems managers would like to see and how it could be 
delivered (given existing constraints in terms of time, money, accreditation, and 
other subject matter inclusion) would be useful.
5) Whilst organisations are buying in structured methods and the latest design 
tools I was surprised to find that the majority of analysts and managers I 
interviewed and observed seldom used them. This indicates a severe disjuncture 
between the advertising, literature and sales claims for such methods and the 
reality of practice. Most systems managers and senior analysts prided themselves 
on designing some of their best systems on the 'back of fag packets'. This is not 
mere boast on their part but is indicative of the process whereby design tends to 
occur - through project teams and via brain storming sessions of designers and 
users using pencil and paper flip charts. At best the tools and techniques 
available were seen by analysts and their managers as mere frameworks or 
signposts, or as a condensation of best systems practice; at worst they were seen 
as clumsy, ineffectual and problematic. There is, obviously, a range of vested
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interests involved in this debate including manufacturers, vendors, and users 
who wish to develop their own systems. Further research into the interests of 
different groups involved in the design, and the sale and use of these 
technologies would be interesting. For example, I have already indicated the 
hostility with which certain analysts and managers have greeted the BCS and 
IEE attempts to introduce and standardise software engineering practices 
throughout the industry. Further research could investigate specific allegiances 
of interest and could detail how the industry is structuring along particular poles 
and perspectives.
6) None of the participatory user-centred design techniques and tools secure 
democratic participation of users in the design process. Indeed, design tools like 
CASE inhibit democratisation of the process by structuring problematics in such 
a way that certain scenarios are suggested to the analyst and user and others 
foreclosed. I would suggest that further investigation into analyst design tools 
and techniques would probably disclose the operation of similar design 
paradigms and cultures to those discussed in this thesis.
This thesis has illuminated the role of designers in the design process. In 
particular it has highlighted the strategic importance of systems analysts within 
the contemporary restructuring of manufacturing and shown how their design 
culture and practices enable them to define what constitutes good or bad 
systems design and what constitutes the organisations interest. Through the use 
of empirical interview and case study data it has shown that systems analysts
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exercise autonomy and are not merely the blind agents of capital. Rather, they 
actively interpret what constitutes capitals interest. Their interpretation of that 
interest informs the types of systems they build and consequently the quality of 






Underpinning this research is what Andrew Sayer (1992) calls a realist philosophy. 
The principle tenets of this are that:
1) The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
2) Our knowledge of the world is fallible. Nevertheless knowledge is not immune to 
empirical check.
3) Knowledge develops neither wholly continuously, nor wholly discontinuously.
4) There is necessity in the world; objects, natural or social, have particular causal 
powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.
5) The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events but 
objects, including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating 
events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and 
much of the natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events.
6) Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept dependant 
which require explanation of their production and material effects. Although they 
are interpreted from the researchers own frame of reference, by and large they exist 
regardless of researchers interpretations of them.
7) Science or the production of any other kind of knowledge is a social practice.
8) Social science must be critical of its object if it is to explain and understand social 
phenomena.
Social scientists invariably are confronted with situations in which many things are 
going on at once, and they lack the possibility open to many natural scientists of 
isolating out particular processes in experiments. The task of assessing the nature 
of each of the constituent processes within social research without being able to
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isolate them experimentally throws a huge burden onto the process of abstraction - 
which is largely ignored, downplayed or taken for granted in most texts on methods. 
This process of abstraction however, is central to the development of research and 
to the presentation of findings. Many of the debates on the relative merits of 
different methodological approaches (for example positivist and anti positivist 1 and 
in particular the dominance of 'scientism' and " scientific method' within the research 
literature)2 fail to give due accord to the role of the researcher and the process of 
abstraction he or she brings to bear in making sense of social actions in the research 
setting and in presenting research findings.
Realist philosophy has the merit of both recognising the reflexive nature of the 
research activity and giving due accord to the dialectical relationship between theory 
and practice in determining processes of abstraction and presentation of findings. 
Realism is therefore not a substantive social theory but, rather, a philosophy which 
enables the examination of substantive social theories.
The type of qualitative, reflexive, social research, which I have undertaken here is 
often contrasted with a conception of'science' as empirical, systematic, rigorous 
and self critical3 . However, this conceptualisation of 'value free' scientific inquiry 
has itself come under increasing criticism as:
a crisis of confidence in which relativism and doubts about the possibility of 
empirical evaluation and scientific progress have been rife (Sayer 1992:8)4 .
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My research begins from the premise that knowledge cannot be gained purely 
through contemplation or observation. Concepts of truth and falsity that arise 
through such analysis in social research are incoherent. The production of 
knowledge is a social activity and needs to be evaluated in terms of its practicality.
Labour is central to this evaluation and to an understanding of human development 
and change. It is the missing link that
bridges the gap between knowledge and the world - a gap which has been 
widened both by the intellectualist prejudice and the real separation of work 
and living of capitalism (Saver 1992:18).
The process of'knowing' in this context comes not through passively observing the 
world as if it were external to us but from the results of material activity as ' one of 
natures forces operating within nature' (Sayer 1992:18). The question of truth in 
social research is thus not a question of theory but a practical question:
In practice man must prove the truth i.e. the reality and power......of his
thinking (Marx 1974:121).
The test of theory is its practical applicability and its utilisation in discourse to 
support or negate argument.
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Methodology
philosophy and methodology do not stand above the substantive sciences 
but serve as underlabourer and occasional midwife to them.....method is 
also a practical matter. Methods must be appropriate to the nature of the 
object we study and the purpose and expectations of our inquiry, though 
the relationships between them are sometimes slack rather than tight (Sayer 
1992: 3-4).
At the outset I felt that a mixture of fieldwork observation and cross sectoral 
interviewing would provide the richest data. This approach would enable me to 
interact with the research setting, to build up a qualitative picture; and would enable 
the process of fine tuning my inquiry in the light of data I had gathered. Initially I 
was concerned that detailed field work studies would generate only restricted 
findings, but these fears were (to some extent) offset by the cross sectoral nature of 
the research and by its sheer scale and time duration5 . I was also concerned about 
the impact of my own theoretical predilections and presence on the research 
context. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue, once one recognises 
the reflexive nature of social research one soon realises the futility of trying to 
eliminate either the researcher or the researcher's theoretical predilections from the 
study. In effect:
all social research takes the form of participant observation, it involves 
participating in the social world, in whatever role, and reflecting on the 
products of that participation. Irrespective of the method employed it is not 
fundamentally different from other forms of practical activity (1983:16).
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With hindsight, working within a labour-process perspective facilitated me in 
developing the research in two ways: through giving me a good understanding of 
the market and broader processes of restructuring; and in enabling me to assess 
which firms were most likely to be at the forefront of change and which personnel 
were most likely to be involved in this process. Likewise, it facilitated me in 
developing a critical interpretation of my own role in eliciting responses from 
interviewees and in interpreting their responses to questions. Without these insights 
my capacity to extract qualitative data from interviewees and from field 
observations would have been more limited. For example, in many instances, I was 




All research starts from a research problem. This may sometimes be mainly 
an area of factual ignorance; we may simply wish to improve our knowledge 
about certain institutions, social processes or cultures......The best
sociological research, however, starts from problems which are also puzzles. 
A puzzle is not just a lack of information, but a gap in our understanding. A 
large part of the skill of producing worthwhile sociological research consists 
in correctly identifying puzzles [and trying] to contribute to our 
understanding of why events happen as they do, rather than simply accepting 
them at their face value (1989: 660).
Writing from within a labour process perspective and recognising the ways in which 
technologies are socially shaped I wanted to find out who was involved in the
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design of IT systems, how they went about designing systems, why they designed 
the systems they did, and the autonomy they had within the design process.
From the outset I recognised that the use of questionnaires was inappropriate for 
the kind of cross sectoral and qualitative analysis I was looking for, for several 
reasons:
First, fieldwork has the merit of being more flexible. It allows the testing of ideas on 
practitioners in the field and the modifying of hypotheses accordingly. One does not 
even need a coherent hypothesis before engaging in fieldwork since the reflexive 
nature of fieldwork itself generates its own rich and colourful picture. Informants 
can speak for themselves. My research developed in this reflexive manner as both 
ideas and data gleaned from interviewing one group of people, for example, trade 
union officials, triggered off new issues, new questions and new ideas which could 
then be used on another group, for example, management.
Second, much of the research was in areas highly confidential, personal and 
sensitive. For example, I was conscious from preliminary discussions with union 
officers, managers and analysts that questionnaires were likely to alienate many 
potential informants as well as prejudicing the quality of data informants may 
provide. I felt that by being present and participating in conversation with 
informants that I would be able to elicit far more sophisticated responses from them
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- by clarifying issues, picking up on possible topics of mutual interest or issues 
which I had not considered, pursuing possible leads and contacts and generally 
putting informants at ease regarding the nature of my investigations and in assuring 
confidentiality and establishing trust.
Third, from my own work experiences I felt that I could not fully experience a work 
culture merely through reading about it or receiving completed questionnaires on it. 
There is no substitute for being physically present. This allows one to act on your 
environment, for example, making personal contacts, friendships, and assimilating a 
wider sensory experience (for example, building up a mental picture of the formal 
layouts of offices, relationship of designers to others in the department and 
organisation at large, even the clothes they wear or their attitudes to others or 
yourself). It also enables more reflexivity in questioning, thereby enabling a richer 
appreciation of an informant's world.
Fourth, by being physically present, informants could question me! This is important 
to qualitative data building. It is also a daunting experience and one which many 
researchers may rather not face. I found that the most detailed, personal, colourful 
and useful information I got was from people that I had built up a rapport with over 
time. The problem with this approach is the need for a certain confidence and 
possibly 'thick headedness' but, more importantly, the capacity to immerse oneself 
in the informants world and culture without 'going native'. One of the most
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stressful, time consuming, and initially daunting aspects of this research was coming 
to grips with new subject matter - computing, systems analysis and design and a 
wide spectrum of engineering, educational, training and managerial literature. There 
was nothing worse than being with a respondent and not having a clue what they are 
talking about. I found that, once informants recognised that I had made an effort to 
understand their subject matter, work and culture, they rewarded me with very 
personal, detailed information and friendship which yielded data.
Because of the cross sectoral nature of the research (finance, services, 
manufacturing etc.) and the diverse groups of people I was interviewing, I 
recognised the need to develop an approach which would accelerate my learning 
curve in a host of distinct disciplines that I had little or no prior familiarisation with. 
Consequently, I set out to elicit the cultural knowledge of engineers and systems 
analysts in terms of both the tools and techniques they deploy and their values, their 
methods and their accounts of their own labour. I investigated this culture within a 
model which highlights the social interaction of groups within the design process - 
designers, users and managers and trade unions. Where relevant I have cited 
informants' verbatim and let them tell their own story. This is not simply a question 
of'fairness' but is intrinsic to the reflexive nature of the whole enterprise; they tell 
their story in relation to my questions and assessment of the issues and problems 
that emerged from particular statements that they or I made. Finally, although I 
worked within an explicit theoretical model I did not force that model on the
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analysis. This is crucial because I was conscious of my own ignorance of much of 
my informants' work and experience and I needed to let them speak for themselves 
and to learn as much as I could about their world. In so doing I did not lose sight of 
the major theoretical issues that structured the research problematic; rather, this 
problematic encouraged reflexivity within the fieldwork with this, in turn, enriching 
my broader theoretical model.
Chronology Of Research
The research took place between October 1988 and February 1995 6 . This extended 
time span enabled me to develop extensive contacts, conduct many interviews and 
pursue a cross sectoral study; the time span allowed me to develop a perspective 
that otherwise might not have been possible. Much of the research after 1991 was 
tied in to my teaching on the engineering, computer science and social science 
degree courses at Napier University.
At the start of the research, in October 1988, I focused on industrial relations issues 
and the literature relating to business restructuring. I interviewed national and 
regional trade union officers for two main reasons: to build up a picture of trade 
union involvement in the design process and their assessment of the changes taking 
place within manufacturing ; and because trade unions were initially more receptive 
than management to being interviewed. They acted as useful 'gatekeepers', who,
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through their strategic position and experience, helped me to establish a number of 
contacts with senior management in both private and public sector organisations.
During the first year of the research I carried out extensive interviews with trade 
union officials and shop stewards, predominantly in South Wales. Following this I 
secured access to a variety of organisations predominantly within South Wales but 
also a few in the South West and elsewhere in England.
The next phase of the research focused upon establishing contacts with systems 
analysts and systems managers and immersing myself more fully in the computing 
and systems literature. To this effect I buried myself in the computer and systems 
design literature. Initially I found this daunting. At the same time many of the trade 
union officers and managers I had interviewed directed me to interesting 
organisations with interesting practices and helped me arrange interviews with 
systems managers, analysts and programmers in a range of organisations that I 
thought would be of strategic value in terms of either their product structure or 
process. This led to the production of several working papers on the education and 
training of systems analysts, on the tools and techniques of systems analysis, and on 
their professional status. Interviewing and subsequent fieldwork of systems analysts 
has run through the life cycle of the research (and, indeed, is still on-going). This 
has been facilitated by my move to Scotland to take up a lecturing post in sociology. 
My work with staff and students on the BSc Mechanical Engineering and BSc
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Computer Science degrees at Napier not only gave me new local contacts but 
opened up new issues.
Whilst engineers were a group that I was researching in Wales, I focused with 
renewed vigour on this group in 1992-3 as it became increasingly apparent that 
much of the systems analyst discourse and tool kit borrowed very heavily on 
engineering. Engineers constitute a distinct group in their own right, standing at the 
forefront of technological change and the restructuring of manufacturing, so my 
analysis of engineers was central to developing an understanding of the design 
process.
From the outset of the research I was interested in exploring issues of class and how 
these may have an impact upon the design process. This interest was accommodated 
in earlier interviewing of systems analysts and engineers. From 1992 it became a 
prime focus of my questioning - partly because I had had more time to ponder the 
issues but also because I had been gathering provocative material from my 
fieldwork which caused me some consternation and much contemplation. For 
example, many engineers and analysts sense of frustration with particular 
characterisations of their class position; or data which indicated that their class 
experiences were, in fact, influencing their exercise of autonomy within the design 
process.
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Rationale for Fieldwork Approach
Large scale research can lend itself to a number of methods, e.g., questionnaire 
surveys, structured and semi-structured interviews, fieldwork or even case study 
approaches. Neither category need be mutually exclusive, much will depend upon 
the research problematic, timescale and resources and staff at ones disposal. There 
are a number of reasons why I chose to adopt an extensive fieldwork approach 
combining both semi-structured interviews and field observations7 :
1) I was not examining one group of employees but many i.e. managers, engineers, 
consultants, trade unionists and systems analysts; moreover, I was concerned with 
addressing a number of broad issues relating to organisational restructuring, 
autonomy, design, democracy and social class - the accommodation of which would 
be less satisfactory within a traditional case study approach because of the sheer 
number of groups, sectors and organisations involved and the difficulty of finding an 
organisation or organisation with all groups present. More importantly, whilst a 
detailed case study has the merit of documenting in detail the specific culture of a 
particular group of workers within a given sector it does not readily allow one to 
generalise ones findings about similar groups of workers in other sectors. Yet as my 
research developed it was precisely these general themes, commonalties, shared 
lineage's and trajectories that threw light on the phenomenon which interested me. 
Exposure to a wide and diverse group of practising designers accelerated my
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knowledge and learning curve and was responsible for my early recognition of some 
of the broader themes that emerged within the research.
2) Systems analysts were a largely uncharted group of workers. There was a dearth 
of sociological literature on systems analysts and particularly relating to their 
exercise of autonomy, values, culture and methods. Consequently, I needed an 
approach which exposed me to as wide a number of practising systems analysts as 
possible to develop an understanding of their work and the issues arising therefrom. 
A more detailed ethnography of say one or two groups of analysts in a particular 
industry or sector would have run the risk of going totally 'native' through having 
insufficient experience and information of analysts, their work, tools or techniques. 
In effect my objectivity could have been compromised. Furthermore, the richness of 
analysts work, its diversity, the complexity of issues to emerge, would have been 
compromised. For example, early on in the research it became evident that a wide 
variety of people practised systems analysis who were not, accurately speaking, 
systems analysts, these were located in a diversity of organisations across a range of 
sectors. If I had not taken the trouble to arrange extensive preliminary interviews I 
may have ended up studying a group that were not at all representative of analysts 
at large.
3) Initial interviewing of trade union officers, management and management 
consultants in an attempt to gauge the depth of business restructuring and the use of
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IT within this process indicated the need to capture the diversity of analysts 
experience and the diversity of locales in which they worked. Utilising a reflexive 
fieldwork approach enabled me to tackle the issues of business restructuring and the 
role of engineers, trade unions, and systems analysts more easily than a traditional 
case study approach would have allowed. For example, I may have ended up 
studying a group of analysts not engaged in any active projects or in an organisation 
that was not implementing any significant IT strategy, or in an organisation in which 
management were obstructive, or one in which I was not allowed access to users or 
trade union officers, etc. In contrast by adopting the fieldwork approach I did I 
could compensate for the shortcomings in any one particular organisation by picking 
up on those shortcomings in others. For example, one company would not let me 
speak to users of the system, but to offset this I could speak to users at other 
companies. This process could be and was applied across a whole range of issues 
and problems and again was possible only because of the extent and detail of my 
fieldwork practice.
4) Importantly, as the research progressed, fieldwork data and ideas did not develop 
in a smooth or progressive fashion. For example, I may have spent weeks discussing 
the issue of de-skilling with one group of analysts in the banking sector and let the 
subject lay dormant only to find several weeks or months later that another group of 
analysts in engineering or retail had something different to say. A more traditional 
case study would not have been able to build up such a detailed or rich picture of
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analysts work - the model I would have had would have been more one dimensional 
i.e. organisation/sector specific. In contrast, the extensive and detailed fieldwork 
approach I took enabled me to build up a rich picture of not only analysts but also 
engineers work. The richness stems precisely from the diversity of individuals, 
organisations and sectors I studied and from my ability to cross reference and 
triangulate opinion and argument. For example, I could contrast the arguments of 
one group of systems analysts discussing autonomy in one organisation with those 
discussing it in another, and I could then bring in the perspectives of other groups 
within that, or other, organisations i.e. systems managers, engineers, management, 
trade unions etc.
5) Choice of a fieldwork approach which combined in depth interviewing, 
observation and participant observation suited both my predilection and the broader 
theoretical and philosophical model I was working within. I was concerned with 
unpacking a complex puzzle. I wanted to know the answers to many questions, for 
example, who were systems analysts, what did they do, what autonomy did they 
exercise in work and over the design process, how did they conceptualise their 
labour, what was their relationship to others within the design process, were they 
'agents of capital' automatically delivering technologies of control and deskilling or 
did they interpret capitals interest via a distinctive culture which could also be a site 
of resistance to that interest. To answer these questions and, importantly, others 
relating to business restructuring, design and democracy I also need to examine
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management and trade union involvement in design. Once the research began I 
quickly recognised that even this group was not large enough and that unless I 
started looking at engineers there was going to be a big hole in my understanding of 
analysts practice. Certainly I did not feel that I could accommodate all these groups 
and interests within a traditional case study approach.
Importantly the fieldwork approach I took necessitated a huge process of 
abstraction in order to be able to assimilate, process and draw out the key themes 
and issues of the puzzle. This type of fieldwork involves handling large and diverse 
quantities of data and being able to draw out that which is significant and that which 
is peripheral. The gathering and grouping of observations on a large scale piece of 
research like this is a matter of intense debate (Glaser & Strauss 1964, Giddens 
1979, Mattick 1986, Hakim 1987). For one thing the role of the researcher in 
setting the theoretical agenda, in being prepared to modify theory in light of field 
practice, and in interpreting data cannot be overstated. As the research developed I 
would formally group observations under discreet headings i.e. de-skilling, 
autonomy, design purity, etc. however, it took several months for me to establish 
some headings and several years for others. This was due to the way in which 
themes and ideas were gathered, processed, updated and modified in the light of 
field practice. In a very real sense, like all researchers, I was often dependent on 
factors outside my control, for example factors relating to access, meetings, 
emergence of new information, new ideas, etc. My fieldwork developed
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incrementally and in spurts as new data even from old informants was comine in 
daily and as I fed back preliminary analysis to key informants for their response. 
Consequently, the grouping of observations on a case for case basis was difficult.
Whilst it would have been interesting to have formally grouped observations in a 
series of cases and compared them that would necessitate another project. Given the 
time constraints and resources at my disposal it was logistically impossible. More 
importantly nor would it have had any practical benefit because of the diversity of 
personnel interviewed and observed and the diversity of organisations they were 
located within. I would have ended up having to group observations of some 300 
personnel in some 60 organisations. The fieldwork just did not unfold in this neat 
fashion it simply was not the case that I had 2 or 3 companies that I could 
meaningfully compare. In some instances research was still ongoing in companies up 
until the point of write up, in others only one or two personnel may have been 
interviewed, in others maybe thirty or forty, in some organisations I had been 
interviewing trade union officials, in others managers, in yet others engineers, in yet 
others all three plus systems analysts! In effect I was not in a position to compare 
like with like. This was aggravated by the fact that in some organisations I was 
allowed limited observation, others none, and in some active participation in work 
events. Consequently to attempt to build this thesis on the basis of grouped 
observations in distinctive locales would have dramatically slowed down the 
fieldwork process and left me with insufficient time to focus on the personnel and
486
ideas critical to my analysis. In a smaller study, one involving a detailed ethnography 
of maybe one or two groups of workers within a company a comparative 
assessment of such groupings would have been easier and worthwhile.
The fact that I was doing fieldwork in a wide variety of organisations involving 
hundreds of personnel and in which factors such as availability of staff, types of 
projects worked upon and a whole host of sectoral influences like industrial 
relations climate, different organisational cultures, project team participation, etc. 
were variable meant that it was not easy to advance concrete hypothesis on the basis 
of clearly grouped observations until late in the research. For example, only after 
sifting through several years of fieldwork did I feel confident enough to discuss the 
issue of democracy and the project team because that's how long it took me to 
formalise and make sense of the contradictory information and observations I had 
been witnessing from analysts and users over the issue of servant and served and 
user orientated computing. If I had not adopted the fieldwork approach I did then 
those issues may never have emerged. For example, if I had done a smaller but more 
detailed case study of a particular group of analysts and users I may have concluded 
on the basis of that one study that there was no ambiguity about the term user or 
that no discord or antagonism of interest was felt by users or analysts. However, 
through interviewing hundreds of analysts, designers and users as well as 
participating in a number of project teams I was able to build up a more detailed 
picture of the issues and recognise sites of antagonism and manipulation.
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Once the process of interviewing and observing respondents had begun I could 
begin cross referring accounts and focusing my research more fully. In effect as the 
research developed key themes and issues emerged and were tested in the light of a 
diverse field practice. These themes a-nd issues emerged on the basis of grouping 
observations under 'general theme' headings, for example, de-skilling, autonomy, 
democracy and design, or project team practice etc. Under these headings I would 
note the respondents name, position, age, organisation, sector, etc. These files 
would then be accessed towards the end of the research when I began to focus on 
those themes that consistently recurred and could be discussed under general theme 
headings. Importantly, these general themes are personnel and sector specific i.e. 
each engineer or analysts might cite an example of design purity on the basis of his 
or her own personal experience, but because of the frequency of their expression 
serve to constitute a distinctive design culture which helps us to make sense of the 
work of engineers and analysts and which enables engineers and analysts to make 
sense of their own work and their relationship to the design process and others 
engaged in that process.
The fieldwork approach I have taken is neither superior nor inferior to that of more 
traditional ethnography's. Each has their own place and purpose within sociological 
research. The fact that I chose the former approach stems from the breadth of the 
research remit: examining organisational restructuring and the role of designers
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within that process, the consequent diversity of groups I had to study, and the need 
to resolve a number of important theoretical debates, for example, relating to de- 
skilling, autonomy, design and democracy. Whilst this kind of large scale and in- 
depth fieldwork can produce huge quantities of raw data it is easy for that data to 
get lost - a case of not seeing the wood for the trees - which is why those 
undertaking such research need not only a reflexive methodology but a relatively 
coherent dynamic theoretical model which enables them to make sense of the data 
and maintain the focus of the research.
Interviewees and Interview Schedules
Five key groups were interviewed:
trade union officers and shop stewards;
senior management;
systems management and systems analysts;
engineers; and
consultants.
These groups were selected because they stand in a key position in relation to 
information technology and the processes of business restructuring. They represent 
a broad social spectrum from the most senior managers to shop floor workers. I 
wanted to capture the diversity, range and perception of change that these different
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groups experienced to build up a more informed picture of the issues and processes 
involved and, specifically, to understand the role of systems analysts within the 
design process.
I approached the issue of interviewing through drawing up preliminary interview 
checklists. These checklists are not exhaustive. 8 In the tradition of semi-structured 
interviews they provided a framework. Some interviewees wished to see a copy of 
the checklist before they granted interviews. Because of this I was careful what to 
include and what to leave out of the checklist. If I felt that some topics were likely 
to antagonise or alienate potential interviewees then I would exclude them from the 
initial checklist and possibly raise them at a later date when I had won the 
interviewees confidence. I had to recognise the need to be realistic in winning over 
respondents - particularly senior management on whose goodwill and patience I was 
often reliant.
When arranging and conducting interviews I was aware from prior work experience 
and my sociological background of the differential power of my interviewees and 
myself. This was particularly so for some of the more senior managers I 
interviewed. This affected the interview and my data gathering in a variety of ways. 
For example, senior managers would inform me they could spare only a few 
minutes, or they would use their position of authority to pressure me into accepting 
their viewpoint as fact. On other occasions they would obstruct a particular line of
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questioning, or. where interviews took place with several people at once, make 
clear their approbation or dislike of a particular informants response or line of 
argument. Ironically, however, I rarely felt disturbed or threatened by this kind of 
posturing; generally I found it highly informative and even quite amusing. Whilst I 
showed appropriate deference and respect to some of my interviewees this did not 
stop me eliciting valuable data from them. Some interviewees clearly wielded 
considerable power but I in turn could be Machiavellian in my line of questioning 
and pursuit of data. Indeed some of the most obnoxious, arrogant and bull-nosed 
interviewees provided the richest sources of data. Most interviewees and informants 
treated me with courtesy. There was a degree of mutual respect for each other's 
work. Often interviewees' curiosity and awe at the task I had set myself tended to 
melt formal barriers and to produce a culture of co-operation and friendliness. 
Interviewees and fieldwork participants were often as enthusiastic about my work 
and findings as I was and were flattered that I found them so interesting. Obviously, 
this facilitated the data gathering process.
Whilst the checklist proved a useful way of securing data I was conscious of its 
limitations. For example it cannot easily capture the mood or culture of a particular 
work group or setting. This could only be captured through fieldwork. As the 
research developed and I became more conversant with different work groups and 
their cultures and practices, I relied less on checklists. Informants did not always 
argue logically, in fact they seldom did; themes and issues were brought up
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anecdotally in passing conversations, or as part of a wider discourse on an 
altogether different subject. Once I had established a rapport with informants and 
they felt comfortable enough to divulge information to me the checklists served 
more as a referral point, for me to make sure that key issues were covered.
The construction of the checklists was itself a reflexive process taking into account 
suggestions from informants. I started out with a preliminary set of questions 
gleaned form literature reviews and initial interviews. These were then either 
extended, abandoned or modified in the light of field practice and my own 
intellectual development. As the research progressed I found I was more readily 
able to target key informants with specific questions. Rather than going through the 
entire checklist I became more and more selective focusing on particular issues and 
topics that needed greater clarification.
Each checklist was designed to elicit data on the issues that were of interest to me. 
The five checklists reinforce one another and were designed to allow cross 
referencing of information and validation of responses from different groups - for 
example, documenting management's interpretations of change and contrasting 
these with, for example, the interpretations of union officials or systems analysts.
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Conduct of Interviews and Field Work
Interview length varied according to a number of criteria - who the interviewee was, 
whether or not it was a first interview; the interviewees agenda for that day, the 
topics to be discussed, etc. Some interviews would be 'one off in the sense that it 
was made clear to me in advance that a particular interviewee would only be 
available for a fixed period of time. By contrast I arranged with other informants to 
interview them several times over several months. In some cases this was because a 
particular project life cycle they were working on had to unfold before I could 
discuss key issues and themes as they emerged; in other cases interviewees had 
extended the invitation to revisit them to discuss in more detail specific issues that 
arose in previous meetings. Some interviewees were also gatekeepers who I had 
arranged to keep in touch with for purposes of conveying ideas, making progress 
updates and establishing further contacts. Interviews varied in length from around 
one hour to several hours. Two to three hour interviews were common.
It was usually suggested by prospective informants that I met for a preliminary 
interview at their place of work during which I discussed the details of my research 
and the possible ways in which they may be able to assist. These initial meetings 
were important in that I was often given a tour of the organisation and introduced 
to other key personnel whom my informant thought might be helpful. From these
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initial meetings I could build up my contacts and arrange further preliminary 
interviews or studies of particular individuals or groups.
Prior to interviews I would always try to ensure that I had read about a particular 
company and its product or service. Likewise, I would try and learn as much as I 
could about the job of the particular informant I was questioning. Unsurprisingly, I 
found that if informants recognised I had at least made this much effort then they 
would generally respond positively.
At interviews I tried to adopt the customary manner and attitudes of the group I 
was studying. This is a question of respecting the customs and tradition of the 
particular group under study.
I was conscious of the fact that many interviewees might feel threatened by the 
disclosure of information they had passed on to me. Consequently, and as a matter 
of practice, letters ensuring confidentiality and details of the research were always 
sent out in advance of any initial meeting.
My interview settings were important. I found that often interviewees would divulge 
more once they were outside their place of work. Initial contacts usually took place 
at the interviewees place of work, but I would often try and persuade them to meet
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at a more ' neutral site' in the early stages of contact. I found pubs and clubs ideal 
places in which to relax the informant.
I worked hard at trying to empathise with informants. I would listen to their stories, 
however stimulating, bigoted or prejudiced, and tried not to impose either my 
opinion on them or to correct them. This was difficult at times, because on many 
occasions I had to sit and listen to offensive attitudes, but I was conscious of the 
fact that it was necessary to let them tell their own story; this was the best way to 
capture their work and world views and the nuances of their culture and beliefs.
I used a variety of data recording techniques during interviews. These ranged from 
tape recording the informant, personal note taking, or, on occasions, having an 
assistant take notes with me whilst I kept a discussion flowing. 9 1 was careful not to 
offend an informant by utilising a technique which I felt was likely to alienate them. 
For example, when interviewing, I found that the use of a tape recorder inhibited 
some informants from divulging personal accounts to me but on the other hand 
helped to focus them when it came to addressing less sensitive issues. This was 
brought home in an interview I had with one systems manager early on in the 
research. He would ask me every 10 minutes 'is the tape still on' and 'I hope it got 
that point'. Some would become paranoid about talking with a tape recorder 
present. Others would ramble into the tape recorder in monotone fashion and then 
get angry with their own lack of panache and demand that the tape was turned off
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so they could 'get down to the real issues'. Likewise sitting with a notepad on my 
knee in either an office or pub whilst at the same time trying to maintain a 
discussion could be tricky. I had to know when and when not to write and I found it 
helps to be histrionic in the process. For example, an informant touches upon an 
important topic and you announce 'brilliant', this can lift their spirits; they can get 
even higher when you then move to the edge of the chair and then ask them to 
repeat the point so you can write it down because 'its so interesting'. At the same 
time I was conscious not to prejudice informants responses by imposing my own 
particular views upon them. It is one thing encouraging informants to speak but I 
had to be careful not to lead them down a particular path and thereby prejudice the 
information they gave.
The quality of the data I was able to gather depended to a large extent on my 
informants' goodwill. It was essential not to compromise this through displaying 
inappropriate behaviour or making mindless statements which may offend. I was 
also conscious of the need to protect my informants. For example, in one company a 
senior manager from another department asked me a series of very personal and 
leading questions about one of my informants. I could sense he was fishing for 
information which he could use to his advantage and to the disadvantage of the 
systems manager I was working alongside. I could easily have provided this 
manager with the information and in that respect furthered my own access to higher 
managerial positions within the company, but I chose not to. This is not a moral
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issue, but a sound fieldwork principle. If the systems manager had learned that I had 
betrayed his confidence not only would he be offended but my entire fieldwork at 
that organisation could have collapsed. Given the reflexive nature of this kind of 
fieldwork I realised the role of the researcher in stabilising or undermining 
relationships in the cultures I was studying and the nature of my own presence and 
attitude on the setting.
In carrying out fieldwork in which I was granted relatively unrestricted access to a 
particular culture it was important not to upset the daily routines of that culture. I 
had to be aware that people modify their behaviour when they know they are being 
studied. Obviously, there were ways for me to minimise this disruption. For 
example, I found that having a quite senior 'gatekeeper' or mentor within the 
organisation who would be prepared to take me under their wing gave me more 
credibility with others within the organisation. At the same time, others could 
perceive my presence and alignment with a particular individual as a threat. I had" to 
be careful against presenting my work in particularist terms and be seen to represent 
either the interests of everyone within a particular culture, or my own interests. I 
tried to do this by spending, where possible, equal amounts of time with different 
organisational members, by consciously not spending too much time with, for 
example, the senior personnel who were sponsoring me. It also helped to be open 
with a wide variety of individuals in the study about the way my work was 
progressing and the issues emerging. For example, at the end of one day I told the
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systems manager that many of my interview respondents thought prototyping 
software was useful but within strict limits - and that it could never replace the skills 
of the analyst. He replied that the best way to find out was to build a mock 
application using me as the guinea pig. He arranged for several of the lads in the 
department to take me through a system the next day so that I could see, first hand, 
the strengths and limitations of the software.
In organising field studies I arranged, wherever possible, to discuss the nature of my 
research and what I was hoping to achieve with those I was about to study. This 
was done for a variety of reasons - to address any possible fears or distrust 
respondents may have; to give those I was studying the chance to ask questions, 
validate my findings and get involved in the research. I tried to get to know those I 
was observing well. Usually people responded in kind and were co-operative - 
sometimes forgetting I was even there.
Potentially delicate and stressful moments arose when I was invited to participate in 
particular discussions. These could involve a variety of forms of participation from 
sitting down with analysts and users with both parties asking my views on a 
particular system strategy or it could involve being asked to comment on any topic 
from politics to religion and sex at any moment and with any group or individual. I 
had to be extremely careful to read the moment and understand the personalities 
present so as not to make statements which may be seen as partial or prejudiced.
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Where I felt ignorant on a particular topic or issue I declared ignorance rather than
risk ridicule or antagonising a particular person. On occasions I was bailed out from
awkward and politically volatile questions by people in the group who had
befriended me or who recognised the inappropriateness of a particular line of
questioning. On the whole, however, because I think I was seen to be interested in
their work and prepared to learn: informants were generally prepared to be gracious
in their treatment of me. For example, one particular software engineer invited me
to use a 'Quickbuild' package on his CAD machine to demonstrate one potential
design scenario that he and colleagues were considering. He assumed that I could
use this package when in fact I could not. I could see the disappointment on his
face. My only response was to play up on my technical ignorance. This brought his
laughter and his renewed determination to show me how the package worked.
Throughout the fieldwork and particularly when it came to participating in
discussions or using the tools and techniques of those I was studying I had to learn
to walk this kind of tightrope.
Recording and Analysing Data
At the end of each day I would attempt to write up as much as possible of the 
relevant findings of that day. Often, it just was not possible to transcribe hours of 
tape recorded interviews. The way in which I collated data also depended on the 
means which I had used to gather it that particular day, who the informant was and
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where they were when I was gathering the information. For example, walking down 
a noisy production line where you can barely capture the odd phrase a production 
engineer is uttering is not conducive to the use of a tape recorder nor is it much use 
trying to scribble down what is said on a notepad as you walk speedily down the 
line. Rather, I had to retain as much as possible in my head and at the first 
opportunity, for example, at lunch or between meetings, jot down the key points of 
the dialogue and other information that may be of use such as type of products built 
or layout of the line.
Over the duration of my research I ended up with a variety of data from 
interviewees. These ranged from tape recorded interviews to extensive notes, glossy 
brochures and material given to me by informants to explain particular argument or 
process. On occasion I telephoned informants after a visit and asked them to clarify 
points they made in the day that I was unsure about.
As the months progressed I was building up a map of how the thesis may take shape 
and how empirical data could be used to substantiate, criticise or modify particular 
theoretical arguments. Key themes, arguments and debates would be entered into 
my filing system as I ordered work along several different fronts roughly 
corresponding to the key areas of my investigation. These were:
systems analysts i.e. tools, techniques and methods.
engineers i.e. tools, techniques and methods
the division of labour in both computing and engineering
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social class
organisational culture and change
trade unions, new technology and industrial relations
users and systems design
democracy and design
management, manufacturing and restructuring
These files were drawn on towards the end of my research as I pulled together the 
central themes and debates and tied them into the structure of my thesis. In this 
process I tried to maintain a balance within each chapter between empirically 
generated accounts of events and change and the more theoretical accounts 
discussed in the literature.
The process by which key themes and debates emerged from the raw data I had 
gathered was complex. As the research was progressing I noted the key areas of 
interest and key themes emerging. In this sense I was actively selecting certain data 
that was of interest to me. However, I sought not to force the data to fit my 
theoretical model. Nor could I, because this model was itself developing in tandem 
with the data gathering and the continual assessment and reassessment of issues and 
themes emerging. For example, I did not advance the proposition that engineers had 
a notion of design purity on the basis of only one or two anecdotal comments from 
engineers or on the basis of the literature I had read. Rather, this perspective was 
selected solely because it recurred in discussion with numerous engineers and thus 
caused me theoretical consternation. Such consternation would push me to cross 
check and cross reference particular perspectives before I would develop
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hypotheses on them. For example, a systems analyst might advance a particular 
perspective on design. I could then cross refer, or triangulate, that perspective with 
those given to me by the analysts manager, or by other analysts, or users, or against 
available literature to check its durability, commonality etc.
It was not a question of my data merely corroborating my theoretical predilections. 
Although I was working within a labour process perspective I did not have any 
ready made thesis or model which served to select or distort my data gathering 
endeavours. Rather, I was all too aware of my ignorance of the group and culture 
being studied and consequently saw a reflexive fieldwork approach as the best way 
to elicit data and develop my own theoretical understanding. This understanding 
developed as a consequence of fieldwork and not separate from it. For example, 
initial comments by engineers on control prompted me to research a body of 
theoretical writing on control theory. In turn this enabled me to comprehend 
engineers' earlier statements and triggered further enquiry into systems theory.
The data I gathered often forced me to revise and question previous assumptions 
and models. For example the theoretical debates on class with which I was familiar 
seemed increasingly sterile in the light of my fieldwork and engineers' and analysts' 
practices. It was because I was conscious of these disjunction's between theory and 
practice that I resisted attempts to strightjacket the data into inflexible theoretical
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models. Where possible I used the data to critically inform and question these 
models.
Sources of Data
The richest sources of data relating to design, tools, techniques and engineers' and 
analysts practice came from those I interviewed and observed. The data they 
supplied continually served as a referral point, opening up new issues or confirming 
or contradicting opinions voiced in either the academic or trade literature. Without 
this primary data my understanding of debates in the literature would have 
progressed more slowly and would have been more circumscribed.
The data I gathered from interviewees and case studies was supported by a variety 
of other information sources, including:
1) Computer based networks - I found these sources provided up to date 
information on a variety of topics although the searches themselves tended to be 
broad, time consuming and invariably in need of detailed tuning before I found the 
specific information I was looking for.
2) Professional bodies, associations and institutes - A variety of organisations, 
including the British Computer Society, the National Computing Centre, the
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Institute of Mechanical Engineers and UCCA, provided data both written and verbal 
on a variety of issues ranging from skills to training policies to social class and 
trade union membership. Much of this data proved useful not only in that it often 
presented the 'official' position of a particular body or institute but that that 
'official' position could then be assessed in relation to practice as discovered in my 
case studies.
3) Company literature - Several companies provided quite detailed accounts of 
their manufacturing and business strategies indicating why they were undergoing 
change and the rationale behind it. This data sometimes came from head office in 
the form of'glossies' and sometimes from within particular departments or sections 
within a company that were working on specific projects. It proved useful in that it 
gave me often detailed information relating to a company's history, manufacturing 
processes and policies which enabled me to clarify and focus my questions when 
interviewing in these companies.
4) Literature from informants - This was often personal or confidential, relating to 
specific process changes taking place within companies that my informants were 
engaged in. For example, systems managers would give me their own personalised 
agendas for change, or explain to me current or proposed systems. The strength of 
this data is that is was given personally by the informant. It enabled me to clarify 
issues with informants and discuss in a reflexive way key points of interest. It also
504
meant that I could have topics explained to me in a fashion that I could understand. 
In this way I was able to comprehend issues quicker than I could by reading a book 
on a particular topic by some author that I could not cross question.
5) Industry manuals and practitioners handbooks - this encompassed access to 
material as diverse as SSADM or LBMS structured systems analysis and design 
techniques, to more personalised 'best practice' manuals that either individual 
systems managers, chief engineers or departments in the companies I studied were 
generating. These texts often gave me knowledge of the issues involved in design 
and because I worked through a number of them page by page, issue by issue with 
(for example) a systems manger or analyst at my side, I was more readily able to ask 
questions, raise points and get issues clarified.
6) Specific software engineering tools and packages - I was given first hand 
experience, sitting down with a number of systems managers, analysts and 
engineers, of using specific design software - for example, Yourdon's Structured 
Systems Analysis and Design and ICLs 'Quickbuild'. This enabled me to see how 
problems were structured, how designers reacted with users and how the software 
itself imposed its own agenda on users and designers alike. Without the experience 
of using packages like Yourdon or a variety of prototyping software that is used by 
systems designers much of my research would have been sterile and anecdotal. As it
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is I have seen many of the tools and techniques that analysts use in action and this 
has been an invaluable input into my research and the formulation of issues.
In summary, my thesis has linked empirical data with broader theoretical debates on 
restructuring, design and class. Through a qualitative data gathering process, 
involving interviews and in depth fieldwork over an extended period, I have been 
able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of particular theoretical models and 
establish a central thesis. Namely, designers exercise autonomy within the design 
process through their articulation of a distinctive culture and set of practices which 
enables them to actively interpret what constitutes good and bad design. This thesis 
emerged out of a reflexive fieldwork practice.
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Appendix : Checklist of Questions
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Preliminary checklist areas for systems analysts and systems 
managers:
1) Areas of work and job definition
2) Scale of systems you are or have been involved in designing
3) Typical analysis and design procedures
4) Background and training of systems analysts
5) Skills required of analyst
6) Theory and methods employed
7) Tools and techniques employed
8) Relationship with management and users
9) Consultation with workforce over design
10) Dilemmas, choices and autonomy analysts face/have
Revised checklist in light of preliminary interviewing, literature 
searches and participant observation:
1) Do systems analysts have specific values that influence their designs and approach 
to work?
2) What constitutes a good and bad design?
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3) How do you define efficiency9
4) Do systems embody particular systems analyst/ systems perspectives?
5) Is analysis and design an art/political process or is it an engineering process or 
mixture of both?
6) Is the process of analysis and design democratic?
7) Are project teams democratic in their structure and decision taking?
8) Do you need democracy to design good systems?
9) How do you perceive analysts professionalisation and status?
10) Which social class would you say you belonged in?
11) Is class important to you?
12) Does class affect or impact in any way upon the process of analysis and design?
Checkl 1st of questions for Information Technology consultants:
1) What is the nature of consultancy you offer and in what areas e.g. office, 
manufacturing, finance, retailing etc.?
2) Do different businesses/ organisations have their own specific requirements?
3) What scale of systems do you advise upon?
4) Do you have any particular system preference e.g. decentralised as opposed to 
centralised?
5) Who usually brings you into an organisation and what is your usual job remit?
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6) How much power and autonomy do you have once you have entered an 
organisation?
7) Why are you brought into organisations?
8) Is it possible for systems staff to utilise structured methods or new tools and 
techniques to achieve the same results as you might achieve?
9) What is the stimulus behind the IT revolution?
10) Can you think of any situations where it might be preferable not to computerise 
current tasks or systems9
Checklist of questions for engineers:
1) Is engineering an art or science or both?
2) Are there any values or principles that influence the type of systems/products that 
engineers design or is engineering value free?
3) What constitutes a well engineered product/system?
4) How do you know when your design is right?
5) Are there any factors which compromise design?
6) Do engineers get due recognition in society?
7) How do you feel your status compares to that of systems analysts?
8) What is your relationship with management?
9) How do you perceive engineers professional image?
10) Do you belong to a trade union?
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11) What social class would you say you belonged in?
12) Is class important to you?
13) Does class affect or impact in any way upon the process of design?
Checklist of questions for senior management:
1) Does your company have an overall IT strategy and how does it fit in with the 
overall company/corporate plan?
2) Has your company introduced any new technology or reorganised production and 
working practices recently?
3) What motivated you to introduce new technology and new working practices?
4) Why did you choose the particular technologies and strategies that you did?
5) Did you hold consultations with other interested or affected parties i.e. other firms, 
consultancies, research agencies, trade unions etc.?
6) Did you anticipate any difficulties in introducing these changes, for example in 
terms of job demarcations, skilling, employment etc.?
7) How did you handle the process of change?
8) How have these changes affected your companies success and viability?
9) Do you anticipate similar changes being introduced in other companies in the same 
line of business?
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Checklist of questions for trade union officers:
1) What is your union policy/guidelines on new technology
- what is your evaluation of this policy
- how do you feel it relates to TUC policy
- what is your evaluation of TUC policy?
2) What size is the union nationally and regionally
- how has membership fared since 1979
- what factors do you feel account for these changes in membership?
3) How important is union activity at either shop floor, regional or national level in 
securing influence over the design, introduction and working of new technology?
4) How do you think your members perceive the introduction of new technology
- how as it affected skill levels
- what problems does it pose for members
- are the problems to do with the way management has introduced the technology or 
do they arise from the specifics of the technology itself?
5) Are you involved as a union in negotiating with employers over the design, 
development and introduction of new technology?
6) There has recently been a spate of literature dealing with the so called 
7apanisation' of British industry and the introduction of new working practices like 
quality circles, just-in-time, and multi-flexibility. Do you know of any companies that 
have introduced such practices and what is your assessment of them?
512
7) Do you feel the current Government is responding adequately to the needs of 
British manufacturing?
8) What do you feel about single union deals
- are they a recent phenomenon
- has their content changed over the years?
9) Do you see any connection between recent changes in working practices and the 
current political/economic climate?




Chapter 1: Contemporary Restructuring of Capital
(1) Marx argues:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist as a class without constantly revolutionising the implements 
of production and thereby the relations of production and with them the entire relations 
of society ... uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting agitation, 
distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. AH fixed fast frozen relations with 
their train of ancient and venerable prejudice and opinion are swept away all new found 
ones become antiquated before they can even ossify ... all that is solid melts into air, all 
that is holy is profaned and man is at last compelled to face with sober sense his real 
conditions of life and relations with his kind (1986: 37).
(2) This scrutinisation of other 'economic miracles' has many historical precedents. Kasslow 
(1986) stresses that this present round of scrutinisation of Japanese industrial relations is not 
new, in the past, other economies, including the German, Swedish, American and, of course, 
British, served a similar purpose.
(3) As the Economist (1983) pointed out, Japan is far from being a miracle economy; rather a few 
15-storey industries dominate a mass of medium, smaller sized firms and sweatshops, 
operating in international terms with below average productivity's of labour. Complementary 
to the dual nature of the economy, there exists a dual labour market, predicated on only one 
third of the workforce being unionised and receiving the benefits of the company world. As 
Briggs (1988) and Kamata (1983) point out, life-time employment and seniority wage systems 
can actually serve to immobilise Japanese capital, preventing management's redeployment of 
labour and rationalisation of production, as well as leading to huge costs of 'socialisation' 
which, by and large western companies are not burdened with. Furthermore, life within the 
'company world' is far from being a harmonious sanctuary and is, in fact, the site of intense 
competition, stress and anxiety (Halliday 1975).
(4) A number of writers have pointed out the coercive nature of quality circles and the stress and 
humiliation Japanese workers feel when they can no longer keep up performances (Kamata 
1983, Littler 1982). Japanese working relations at Komatsu's plant in N.E. England explode 
the myth of 'happy famiiyism' and highlight how quality circles and 'happy familyism' are 
primarily attempts to reduce poor quality and improve productivity through incorporating the 
workforce into a shared belief system (Hauge 1987).
(5) Hill and Blyton's (1987) argument that flexibilisation does not significantly reduce- labour 
costs and cannot, therefore, be said to benefit British business misses the point. It is not a 
question of reduced wages per se but increased exploitation, i.e. labour productivity. Wages 
can rise yet the rate of exploitation rise even more dramatically through strategies of 
Japanisation.
(6) Teleworker cited Channel Four (1995) 'Visions of Heaven and Hell'.
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(7) I found that, advances in Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacture 
(CAM), Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM), Robotics, Statistical Quality Control 
(SQC), Line Balancing and Just in Time (JIT) techniques have enabled many of these firms to 
achieve product diversity, improved quality and "flexibility" whilst at the same time 
streamlining or abolishing supervisory and middle manager grades but still retaining 
hierarchical control and centralised power.
(8) In the coal mining industry Winterton (1986) has shown how MINOS and FIDO operating 
systems were used by the NCB to monitor machine cutting speeds, work stoppages, outputs 
and labour productivity's, not only on different teams on the same face, but against other 
teams on other faces and in other pits and regions, this data was then used by management to 
victimise miners before, during and after the strike.
(9) There are several Regulation Schools each has its own distinct focus:
The Grenoblais School - there are two main reference points for this school; a sustained 
critique of the theory of general economic equilibrium as an adequate basis for understanding 
the dynamic of capitalist economies (Bernis 1977, Ruzza 1981) and a penodisation of 
capitalism into three stages: competitive, monopoly and state monopoly capitalism, each with 
its oxvn mode of regulation.
The Parisian School - initial studies were concerned with Fordism in the USA, the nature of 
monopoly capitalism, the causes of inflation and the development of public spending. In 
contrast to the Grenoblais and orthodox state monopoly capitalist theorists Parisians 
distinguish two basic stages of capitalism: 'extensive1 and 'intensive'. In an 'extensive 
accumulation regime' capital expands by merely spreading into new areas of economic activity 
at the expense of non-capitalist producers. In an 'intensive accumulation regime' capital 
accumulates mainly through reorganisation and rationalisation of existing areas of activity, 
mechanisation and hyper-mechanisation leading to the production of relative surplus-value. 
The 'extensive' regime is characterised as having a competitive mode of regulation, the 
'intensive' regime as having monopolistic regulations (Lipietz 1988).
The PCF-CME School - inspired by Boccara, the PCF developed a new view of state 
monopoly capitalism based on a law of 'over-accumulation - devalorisation' and its impact on 
the relations between private monopolies and the state. According to this school short term 
tendencies towards over-accumulation can be eliminated through the actions of private 
capitals as they reorganise the labour-process and/or modify the conditions in which 
surplus-value is realised: whilst in the long term over-accumulation must be eliminated 
through devalorisation of a large part of the total social capital, responsibility for such 
devalorisation devolves primarily to the state. This approach focuses on how monopoly 
capital is advantaged by state measures which transfer the formal ownership of capitals or 
redistribute profits among private capitals. It qualifies as a regulation approach by virtue of 
its economic and mechanistic analysis emphasising the changing economic and political 
procedures needed to regulate capital accumulation within successive stages of capitalism 
(Boccara 1976).
The Amsterdam School - has developed a distinctive approach based on a Marxist critique of 
political economy utilising Gramscian analysis of hegemonic strategies. Its key concepts 
comprise: 'fractions of capital' and 'comprehensive concepts of control'; the latter referring to 
potential hegemonic projects intended to win both bourgeois and popular support within an 
accumulation strategy which advances the particular interests of a dominant fraction of capital 
whilst also securing the needs of capital in general and providing a flow of symbolic and 
material rewards to a critical mass amongst the dominated classes (Jessop 1988).
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The West German School - ihe most distinctive feature of this school is its focus on 
'societalisation'. Attention is focused not only on the accumulation process considered in a 
narrow economic sense, but also with that of capitalist societies as a whole through specific 
modes of'mass integration' and the formation of'historic blocs' (Hirsch 1986, Lutz 1984).
The Nordic School - explicitly influenced by Parisian regulation theory, this school is 
distinguished by its concerns with national modes of growth and national modes of economic 
policy making, reflecting the mode of growth, the political traditions, and the changing 
balance of economic and political forces within each country (Mjoset 1985).
In addition to these six European schools regulationist currents can be discerned in America 
and Britain. In America the most distinctive is the so called 'social structure of accumulation' 
approach which argues that sustained periods of accumulation require specific social and 
political conditions to support and reinforce the economic factors making for growth. The 
social structure of accumulation being reproduced through a specific balance of forces, 
changes in this balance leading to possible major economic crisis (Gordon 1980). Two other 
regulation currents also exist in America, they comprise analysis of Fordism, neo-Fordism and 
post-Fordism and studies into the conditions of post-war American growth (Edwards 1982). 
In Britain the focus has been on 'strategic relational' accounts of the state, post-Fordism and 
strategies focusing on the dialectic of structure and agency (Jessop 1983).
(10) Regulationists emphasise that whether or not this system is realised, or not, is determined by 
contemporary struggles and not any iron laws of history which propel the masses into 
revolutionary struggle. Yet they nonetheless talk of new accumulation regimes as though 
history had already made its final pronunciation on the subject - that is their analysis is 
teleological.
(11) The Regulative model is an attempt to juxtapose most of the schools and debates into some 
kind of ensemble. The model also attempts to show an accumulation regime in its totality and 
the different points which can be interpreted as the crux of the regulative ensemble. It is an 
ideal type, thus it should be read very liberally. The direction of the arrows should not be read 
rigidly, in their present position they signify RTs assessment of the British debates, but some 
regulationists would reverse the direction of the arrows, ignore some of them or even abandon 
part of the model. This schematic diagram does not do full justice to RT because further 
detail can be built in. For example, the diagram as it stands veers towards creating the 
impression that one regulative system exists at one time, when in fact the regulation model 
can readily accept articulations between Modes of Regulation and Regimes of Accumulation, 
so that several forms may coexist and articulate, somewhat like the 'articulations of the modes 
of production' debate. In this sense RT marks an exciting extension of these debates as the 
permutations (theoretically at least) are endless. At a concrete level this is saying that 
different Modes of Regulation and Regimes of Accumulation may exist in different fields or 
even within the same field. Thus, for Regulationists at the height of Fordism, certain sectors, 
e.g. catering used pre-Fordist techniques. Likewise, Regulationists argue that as consumer 
goods currently move into post-Fordist systems, restaurants are just entering the Fordist 
system i.e. Wimpy/MacDonalds. etc., these in turn coexisting with pre-Fordist outlets, e.g. the 
local Chinese takeaway. Of course the difficulties then arise in determining the relative 
primacy of sectors and of closely measuring/isolating the types of productive technique used, 
something which to RTs lasting discredit they have nowhere successfully done.
(12) Department one refers to the capital goods sector of the economy - capital invested in 
production of the means of production: machinery, raw materials, chemicals, power, etc. 
Department two refers to capital invested in the production and realisation of consumer goods 
and services.
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(13) Jessop (1988) argues that in addition to the above general problems experienced within the 
international Fordist Regime the UK had its own particular domestic problems which resulted 
in the development of "flawed Fordism". The peculiarities of the British social formation - 
existence of empire, strength of labour movement, domination of city institutions over 
industry, the peculiar gentry culture of the ruling classes, meant that Britain was achieving 
Fordism just when it was going out of fashion. In other words, Britain was instituting mass 
production plant (super-steel mills, etc.) just when its competitors were supposedly switching 
over to flexible production facilities (mini-mills, reprogrammable robots and flexible 
production lines, etc.).
(14) Attempts to drive down wages, lengthen the working day, intensify work through closer 
supervision, either personal or electronic, shifts to home working, short term performance 
related contracts, the utilisation of female and child labour, abolition of legal minimum wage, 
etc. are all attempts to increase absolute surplus-value production; these processes are 
contingent on the balance offerees, the political context and class struggle.
(15) Meegan (1988), Morgan and Sayer (1988) argue that strategies of flexibility in the UK with 
their focus on product differentiation usually indicate that companies are in trouble and that 
far from being evidence of market strength or indication of emergent regimes are actually a 
sign of imminent death as they usually indicate a firms exclusion from the market by those 
able to live in the more profitable world of high volume production. Management at one 
company 1 studied made it clear that their decision to go dedicated and to abandon strategies 
of niche marketing and production stemmed from the fact that equipment and labour in the 
plant were not being used maximally and that traditional markets were declining. Rather than 
continue production within a declining market base this company decided to invest heavily in 
dedicated, predominantly Taylonst. high volume, narrow product range manufacture, focusing 
on only 12 product varieties from the previous 100 plus and narrowing the customer base from 
over 160 variegated customers to only 25.
Chanter 2: Engineers Values and Methods and Role in the Design Process
(1) Tims, for example, many engineers, particularly in heavy engineering, conveyed to me their 
sense of frustration and despair over the run down of British manufacturing and lack of 
interesting projects, and sense of status and worth that goes with them. Alternatively, systems 
analysts tended to be far more optimistic about the restructuring of business, perceiving, on 
the whole, a key role for themselves and information technology within this process. Both 
groups however, were concerned over the particularities of Government strategy and more 
broadly what they perceived as an 'anti-productivist' culture within the UK economy. These 
issues are discussed more fully below and in chapter six.
(2) Thus, for example, in the light of changed terms of competition one particularly dominant 
design philosophy - Taylorism has come under increasing criticism from both management 
and engineers alike as no longer suitable to the market conditions of the 1990s. The point is 
that not only do engineers reassess their practice in light of changing social circumstances, but 
perceptions of their own role, status and relationship to others within the design process 
likewise undergo continual change. For example, the dramatic ending of the old seven year 
craft apprenticeship and the new graduate recruitment route into engineering is reputed to 
have had a dramatic impact on engineers relationship to shop floor workers and the 
development of particular engineering tools and approaches (Smith 1986, Lane 1995).
(3) For example, both systems analysts and engineers present their work and relationship to both 
the design process, management and the shop floor in similar vocabularies. Systems analysts
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also borrow heavily from the engineers 'tool kit' - utilising systems and control theory and a 
whole series of underlying philosophies and attitudes towards the design and organisation of 
work.
(4) The specific methodological approaches and values I focus upon in this chapter are not the 
only ones which engineers hold. Engineers, of course, are members of society, consequently it 
would be surprising if the values and cultural symbols of that society did not colour their 
approaches to design. Vasiland (1990), for example, argues that engineers are utilitarian and 
that engineering practice is shot through with utilitarian philosophy. Engineers and analysts 
make utilitarian decisions every time they cost-benefit a design i.e. weighing up the costs of 
routinisation, or deskilling, against possible benefits in terms of wage savings and productivity 
improvements. Likewise broader patriarchal and sexist cultures have been noted amongst 
engineers (Cockburn 1985, Cowan Schwarz 1976, 1979. Faulkner & Arnold 1985, Wajcman, 
1991). I have not been able to spend as much time exploring these particular issues as I would 
have liked. To give but one example, one particular engineer was showing me a number of 
proposed drawings for a new range of washing machine. He explained why he favoured one 
particular design: 'I like this design, its uncluttered, there's not a lot of idiot switches...you 
cannot afford complexity, its best to in-build decision making into the circuitry...no we don't 
want complex switches and instructions...no, these will put your average housewife right 
off...its best to keep it simple. You know what women are like' (Design Engineer. White 
Goods Manufacturer. Wales).
(5) Although one of my research intentions was to establish ways in which engineers values and 
methods have an impact upon the design of work and engineers own formulation of that work; 
the different value systems and methodologies which engineers held came about through 
discussion and observation of engineers at work. In effect, although my analytical position was 
that of labour process theory, the specific value systems of engineers emerged in the course of 
my immersion in the daily practices of engineers. The particular values systems and methods I 
have chosen to focus on are not exhaustive; they merely indicate important ways in which 
engineers conceptualise their activity and the way that activity can shape design practice. 
Further research is needed in this area and I would suggest useful cross cultural studies would 
be useful.
(6) Stimpson (1991) uses the second law of thermodynamics to make the point that engineers 
need to remember that notions of constancy are ' unscientific' and that too many engineers, in 
their desire to attain states of 'constancy' and 'control' are disrupting the balance of the 
universe.
(7) As Hales (1982) argues, a process of mathematical and operational reductionism takes place 
within the sciences. The mathematical reduction seeks to break down qualities into 
specifically measurable and definable quantities which can be worked upon. i.e. quantitative 
physical laws; the operational reduction seeks to pin down a quality, in a quantitative form, so 
that other experimenters may use the same unreal language to make reality stand still, long 
enough for objects to be singled out and have numbers stuck on them.
(8) As an operational methodology, such an approach has its weaknesses, hence the comment 
from the engineer above, who remarks sarcastically on hitting problems with the design of a 
particular surgical implement that he will just go back to ever more sophisticated calculus and 
utilise the computer software to construct ever more realistic scenarios of reality.
(9) Novack (1978) argues that this is easy to prove, if we observe these two letters under a lens - 
they are quite different from each other. But one can object, the question is not the size, or the 
form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of 
sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality, a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound
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of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a 
pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true: all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, 
weight, colour, etc., they are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of 
sugar is equal to itself at "any given moment". This does not withstand criticism. How should 
we really conceive the word moment? If it is conceived as an infinitesimal interval of time, 
then a pound of sugar, during that moment, is subject to inevitable changes. Or is the 
"moment" a purely mathematical abstraction, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; 
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a 
fundamental element of existence, as was made clear to the above engineers, once the calculus 
was unfrozen!
(10) As Ouchi (1981) argues, MRP tells people what to do but it does not consider their 
psychology's, needs or interests; as such, it is an explicit rather than implicit form of control 
which tends to alienate workforces and sap creativity. Ploss (1990) argues that there are three 
basic flaws with MRP, all relate to its underlying architecture. First, forecasts are always 
wrong, the business environment, product quality, demand, etc. are too variable; humans, 
material and processes cannot respond quickly enough even if initial forecasts were right. 
Second, there are no quality improvements, MRP is a 'push' system of manufacturing 
planning and control, whereas JIT. Ploss preferred model, is said to thrive on controlling 
quality and improving it via mobilisation of organisational culture and people, not a piece of 
computer software. Finally. Ploss argues. MRP evolved from the 'scientific management' 
concept and is intended to make factories efficient not through mobilisation and 
harmonisation strategies, but through reducing manpower and human discretion, using 
standardisation and automation (cited Chan et al, 1990).
(11) These approaches share many of the characteristics of the analytic tradition, which received 
added impetus with the development of bourgeois society and, in particular, the need of 
manufacturers to specify, detail, control and predict, manufacturing processes and labour. The 
strongest proponent of this view, of course, is F.W. Taylor, and the Time Motion and Methods 
study programme he initiated (Littler 1978, Wood 1982).
(12) Taylor's book 'The Principles of Scientific Management', starts from the premise that the 
nature, pace and intensity of work should be organised 'scientifically' and that many existing 
work practices are found wanting. In particular, he asserted that if not closely supervised, 
labour would "soldier" or slack doing the minimum amount of work for the maximum wage. 
He also maintained that poor organisation of work led to 'inefficiency' arguing that both 
wages and profits would rise if work were planned 'scientifically'. On the basis of extensive 
time and motion studies. Taylor and his colleagues sought to highlight the ways in which 
labour productivity could be increased. The chief mechanisms for achieving this being - 
increasing the division of labour, separation of conception and execution of task and 
deskilling. The first principle is premised on successively breaking down a skilled task into a 
more roudnised and repetitive unskilled task. Implicit in this assumption is that the person 
breaking down the task has a superior model of how that task should be carried out. The 
second principle is premised upon taking away the knowledge of skilled workers, both 
theoretical and esoteric, of production processes and productive technique and embodying it in 
the hands of designers, engineers and managers. Again, implicit in this formulation is the 
assumption that engineers and managers can appropriate this knowledge and will have a 
superior method of organising production. Finally, as a consequence of the above two 
processes the tasks have become so simplified and routine that management can utilise 
cheaper deskilled labour and more readily replace workers.
(13) Ingall (1965) has reviewed ten or so major algorithms used by production engineers. They all 
embody the same assumption that, on average, different operators work at the same pace 
throughout a shift, on average cycle time of operadons is irrelevant, on average learning on
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the job can be ignored, on average, variations in pans and equipment can be ignored. An 
average, however, is just that: it represents a mean value, it does not even tell one whether the 
exact average state has occurred:
One thing for sure, on any given line at any one time you can be sure that all aspects will 
not be operating at their average value (Production Manger, Automotive Components 
Manufacturer. Wales).
(14) In discussing the shift to group working at Volvo's Kalamar car plant. Buzacotti argues:
The revolution at Kalamar has not been throwing out the assembly line but eradicating 
the organisational principle of the one man, one shift, one station, a principle that had no 
intrinsic relation to the design of assembly lines but was, rather, a management time and 
motion imposed structure (1986: 837).
(15) Thus to control is to apply goal directed constraints to energy and activity. Direct control is 
seen as that which is affected by the structure or pre-setting of a control device whereas 
feedback control has three main elements:
(a) a control device affects output in the same way at any given moment that direct 
control would do.
(b) some characteristic of the output is measured against a standard,
(c) information about variance from standard is fed back into the process causing the 
control device to change its effect.
In short, feedback control is one that varies its control of output in accordance with a 
comparison of the output with a standard. A feedback control system can be completely 
mechanical, i.e. a closed loop system' where information is automatically fed into the system 
via some readout device; or an 'open loop system' necessitating human agency to act upon 
and modify the current system in the light of new information.
(16) Cooley (1983) relates how four PhD mathematicians, at Lucas Aerospace, had been trying for 
four years to design an afterburner of a large jet using mathematical equations and 
computer-aided design technology but could not do it; meanwhile they found that a sheet 
metal worker on the shop floor, together with a draughtsman, had actually succeeded in 
drawing and making a successful prototype of one of these afterburners.
(17) In Britain, Scott (1958), was one of the first social scientists to consider the factory as a social 
system, comprising three key elements - occupational structure, formal structure and informal 
structure. He placed great emphasis on the latter, for any understanding of the functioning of a 
particular organisation. The dichotomy between formal structure, as something defined, 
explicit, recognised and purposive and the informal structure as characterised by spontaneity, 
affinity and congeniality, began to feature prominently in sociological accounts of industry 
from the late 1950's and entered slowly into the engineering vernacular via the work of Trist 
(1960) and the Tavistock Institute during the War years in their analysis of bureaucracy. 
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), Scott (1958) and Blau (1956) all rejected the notion that 
the 'informal' structure of an organisation was 'dysfunctional'. They all sought to stress the 
ways in which the non-official, informal relationships and practices can assist an organisation 
achieve its stated goals, as well as the ways in which it may hinder that achievement. This 
stands, in stark contrast, to the majority of systems theory deployed in engineering today 
which still focuses on the 'formal' structure and seeks to impose order and control over the 
'informal' - to quantify and eliminate it.
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(18) This is evident not only in the small slot social science and particularly sociology and 
sociological studies of technology have in engineering curricula but was evident from my 
interviews of engineers, engineering educators and course validators. One Chief Design 
Engineer and Course Validator. in particular, was forthright in his condemnation of 
engineering degrees:
Despite Finniston ... despite years of proven debate concerning the need to enlarge upon 
the social science component of engineering degrees so as to provide a more rounded 
adaptable engineer ... the kind that the market needs ... little has been done. Too many 
Heads of Department and Professors are stuck in the mud ... their view of engineering is 
simply out of touch with the times and out of touch with the needs of engineers 
themselves ... every year these individuals keep churning the same old teenies of the line 
... with the same abysmal understanding of business and organisation ... the same 
abysmal communication skills and consequently suffering the same indignities of lack of 
career promotion and streamlining off into technical rather than managerial grades 
(Chief Design Engineer. Aerospace Industry, England).
My own experience of teaching engineers shows the arrogance and contempt displayed 
towards the social sciences by some engineers. One particular Professor and Dean of 
Engineering, in a bitter exchange involving several senior staff said that he wanted a "factual 
business" input into his degree and not a "value loaded", "critical" sociology of technology and 
design. Discussion of class, controversy, and the politics of design and engineering practice 
was, for this Professor, too much to bear.
(19) Kevin Webster is a car mechanic in the British television series Coronation Street. In a 
1991 survey conducted by Nottingham University into teenage perceptions of engineers 
teenagers were asked to name any famous engineers' they could think of - Kevin Webster was 
the most cited response (cited in Daily Record, July 6th 1991)
(20) The essence of Armstrong's argument is that, insofar as the managerial credentials of 
professional engineers rest upon their position of authority within productive labour, they are 
out of key with the conception of management, dominant in Britain. For many years, the 
engineering profession has tried to overcome this by adding managerial subjects to 
engineering education. However, so long as management is conceived of as a distinct field of 
study in its own right, such a strategy can do little more than place engineers in the position of 
amateurs competing with full time specialists.
(21) From this stereotypical classification of what constitutes management, it is but one small step 
to offer the same managerial courses to everyone from foremen to top executives irrespective 
of industrial settings. It is the same logic which also enables management consultants, like 
fortune tellers, to offer essentially the same service to all customers.
(22) A 1990 survey of engineering graduate employment shows that two out of three recently 
graduated engineers were using their degrees to get out of engineering and into areas like 
management and accountancy (MacKillop 1990).
(23) Armstrong argues that management is part of unproductive labour, i.e. that it is not directly 
productive of surplus-value but rather ensures the social relations are right for surplus-value to 
be produced in. For Armstrong, it is from this sphere of unproductive labour that control 
originates. Management becomes concerned with global decisions whilst those carrying out 
productive labour only become concerned with technical decisions. Wright (1976) has pointed 
out, many workers, i.e. office workers, bank clerks, maintenance and repair workers, dustbin
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men. cleaners, etc.. are also not directly productive of surplus-value, but this does not mean 
that they are not workers, or that they hold an anti-producuvist philosophy.
(24) For example. Forty (1994) relates recent changes in design aesthetics to an abandonment of 
modernism on the pan of designers:
Modernism...was a unique attempt to create a system of values independent of the 
vagaries of fashion and taste. This system defined quality in relation to the way the object 
was produced....the most general complaint against modernist design has been that it has 
made everything look the same; it has suppressed difference....one aspect of this new 
modernist principle lay in eliminating ornament, and another lay in reducing the variety 
of products down to a few or to just one design...the icon was the Model T Ford (1994: 
28-29).
Stumpf (1994), on the other hand, argues that design has become commodified and swamped 
under style. That there has been a 'stylisation of life' reflected in an image based throw-a-way 
culture. This has had the effect of inculcating in designers a preoccupation with style and a 
lack of focus on content and proprietorship:
There is a difference between consumption for consumption's sake and the notion of 
proprietorship as it was alluded to in our Constitution....My Swiss grandfather, who lived 
to be 94. used only two straight razors his whole life. A man today, from age 13 to 73, 
can be expected to use 12.000 disposable razors. The idea of proprietorship is not to keep 
the traditional straight razor but is, perhaps, to design one that could be sharpened a 
dozen times (1994: 23).
(25) By contrast Evamey (1994) argues that some designers, particularly those designing for the 
upper end of the market, are moving away from the functionalist lines of modernism towards 
a new style reflected in the creation of products whose primary function is philosophical rather 
than practical but this in turn has done nothing for the image of the designer:
The liberating influence on industrial design of post-modernism has been unmistakable: 
the power of the visual image of the product has been exploited by manufacturers the 
world over. But the result has been that the designer is reconfirmed in the minds of many 
in industry as a purveyor of image only, unable to be trusted with anything serious like 
engineering (1994: 14).
(26) For example, Ward (1990) argues that within design there is an hidden curriculum which 
serves to inculcate in designers a particular attitude towards design which reinforces within 
students an uncritical acceptance of existing authority and traditional design paradigms, 
which downplays enquiry and free expression and which stifles creativity and community 
based design concepts.
(27) The issue of 'compromise' within the design process is discussed more fully in Chapters 3 and 
4. Systems designers recognise that systems are ultimately 'compromises' between different 
groups, value systems and interests, which, ultimately challenge dominant notions of 
'efficiency' and 'technologically deterministic' accounts of design and development. More 
generally, the notion of compromise as a route into understanding the social construction of 
technology is central to a number of sociological accounts of technological development. 
Particularly relevant here is the work of Gallon (1986) on the technological controversies 
surrounding the development of the electric vehicle in France; Noble's (1984) work on 
engineers and the development of CNC machine tools in America and Pinch and Bijker's 
(1984, 1990) social constructivist work on the bicycle and debates in solar physics. In each
523
case the authors focus on failed as well as successful technologies, exploring why one 
particular design becomes successful and other interpretations get dropped.
Chanter 3: Systems Analysts Work. Values, Methods and Role in the Design Process:
(1) This chapter develops and extends ideas discussed in earlier papers written by Lane (1988a 
1988b) and Mackay and Lane (1989).
(2) I studied systems analysts in a wide variety of organisations with the intention of building up 
cross sectoral data on their work, values and methods. The objective being to more accurately 
capture the diversity of organisations systems analysts work in and the way in which this may 
affect their practice. I also wanted to be able to contrast systems analysts work experiences 
with those of engineers and cross sectoral analysis facilitated this.
(3) Oxman (1990) argues that one of the characterising aspects in the emergence of a theory of 
design methods has been the belief that logic and rational procedure are in themselves the 
foundation of design. The BCS and IEE in their enthusiasm to distance themselves from past 
design traditions based upon intuition, preferred models and practice risk alienating many 
potential designers and discarding a rich knowledge base which may not be readily amenable 
to encodement in particular methodology, tools, or technique. In this context Oxman argues 
that prototyping software may be one way of bridging design knowledge and design practice:
With respect to knowledge based design systems, the use of the prototype, as a 
knowledge structure, provides an effective basis for the organisation of design knowledge 
(1990:21).
Stolterman (1994) argues that today almost nobody questions the idea that design should be 
based on theoretical and scientific knowledge. This is, however, historically a quite new idea. 
For example, early engineering schools were established as parts of art schools. With the 
enlightenment however, a new picture of the engineer emerged. The engineer was now a 
person able, on the basis of scientific knowledge, to tell the practitioners, the artisans, how to 
do their work. Today the education of engineers is almost totally dominated by the idea of the 
superiority of theoretical knowledge over the practical knowledge obtained by doing. The BCS 
and IEE in their enthusiasm to establish the professional credibility of systems analysts via the 
stabilisation of a particular tool and design paradigm may be doing much to undermine what 
has been described to me by practitioners as a personal, political and artistic process, requiring 
characteristics like flair, business nouse. communication skills and creative thinking.
(4) Sargent (1994), for example, argues that attempts to synthesise a design science in terms of a 
particular set of proven methods, tools or techniques is exacerbated by the variety of design 
activity. Any unified design science would have to cover the following types of design activity:
Search
Exploration of emergent information
Decision making
Matching and disposition












Use or construction of idioms
Sargent argues:
the techniques and methods used by designers can be seen to be derived from practice 
and are not in principle derivable by any kind of design science although the elegance of 
their reformulation may present that appearance (1994: 391).
(5) The NCC (1984. 1994) foresees a strong and continuing role for systems analysts as 
information technology becomes a core business activity. Analysts with good organisational 
awareness and business understanding are perceived by the NCC as being in a good position 
to advance their own careers and it is expected that demand will rise as more complex real 
time systems come on line and organisations network more and more information.
(6) (6) Sargent (1994) argues that failure in design should be a central element of the learning 
process of designers and that any design science needs to acknowledge failure and attempt to 
build up a typology or culture of failure which will help ennch design practice.
(7) For example. Dovey (1990) discusses the work of Alexander and his attempt to develop a 
panem language which focuses designers attention on a number of key issues. For example, 
what constitutes a good or bad design, debates on gigantism. puntanism, totalitarianism and 
ethics in design. Alexander (1979. 1985, 1987) has developed a series of patterns covering 
issues as diverse as house building, office design, public works and 'access to water'. Each of 
these patterns addresses issues of ownership, responsibility, or aesthetics etc. and indicates 
the issues designers face on a daily basis and their attempts to conceptualise their own design 
activity and raise it to a higher ethical level.
(8) For example, Evamey argues:
Designers use a more chaotic way of reaching solutions than that of the engineer, 
marketer or economist, and it is the job of uniting creative and logical minds behind a 
common goal that worries so many businessmen (1994: 15).
Chanter 4: The Software Bottleneck
(1) According to the NCC (1984) the boundaries of an investigation are usually stated as 
departments, groups or functions which are to be studied or sometimes excluded from the 
study. If the analyst can be given a list of those people or groups who provide input to the area 
to be investigated, and a list of those who receive output from it, i.e. the sources and 
destinations, then he has. by implication, been given the boundaries. Neither 'source 1 nor 
'destination' are to be investigated - but all areas in between are.
Normally, the people who are the sources of input data and the people who receive 
output, the destinations, are outside the area to be investigated. Everyone and everything 
in between the sources are destinations is in the area of study. (1984: 35)
The NCC (1984) recognise this model assumes the analyst can identify precisely key data 
flows into and out of the area of study. The NCC also acknowledge that exploration of a 
source or destination may occasionally be required by an analyst. What the NCC fails to 
recognise, however, is that many analysts are either ill-equipped, or lacking the necessary 
organisational back up to do this; many preferring to accept source and destination boundaries
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within a system and to utilise a narrower, more comfortable definition of users - i.e. those 
falling wuhin the pre-defmed boundaries. This spares many analysts the unpleasantness, stress 
and additional time and effort of entering into the murkier terrain of organisational culture, 
power and politics.
(2) This is one reason why the NCC recognises the continuing role of the analyst arguing that 
much of the literature on specific methodologies, tools and techniques imply a clear cut 
process of analysis and design, when, in fact: "This is never true' (1984: 172).
The idea of change generally emanates from senior management, particular for larger 
projects, though in some instances it may flow from senior systems staff. The critical 
point is that most analysts who are part of the chosen project team will seldom question 
the validity of the project. One possible reason is that if they were thought to do so then 
they would not be chosen by senior management to be team members. Another possibility 
is that both the originator of the system and analyst share a similar discourse and have 
similar interests in seeing the system developed. Further explanation can be sought in the 
division of labour and the actual structuring of projects. The majority of analysts work 
takes place in the context of a system life cycle. This structures the actual day to day 
activity of analysts from fact finding through to preparation of structured specifications. 
Ironically, analysts working in project teams invariably work to tight budgetary and time 
constraints these serve to push the analyst through the various stages of the system life 
cycle as quickly as possible. In this context few analysts question either the individual 
idea or the composition of teams. In particular, user input at stages 3. 4 and 5 are critical. 
Analysts will often side with more senior personnel in railroading through these 
particular stages of the system life cycle, particularly if faced with recalcitrant or 
obstinate users, whose demands may be deemed 'extravagant', 'unreasonable' 
'dysfunctional' or too time consuming or costly etc.
Chanter 5; Trade Unions, New Technology and Work Redesign:

































Professional and clerical staff
Mineworkers/Mining
Table 2. Unions Accessed
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Note : unions are increasingly unrepresentative of particular crafts or groups of 
workers and this is reflected in their increasingly anachronistic titles e.g. AEU 
represents all workers at Nissan and not only engineers.
These unions were chosen because they represent members in a broad cross section of 
manufacturing, finance and service based industries. They enabled me to build up a model of 
change in the respective industries and trades their members were employed in. In addition 
union officials provided valuable data on union perceptions of change and union involvement 
in the design process. They also proved very helpful in establishing contacts for me with 
management and in suggesting possible companies that may be of interest to study.
(2) The majority of union publications on new technology were in the early to mid 1980s, 
reflecting the TUC's official endorsement of the NTA strategy towards union involvement in 
the design process - for example:
APEX (1985) Job Design and New Technology.
NALGO (1986) New Technology and Change - Negotiating Guidelines.
APEX (1984) Office Technology - The Trade Union Response.
Since the mid eighties union concern over issues relating to the design of technology and work 
has fallen sharply (McLoughlin & Clark 1994, Beaumont 1995, Hyman & Mason 1995).
(3) TUC checklist on new technology agreements:
(a) Change must be by agreement: consultation with trade unions should begin prior to 
the decision to purchase, and status quo provisions should operate until agreement is 
reached.
(b) Machinery must be developed to cope with technical change which emphasises the 
central importance of collective bargaining.
(c) Information relevant to decision making should be made available to union 
representatives prior to any decision being taken.
(d) There must be agreement on both employment and output levels within the company. 
Guarantees of job security, redeployment and relocation agreements -must be 
achieved. In addition, enterprises should be committed to an expansion of output after 
technical change.
(e) Company retraining commitments must be stepped up, with priority for those affected
by new technology. Earnings levels must be secured. 
(0 The working week should be reduced to 35 hours, systematic overtime should be
eliminated, and shift patterns should be altered, 
(g) The benefits of new technology must be distributed. Innovation must occasion
improvements in terms and conditions of service, 
(h) Negotiators should seek influence over the design of equipment, and in particular
should seek to control work performance measurement through the new technology, 
(i) Stringent health and safety standards must be observed, 
(j) Procedures for reviewing progress, and study teams on the new technology should be
established (TUC 1979).
It should be noted that only checklist number eight specifically seeks to address the issue of 
union involvement in the actual design of equipment. The majority of the measures are 
designed to cushion the impact of technology on employees and to secure working conditions, 
living standards and adequate health and safety provision.
(4) WIRS (1990) survey evidence suggests that of the 43% of workplaces using new technology 
which reported a reduction in their manual workforce only 9% claimed this was due to the
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adoption of microelectronic technology. More commonly cited reasons for job losses were 
reorganisation, lack of demand, or imposition of cash limits by central government or local 
authorities.
Chanter 6: Engineers and Systems Analysts: Class and Work
(1) For example. Poulantzas' (1973) assessment of engineers as part of the 'new petit bourgeoisie', 
or Whalley's (1986) characterisation of engineers as 'trusted workers'. Both approaches utilise 
ascriptive and formal models of class: class position is determined according to a set of 
assumed physical or cultural attributes and not relationally. This type of sociology tends to 
consign particular strata within the collective labourer into distinct camps rather than 
conceptualising different strata within the collective labourer dialectically - an approach 
which would emphasise changing relationships, alliances and values.
(2) The massive development of the productivity of labour, socialisation of the productive forces, 
and dramatic rise of corporate and state bureaucracies concomitant upon the development of 
capitalism, has given rise to the 'collective labourer' as more and more strata of concrete 
labour become commodified and turned into abstract labour-power. Marx was at pains to 
demonstrate that the expansion of capital had its corollary in the expansion of labour-power
Accumulation reproduces the capital-relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists, or 
larger capitalists at this pole, more wage workers at that. The reproduction of a mass of 
labour-power, which must incessantly re-incorporate itself with capital ... which cannot 
get free from capital, and whose enslavement to capital is oniy concealed by the variety 
of individual capitalists to whom it sells itself, this reproduction of labour-power forms, 
in fact, an essential of the reproduction of capital itself (1976: 575-6).
In effect, and contrary to those theorists who posit a growing middle class. Marx highlights how
in reality, the labourer belongs to capital before he has sold himself - his economic 
bondage is both brought about and concealed by this periodic sale of himself, by his 
change of masters, and by the oscillations in the market price of labour-power (1976: 
542).
(3) For example. Fincham and Rhodes argue, 'The growing new white collar groups derived their 
class position not from property but from their employment' (1992: 277). Yet Fincham and 
Rhodes realise that many 'white collar' jobs are undertaken by women, often pan-time, of low 
status and low pay. They are also aware of the fact that 'white collar' work, is prone to 
routinisation and de-skilling and that there is growing unionisation of 'white collar1 employees 
(1992: 288). So why define a class in terms of its occupation, in the first place, when it is 
obvious as Fincham and Rhodes concede, that 'the diversity and fragmentation of white collar 
groups is now such that they no longer constitute a single class' (1992: 277). Hyman (1983) 
stresses the range of internal differentiation's in terms of pay, conditions of work, and 
gendering and clearly casts doubt on the adequacy of categorising occupations in terms of 
'white collar1 , or otherwise.
(4) Marx's primary intention in Capital was to show how surplus-value was pumped out of the 
direct producers. This necessitated a high level of abstraction i.e. his analysis was pitched at 
the level of 'pure mode of production'. This does not mean that Marx was unaware of the 
existence of other classes, far from it. In the 18th Brummaire. he deals in depth with the role 
of the petit-bourgeoisie. In vol. 3 of Capital, in particular Chapter 15. he examines the 
different gradations and conflicts of interest that emerge within the 'collective labourer' with 
the spread of the factory system: the emergence of foremen, supervisors, overseers, skilled and 
unskilled workers etc.; likewise in his analysis of the development of the joint stock company
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he stresses the emergence of 'capital without function1 and 'functionaries without capital'. He 
was also acutely aware of the fact that, in reality, there are no pure modes of production and 
no pure class
in actual concrete, historical social formations, modes of production do not appear in 
their "pure" state, on their own. They are always combined with and stand in complex 
articulation to. other. previous or subordinate modes of production - which cross cut and 
over-determine any tendency of "pure" mode to produce a series of "pure" classes' (Marx 
cited in Giddens & Mackenzie. 1982: 64).
(5) For Weber, the majority of the population are 'negatively advantaged' in that they are forced to 
survive by the sale of their labour in the market. But the skills, educational qualifications and 
abilities of people in this position will differ considerably and therefore, for Weber, so will 
their degree of market power. Whilst Weber follows Marx in attributing crucial importance to 
private property in class formation he nonetheless views class distinctions as reflections of 
difference in the size of one's purse. This raises the possibility of a whole series of finely 
gradated classes and fractions of classes corresponding to an almost infinite number of market 
income positions. For Marx, however, 'only vulgar common sense turns class differences into 
differences in the size of one's purse' (1968: 43).
(6) Marx noted that in times of rapid capital accumulation, capital can make concessions to its 
wage slaves
A rise in the price of labour as a consequence of the accumulation of capital, only means, 
in fact, that the length and weight of the golden chain which the labourer has forged for 
himself allows of a relaxation of its tension' (1975: 232).
(7) Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich argue that a Professional Managerial Class (PMC) has arisen in 
America comprising one quarter of the population (cited in Walker, P 1982: 14). Gorz argues 
that there is an 'unbridgeable objective class distinction' between professional, technical, 
managerial and production workers (1972: 27-28). Poulantzas stresses that a distinction 
should be made between productive and non-productive workers such as engineers, 
technologists, foremen and office workers and that these latter groups should no longer be 
regarded as part of the working class but rather a section of the 'new petit-bourgeoisie' (1973: 
78). For Lockwood (1966) an increasing differentiation of the working class is occurring 
between the 'proletarian traditionalist1 , the 'differential traditionalist' and the new rapidly 
emerging 'privatised worker', the latter allegedly holding a 'pecuniary ideology' as opposed to 
the class, or status ideology of the proletarian traditionalist, or deferential traditionalist.
(8) Poulantzas identifies production relations as having a dual character firstly, a relation between 
persons and nature (the labour process), secondly, the relation between people (the social 
relations of production). It is this latter which Poulantzas describes as: 'relations between men 
and men, class relations' (1975: 10). It is the relationship between producers and the 
productive forces which, for Poulantzas, 'defines the exploited class in the relations of 
production' (1975: 19). From this Poulantzas arrives at his general definition of the working 
class: 'the working class in the capitalist mode of production is that which performs the 
productive labour of that mode of production1 (1987: 20). Poulantzas' identification of the 
central determinant of class is derived from relations within the labour process: whereas, as 
Hunt argues, 'it should be insisted that relations within the labour process specify the 
particular role within the prevailing class relations that various forms of labour perform, but 
they are not the determinants of those relations' (1977: 29).
(9) As Hunt argues
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Is it correct to use Marx's distinction between productive and unproductive labour to 
define the economic identification of the working class. It is important to note that 
Marx's thesis concerning productive/unproductive labour are not as unproblematic as 
Poulantzas suggests (1977 88).
(10) Marx argues that
The only worker who is productive is the one who produces surplus value for the 
capitalist, or contributes to the self-valorisation of capital. If we may take an example 
from outside the sphere of production, a schoolmaster is a productive worker when, in 
addition to belabouring the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to 
enrich the owners of the school. That the latter has laid out capital in a teaching factory, 
instead of a sausage factor.-, makes no difference to the relation (1976: 644).
Again
A writer is a productive labourer not in so far as he produces ideas, but in so far as he 
enriches the publisher who publishes his works (1969: 213).
(11) Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979) maintain that an objective antagonism between the 
working class and the PMC exists which has 'undercut the revolutionary chances of the 
working class' (1979: 43). How can the revolutionary chances of the working class have been 
cut when the very existence of the PMC is, according to the Ehrenreichs. 'predicated on the 
atomisation of working class life' (1979: 42-3).
(12) For example, at certain social conjunctures 'profit sharing schemes' have been used by 
employers to secure worker loyalty and acquiescence to management and the market. 
Whileyism in America represented a movement of factory committees, works and national 
councils to secure greater worker participation in manufacturing decision taking (Nichols 
1980: 381-394).
(13) In the first phase, Carchedi argues that the function of capital is still carried out by the 
individual entrepreneur. The employee is merely an extension of the entrepreneur when the 
latter has to be absent from production. In this respect, he performs the function of capital 
which is not yet a global function. In this phase, the relationship between the entrepreneur 
and employee is direct and personal and his place in the division of labour as an executor of 
the partial functions of capital ensures him a position of privilege and far higher salary than 
the worker. Finally, for Carchedi. this place in the capitalist production process requires a 
legal and economic education which ensures that this employee is either petit bourgeois, or 
bourgeois in origin. For these reasons Carchedi argues that the employee in this phase belongs 
politically and ideologically to the petit bourgeoisie. During the second phase Carchedi argues 
that the rise of the joint stock company leads to the appearance of
that complex organisation, both bureaucratic and hierarchical, within which the function 
of capital is carried out globally. The transformation of the function of capital into the 
global function of capital, implies that many of those who perform the global function of 
capital also perform the function of the collective worker. That is to say, the position of 
the employee moves further and further away from the entrepreneur and thus ,the 
personal relation between the two is broken (1980: 256).
Although the employee is no longer an extension of the entrepreneur and his labour-power has 
been devalued, he is still far from proletarianised in this second phase. Indeed, for Carchedi, 
the ideology of career making, preferential salaries, terms and conditions and the fact that, 'he 
still requires a broad culture for the performance of his function' (1980: 256) ensures that the
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employee identifies his interests with those of the dominant classes, producing a very 
conservative, 'individualistic lifestyle 1 , through which this employee tries to 'imitate the life 
style and consumption pattern of the entrepreneur' (1980: 257).
(14) Thompson (1990) identifies four key features of labour process theory: (a) the employment 
relationship as the basic class relationship, changes here impacting directly on the rest of the 
economy and society, (b) the accumulation process - competing capitals seeking ever greater 
rates of profit continually transform the labour process, (c) capital is compelled to increase its 
control over labour so as to secure surplus-value production, in the context of growing worker 
organisation and politicisation - forms of control are often complex and varied, nonetheless a 
'generalised control imperative' exists within the work process, (d) the employment 
relationship is a relationship of both co-operation and conflict.
(15) Braverman (1974) argued that the dictates of accumulation compelled capital to seek to reduce 
the value of labour-power and increase its productivity and that one of the central mechanisms 
for achieving this was the implementation of 'scientific management' which, through the 
systematic disassociation of the labour process from the skills of the labourer, the separation of 
conception from execution of task, and the use of the monopoly over knowledge to control 
each step of the labour process and its mode of execution, would effectively place control in 
management's hands.
(16) In effect, the ebb and flow of capital into and out of different branches of production, should 
caution one against making glib assumptions about capital's universal tendency towards 
de-skilling. When capital opens up a new branch of production new skills may emerge but one 
profit rates tend to equalise out within this branch of production, then capital may adopt a 
more vigorous strategy of rationalisation seeking to recoup falling profitability through 
strategies of labour intensification and de-skilling. Obviously, its capacity to do so will be 
contingent upon the respective balance of class forces and the degree of organisation of labour 
within respective branches of production.
(17) Once capital purchases labour-power it needs its co-operation if production is to take place. 
Otherwise, too much time, effort and money would be wasted on means of coercion, 
surveillance and administration leading to possible absenteeism or simply withdrawal of 
consent on the pan of the workforce, for example, in the areas of materials handling; quality 
checks, maintenance and repair. Thus, whilst playing its pan within any capitalist labour 
process, coercion alone, is an insufficient and costly means of organising labour-power 
(Burawoy 1979).
(18) This argument finds parallels in the work of Weiner (1981) who argues that a dominant 
anti-productivist culture permeates the British ruling class which look down on manufacturing 
and those engaged in it. The argument is that a specific section of the ruling class located 
within landed and financial capital were, through their political and cultural hegemony, able 
to oversee the process of industrialisation and ensure the perpetuation of a dominant 
aristocratic culture. The public school system is seen in this model as an institution for 
incorporating the sons and daughters of wealthy, predominantly northern industrialist 
magnates, into the dominant aristocratic culture. Armstrong (1989) utilises Fox's (1974) 
theonsation of power and trust to argue that British management is a high trust, high 
discretion job, whereas productive activity - due to the peculiarities of the British society 
discussed by Weiner. is a low trust low status job. In effect, Armstrong draws exactly the 




(1) A useful way of summarising the debates about positivism and anti-positivism in social 
science is contained in the table below. Obviously these are idealised versions and in practice 




(ii) Process of validation
(iii) Form of explanation
Positivist
Social reality exists as 
objective casual relations 
between phenomena
Observational constructs 
in order to hypothesise 
about causal relations 
between variables
Testing of hypothesis by 
use of quantitative 
evidence
Empirically valid 




Social reality is a 




the apprehension of 
qualitative evidence
Meaningfully intelligible 
descriptions of how 
social life is 
accomplished.
Table 3. Positivist and Anti-Positivist Methodology 
Bilton et al argue:
The logic underlying the positivist sociological explanation of social reality is based on a 
desire to measure quantitatively the extent of a relationship between phenomena, and in 
so doing to match the rigour of the laboratory experiment in other sciences, and to 
provide general law like propositions about social reality (1987: 511).
By contrast anti-positivists tend to split into two camps:
There are those who feel that once one has avoided imposing categories on the subject 
matter at the discovery and validation stages and has understood the actors way of 
looking at the \vorld, one is then in a position to provide an objectively valid explanation 
of the nature of this socially constructed reality. Max Weber was an important exponent 
of this view......However there are others who claim that such objectivity is impossible.
From this point of view the only sort of explanations that sociologists can provide are 
subjective: reflexive or retrospective accounts of how, as meaning attributing individuals, 
they arrived at their particular understanding of some specific social situation (Bilton et 
al 1987:514-515).
Giddens (1985) tries to address the notion of structure and agency so central to debates on 
sociological methods by attempting a synthesis which challenges the theoretical division 
between 'hard' and 'soft' positivism with their mutually exclusive ontology's, epistemologies 
and methodologies. Giddens argument is that social reality cannot be conceptualised in terms 
of a 'pre-given universe of objects' open to some 'independent' or 'context free' observer. 
Rather it can only be understood as the ongoing product of actors consciously creating their 
world. At the same time these actors are. however, constrained by the structural conditions in 
which they live so that although 'men produce society' they do so 'not under conditions of 
their own choosing'. In other words there is a dialectical relationship between structure and 
action.
532
(2) Saver argues that:
Scientism uses an absurdly restrictive view of science, usually centring around the 
search for regularities and hypothesis testing, to derogate or disqualify practices such 
as ethnography, historical narrative or explorative research, for which there are often 
no superior alternatives (1992:4).
Indeed in the 1960s sociology was growing rapidly as a subject discipline receiving 
considerable support from government who thought this new social 'science' would help the 
state to fashion more effective and enlightened social policies (Bilton 1987). As pan of this 
process the government established the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 1966. 
However, at the very time when social science had established its credibility as a discipline 
based on 'sound scientific principles' developments in sociological theory, primarily about the 
relationship between structure and action along with developments in neo- Marxism led many 
to reconsider the subjects 'scientific' status. Consequently, in 1985 at the behest of Sir Keith 
Joseph the SSRC was renamed the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) the word 
'science' conspicuous only by its absence. Government funding has also been cut back 
dramatically for the ESRC and this has prompted further heated debate within the social 
sciences between those who seek to restore the disciplines ' scientific' ethos through adopting 
increasingly quantitative and mathematical approaches within a positivist ontology and 
methodology and those who have declared the sterility of the debate and decided to draw upon 
a wide range of research methods without feeling one has to discuss the sort of methodological 
assumptions their use implies (Bilton 1987). The notion that science can be assumed to be the 
highest form of knowledge and that other types of knowledge are dispensable or displaceable 
by science has been challenged (Saver 1992, Pinch & Bijker 1987). Knowledge cannot be 
regarded as a thing or product which can be evaluated independently of any consideration of 
its production and use in social activity. As Saver argues:
The word science needs special comment. There is little agreement on what kinds of 
methods characterise science beyond the rather bland point that it is empirical, 
systematic, rigorous and self critical, and that disciplines such as physics and chemistry 
are exemplars of it. Most users of the term obviously consider it to have strong honorific 
associations that few are willing to cede to opponents...[yet)....the time when science was 
thought to involve the steady accumulation of objective knowledge through a neutral 
medium of observation has long since gone (1992: 7-8).
(3) Hammersley and Atkinson argue that.
The most important feature of scientific theories is that they are open to, and subject to, 
test: they can be confirmed, or at least falsified. This process of testing involves 
comparing what the theory says should occur under certain circumstances with what 
actually does occur; in short comparing it with 'the facts'. These facts are collected by 
means of methods that, like the facts they collect, are regarded as theory neutral; 
otherwise it is assumed they could not provide a test of the theory. In particular every 
attempt is made to eliminate the effects of the observer by developing an explicit, 
standardised set of experiment or interview procedures. This allows replication by others 
so that an assessment of the reliability of the findings can be made (1983: 5).
Naturalism's response to this positivist scientific method was to assert that the researcher 
should study the social world in its natural undisturbed state and not in artificial settings like 
experiments or formal interviews. Furthermore the researcher should carry out the research in 
ways that are sensitive to the nature of the setting even to the extent of going 'native' i.e. 
totally immersing oneself in the culture, values and lifestyles of the group one is studying. 
Both positivist science and naturalist science
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assume that it is possible, in principle at least, to isolate a body of data 
uncontaminated by the researcher, either by turning him or her into an automaton or 
by making him or her a neutral vessel of cultural experience. However, searches for 
empirical bedrock of this kind are futile; all data involve theoretical assumptions 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1983: 14).
(4) For example, there is heated debate in the natural sciences regarding how the risks associated 
with exposure to radiation are to be identified and assessed. Disagreement over this results in 
the fact that the measure of the risk of cancer varies by a factor of ten between the USA and 
Britain. This is despite the fact that both countries vigorously defend their own models of risk 
assessment.
(5) There is heated debate as to which methodological approach is most appropriate in 
sociological research. The table below indicates the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
four main research methods:
Research method Strengths Limitations
Fieldwork Usually generates richer and more 
in depth information than other 
methods. It also provides 
flexibility for the researcher to 
alter strategies and follow up new 
leads that mav arise.
Can only be used to study 
relatively small groups or 
communities. Findings might only 
apply to the groups or 
communities studied.
Survevs Make possible the collection of 
data on large numbers of 
individuals.
The material gathered may be 
superficial. Important differences 
between respondents viewpoints 
may be glossed over. May not 
convey an accurate impression of 
what people actually believe. __
Documentary 
Research
Can provide sources of in-depth 
materials as well as data on large 
numbers and is often essential 
when a study is wholly historical.
The researcher is dependent on 
the sources that exist which may 
only be partial. It can be difficult 
to interpret how far they represent 
real tendencies - as in case of 
some kinds of official statistics.
Many aspects of social life cannot 
be brought into the laboratory and 
the responses of those studied may 
be affected by their experimental 
situation._____________
Experiments The influence of specific variables 
can be controlled by the 
investigator and are usually easier 
for subsequent researchers to 
repeat._______________
Table 4. Four Main Methods Used in Sociological Research
(6) I interviewed over 300 respondents in over 60 organisational settings. In turn many of these 
interviewees were also directly observed in field studies and subsequently re-interviewed in 
the light of gains in knowledge and understanding brought about through fieldwork. This 
offsets one of the chief objections to ethnographic study i.e. that sample sizes are too limited
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to make useful claims about them. I must emphasise that this research involved intensive 
interviewing. This coupled to more detailed case study involving participant observation 
enabled me to build up not only a rich picture of analysts work culture but also to make useful 




Wide access to staff for at least two months
Limited access to staff for up to two months
Restricted access to staff over several months
Remaining organisations accessed on a more 









Table 5. Type of Case Study Access and Number of Organisations.
Public Or Private Sector Utility (PPSU)
Electrical Or Electronic White Goods (EWG)
Computing Software/Hardware/Consultancy (CC)












































Table 7. Interviewee Number and Type
(9) Refer to Appendix : Checklist of Questions.
(10) I was assisted on three separate occasions by undergraduate students. One who was on work 
placement with me during the summer of 1992 and who attended seven interviews with me 
and helped take notes and ask questions; and two whose Honours projects I was supervising. 
These students were doing fieldwork for me as part of their Honours projects. These projects 
were set up by me and I was their main supervisor. Their projects overlapped with my own 
research on design. They were involved in arranging and conducting interviews and case 
studies of their own. On five occasions these students also assisted me whilst interviewing - 
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